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Ethnography of a Colonial Present: History, Experience, and Political Consciousness in West Papua

A dissertation presented

by

Veronika Kusumaryati

to

The Department of Anthropology

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of

Philosophy in the subject of Social Anthropology

Harvard University

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Ajantha Subramanian Veronika Kusumaryati

Ethnography of a Colonial Present: History, Experience, and Political Consciousness in West Papua

This dissertation is an ethnography of a colonial present and the making of political consciousness in West Papua, a self-identifying term that refers to Indonesia's easternmost provinces of Papua and West Papua. Despite Papuans' demands for their own nation-state, West Papua was transferred from Dutch colonial power in 1963 and subsequently incorporated into the newly independent modern state of Indonesia. While this transfer marked the end of European colonialism in the region, Papuans consider it to be the beginning of another period of colonialism. They continue to use this term to frame their history and to refer to their present experience under Indonesia.

Drawing from eighteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in West Papua, this dissertation investigates Papuans' articulations of their coloniality. My narrative begins with the arrival of Christian missions and the establishment of civilizing schools (*beschavingsschool*) during the late period of Dutch rule, and covers defining historical moments and transitions from 1945 to 1969. After the arrival of Indonesia, I analyze Papuans' experiences of state violence, their encounters with Indonesian models of development, transnational mining operations, transmigration programs and their impact on Papuans' economic marginalization, and Indonesian cultural domination. I use the term "a colonial present" to refer to the trans-temporality of colonialism in West Papua, and how the Indonesian state governs this territory through its civil and military administration. By examining West Papua's colonial history and the experience of the Papuans in a colonial present, this study offers a new approach to the ethnography and historiography of colonialism, decolonization, and postcoloniality.

.

Table of Contents

Maps and Figures v

Timeline vi

Acronyms/Glossary viii

Acknowledgements x

Note on Conventions xv

1. Introduction 1
   - Foreigners as History 5
   - Rupture or Continuity: Moral Claims, Political Questions 11
   - Indonesian Rule: State Forms, Military, and Development 15
   - Scholarly Contexts 21
   - Outlines of the Chapters 30
   - Politics of Anthropology in a Colonial Present 32

2. Evidence of Writing: Churches and Colonial Politics in West Papua 38
   - Educating Papuans Before World War II 45
   - Civilizing Schools in West Papua 51
   - The American Evangelicals in the Central Highlands 57
   - Women's Place is in the Missions 63
   - Papuan Subjects and The Idea of Indigenity 70

3. The Death of Musa Mako Tabuni and Other Stories 80
   - Indonesia's Beginning 84
   - The Death of Musa Mako Tabuni 87
   - Generative Death: Funeral and Mourning in West Papua 94
   - How the Death Is Remembered 98
   - Colonial Duration and Narrative of Extinction 106
   - The Opposite of Death 116

4. The Capital of Gold: Mining and Meaning in West Papua 117
   - I am, the Seventh Bullet 123
   - The Contested Beginning 127
   - Henry Kissinger and His 'Dirty Business' 130
   - The Second Commandment: Accumulation by Dispossession 138
   - The Killings and the Creation of a State of Emergency in the Mining Site 144
   - Mining and Meaning in West Papua 152

5. From Big Men to Big Women of Melanesia 154
   - The Politics of Migration in Jayapura 155
   - The Political Economy of the Shift: the Marketplaces and the birth of 'mothers of the market.' 166
   - From Big Men to Big Women: Contemporary Politics in Melanesia 179

6. The Origins of Papuan National Consciousness 188
The Birth of a Movement 192
Abepura, A Student City 197
Papuan Student Organizations and Youth Political Consciousness during the New Order 211
The 1977 Uprisings in the Central Highlands 215
The Idea of Blackness 224
Civil Society and Its Discourse in West Papua 235
After the Indonesian Reforms: The Return of the Repressed 239
KNPB as a Media 242

7. Colonialism and Papuan Historical Consciousness: An Epilogue 246

Works Cited ..... **Error! Bookmark not defined.**

Maps, Figures, and Tables

Map 1. West Papua /xvii
Map 2. West Papua (detailed) /xvii
Figure 2.1. The Dutch school system in the Netherlands New Guinea /51
Figure 2.2. Civilizing school (*beschavingsschool*) in Enarotali, Wisselmeren in 1950 /52
Figure 2. 3. A C&MA missionary (identified as Else Stringer) taught Mee pupils in Enarotali, Wisselmeren in 1954 /70
Figure 2. 4. A Mee teacher taught a group of Mee girls in 1955 /71
Figure 2. 5. Twenty-three out of twenty-nine members of the New Guinea Council /74
Figure 3.1. After and Before: The Indonesia's minister of Law, Politics and Defense Luhut Pandjaitan visited Theys Hiyo Eluay's grave in Sentani /103
Figure 3.2. Before and After. Timika's police forces repainted the grave of Kelly Kwalik in Timika /104
Figure 4. 1. Population of Timika in 2010 /149
Figure 6.1. Map of Jayapura Metropolitan Area /206
Figure 6. 2. Black Brothers /238
Figure 7.1. Tales of Heroism: War on Independence 1945-1949 (1993) /280
Figure 7.2 "Indonesian Struggle to Take Over West Papua" /281

Table 2. 1. The Alliance's Bible Schools in the Central Highlands /60
Table 6. 1. Number of Incoming Students at the University of Cenderawasih /213

Timeline

1828 The Dutch military set up their first post in Fort du Bus (Kaimana)
1836 The Dutch left
1855 The arrival of the European Protestant mission in Mansinam, New Guinea
1898 The Dutch colonial government set up their first permanent post in Manokwari
1902 The Dutch colonial government set up their post in Merauke
1936 The 'discovery' of Ertsberg (copper mountain) by Jean-Jacques Dozy, Dutch geologist.
1938 The Dutch colonial government establishes their first government post in the Central Highlands (Enarotali)
1939 The arrival of American evangelical missions in Enarotali
1945 The Indonesian Independence
1949 The Dutch recognizes the Indonesian independence during the Round Table Conference. New Guinea remains with the Dutch.
1955 The Vietnam War began
1956 The Dutch sets up a new government post in the Baliem Valley, Central Highlands.
1959 The Dutch relocates the Catholic Amungme from the Central Highlands to Agimuga.
1961 The New Guinea Council (Nieuw Guinea Raad) is established.
1962 The New York Agreement, West Papua is transferred from the Netherlands to UNTEA
1963 West Papua is transferred to Indonesia
1965 The anti-Communist Purge in Indonesia
1965-1966 The emergence of Free Papuan Movements, military operations in Manokwari and Biak.
1967 The signing of Freeport's Contract of Work for an exploitation of copper in West Papua
1969 The Act of Free Choice or *Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat* (Pepera)
1973 The inauguration of the Freeport mining operation by President Suharto. West Papua is called Irian Jaya
1974 Freeport's negotiation with Tuarek Natkime and other Amungme leaders, called "The January Agreement"
1977 Uprising in the Central Highlands. The Indonesian security forces killed from 2,000 to 4,000 Papuans
1984 Arnold Ap and Eddy Mofu, both were anthropologists are shot dead by the Indonesian Special Forces
More than 10,000 Papuans flee to Papua New Guinea
1988 The discovery of gold in Freeport mine was made public
1995-96 Insurgency at the mining site, the publication of the first human rights report from West Papua
1995 The inauguration of Kuala Kencana (mining town) by President Suharto
1996 Freeport initiated one percent fund and corporate's community development programs. In Jayapura, Papuans' rally at the University of Cenderawasih. A couple of police officers and Papuan students were killed.
1998 The Indonesian democratic reforms. **[continued]**

Timeline [continued]

1998 The Biak incident. The Indonesian military forces killed almost a hundred Papuans.
2000 The Second Papuan People's Congress
2000 Outbreak of violence in Wamena, the Baliem Valley killed 42 people, mainly Papuans. The Indonesian Human Rights Commission designated this incident as a gross human rights violation.
2001 The Wasior incident, the Indonesian Mobile Brigade killed four Papuans. Rapes, tortures and involuntary disappearance followed. The Indonesian Human Rights Commission designated this incident as a gross human rights violation.
2001 The killing of Theys Hiyo Eluay, the chairman of Papuan Presidium.
2001 The granting of a special autonomy status to West Papua.
2002 Shooting of American teachers in Freeport's concession
2006 The University of Cenderawasih bloody incident killed three civilians (Papuans and non-Papuans).
2008 Musa Mako Tabuni was arrested and tried for treason. The establishment of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB).
2009 General Kelly Kwalik was shot dead by the Indonesian anti-terrorist detachment.
2012 The killing of Musa Mako Tabuni, the chairman of KNPB
2012 "Riots" broke in Abepura
2012 The killing of Hubertus Mabel, leader at KNPB
2014 Martinus Yohame, leader at KNPB was found dead
2014 The Paniai shooting killed four Mee tenageers in Enarotali.
2016 The United Liberation Movement of West Papua applied for the Melanesian Spearhead Group's membership. The big rally and arrest in the Mobile Brigade's Headquarter.
2016 The death of Robert Jitmau, Papuan lawyer.
2017 TPN/OPM attack, claim of hostage crisis in Banti & Tembagapura

Acronyms/Glossary

ABRI	*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (used until 1999)
ABMS	The Australian Baptist Missionary Society
Adat	custom, tradition
APCM	the Asia Pacific Christian Mission
Babinsa	*Bintana Pembina Besar*, non-commissioned officer with village level authority under the Indonesian military territorial system.
Bais	*Badan Intelijen Strategis*, the strategic intelligence agency of the TNI
Bakin	*Badan Intelijen Negara*, the state intelligence coordinating agency
Bappeda	*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah*, regional development planning body
BPS	Biro Pusat Statistik, the Indonesian statistics bureau.
BPUPKI	*Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, The Investigating Committee for Preparatory Works for Indonesian Independence
Brimob	*Brigade Mobil*, the mobile brigade, the special operations and paramilitary units within the Indonesian National Police force.
Bupati	regent, head of regency
C&MA	the Christian and Missionary Alliance
COW	contract of work
DAP	*Dewan Adat Papua*, the Papuan Adat Council
DOM	*Daerah operasi militer*, a special status given to areas deemed in need of military interventions. The status of DOM confers considerable powers on the military.
DPR	the National Parliament (People's Representative Council)
DPRD	the provincial or regency Parliament
Dwifungsi ABRI	the dual function of the Indonesian military
FLNKS	*Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste*, The Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front, a pro-independence group in New Caledonia which is now under the French.
GIDI	*Gereja Injili di Indonesia*, the Evangelical Church of Indonesia
GKI TP	*Gereja Kristen Injili di Tanah Papua,* the Papuan Reformed Church
GKII	*Gereja Kemah Injil Indonesia*, Evangelical Tabernacle Church of Indonesia
Golkar	*Golongan Karya*, Functional group, an Indonesian political party, Suharto's party
HAM	*hak-hak azasi manusia*, human rights
Kabupaten	regency
KNPB	*Komite Nasional Papua Barat*, The National Committee of West Papua
Kodam	*Komando daerah militer*, area military command
Kodim	*Komando distrik militer*, military district command
Korem	*Komando resor militer,* military regency command
Komnas HAM	*Komisi Nasional Hak-hak Asasi Manusia*, the National Commission on Human Rights
Kopassus	*Komando Pasukan Khusus*, Special Forces Command, an Indonesian Army special forces unit that conducts special operations missions for the government.

Acronyms/Glossary (continued)

Kostrad	*Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat*, Army Strategic Reserve Command
Lemasa	*Lembaga masyarakat adat Amungme*, the Amungme Customary Council
Lemasko	*Lembaga masyarakat adat Kamoro*, the Kamoro Customary Council
LMA	*Lembaga Masyarakt Adat*, the Customary Council, a government-sponsored adat body
MPR	*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, The People's Consultative Assembly
MRP	*Majelis Rakyat Papua*, The Papuan People's Consultative Assembly
MSG	Melanesian Spearhead Group, a subregional grouping of Melanesian countries
NGO	non-governmental organizations
NKRI	*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia
OPM	Organisasi Papua Merdeka, West Papua Liberation Movements
Orde Baru	the New Order, a political regime which ruled Indonesia from 1966-1998.
Orde Lama	the Old Order, a political regime which ruled Indonesia from 1945-1966.
Otsus	the special autonomy status, granted to West Papua in 2001
Pancasila	the Indonesian state philosophy, literally means "five principles."
PDP	*Presidium Dewan Papua*, the Papuan Presidium Council
Pepera	*Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat*, the Act of Free Choice
Pemekaran	territorial redivision
PKI	*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, the Indonesian Communist Party
POLRI	*Polisi Republik Indonesia*, the Indonesian Police
Polda	*Polisi Daerah*, provincial police
RBMU	Regions Beyond Missionary Union
SKP	*Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian*, Office for Justice and Peace
TEAM	the Evangelical Alliance Mission
TNI	*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, the Indonesian Armed Forces
TNI AD	Angkatan Darat/Tentara Nasional Indonesia, the Indonesian Army
TNI AL	Angkatan Laut/Tentara Nasional Indonesia, the Indonesian Navy
TNI AU	Angkatan Udara/Tentara Nasional Indonesia, the Indonesian Air Force
Trikora	*Tri Komando Rakyat*, three people's commands, launched by Sukarno on December 19, 1961 to win over West Papua.
UFM	The Unevangelised Fields Mission
ULMWP	United Liberation Movement of West Papua
UNTEA	the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority, established by agreement between Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands in October 1962 to maintain peace and security in New Guinea during the transition period, pending transfer to Indonesia.
UU	*Undang-undang*, Law
UZV	*Utrechtsche Zendings Vereniging*, the Utrecht Missionary Society

Acknowledgements

"I think you should go to West Papua, " she said. It took me minutes to concede. "Yeah, why not?" I had never been to West Papua. Then I went and when I came back from "the field" in 2016, she said, "I am glad that you survived." I not only survived. I report and write about it. But she will not be able to read about it. Like Papuan friends that I met in West Papua, she has gone to another world. I went to West Papua and wrote this dissertation because of the Papuans, but also because of her. She invited me to come to Harvard, to see whether I would "be interested in doing a graduate study." She gave me her guidance, advice, criticisms, and stories over the past six years, helped me find my own voice and what I want from anthropology. She gave me an example of how to be a good anthropologist and great writer. To her, Professor Mary Margaret Steedly, this dissertation is dedicated.

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me to present one chapter of my dissertation at a panel that she organized at AAA. I thanked her, Patricia Spyer, and Amali Ibrahim for the feedback. I also extend my gratitude to the Van Vollenhoven Institute and KITLV who invited me to present a topic from my dissertation in their *adat* conference. I would like to thank ARI Institute at NUS and Rita Padawangi who invited me to present a section from my mining chapter at the conference "Reclaiming the City."

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My father, F.X. Sukadi and my brothers Paulus Susilohadi and Patresius Agus tolerate my adventures. Alia Damaihati, Kurnia Yudha, and Heni Matalalang are home. Ucu Agustin is the source of my happiness and latest gossips. My mother Agnes Tuti passed away when I was in the field. She taught me a lot about life but she taught me more about death. If it were not for Cypri Paju Dale, I would have not survived the fieldwork and dissertation writing years. He helped me clarify so many thoughts, asked me so many questions, and told me to keep going. He has been a great companion in this journey.

Note on Conventions


West Papua was previously known as the Netherlands New Guinea (or New Guinea for short) during the Dutch rule (1898-1962). Under Indonesia, West Papua had been called Irian Barat (1963-1971), Irian Jaya (1973-1999), and Papua (2000-2007). In 2007, Papua was divided into two provinces which go by the names of "Papua" and "West Papua." I will use New Guinea or the Netherlands New Guinea to refer to West Papua during the Dutch era. Except in original quotations, I will use West Papua, a self-identifying term to refer to this region after the Dutch period. It is common in Indonesia to assume Papuans as Indonesians, but in this dissertation, I will use Papuans' self-identification to refer to themselves.

Indonesia will be used to refer to the Indonesian state and country, which may or may not include West Papua depending on the claim made in a specific context under investigation. I use Indonesians to refer to non-Papuans or in other words, Indonesian citizens that Papuans claim exclude Papuans. Papuans also use the term "Melanesians" to refer to a racial and cultural grouping that includes the indigenous population of West Papua, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, the Kanak Nation in New Caledonia, and Fiji. Some scholars use Papuans and Melanesians interchangeably, especially in the context of a distinction between indigenous Papuans and Indonesian Malays (Osborne 1984). In the mind of most Papuans, Malay is a racial category and distinctive from them. In chapter five, I will make explicit the stake of the use and debate on Melanesian-ness and Malay-ness in West Papua.


I will use the term 'ethnic groups' in lieue of the old anthropological groupings 'tribes' to refer to Papuan ethno-linguistic groups. Accordingly, self-identifying names are adopted, such as for the Mee ethnic group who used to be called Kapauku, Ekagi, or Ekari.

The Lani is used to refer to the groups that used to be called the Western Dani. The Hubula is used to refer to the Dani ethnic group in the Baliem Valley. The Amungme and the Damal used to belong to one group called the Damal or Uhunduni. Since the arrival of the Dutch and Indonesian governments and particularly the mining, the Damal and Amungme refer to two different groups. While this distinction is highly permeable, I will use Amungme's and Damal's self-identification to refer to their ethnic affiliation.

The ethnographic component of this dissertation fieldwork was carried out in Papuan Malay (a lingua franca of West Papua), Indonesian language, and Papuan vernaculars (primarily Mee and Hubula languages), while the archival component comes in Indonesian, Dutch, and English languages. A few materials are in Papuan vernaculars and French. Unless noted, all translations are mine.



Map 1. West Papua. Credit: author.



Map 2. West Papua (detailed). Credit: GRID-Arendal (used with permission).

1. Introduction

In 1973, Papuan Baptist pastor Reverend Socratez Sofyan Yoman went through one of the most terrifying experiences of his life. He recalls the incident, "I just entered an elementary school in Tiom. I went home from school and saw that three members of the Indonesian military had arrested an older gentleman from a crowd. They beat the poor guy until blood dripped from his nose and mouth. They brought him to the post and continued the beating. I saw it. I witnessed it. I felt so insulted. I felt so hurt and wounded" (Yoman 2009, 20). Indonesian soldiers have been stationed in Tiom since the transfer of West Papua's administration from the Dutch colonial power to Indonesia in 1963. Like many Papuans whose stories I recount in this dissertation, Reverend Yoman remembers that history. He does not only remember. He names the names. He speaks. He writes. In one of his many books, Reverend Yoman writes, "The moment of May 1, 1963 marked the victory of the Indonesian nation over the Papuans. For Papuans, May 1st is the beginning of calamity and the genocide of the Papuan people and Melanesian race" (2012, 241). When I saw him standing in a church pulpit on Christmas Day of 2015, he prayed, "God bless the spirits of dead Papuans and the bones of Papuan fighters."

The transfer of administration from the Dutch to Indonesia effectively ended European colonial rule in West Papua, but for Papuans like Reverend Yoman, it was the beginning of a new colonialism. As Reverend Yoman has witnessed, Indonesia brought security forces and violence to West Papua. They brought their own bureaucracy and administration along with their own models of development as settlers. Papuans like Reverend Yoman continue to use the term colonialism to describe their situation. It is a

generic term that refers to their subjugation to foreigners. It describes their history, though primarily their present. Papuans' formulation of colonialism stands in contrast to the consensus of international communities, including its former colonial power, the Netherlands, and the Indonesian government. For them, the question of West Papua's colonialism was resolved after its incorporation into the postcolonial, modern, and democratic state of Indonesia.

Scholars of West Papua have considered West Papua to be an exemplary case of deferred decolonization. Despite a widespread agreement about its problematic process, its incorporation into the Indonesian state has been accepted. Much scholarship on West Papua has focused on the persisting independence movements against Indonesia on the one hand, and excessive Indonesian violence in West Papua on the other, but scholars use the term colonialism only to refer to the Dutch period. They rarely use the term colonialism to refer to the relationship between the Indonesian state and West Papua, even those who use strong terms like "Indonesian genocide in West Papua." Other scholars prefer to focus on what Cooper calls stance (2005); that it partly depends on the researchers to decide whether the West Papua situation under Indonesia can be called colonial or not. This variety of positions points to two major problems in scholarship on colonialism and nation-states. First, most scholars consider colonialism as a past historical reality, not a relation that continues to exist in the present. Secondly, there is a strong sentiment in the fields of area studies and political science on Indonesia that after it became a nation-state Indonesia had arrived at its final stage. This view reflects a broader context of scholarship that assumes a nation-state as the pinnacle of the political teleology of progress. In other words, nation-states are the end of colonialism.

In West Papua, however, colonialism is loud and present. It is pervasive in Papuans' political discourse, and also thoroughly felt in the ethnographic moments that I encountered as an anthropologist. State violence, Papuan death, racism, economic marginalization, and the exploitation of West Papua's rich natural resources raise difficult questions. Why do Papuans see themselves as the colonized? How do they understand their coloniality? Why is Indonesia framed as a colonial power? How do everyday experiences and encounters with the Indonesian state apparatus and ideology shape Papuans' anti-colonial consciousness? How do they actively create meaning out of their intergenerational experiences under foreign rule? What do Papuans do with that?

These questions indicate that colonialism in West Papua is an anthropological problem, which is to say, a problem of cultural, social and historical processes. In the chapters that follow, I show the ways in which colonialism in West Papua can be approached anthropologically and historically. Although my focus is mainly on the last fifty years of Papuan history, from the late Dutch colonial period through Indonesian rule, this dissertation situates West Papua within the long durée history of their encounters with external forces.

In sum, this dissertation is an ethnography of a colonial present and the making of political consciousness in West Papua, a self-identifying term that refers to the marginal provinces of Papua and West Papua of Indonesia. I propose three domains of inquiry to examine the question of a colonial present in West Papua. First, I consider Papuan everyday experiences and encounters with what Papuans call *ambers* (foreigners, foreign powers) and what those experiences mean to them. Here I follow the experience of Papuan men and women, young and old, those who live in the country and the city, the Highlands and the coasts, to understand how they articulate their coloniality and forge a distinctive political

consciousness as Papuans. Second, I look at Papuan historical events and how Papuans make sense of these events and write about them. Third, I look at how the Indonesian state, particularly its civil and military administration, governs this territory, how they create categories and what they tell us about the Indonesian state as a colonial power. My examination of the Indonesian state illustrates how the state has been configured through its interaction with Papuans' processes of subject and identity formation. This is an ethnography of the Indonesian state as it is practiced in West Papua. It is also an ethnography of Papuan experiences and consciousness under successive regimes of colonialism and their projects to rewrite their own history.

This dissertation contributes to scholarly debates on contemporary colonialism and the study of postcolonial states. First, West Papua offers an opportunity to understand the details of colonial history and the experience of the colonized in a colonial present. Second, West Papua also offers a unique vantage point to reconsider modern nation states like Indonesia as political and cultural entities. To understand the Indonesian state from the vantage point of West Papua also allows for a new approach to the Indonesian historiography of colonialism, decolonization, and postcoloniality. Third, as a Melanesian cultural area within the Southeast Asian state model, West Papua demonstrates the interplay between race, ethnicity, religion, and political movements. Finally, in contrast to prevailing traditional ethnic studies in Melanesia, this study reinvigorates the study of Melanesian society through the study of nationalist political projects.

In the following sections of this introductory chapter, I present a brief sketch of the Papuans and their histories that are the subjects of this ethnography. I also turn my attention to the Indonesian state and how their claim over West Papua is framed through a nationalist and postcolonial language of rule.

Foreigners as History

Papuans have been subjected, narrated, politicized, and inscribed by powerful others. Thus, Reverend Benny Giay, a Papuan intellectual, defines the Papuans as "the people whose ancestors were settled in the land of West Papua for thousands of years, long before the evil forces or the *suanggi*, such as the Indonesian state, the United States, and the Netherlands were even born. The Papuans are the descendants of those ancestors who already had rules of law and religion to guide their lives and their management of natural resources long before the Indonesian nation-state was formed and other nations were established. That is the first definition. But that is not the only one" (2000b).

Reverend Giay's self-definition points to complex historical processes that shaped the history of West Papua and the ways in which Papuans see themselves. These processes are also reflected in the changes in their place names. West Papua was previously known as the Netherlands New Guinea (or New Guinea for short) during the Dutch rule (1898-1962). Under Indonesia, it was called Irian Barat (1963-1971), Irian Jaya (1973-1999), and then Papua (2000-2007).

Comprising more than 260 ethnic groups who live in the islands, coastal and swampy areas, as well as in rugged mountainous terrain, Papuans have lived in their homeland in the western part of New Guinea Island, the world's largest tropical island, for at least 40,000 years (see **Map 1**). The eastern part, which was colonized by Germans and British in the 19th century, got their independence in 1975 as Papua New Guinea. West Papua occupies a total area of 459,411.67 km² or about 23 percent of the Indonesian territory. As of 2017, West Papua's population is 3,755,948; nearly half of them are native Papuans.

When its neighboring areas to the west had come under the Dutch colonial power beginning in the 16th century, New Guinea was left to itself until about the 18th century. The

European Calvinists arrived in the region in 1855, fifty years before the Dutch colonial government set up their permanent post, which would characterize Dutch colonialism in this region.[1] In 1863, four ministers from the Utrecht Missionary Society (*Utrechtsche Zendings Vereniging*, UZV), a new missionary body of the Dutch Reformed Church, arrived and carried out more systematic evangelization efforts.[2] The arrival of UZV allowed for the expansion of missionary activities to the west and north. When the colonial government finally arrived in 1898 and integrated New Guinea into the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch missions had established themselves as a significant political actor in the region, at least for the colonial government. Their familiarity with local languages, and particularly their knowledge of local cultures, were useful for the expansion of the Dutch colonial agenda.

The Dutch, however, considered this area to be a backwater, and Papuans primitive. In their view, Papuans needed to be civilized before they could be governed. As I will narrate in the following chapter, this attitude can be seen in their projects of civilizing schools. Civilizing schools would mark not only the increasing power of the Christian missions and their complicated politics with the Dutch government, but also the place of the Papuans within the colonial hierarchy of the Dutch political project (*Pax Nederlandica*). But ironically, through this type of school, the Papuans began to call themselves Papuans, a

[1] Seen from the timeline of Dutch missionization in the Netherlands East Indies, the arrival of Dutch mission in New Guinea was considerably early. The Netherlands Missionary Society (*Nederlandsche Zendingsgenootschap*, NZG) began their work in Minahasa (North Sulawesi) in 1831, in East Java in 1849, in Karoland (North Sumatra) in 1890, and in Central Sulawesi in 1892. The *Nederlandsche Zendingsvereniging* (NZV) began their work in West Java in 1863, and the *Mennonite Doopgezinde Zendingsvereniging* (DZV) has worked in Central Java since 1851. The Dutch Catholic arrived in 1859 and soon began their work among the Javanese in Central Java and outer islands. For the Karoland case, see Kipp 1990 and Steedly 1993. For the remaining examples, see Aritonang and Steenbrink (2008). The Dutch colonial government instituted the work of missionaries in their law in 1854 with the passing of the East Indies Government Act of 1854 (Staatsblad 1854, No.129, Article 123).

[2] UZV was founded in founded in 1859 after their separation from the Netherlands Missionary Society (*Nederlandsch Zendelinggenootschap*, NZG) on the basis of their refusal of modern direction within the NZG.

political identity distinct from other Dutch subjects. I address this particular form of colonial politics in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. This was a process by which Papuans began to be inscribed, written about, and assessed as a racial type. In other words, this was a beginning of the racial order of the colonial world of New Guinea.

This process was intensified in the 1930s, when a massive conversion of Papuans took place in the coastal regions and islands of New Guinea. Large groups of coastal Papuans began to form strong Christian communities in Biak, Sarmi, Manokwari, Sentani, and Hollandia (current day Jayapura). These areas would become the strongholds for the Papuan Reformed Church (*Gereja Kristen Injili di Tanah Papua*), the largest Christian denomination in present-day West Papua.[3] The Dutch Catholics followed their Protestant brethren in the early 20th century with the establishment of their first mission post in Merauke in the southern part of New Guinea. Merauke's case was a landmark of the Dutch Catholic's strongholds among the native population, as well as their collaboration with the Dutch colonial government. Similar to the Protestants, Catholics aggressively built congregations and schools to connect with the indigenous population. During this period, Indonesian teachers and staff began to arrive and work in the missions' schools (both the Protestant and Catholic schools), and help with the missionary efforts. Indonesians then became the interface and intermediary of Dutch power in New Guinea.

Dutch colonial control in New Guinea, however, was far more limited than they would have liked to admit. Until a few years after World War I, the Dutch colonial government had not controlled the Central Highlands, where sixty percent of the indigenous Papuan population lived. Before the missionaries arrived in 1939, Roux lists at least forty

[3] If I translate "Gereja Kristen Injili di Tanah Papua (GKITP)" literally, I will come up with the Evangelical Church of West Papua. I prefer to use the Papuan Reformed Church so that readers do not confuse it with the evangelical church of an American type which also uses the word "Injili/Injil."

scientific and military expeditions conducted in the Central Highlands or with the aim to reach the Highlands of New Guinea (1948). The first Dutch government post in the Highlands was built in Enarotali a few months before the arrival of the Christian and Missionary Alliance (C&MA), an American evangelical Protestant mission in 1939. The Dutch government granted permission for an American mission to work there; as Mr. Jensen, a resident of Ambon under which New Guinea was administered, told Dr. Robert Jaffray, "I want to give these people the best civilization has to offer. I want you to take the gospel to them"(Wick 1990, 28).[4]

The arrival of the Anglo-Americans further complicated the Dutch colonial agenda. Established in 1887 in New York City, C&MA is a non-denominational missionary society with an emphasis on global evangelism.[5] They started working in the Netherlands East Indies in 1928, right after what Aritonang and Steenbrink call "the great century of Christian mission"(2008, 161). From their Makassar headquarters, C&MA sent missionaries to the Highlands of New Guinea and in the Dayak country of Borneo. By 1950, they successfully

[4] Jensen reiterated Queen Wilhelmina's throne speech delivered in 1901. See Kipp 1990, 31.

[5] The Christian and Missionary Alliance was part of the new wave movement in Protestant missions that emerged during the late 19th century and 20th century. After the rise of civil movements—partly inspired by Marxism but primarily supported by a broad-based political mobilization of the working and middle class, the West (including churches) no longer could sustain their claim as the primary holder of moral superiority. This collapse incited a variety of responses, which one among others was the emergence of neo-orthodoxy in Europe then the United States and secondly and this is more important to our conversation here was the rise of [Christian] fundamentalism. Interestingly, the latter marked the shift of Christian mission geographies, from Europe to North America. According to Bays (2003), by the late 1920s Americans constituted about 40% of the more than 30,000 Christian missionaries worldwide. It was not a coincidence that this phenomenon took place simultaneously with the rise of the United States as a new political and economic empire in the world. As Hudson says, "American imperial expansion was accompanied by a mounting enthusiasm among the churches for overseas missions." See Tucker 2004, 284-285 and Hudson 1973. In the United States, the birth of C&MA should be situated within the long series of the emergence of faith missionaries, such as the China Inland Mission (1865), the Evangelical Alliance Mission or TEAM (1890), the Central American Mission (1890), the Sudan Interior Mission (1893), and the Africa Inland Mission (1895). All these missions are in the line of conservative evangelicalism.

converted the Mee to Christianity, the first Highlander group to do so. In 1954, C&MA landed their first missionaries in the Baliem Valley, two years before the Dutch government set up their post and four years before Catholics began their missionary efforts in the Valley.[6] After C&MA and the Catholics, other Anglo-American evangelical missions, such as Regions Beyond Missionary Union (RBMU)[7] and the Evangelical Alliance Mission (TEAM)[8] entered other parts of the Central Highlands. In January 1955, the Asia Pacific Christian Mission (APCM) set up a missionary post in the Lani area of Bokondini. The Unevangelised Fields Mission (UFM), a British missionary body founded in 1931 sent their missionaries to the upper regions of the Rouffaer River. By the late 1950s, Christian missions had divided the Lani and Hubula speaking areas of New Guinea into at least six church jurisdictions.[9] In

[6] The Dutch government arrived in Wamena at the heart of Baliem Valley in 1954 to conduct a preliminary administrative survey. In January 1955, Head of Native Affairs Victor de Bruyn visited Balim Valley with some police officers and DWO (Dienst van Waterstaat en opbouw). They arrived through a missionary airstrip in Hitigima (Alua 54). The post itself was officiated on December 14, 1956.

[7] RBMU (The Regions Beyond Missionary Union) originated in London in 1873 when Henry Grattan Guinness (1835-1910) founded his East London Training Institute for Home and Foreign Missions. While they built their school as interdenominational, RBMU can be described as a revivalist at best. In the eastern part of the island which is now an independent state of Papua New Guinea, the London Missionary Society took a predominant role in the early missionary efforts. If West Papua was, using the missionary's term, invaded from the west, Papua New Guinea was missionized through the east, namely from Polynesia and Australia. Until today, many Polynesians, particularly Samoans still work as Bible teachers and missionaries in some parts of Papua New Guinea.

[8] The Evangelical Alliance Mission (TEAM) calls themselves as "a global missions agency that partners with the local church to send missionaries and establish reproducing churches among the nations, going where the most people have the most need and proclaiming the gospel in both word and action." Although it's not clear from their statement, their works in West Papua are very much in line with the British and Australian evangelical churches.

[9] The fields were the Australian Baptist Missionary Society (ABMS) in the upper regions of the North Baliem, the Asia Pacific Christian Missionary (APCM) in along the northern slopes of the Hablifloerie River, Regions Beyond Missionary Union (RBMU) in the Swart Valley, Unevangelical Field Mission (UFM) in the upper regions of the Rouffaer River, the Christian and Missionary Alliance (C&MA) in the central and south Baliem Valley, Ilaga Valley, Puncak and Puncak Jaya,

all of New Guinea, by the end of the Dutch rule, more than half of Papuan natives had belonged to the Protestant and Catholic churches.[10]

While it took almost a century for the Dutch Reformed Church to establish a Papuan indigenous church, the Anglo-American evangelical Protestants needed only twenty-five years to set up their indigenous congregations. The C&MA congregations established the Kingmi Church in 1962**.** RBMU, TEAM, and UFM congregations gathered to form a Lani indigenous church called the evangelical church of Irian Barat (now the Evangelical Church of Indonesia, GIDI) in 1963. The Australian Baptist Missionary Society (ABMS) who worked in the Lani-speaking areas of Makki and Tiom set up the Papuan Baptist church in 1966. Reverend Socratez Sofyan Yoman belongs to this church.

The intensification of missionary projects in the Highlands redrew the map that the Dutch colonial government had made in 1912 regarding the territorial division of the Catholic and the Dutch Protestant churches in New Guinea.[11] This chronology also demonstrates that like their fellow Papuans in the coastal areas, Papuans in the Highlands were introduced to Christian missionaries first, and the Dutch colonial government later. This process resulted in a distinctive conception of Papuans as Christian subjects, and to a

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Nduga, and Yahukimo, the Catholic church in the lower Baliem Valley and the Dutch Reformed Church in the Yali speaking areas of the Baliem Valley. Bibliography on this topic is extensive, from Sunda 1963, Hayward 1997, Farhadian 2009, Giay 1995 and 1999, Kiwak 2008, Wenda 2009.

[10] By 2017, 95% of the indigenous Papuans are members of Protestant and Catholic churches, thus differentiating themselves from the majority of Indonesians who are Muslims.

[11] Governor-General A.W.F. Idenburg separated geographical working spheres and created a Protestant north and Catholic south for the Dutch New Guinea through a demarcation line of 4°30' latitude (Derksen 2016). A.W.F. Idenburg was the minister of Colonial Affairs (1902-1905) and then became the governor of the Dutch East Indies (1909-1916). For more reading about his policy, see Holtrop 2000.

lesser degree, as Dutch subjects.[12] In the following section, I discuss the ramification of this subject positioning for the emergence of Papuan elites in the late Dutch period and the dissertation's larger arguments about Papuans' political consciousness.

Rupture or Continuity: Moral Claims, Political Questions

Global powers and processes made their way to the Papuans early, but it was not until the 1950s and 1960s that Papuans became a subject of dispute between European colonial powers and a postcolonial nation. It is not unusual for two countries to stake a claim to the same territory and its people, but in West Papua, this is specifically a case when the term colonialism itself was and remains at stake.[13] Does Indonesia's claim reflect the end of European colonialism in West Papua? Is the claim post-colonial? Or is it also a colonial claim? The crux of the problem seems to be in whether the mode of rule emerged from a transfer from one colonial power to a postcolonial state can be called colonialism at all. Who has the power to make such a category? Who has the power to call colonialism colonialism? Could a non-European power, a postcolonial nation like Indonesia, become a colonizing power? This dissertation questions the process of colonial marking, the power to define a political relation as colonial or otherwise. This marking is critical, not only in the discourse of a colonizing power, but especially for the colonized and the present-ness of their colonial situation. This marking is also critical for our understanding of post-coloniality and postcolonial nation-states.

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[12] By 2017, 95% of the indigenous Papuans are members of Protestant and Catholic churches, thus differentiating themselves from the majority of Indonesians who are Muslims.

[13] India's invasion of Goa is the other case that occurred almost at the same time with New Guinea. See Newman 1984 and Benton 2002.

The period after World War II was the most important period for both Indonesia and New Guinea. Indonesia declared its independence in 1945 and went through a difficult process of state formation, while in New Guinea a new national consciousness emerged. The Indonesian War of Independence forced the Dutch to recognize Indonesian sovereignty in 1949. This coincided with the larger wave of postwar decolonization that occurred across various crumbling European empires. The Dutch government, however, managed to negotiate for the separation of New Guinea from the territory of the Republic of Indonesia with a stipulation that the fate of this disputed territory would be decided by 1950. In the years that followed, Indonesia pursued its claim over New Guinea as a former Netherlands East Indies' territory. This is a departure from the previous debate within Indonesian nationalist elites about the territory of their new country in 1945, a few months before Indonesia declared its independence. During the heated session of The Investigating Committee for Preparatory Works for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) from July 10th to 11th of 1945, Mohamad Yamin and Sukarno, two nationalists who would occupy important roles after independence, refused the proposal that Indonesia's territory should be limited to the former Netherlands East Indies' territory. Indeed, Sukarno's territorial conception was based on the Japanese colonial holding *Dai Nippon Teikoku* (BUPKI 1995, 152). He also cited an old text *Negarakertagama*, written by Prapanca, the official historian of Majapahit Empire (1200-1400 AD) to justify his claim to New Guinea.[14] In the final voting of the Committee, 39 out of 66 members supported Sukarno and Yamin. This final decision of Indonesian territory included New Guinea, but also the territory of current day Malaysia (Malay peninsula and North Borneo), Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, and East Timor.

[14] After becoming the deputy first minister/minister of Information under Sukarno in 1962, Yamin reiterated his position in a speech delivered on the national re-awakening day in Jakarta, May 20, 1962. See Yamin 1956 and 1962.

The Netherlands, on the other hand, insisted that New Guinea should receive their own independence. Much scholarship about the Dutch's insistence considers the Dutch's emotional attachment to New Guinea and their trauma related to Indonesian decolonization (see Lijphart 1966; Penders 2002; for more nuanced arguments, see Drooglever 2009). While these factors might play a major role, the role of Papuans could not be neglected. Papuans did not participate in the Indonesian nationalist struggle against the Dutch and Japanese occupations. They also had a different colonial experience than their 'fellow' Indonesians. Experience for Papuans is one of their key arguments.

The Dutch colonial government began to carry out aggressive efforts of development to bolster its claims toward the colony from 1949 to 1962. They increased the number of schools, improved public services, appointed Papuans to the colonial bureaucracy, and most importantly, promised to Papuan leaders to respect their right to self-determination. Indeed, the Dutch colonial government established the New Guinea Council (*Nieuw Guinea Raad*), a representative body of Papuan people that would prepare Papuans for independence, projected to happen in 1975. As I chronicle in Chapter 2, members of the New Guinea Council were Papuan elites educated in the mission schools. Most of them came from the Catholic and Reformed Church areas, but they had transcended their ethnic identity to form a national identity as Papuans. In 1961, a national committee established by the mandate of the Council decided on a national flag (morning stars flag), national anthem (*Hai Tanahku Papua*), and formal name (West Papua) for the imagined country.

The emergence of Papuans as a political category and a group of real people with aspirations for their nation-state became a central problem of Dutch decolonization in New Guinea. Sukarno, the Indonesian president (1945-1966) who voted for New Guinea's inclusion in the Republic, saw Papuans as Dutch puppets. He propagated that the

occupation of New Guinea was an anti-colonialist enterprise. He considered Indonesia as a moral force whose mandate as a newly independent country was to "liberate New Guinea" from the shackles of Dutch imperialism and colonialism (Soekarno 1961a, 9; Subandrio 2001, 207). In an explanatory memorandum for the General Assembly in 1954, the Indonesian government asserted their claim, saying, "West Irian is and always has been—historically as well as constitutionally (legally)—an integral part of Indonesia. That is to say, also a part of the Netherlands East Indies."[15] In other words, Indonesia considered Papuans as passive victims of Dutch colonialism. They were miserable primitives locked in a colonial relationship with a small European power.

President Sukarno launched a huge military campaign and ordered the formation of the Mandala command in 1961 to win over the region. He mobilized support domestically and abroad, mainly from the Non-Aligned Movement and the Soviet Union. The Kennedy Administration, which was increasingly concerned with political development in Southeast Asia, brokered the New York Agreement that forced the Dutch and Indonesia to sit at the same table. In 1962, the Dutch, without Papuans' knowledge, signed the New York Agreement, an agreement that ordered the transfer of New Guinea to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), and then to Indonesia. In 1963, New Guinea was transferred to Indonesia.

Under the New York Agreement, Indonesia was allowed six years of an interim rule before it had to consult the Papuans as to whether or not they wanted to be part of Indonesia. This was called the Act of Free Choice (I. *Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat*, Pepera). But instead of conducting a democratic consultation, the Indonesian government designated 1,025 tribal elders and community leaders to represent the indigenous population of West

[15] U.N. Doc A/2694, August 18, 1954. Jennings (1963), The Acquisition of Territory in International Law) rightly points out that in the same period, Ceylon was also part of the Netherlands East Indies.

Papua contravening the principle of one-man, one-vote. Scholars and journalists have also reported how Indonesia intimidated and coerced Papuan representatives to vote for Indonesia in 1969 (Lagerberg 1979; Budiardjo and Liong 1988; Osborne 1985; Kirksey 2012). Despite its controversial nature, the agreement was upheld and recognized by the international community. For Papuans, this was a defining moment of colonialism, a moment when a new form of post-European colonialism was introduced and engineered by new international power holders. As Reverend Yoman's statement shows, Papuans continuously challenge this history of transfer. History is also their key argument.

Indonesian Rule: State Forms, Military, and Development

For Papuans, a colonial present is marked by securitization and militarization of everyday lives. It is also felt through violence that disproportionately impacts them. Violence shapes how Papuans narrate their lives. When Indonesia arrived, thousands of Papuans were arrested, tortured, and killed. Offices were looted, and houses were burnt. But as I write in chapters 3 and 7, this does not make it into history textbooks anywhere—not in Indonesia, nor in the Netherlands. Yet it is not as though it stopped in the 1960s. After the Indonesian arrival, one could not call one's self a Papuan. One has always already been an Indonesian. Here, Papuans reframe their experience as one of colonialism. It is a birth of a new field of battle. History and historical narratives are central because that is also how Indonesia frames West Papua's return to the bosom of the motherland. It is a nationalist narrative of struggle, and a militarized one.

In the 1960s when West Papua was invaded, Indonesia had gone through major political upheaval. Sukarno, the populist president, was toppled by the so-called

Order of Eleventh March, a document signed by the president that gave the army commander Lt. General Suharto authority to take whatever measures he deemed necessary to restore order after an abortive military putsch in 1965.[16] Suharto came to power, and between 500,000 to three million people of alleged members of the Indonesian Communist Party and Sukarno's supporters were purged in, as many scholars have argued, "one of the 20th century's worst massacres."[17]

The Indonesian military's rise to power was thoroughly felt in West Papua. The New Order, as the new political regime called itself, intensified the securitization and militarization of West Papua. Indeed in West Papua, the history of Indonesia's presence is by and large the history of the Indonesian military. Right after the transfer, Indonesia immediately set a territorial structure for the deployment of Indonesian security forces. West Papua was divided into three military resort (regency) commands (*Korem*), eight military district commands (*Kodim*), and 65 military rayon commands (*Puterpra*). In 1965, the first organized resistance against Indonesia was staged in Manokwari (see **Map 2**). Papuan elites, members of the political class during the Dutch rule established pro-independence groups that are now called the West Papua Liberation Movement (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM*). The OPM proves that Papuans have fought Indonesia's incursion from early on, but OPM is also used to justify the continuing presence of Indonesian security forces in the region.

During the transition period of from 1961 to 1969, Indonesia conducted four military operations to conquer the region and suppress Papuans' resistance. After the Act of Free Choice, the military operations did not stop. Approximately eight military operations

[16] About the order, see Siegel 1998. About the coup, see Anderson and McVey 1971.

[17] See Lovell 2018.

took place in 1969-1998.[18] Since 1977, West Papua was officially designated as a military operation area (*daerah operasi militer,* DOM hereafter), the first of its kind in Indonesian history.[19] The DOM status gave the Indonesian military sole power through the extercise of martial law and control of the region. It also meant a suspension of Papuans rights under the Indonesian legal system.

The status ended two months after the political reform that ousted Suharto's regime in 1998, but the excessive presence of the Indonesian security forces has been maintained. Today, West Papua has the highest concentration of security forces in the country, with a per capita ratio of population to security forces of 1:99, compared to the rest of the country, which is 1:296 (Supriatma 2015). Supriatma also estimates that the total number of security forces in West Papua in 2014 was 36,254 personnel. These consisted of 21,400 TNI personnel (18,950 armies, 1,050 navy, and 1,400 air force) and up to 14,584 personnel of Indonesian police.[20] But numbers are merely indicative of the larger importance of the security forces in West Papua as the representative of the Indonesian state.

What is specific about the Indonesian military is the doctrine of the dual function of the Indonesian Armed Forces (*Dwifungsi ABRI*). The subject of much scholarship on Indonesia (Notosusanto 1979; Sundhausen 1982; Crouch 1988; Vatikiotis 1998), the dual function of the military is conceived in their role as a military as well as a political force. During the New Order, the dual function of the military was used to justify their role in promoting national development, taking leadership positions in the non-military spheres, and ensuring internal political stability. This characterizes a specific approach of

[18] AHRC &ICP 2013 and The Human Rights Watch 2007.

[19] As I narrate in chapter 6 of the dissertation, East Timor was invaded by Indonesia in 1975. While Indonesia did not use the term 'DOM,' East Timor was treat like a DOM (military operation area).

[20] See Supriatma 2014.

development in West Papua, notably transmigration programs and extractive industries, which are the subject of Chapter 5 and 6 of this dissertation.

Development too is a mainstream discourse in scholarship on West Papua. The Indonesian government and their Western allies frame West Papua within a narrative of lack. It regards West Papua as a development periphery in a sense that it occupies a marginal place in the nation because it lacks development, or even that it was not being governed. But West Papua has received many schemes of improvement from the national government, corporations, and international developmental agencies. The Indonesian state itself has positioned itself as "the harbinger of national development" on which its legitimacy rests (Sharma and Gupta 2006, 15). But as scholars of Indonesian development have shown, West Papua is the only place where the exercise of brute power is *continuing* part and parcel of the development.

As I describe in Chapter 4, the Indonesian development model in West Papua relies on the exploitation of West Papua's rich natural resources. Right after the rise of Suharto's rule, or the period that is called the New Order (1966-1998), Indonesia signed a contract with the American mining company Freeport McMoRan to extract Papuan gold and copper from the Central Highlands. Freeport was the first among hundreds and now thousands of extractive companies that worked in West Papua in the mining, plantation, and fishing sectors. Mining areas and plantations make use of very few Papuan laborers. Most workers are sent from Indonesia, and are primarily of Javanese, Sulawesi and Nusa Tenggara origins. In West Papua, plantations and mining are created to serve the Indonesian migrants, and conversely, the migrants enable the establishment of plantation sectors. It is here that the extractive economy developed alongside the Indonesian program called transmigration. This

transmigration program played a pivotal role in the marginalization of indigenous Papuans, a major demographic shift, and the emergence of a language of genocide in West Papua.

As I will further explore in Chapter 5, the transmigration program is the most massive migration program in human history (Aditjondro 1983a, 13). During the New Order (1967-1998), this policy was framed as a solution to overcome the problem of uneven population distribution in Indonesia and to spur economic growth in the outer islands. In West Papua, however, transmigration was fueled by the pursuit of national integration and national security. In other words, transmigration in West Papua is not so much about population redistribution as it is about nation-building projects.[21] In this sector too, Papuans are characterized by their lack of loyalty to the Indonesian nation and nationalist project. By virtue of their history and cultural and racial differences, Papuans' commitment to Indonesian nationalism remains questionable even after more than fifty years under Indonesia. Various programs are introduced to transform Papuans into modern Indonesian subjects and instill Indonesian nationalism in them. They must go to schools, read the heroic narratives of Indonesian nationalist struggle, and attend Indonesian flag raising ceremonies. They have to remove their *koteka* (penis gourds) and grass skirts, wear modern clothes, eat rice, and adopt new lifestyles as Indonesian subjects. Papuans, on the other hand, regard these Indonesianization projects as a threat to their cultures. They embark on various cultural and political projects to challenge what they perceive as cultural genocide.

In 1999, after East Timor seceded from Indonesia, a hundred Papuan representatives met Indonesian President Habibie to demand a referendum. Apparently shocked by this request, the Indonesian central government devised a new policy toward the region. In 2001,

[21] See Tirtosudarmo 1990 and 2013. I would like to thank him for sharing his early research.

Indonesia granted special autonomy status to West Papua.[22] The granting of special autonomy status to West Papua reflects the spirit of democratic reforms. But it also represents a combination of pressures such as security, market imperatives, a new notion of transparency and political participation through decentralization, and the traumatic experience of East Timor's secession. Both the 1998 Indonesian democratic reform and the introduction of special autonomy status ended the status of West Papua as a military operation area and provided an opportunity for the Papuans to exercise their democratic rights. But most importantly, these reforms have been influential in shaping West Papua's contemporary politics and economy, especially in the "widening of the arena of political mobilization" (Chatterjee 2004, 47). Special autonomy status offers an opportunity for Papuan elites to benefit from democratic transitions and allows them to participate in the democratic process, mainly through a Papuanization of provincial political governance and the introduction of electoral processes at the provincial and regency (*kabupaten*) level, as well as the proliferation of administrative expansion (*pemekaran*) as an integral process of decentralization reforms.

As I write in Chapter 5, the special autonomy status introduced a new mode of Indonesian governance in this region, but on a broader level, it does not change the relationship between Jakarta and West Papua. Using its territorial doctrine, the Indonesian forces maintain a high presence in West Papua. The exploitation of West Papua's natural resources continues unabated while the number of Indonesian settlers begins to exceed the population of indigenous Papuans. The democratic and decentralization reforms, however,

[22] It should be noted that the granting of autonomy to the provincial governments is not unique to West Papua. However, the word 'special' adds a sense of privilege to West Papua. The special autonomy status was granted only to two provinces: Aceh in the westernmost part of Indonesia (which had a secession group called the Free Aceh Movement) and West Papua. Yet compared to Aceh, West Papua gains an extremely high degree of autonomy and financial benefit from the scheme. This reflects Indonesia's weaker legitimacy in its easternmost province.

have enabled the Papuans to articulate their political aspirations, to rewrite their history, and to continue their struggle for self-determination under a new condition. This dissertation is set under this new condition.

Scholarly Contexts

Colonialism

Colonialism has been one of the most crucial historical moments for many indigenous communities in the world, including in the Pacific. After the crumbling of European empires in the 1960s and the emergence of independent nation-states in the former colonies, decolonization is assumed to be a natural progression in world history, but it is not. While many nations have achieved their independence after World War II, some nations are left out. They were either incorporated into new post-colonial nation states or remained part of a colonial power, like New Caledonia. The West Papua case is quite exemplary, as scholars and governments somewhat agree that West Papua is no longer a case of colonialism. Scholars use the term 'legacy' or 'vestige' to look at West Papua. Others, like Stoler, use duress to refer to this recurrent history (2013 and 2016). I refer to this situation as a colonial present for at least two reasons here. First, it is an indigenous category that not only refers to a concrete social situation that can be examined ethnographically, but it also performs analytical work that can draw our attention to salient aspects and important questions related to Indonesian rule in the region. My usage of a colonial present also refers to a set of politics that gives birth to distinctively anti-colonial political consciousness in West Papua. This is the politics of the history of colonialism, a politics where the definition of colonialism becomes a realm of continual struggle over meanings and signification

(Gramsci 1971; Hobswam 1977; Hall 1987; Voloshinov 1973; Verdery 1999, 24; Koselleck 2002).

The conditions in which colonialism takes place are no longer the same, or at least not the ways in which we see it. Historians and anthropologists have been preoccupied with colonialism as a past historical reality. They define colonialism as a mode of governance that is characterized by the establishment of foreign rule, usually the European imperial power, and control of people of non-European origin (Butt 2013; Césaire 1972[1955]; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991 and 1997; Cooper 2005; Fanon 1965 and 1967; Furnivall 1948; Giay 2000 and 2001; Memmi 1965; Stoler 2009). The relationship between the colonizer and the colonized is predicated on the relation of domination, exploitation, and cultural imposition. Those who maintain a distinctive temporal break between colonialism and its aftermath use the word postcolonial or postcolony (Mbembé 2001; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006). Recent scholarship on colonialism, however, emphasizes ongoing colonialism, such as settler colonialism in the Americas and Palestine (Morgensen 2011; Simpson 2014) or the persistence of the colonial relationship (Appiah 1991; Quijano 2000 and 2007; Mignolo 2011; Scott 1995). The latter uses the term coloniality of power. Decolonization, an anti-thesis to colonialism has referred to a historical event when former European colonies achieved independence following World War II (Steedly 2013 and Wilder 2015). To expand the temporal stretch of colonialism to the present day means that decolonization is an urgent political agenda that aims to remove both the continuing coloniality of power as well as contemporary colonialism (Smith 2012).

While mindful of this genealogy I depart from natives' points of view to describe various domains of West Papua's colonial present (Malinowksi 1922). And here, the most

important argument of this dissertation is that Papuans consider Indonesian rule in West Papua to be colonial. This means that Papuans use colonialism to refer to their present condition, not only during the period under European rule. This means that colonialism in West Papua is the historical *and* ethnographic setting of this dissertation. To interrogate the West Papua situation as a colonial present helps us to understand the trans-temporality of colonialism in West Papua, a complex relation of emergent and residual forms of colonial rule, and the broad spectrum of meanings and politics that take place there. It also describes and uses indigenous modes of analysis (Kirsch 2006) as a foundation for an anthropological project that takes Papuans' articulation, agency, and historiography seriously. In other words, this dissertation wishes to contribute to a new direction in the anthropological study of colonial experience under a new colonial present.

Area Studies and Its Problems in West Papua

This study positions itself between two ethnographic area studies, namely of Melanesia and Southeast Asia. Anthropology has employed culture areas as a discursive framework in constituting culture theories and comparative projects (Lederman 1998, 431). An area studies approach defines the predominant mode and domain of anthropological analyses. In its early scholarship, West Papua was understood as part of the larger Melanesian world. Most studies focus on ethnic studies or 'traditional' institutions of the Melanesian societies. They attempted to provide histories to those who were ostensibly "people without histories." Others, primarily explorers and travelers, have used the "missionary in the rowboat" model, looking at indigenous communities as the exotic (Cohn 1980, 199).

Russian anthropologist Miklouho-Maclay is a telling example. Miklouho-Maclay conducted the first anthropological study of West Papua in 1874 (Kirksey 2010). Under a

pretext to discover "pure savages," he focused on the Kowiai of the southern part New Guinea (Miklouho-Maclay 1982 and 2007). His research model was not very different from his predecessors, such as the British naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace. Miklouho-Maclay, however, was famous for his relatively progressive view towards the natives and his consideration of the role of colonialism in changing natives' lives. The arrival of professional anthropologists was not that influential in New Guinea until the Dutch colonial government founded the Bureau of Native Affairs in 1951. The Bureau was both a research organization and an advisory body.[23] Their primary functions were to carry out anthropological research as well as to provide advice for specific native affairs to the Governor of the Territory in 1951 (The Bureau of Native Affairs, 1958). The Bureau focused on three domains of investigation, namely culture, language/linguistics, and demography. The research on culture included research on the sociopolitical organizations of indigenous communities, kinship, land tenure, *adat* (customary law), religions, community development, and public health (Bruijn 1958). Here we see that while ethnic studies were still predominant, some researchers had developed interests and research projects on larger Papuan communities in the urban areas.

The Americans began to carry out anthropological research after World War II, and their interest lay in the Central Highlands. As I recount in the following chapter, it was the American evangelical missions who traveled to the Central Highlands and wrote anthropological and linguistic essays on the Highlanders groups. Professional anthropologists began to arrive in the late 1940s, such as Leopold J. Pospisil, who conducted his fieldwork among the Mee (1958 and 1978). The Department of Anthropology at Harvard University launched a huge research project called the "Harvard Peabody Expedition to New

[23] The Dutch National Archive (number 2.10.25),

Guinea" in 1961 that yielded the first comprehensive account of the Hubula (Gardner 1964; Heider 1970 and 1979; Matthiesen 1989). After the Indonesian arrival in 1963, few significant works came from research in the area due to the prohibition of foreign journalists and researchers from entering West Papua and an almost complete absence of academic freedom within the Indonesian, but particularly in the Papuan universities. Some exceptions include Giay (1995) and Danilyn Rutherford (2003 and 2012).

Contemporary scholarship on West Papua has left the tribal behind, but the focus on ethnic studies is still predominant. Stasch's study on Korowai (2009), Rutherford on Biak (2003 and 2012), Kirsch on Muyu (2006), Breton on Wolani (1999 and 2005), and Giay on the Mee (1995) are among the most important contemporary ethnic studies of West Papua. Recent literature on West Papua has also begun to address political violence and conflicts between the Indonesian government and the Papuan independence movements (Osborne 1985; Kirsch 1989, 1991, 1996, 2002; Sands 1991; Glazebrook 2001; Drooglever 2009, Butt 2002; Munro 2002). Rutherford (2003 and 2012) in particular has focused on the formation of West Papuan nationalism, such as her exceptional study on the *amber* and messianic movements among the Biaks (2003) as well as Kirksey's study (2012) on contemporary Papuan liberation movements. It is telling that it was not until the late 1990s that ethnography of West Papua was conducted in relation to the Indonesian nation-state. [24]

While extremely useful, traditional studies of an ethnic group cannot address the question of trans-ethnic and trans-regional identity such as Papuan-ness that I address in this dissertation. Secondly, it cannot adequately address the process of capitalist expansion in West Papua. Not even, as Goswami suggests, a desire "to situate the formation of particular

[24] The argument is that West Papuans belong to Melanesians, and ethnically are different from the Malays of Western Indonesia. Sillitoe's 1998 includes a discussion on the Dani (Hubula and Lani), the Mee, and the Yali (who are the largest ethnic groups of West Papua).

national spaces within the historical geography of capitalist expansion and the consolidation of the interstate system" (2004, 610). While recent literature on Melanesia has addressed broader questions of capitalist expansion in the region (Brookfield 1972; Sahlins 1981 and 1985; Dening 1995; Foster 2002; Kirsch 2006 and 2014; West 2012; Golub 2014), the specificity of Indonesian state forms in West Papua and the language of colonialism require a new focus within the new Melanesian anthropology. What I am trying to do here is engage with both ethnographic and historical materials of Melanesian societies within their long histories of encounters with external others: Europeans, Indonesians, and Americans. This dissertation also addresses the meaning of Melanesian-ness in contemporary regional politics, which will enrich trans-ethnic and trans-national studies of Melanesian societies.

Anthropology of the State in Southeast Asia

From the Southeast Asian perspective, to argue that Indonesia is a colonial state is to make a strong argument against the existing literature of this large and powerful nation. The fact that East Timor, a former Portuguese colony that was invaded by Indonesia in 1975 gained independence in 1999, gives strong precedence for Indonesia as an occupying force, a theorization of the Indonesian state that Southeast Asian anthropology has yet to adequately address. Much scholarship on East Timor, for instance, uses the word 'occupation' instead of colonialization to refer to Indonesia's invasion, stating that East Timor was already sovereign before the invasion (Durand 2016; Leach 2017; CAVR 2013). West Papua poses a quite challenging case because it was transferred by its former colonial ruler. In other words, West Papua was not a sovereign nation-state before the Indonesian invasion, a pretext that Indonesia uses to justify its sovereignty over this nation. Papuans and their advocates have pursued two legal challenges through international legal frameworks: first, that self-determination should have been granted to West Papua because it was already a nation, and

second, Indonesia did not carry out the Act of Free Choice in accordance with the New York Agreement (see Janki 2010). This debate reflects how scholarship on the Indonesian state on the one hand, and the Papuan independence movements on the other, speak in two different registers.

Much scholarship on the Indonesian state uses spatial metaphors to draw a connection between Jakarta (or Java) with outer islands, including West Papua. The terms "the Indonesian frontier" (Rutherford 1999 and 2003) and an out of the way place (Tsing 1993) exemplify the broader scholarship on states and power in Southeast Asia.[25] In classical Southeast Asian states, the symbolism of the center as the *axis mundi* is highly celebrated. Coedès (1968), Tambiah (1977), Errington (1989), and Wolters (1982) argue that classical Southeast Asian states consist of an exemplary center and disorganized peripheries. Some theorists go further and declare that the state is defined by its center (Anderson 2006, 41).[26] As Geertz says, a central government is essentially an extension of the ruler's household and staff (1980, 46).[27] He says, "The whole of the *negara*—court life, the traditions that organized it, the extractions that supported it, the privileges that accompanied it—was essentially directed toward defining what power was; and what power was what kings were…The driving aim of higher politics was to construct a state by constructing a king. The more consummate the king, the more exemplary the center. The more exemplary the center, the more actual the realm" (124).

[25] Compare Tsing 1993.

[26] Anderson 2006.

[27] To some extent, Geertz's work (1980) shares similar suggestions. In his Balinese case, he argues that the states ('Negara') are not primarily a system of governance but rather an organized spectacle designed for "a continual explosion of competitive display" (125).

Anderson summarizes how the Javanese concept of power concerns less the use of power and more the problem of concentrating and preserving power (2006, 23). Second, Anderson identifies the symbol and symbolic of power like *alus*-ness (finesse) in the conception of power (55). Using Weber's notion of charisma, Anderson suggests that charisma can be a permanent and organizing principle of the state, and precedes the rational-legal domination predominantly attached to Western democracy. Yet, charisma in the mandala system points to the sphere of influence, not a strict organization of space. "The importance of a *mandala* did not depend on its geographical size but on *a network* of loyalties that could be mobilized to provide armed power to leaders whom I described as 'men of prowess. The mobilization of loyalties is the salient feature in the Southeast Asian political system" (25). While Anderson, for instance, discusses modernity and histories of colonialism in the region, it is not clear whether this history has transformed the *mandala* structure.

This conception of power has informed recent scholarship that considers the construction of marginality within Indonesia. Tsing says that marginality is a relation of and with power (1993, 90). In Tania Li's words, it is a process "through which particular spaces become subject to descriptions which are simplified, stereotyped and contrastive, and then rated according to criteria defined at the center" (2005, 2). Indonesian political scientists share this view, stating that West Papua is a centrifugal force within the Indonesian state. It occupies the lowest ladder of Indonesia's variegated spaces of sovereignty. As a periphery, a region like West Papua is characterized by a lack—of development and a sense of national unity, but at the same time a site of potential and desire (Li 2014, 13 and Rutherford 2003). From this literature, the relation between the central government and West Papua is the relation between center and periphery. For some policy analysts and pundits, this means that

the West Papua problem within the Indonesian state can be solved through decentralization or special autonomy schemes.

I argue that, on the contrary, all of these analyses stand in contrast with the conception of Indonesian national unity and integrity that is defended by the Indonesian military and believed by most Indonesian citizens. As an article of faith, the doctrine of the Indonesian unity (or *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*, NKRI) has been formulated through three articulations. First, that Indonesia's territory extends from Sabang (in Aceh) to Merauke (in West Papua). Secondly, the Indonesia state is a unitary state, and thirdly, the Indonesian military's territorial doctrine. The territorial conception from Sabang to Merauke and the principle of Indonesian integrity refuses the prevailing Indonesian spatial notion of power. It also cannot help us understand the incessant ambition of the Indonesian military to govern and deploy their largest forces in Aceh and West Papua, the two most highly volatile and militarized provinces in the country. It cannot explain the particularity of histories of places like West Papua and East Timor within a unitary system. In my case, the center-periphery relations cannot address the specificity of West Papua's history of incorporation into the Indonesian nation-state and Indonesia's insistence on instilling Indonesian nationalism there. I argue that in West Papua not only do we need to examine the process of imagining and defining the 'margins' (Keane 1997, 37), or account for "the push-back from the margins" (Steedly 2013, 7), but also we must historicize what I call the predatory center, which is the center that consistently seeks to expand its reach and influence (compare Abrams 1988 [1977]).

My contribution to the study of the Indonesian state is that I consider the Indonesian state from the experience of the colonized, those who experience the reach and effect of the state as well as the site that generates the power of the state. To put it

differently, I look at West Papua both as the source and effect of the state, a place where the power of the state takes place (Feldman 1993, 3). Here, I decouple the Indonesian state from Indonesian nationalism, even though both of them are ideological projects geared toward certain political goals. In contrast with the study of Indonesian nationalism, which champions the role of affect and media in constituting the nation (Anderson 1983), in West Papua, Indonesian nationalism is a state project (Gupta and Sharma 2006, 8) and it is primarily exercised through violence. Indeed, I argue that violence is an event and structure of Indonesian nationalism in West Papua. In West Papua, Indonesian nationalism also has to deal with the questions of cultural and racial difference. Racial difference, in particular, sets the limits of Indonesian nationalism and the Indonesian state's projects of militarization and development. This too is rarely discussed in the anthropology of Southeast Asia and Indonesia. If it is, it is mainly through the discussion of the role of Chinese diaspora communities. This dissertation then opens up a new vista to view the debate on race and cultural difference through the conception of blackness or Melanesian-ness in Indonesian studies.

Outlines of the Chapters

The dissertation will begin in the Dutch colonial era (1898-1962) with the study of civilizing schools (D. *beschavingscholen*). I argue that civilizing schools marked the collaboration of the colonial and Christian missions in civilizing Papuans and allowed for the emergence of a trans-ethnic identity as Papuans. The arrival of the missions and the education systems that they introduced had profound implications on how Christianity has shaped the lives of many Papuans. They also framed how West Papua as a nation was

envisioned by missionary-educated Papuan elites. This chapter shows that racial relations permeate through different phases of Papuans' encounters with the missions, and result in a strong conception of Papua-ness as the center of their identities.

Following the departure of European colonial power, West Papua was transferred to Indonesia in 1963. Chapter three addresses the transition to Indonesian rule and how Papuans see themselves in this new political constellation through Papuans' encounters with violence. Although violence is not something new for Papuans, they entered a whole new relationship to violence after Indonesia's arrival, primarily due to the militaristic character of the Indonesian rule in the region. Chapter 3 is a study of the impact of a new colonial state in West Papua and the violence that it brought to the population through a focus on death: how Papuans die and how Papuans see themselves, their past and their future amidst the spectacularity and pervasiveness of death.

Continuing this exploration, Chapter 4 deals with Freeport Indonesia, a subsidiary of the American mining company Freeport McMoRan, who runs the world's largest gold mine in West Papua. Here, I examine different forms of knowledge to understand the relations between mining, Papuans, and their dispossession.

From experience I turn to the discussion of political life and consciousness through the study of women's movements. Anthropologists of Melanesia have developed relations between political life and gender formation in the region, drawing attention to the questions of inequality and male personification as a basis for Melanesian politics. Instead of following this script, Chapter 5 focuses on the quotidian politics of the urban space where Papuan women assert their presence as market actors. Through the study of a group of indigenous Papuan women traders who have organized themselves under *Solpap* (I. *Solidaritas Pedagang Asli Papua*, The Solidarity of Papuan Indigenous Traders) and Yosepha Alomang, founder of

the Kulalok cooperative, I want to reexamine the conception of power and gender in Melanesia. Chapter 6 addresses Papuan liberation movements. It examines West Papua's national consciousness against the backdrop of the changing approaches of Indonesia rule in West Papua. There are four historical moments that the chapter looks carefully: 1) the emergence of the West Papuan Liberation Movement (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*) and its armed wing in 1965; 2) the rise of students and youth movements in the city of Jayapura from the 1970s; 3) the emergence of the conception of blackness and Melanesian-ness among the Papuans; and 4) Papuan nationalism after the 1998 Indonesian democratic and decentralization reforms.

I conclude the dissertation with a reflection on Papuan history and how Papuans see their history. What does a failed decolonization mean for them? How does history become an extremely high-stakes battle in Papuan politics and how do Papuans, through their encounters with a new colonial power, articulate a new historical consciousness that is characterized by their resistance against the *amberi* (foreigners) historiography of West Papua?

Politics of Anthropology in a Colonial Present

History and Historical Consciousness

My dissertation argues that Papuans' consciousness rests on their histories and experiences under colonialism. Therefore, I use historical ethnography to tell Papuans' histories, but I also look at how Papuans see their own histories. In other words, I am also interested in understanding their historicity. Ballard suggests that there are at least three types of historical accounts of West Papua; the personal memoirs and histories of the Dutch colonial administration, the Catholic and Protestant missions, and the Indonesia government

(1999, 151).[28] All of these histories share two common threads, which are the lack or absence of Papuan agency both in the historical narratives and the authorship of the historical writing, and the medium through which these histories are disseminated, namely writing. This is a genre of history that Papuans call *amberi* history (foreigners' history). *Amberi* history of West Papua rests on the *amberi* historiography, *amberi* archives, and *amberi* categories of knowledge. Their documents are stored in the state archives, church archives, university archives, and other *amberi* institutions. I make use of this *amberi* history and pay attention to their *amberi*-ness.

Writing and rewriting Papuan history is the central tenet of Papuans' colonial consciousness. I consider Papuans' historical projects fundamental to my dissertation. Papuan intellectual Tom Beanal says that the history of Papuans begins when the Papuans become subjects of history. It starts when Papuans are aware that they have been colonized. Therefore, they rise and fight (Giay 2000a, 3). The guiding question for this historical research is then as follows: What kind of logic and semantics do they use to describe their historical events and processes? To answer this question, I look at different historical moments that are deemed important by the Papuans.

The first historical event of this kind is the transfer of New Guinea's administration from the Dutch to the UNTEA in 1962, and then to Indonesia in 1963. The second is a set of violent events that take place after the arrival of Indonesia, for instance, military operations. Here, violent events have transformed themselves into a structure that shapes Papuans' encounters with Indonesia. The third is the arrival of Freeport's mining operations in 1967. The fourth is the arrival of Indonesian migrants, and the last one is a series of Papuan resistance movements against Indonesia from 1963 to 2016. My research on Papuan

[28] Compare Jaarsma 1993 and Power 1999.

history necessitates a redefinition of the archive. For Papuans, archives of Papuan history are located in their experiences as the colonized.

Spaces of Experience

Joan Scott (1991) has warned that using experience as an epistemological foundation of historical projects precludes questions about discourse, difference, subjectivity, and power. In other words, she is concerned with the question of who gets to decide what counts as experience (790). In this dissertation, I attempt to develop methods to "historicize experience, and to reflect critically on the history we write about it" (790). To put it differently, I develop methods that enable me to historicize Papuans' experience and make clear their subject positions so that we may "understand the operations of the complex and changing discursive processes by which identities are ascribed, resisted, or embraced, and which processes themselves are unremarked and indeed achieve their effect because they are not noticed" (792, compare Chakrabarty 1992).

This requires attention to the forms of narration and their absence. I gathered books, articles, social media posts, short stories, novels, and poems by Papuans. I carried out interviews with Papuan authors. I conducted oral histories of the older generation of Papuans who graduated from the mission schools. I collected songs, stories, and sermons that I heard from student groups, on campus and in the boarding houses, from writers and poets, from ministers and pastors, farmers and traders. I use these archives of experience as a sensing technique. It is a technique that allows me to sense and attend to Papuans' history and historicity.

As I have demonstrated across the chapters, I also emphasize the fact that Papuans write, make a new category of knowledge, write about their colonizers, and fight an epistemic struggle as a colonized nation. Scholars, those who are infatuated with liberation movements, have chronicled the lives of many Papuan men—for they are mainly men—who take arms, make statements in the media, form liberation groups and fragment them, attach themselves to the Melanesian cargo cult and magic amulets, travel to the Netherlands, or Australia, and make their cause known to the international audience. I follow these men, but also the women, those who die in silence, those who occupy the spaces in the city and involve themselves in a capitalist economy, those who tend their gardens and challenge the mining company, those who are not subsumed under the structure of a colonial system, but reinvent their institutions, such as a pig feast for adjustment, but also radicalization. I write about these women in Chapter 5, but also about their men and children. I write about those who go to Indonesian schools, learn the history of their subjugation, pretend that they are the empty bottle where the teachers fill them with stories of heroic Indonesian nationalist struggle. Those are the children who go to the university, live in the student boarding houses, meet students from other areas in the territory, and create urban-based organizations that have a strong presence on Facebook and in the streets. In other words, this is an ethnography that addresses a new reality of Papuan connected worlds.

Engaged anthropologist

I spent approximately 18 months of ethnographic and archival fieldwork in West Papua from the summer of 2012 to my extended fieldwork in 2015-2016. As an Indonesian, I had never visited West Papua before 2012. When I finally arrived there, my arrival marked my immediate entrance into a colonial system. My access to certain spaces and knowledge

depended on my recognition of the social order of the colonial world, and the colonial thresholds that exist between them. I depended on the existence of Indonesian domination system and the American imperial power (Asad 1973 and Said 1989). My national citizenship eased many procedures that I had to go through to research West Papua.[29] My citizenship and physiognomy granted me access to the powerful, but it prevented me from acting innocent among the colonized. Rejections, refusals, and denials from Papuans were commonplace. Papuan high officials were extremely careful for not openly talking about Indonesian sovereignty. Suspicions abound. In a culture of political surveillance and military control, gathering data and doing participant observation was not too different from intelligence works. Both could have life and death consequences for the Papuans. This broader colonial context shaped the ethnographic knowledge that emerged in this dissertation.

Before I began my fieldwork, I reported to and applied for an affiliation with the University of Cenderawasih. The affiliation with the university was crucial for my research. The university allowed me to work with their anthropology department, anthropology lab, and their museum, and to develop meaningful connections with Papuan students and lecturers. In the hinterlands, the affiliation with the University and the discipline of anthropology—so familiar to many Papuans— helped Papuans understand some of my work and justified my interest in their cultures. The university itself was a critical site to look at as I write in Chapter 6.

I also slowly built connections with Papuans through language tutorials. Due to my relationship and some practical considerations, I decided to learn Mee and Hubula

[29] Even after the reforms, non-Indonesians are prevented from carrying research and journalistic works in West Papua, unless they are willing to go through complicated and strict vetting process from the Indonesian government and military and intelligence administration.

languages, two languages spoken by the two largest ethnic groups—in terms of population numbers—in West Papua. A familiarity with Papuan vernaculars offered some assurance to the Papuans that I was not 'just another Indonesian colonizer," or worse that I was a spy or intelligence officer. This should be read in the context where, although Indonesian presence in West Papua has extended more than 50 years, very few Indonesians speak the language or even consider Papuan languages and cultures were worth studying.

The strict control and nature of spatial configurations in West Papua prevented me from accessing military installments and insurgent areas. Access to a certain population is considered improper or simply dangerous, such as Papuans' demonstration of independence. Here filmmaking and my involvement with media projects in West Papua allowed a different and more nuanced positioning. While I was in West Papua, I was involved in a collaborative project for an online video platform with the Papuans. The platform was intended to provide spaces for issues deemed important by Papuans. I used my anthropological and media works there to support Papuans' struggle to become subjects of their own. Kirsch (2018) calls it engaged anthropology. For me, it was an ethnographic moment. It was a moment where even though the Papuans and I stood across the road, we both were defiant to the power that defined us.

2. Evidence of Writing: Churches and Colonial Politics in West Papua

"The people of South New Guinea die out, that's the fact. Does the Government know?" The question was asked by the member of the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart (D. *Missionarissen van het Heilig Hart*) Peter Vertenten, M.S.C. in *de Java-Post*, a Catholic newspaper in the capital of the Netherlands East Indies, Batavia on June 27, 1919.[30] Pastor Peter Vertenten arrived in Merauke in the south New Guinea eight years after the Dutch colonial government established their post in 1902. The so-called "depopulation of Melanesians" including the Marind-Anim had sparked a series of debates in the government circles, missions, and publics.[31] After the arrival of European traders, Chinese hunters and Dutch colonial government, the population of Marind-Anim decreased significantly.[32] During the

[30] The article was written for *De Java-Post*, June 27, 1919. Several major newspapers immediately responded to it or reposted the original article. This quote is from "De bevolking van Zuid Nieuw-Guinea" in *Het nieuws van den dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië,*" 01 July 1919. *De Sumatra Post* interviewed Vertenten on August 1, 1919 after the publication of his articles (see "Vrouwen te veel," np.). Also in *Het nieuws van den dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië*," under a title of "Zuid N. Guinea" on July 24, 1919. All translations in this chapter are mine, unless noted otherwise.

[31] The depopulation of Melanesians was a big concern in the early 20th century, ironically just when anthropology as a discipline was consolidated in the area. In 1922, British anthropologist W.H.R. Rivers edited a volume on this topic entitled *Essays on the Depopulation of Melanesia*. This edited volume focuses their study in Solomon Islands and New Hebrides (today Vanuatu) where black birding took place. Like Atlantic slavery, many Pacific islanders were coerced to work in plantations primarily in Australia and Fiji through black birding. Malinowski's salvage anthropology cannot be more resonant here. In the larger context, the belief that the savages were self-exterminating is aligned with the rise of biological racist doctrines in the late 19th century. See Brantlinger 2003.

[32] Chinese and European hunters and traders had arrived in Merauke from at least 18th century, Captain James Cook included. The Chinese hunted feathers of birds of paradise which were *en vogue* in the European fashion in the 18th and 19th century. After the Dutch government prohibited the hunting—due to the significant decrease of the bird population—in 1920, the Chinese and European hunted for sandal wood barks and other valuables. See Swadling 1997.

course of 1915-1919 venereal granuloma and Spanish flu eliminated one third of the coastal Marind population (Steenbrink 2015, 243). In the same period, the birth rate was almost zero. Since 1911, the Dutch had prohibited the Marind-Anim's headhunting and *mayo* cult, an initiation cult that entailed the use of human sperm gathered from *otiv bombari*. For the Dutch, it was the *otiv bombari* that stirred up their moral concern. They called it "ritual promiscuity", as a series of intercourse took place between one woman and all men belonging to her husband clan in the course of the Marind-Anim wedding ceremony (van Baal 1963, 213). Pastor Vertenten and Dutch colonial doctor dr. Cnopius were in the opinion that this ritual had spread a number of venereal diseases in Merauke.[33]

Vertenten's campaign in Batavia resulted in a series of policies and drastic measures to save the Marind-Anim—from themselves. A total reform was imposed upon the Marind-Anim that involved not only the Dutch colonial administration in Merauke but also the Dutch Catholic Church. This reform included a relocation and reconfiguration of Marind-Anim life into the so-called model villages where Marind-Anim's modes of living were about to be completely altered. The Marind-Anim all had to wear western clothes, lived in a nuclear monogamous family, and practiced Christian conduct. The model villages also required children to attend missionary school in the morning and return to their family in the afternoon. The construction of model villages put the school and church at the center of village life. Headhunting, a separation between men's and women's houses, *mayo* cult and

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[33] Reports of anthropologists suggest that the ceremony aimed to obtain male and female secretions for fertility purposes. See Knauft 1993. Otiv-bombari was performed in wedding nights, when a group of men – estimates ranged from just a few to all the adult men in the village – would have intercourse with the bride. See van Baal 1984. Paul Wirz, a Swiss anthropologist who worked among the Marind-Anim and knew Vertenten personally thought that Vertenten dramatized the demographic crisis of the Marind-Anim. As a Marxist, he was against the coercion that the government and mission exercised upon them. He says, "The new misery that came over the Marind-anim with that [program], can hardly be described. The government or much more the mission, because from them it all originated, acted with ruthless austerity." See Wirz 1922.

otiv-bombari ("the orgy" the Dutch say) were to be abolished once and for all. For this service, Pastor Peter Vertenten was called the savior of Marind-Anim and received the Knight in the Order of Orange-Nassau.[34] For the Catholic, it was the beginning of their dominant role in the life of southern Papuans.

We have learned how different missions arrived in New Guinea and began their civilizing missions in various places in the region. This chapter will focus on the colonial politics of churches in New Guinea, a vast area which under the Dutch but primarily Indonesia's rule has been considered as the colony's backwater. With large groups of Papuans Christianized in the 19th century, Dutch Calvinist, American Evangelical Protestant and Catholic missionaries established congregations, schools, centers for translation and language learning, and centers for food production with an aim to build Christian communities among these people. The chapter attempts to make an argument for the aggressive efforts for the inscription of Papuan ethnicities and Papuan vernacular languages as a form of knowledge as well as a political instrument, and the emergence of trans-ethnic and trans-linguistic networks that gave a basis for the emergence of indigenous Papuan identities.

The timeline for this history spreads from the mid-19th century when the Dutch colonial government and the Dutch Calvinist arrived in coastal West Papua, then in the 20th century when the Dutch Catholic began their work in the coastal south, and in the mid-20th century when the Anglo-American evangelical Protestant arrived in the Central Highlands, an area un-pacified by the Dutch colonial administration. The last part of the chapter will

[34] By a historical coincidence, he moved to Belgian Congo and worked there from 1927-1939. During this period, the Belgian colonial government also carried out a program to tackle the depopulation and sterility problems of native Congolese. For a remarkable account of this policy, see Hunt 2016 and on the biography of Peter Vertenten, read Vlamynck 1949.

focus on the period when the Dutch power eclipsed in the whole territory and was replaced by Indonesia in 1963.

The heated debates regarding the 'cultures' of Marind-Anim and Papuans in general or whether the Papuans have a culture at all marked not only the Catholic approach to the problem of church planting, but also mission politics in the colonial West Papua. In the heyday of European colonialism and the ascendancy of theory of evolution in Euro-American science and missionary circles, social Darwinism entered and made use religiosity discourse as a way to understand and make sense human differences. In other words, the idea about God and or supernatural beings is used to chart human evolution, with Christianity was placed at the pinnacle of this development.[35]

The impact of this discourse was certainly felt among the British evangelicals who had worked in the Pacific Islands since the 18th century. In West Papua, however, the Christian missions came from the Netherlands, a small imperial power that ruled the whole Netherlands East Indies until 1945 and Netherlands New Guinea until 1963. To some extent, Dutch churches (both Calvinist and Catholic) share many of the concerns that the debates articulated, particularly on the question of universal faculty of faith and the place of indigenous non-white in the church. Yet some questions arise as how did certain conception of salvation and race manifest itself in the Dutch missions in New Guinea? How did it diverge from the latter missionaries, particularly the American evangelical Protestant that would dominate Christianity in the Highlands? What are the impacts of these various race

[35] This took place most fervently in the United Kingdom where many early Melanesian (and Pacific in general) anthropologists worked. The 19th century also witnessed the publication of Charles Darwin's *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871) and E.B. Tylor's *Primitive Culture* (1871) which offered a springboard for the question of religious faculty that may or may not distinguish men from animals. See Gardner 2008 and Stocking 1968.

and colonial politics in the constitution of Papuan Christianity and Papuan identity in general?

Since the beginning, the Dutch Reformed Church—the first mission that arrived in this region collaborated with or at least upheld the sovereignty of the colonial state, complying with their Calvinist doctrine and emphasizing their shared agenda with the Dutch colonial power.[36] For the case of the Protestant, Dr. Hendrik Kraemer, a professor of theology and "a fighter for the renewal of the Netherlands Reformed Church" even says," [The Dutch Reformed Church] was a *government institution*" (Kraemer 1958, 33), that the church officials

> "derive their authority from their nomination by a religiously neutral government, which has only a certain relationship to a church by virtue of certain historical causes…It is neither a State Church, nor a National Church, nor a free church. It mostly resembles a state church, but lacks one of the most salutary features of a state church: the link with a state which, however tolerant, has a definite appreciation of Church and Christianity. The Protestant church in the Indies, however, is linked to a state which, also because it rules a colonial non-Christian country, professes as much as possible disinterest towards religion and church. The centralized organization of the Protestant church in the Indies is not based on principles of ecclesiastical law, bet it hierarchy or episcopacy, but on the fortuitous fact, totally foreign to the essence of a church, that it has been created in the image of government hierarchy"(34).

This lengthy passage represents the circumstances in which the Calvinist church worked both in the Netherlands East Indies and New Guinea. While Catholic represented the minority and tensions frequently arose between them, the Catholic Church, as my vignette shows, was also engaged in the imperial projects of pacification. Indeed in what the 19th

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[36] Before the dissolution of the Dutch East India Company (D. *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*) and the transfer of its colony to the imperial government in 1799, the Dutch Reformed Church took the role of the "official" church of the company, particularly in Batavia (Jakarta) and Moluccas, two trading centers in the Netherlands East Indies. In his *Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Max Weber extensively discusses the relation of Calvinism and Pietism, two strands of Protestantism that were particularly strong in the Netherlands, to capitalism. The whole idea about the spirit of capitalism is indeed based on Calvinist's doctrines. See Weber 1985[1930], 95-154.

century missionary called a cannibals' and headhunters' country, collaboration with the colonial government was not merely a form of doctrine but a necessary means for a church expansion.

Dutch civilizing missions in the Netherlands New Guinea are highly specific and unique to Papuan context, but in the larger background, the expansion of Dutch territorial control from Java to the Netherlands East Indies' outer islands (D.*buitengewesten*) should be understood as a regional and global historical phenomenon. In 1795, the French Revolutionary Army under the leadership of Napoleon invaded the Netherlands and ruled the country until 1813. Overseas Dutch territories were immediately occupied by the British. After the Treaty of Amiens, the British returned two of these territories, i.e. the Netherlands East Indies and Cape Colony to the Dutch. Following this transition, the Dutch underwent a major national and imperial building phase. After losing Belgium in 1939, the Dutch soon expanded and intensified their territorial control of Netherlands East Indies to Other islands, particularly Sumatra and New Guinea. Even if the colonial expansion was constitutive to the formation of Dutch national identity, the Dutch publics were silent about Dutch colonial expansion abroad. Susan Legêne argues that this has something to do with the continuing power of the Dutch elites who retained their overseas possession even under the French rule.

This silence was even more deafening particularly in the context of Dutch involvement with the slave trade.[37] Unlike the British and France in that period, the Dutch never wanted to surrender their interest in the slave trade. In fact, not until in 1863, thirty years after England and fifteen years after France that the Dutch ceased their involvement

[37] Until today, the silence remains. The Dutch national silence on slavery makes their indifferent attitude towards West Papuan issues thoroughly unsurprising. See Legêne 2002. For the involvement of Dutch in the slave trade, see P. C. Emmer 2006.

with the slave trade.[38] This has a large consequence in New Guinea's context in which Papuan slaves had been seen in the 17th and 18th century Moluccas (Andaya 1993; Widjojo 2014). We will return to this after considering the specificity of Dutch's presence in New Guinea.

In 1828, the Dutch reluctantly set up their government post in coastal Fort du Bus in the western part of the region but left in 1936 due to the hostile natives. The social and anthropological situation of Papua Island—both in New Guinea and Papua New Guinea was unparalleled in most areas of administrative and religious expansion in the world. This in particular refers to their diversity and what foreigners perceive as a lack in political institutional forms (Sahlins 1963). As two Dutch anthropologists say, "On anthropologists whose training had focused almost entirely on Indonesia, Papuan cultures created an impression of extreme variability and incompleteness. In most respects New Guinea was the opposite of Java…"(J.J. De Wolf and S.R. Jaarsma, 1992, 118). Confronted with populations that had never had a sustained encounter with European power, that speak in many different languages, have many strange and different 'cultures', have no hierarchical form of governance, and live in an extremely difficult terrain, both the government had to find a way to render these people legible to modern administration. Christianity was their first answer.

[38] In the United States, slavery also ended in 1865.

Educating Papuans Before World War II

> " Labour must […] be performed as if it were an absolute end of itself, a calling. But such an attitude is by no means a product of nature. It…can only be the product of a long and arduous process of *education*."
>
> (Max Weber1985[1930], 62)

The colonial government saw that the mission could be useful for their pacification efforts, particularly through their education program. For the missions, as I have demonstrated with Peter Vertenten and his Catholic Church in Merauke, the importance of modern education in "saving" Papuans and to incorporate them into the sacred union of Christianity was out of question. In the Catholic area, school was the only platform for the church to make a connection with the indigenous population. In the Protestant circle, school was the first institution that the missions set up to attract the indigenous population. In the school, the missions could impose their reform agenda to Papuans, particularly children; as it was the place for Papuans "to unlearn their bad habits"(Cornelissen 1988, 253; Kamphuis 96). Similar to the civilizing efforts in Canada (Francis 1998), education then became the domain in which colonial politics was exercised—both by the government and the missions.

In New Guinea, the first modern school was established by the European Calvinist in the island of Mansiman in the Cenderawasih Bay in 1858 (Rumainum 1966, 73; Kamma 1976, 371; Hummel 2012).[39] In the whole Netherlands East Indies, the colonial government began their education efforts in 1871, fifteen years after the mission initiative in Netherlands New Guinea.[40]

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[39] In the eastern part (today Papua New Guinea), Christian missionaries began to arrive in 1871, mainly represented by the London Missionary Society. See Healey and Taylor 1977.

[40] In 1871, the Dutch colonial government passed the *Grondslagenbesluit Onderwijs* (Foundational Decision on Education) that became the foundation for the establishment of public school system in the colony. See Kamphuis 2015, 23 and Boone 1994.

Since its inception the school system in the region was markedly different. The originary structure of modern school in New Guinea is a European home. Early Papuan school children came from former slaves that were manumitted and adopted into European household. They were trained as members of Protestant family with lessons that geared towards a good Protestant conduct, such as hygiene, reading, writing, basic arithmetic, gardening, singing and praying (Van Hasselt 1922, 49). It is mentioned only as a matter of fact that the first Papuan school was run by a woman. Augusta Letz, wife of *Zendeling-werklieden* (Christian Workman) missionary Carl Ottow expanded a home schooling that his husband established in 1857. In addition to the boys, Letz opened a school for girls, the first of its kind in the region with seven indigenous students studied how to read, write, and sew (Latuputty 2014). [41]

In 1863, the Utrecht Mission Society began to take over the missionary efforts in New Guinea, marking the more institutionalized form of missionization on the side of European Calvinist. With more resources, they expanded to the western shore of Cenderawasih Bay, from Manokwari to Ron islands. For the first time in New Guinea, Reverend J.L. van Hasselt led the mission from Manokwari and became the first head of mission in the region (1863-1907). With the expansion of the mission, so was the school system. By the end of 19th century, there were seven schools in New Guinea (Latuputty 2014, 126). In 1915, however, the number increased to 86 schools and in 1933, it amounted to 155 schools, mainly in the western shore and north coast of New Guinea (Staat der Gementen en Schoolen 1915; Asperen 1936, 40-41). In 1942, the Dutch Protestant had managed 300 schools.

The Catholic began their work in the south of New Guinea at the turn of century. The Missionaries of the Sacred Heart arrived in Merauke and began to work among the Marind-Anim

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[41] Alfred Russel Wallace (1906) also mentions that most students were indeed girls. See his *Malay Archipelago* part II.

and Muyu (Haripranata SJ 1972; Cornelissen 1988). Other areas in the south, such as Mimika and Asmat, the west (Kaimana, Fakfak, Babo), Manokwari, then to the north in Keerom followed suit. Teachers from Kei, Tanimbar and North Sulawesi in Indonesia were assigned to village schools in the south. Their mission in Fakfak developed with the establishment of secondary schools (D. *vervolkschoolen*, VVS) and teachers' schools (D. *Opleidingssch ool voor Volksonderwijzer* [OVVO] or *Opleidingsschool voor Dorps- onderwijzers* [ODO]). Fakfak became the first center for the mission and the most important one for the elementary education for the indigenous Catholic community. Papuan students came from all over place in the Netherlands New Guinea to be trained. After the graduation, they would be sent to the hinterlands and other remote areas to develop new Catholic churches and schools there.

In the Central Highlands, the Catholic mission opened their post and built parishes in Wisselmeren. Herman Tillemans M.S.C. opened nine mission posts with a school and brought teachers from Kei between 1939-1943. In 1949, when the war ended, the Fransiscan took over the Catholic mission in Enarotali, Waghete, Kugapa, then in Ugapuga (1951), Epouto (1951), Modio (1952), and Timeepa (1952). In 1957, the mission started to work in Moni area in Bidogai and Bidai. In Ilaga valley, a mission station was opened in Lani and Amungme area in 1960. In Tigi area, a second parish was established in Deiyai. In the late 1950s, a mission post in Ugapuga, Kamuu valley was relocated to Moanemani. The Fransiscan took over Mimika coast in 1952 after the Missionary of Sacred Hearts worked there since the 1920s. The center of mission for the whole territory was Kokonau, and two parishes were set up in Peronggo and Atuka. By 1936, in the whole Netherlands South New Guinea there were already 197 Catholic village schools. From there, the Franciscans went to the southern part of the snow mountain (Carstenz-Massive) and opened mission posts in Tsinga and Noemba valley in Amungme area. The Baliem Valley followed through in 1958 and Star

Mountain in 1959. According to a 1964 document,[42] there were at least 24 village schools (D.*dorpsscholen*) in the whole Wisselmeren. By January 1, 1969, there were 25 new village schools to be subsidized in Paniai and by October 1, 1969, there were seven new village schools in Baliem area (Verslag van de Gang van het Onderwijs in Het Visdom Djajapura 1969) with the total number of students for both areas was approximately 13,000 (on average 72 students per school, two thirds were male). Local appointed teachers were 274 teachers and the remaining 91 were from outside New Guinea.[43]

Except the civilizing school, the educational policy in New Guinea seems to be aligned with the policy in Batavia, particularly after the transition to the Ethical Policy in the early 20th century. But if the Ethical Policy resulted in the proliferation of public schools in the Netherlands East Indies, in New Guinea they had to wait until after 1949 to witness the same phenomenon (see Suwignyo 2012). This will mark a policy difference between the Netherlands East Indies and New Guinea that continues until this area under Indonesia. Klein (1961, 88) describes that in elementary level, the Dutch colonial government merely run two public village schools in New Guinea while the missions (both Protestant and Catholic) run 710 subsidized schools and 496 non-subsidized schools with the total number of pupils in 1961 was 33,374 children. In the higher level (continuation schools, secondary schools, and teachers' school), the missions run 110 schools compared to 23 the government schools. The Catholic and the Protestants received an equal amount of subsidy, which was disadvantageous for the Protestants; as they had to divide this subsidy to several denominations.

[42] YPPK Archive: Sapta Usaha Tama Participants List, 1964.

[43] All this data is collected through the archive of Yayasan Pendidikan dan Persekolahan Katolik in Jayapura. Since the archive is not classified and systematically recorded, specific page or box or folder cannot be provided. If specific information can be surmised from the archive itself, sources will be provided. This number included 22 Toraja teachers

From Klein's data, we can also elicit that most schools were located in the Catholic and European Calvinists areas, with schools in South New Guinea and Fakfak, traditionally Catholic areas amounted to 279 schools, while in Hollandia, Geelvink Bay, and West New Guinea,[44] traditionally European Calvinist areas amounted to 353 schools, and the Central Highlands which belongs to the American evangelical Protestant merely had 80 schools (Klein 1962, 94). The Dutch Reformed Church run at least three training schools for village teachers in Hollandia, Biak, and Serui, the Catholic had four schools which were located at Fakfak, Mindiptama, Merauke, and Nabire. The evangelical Protestant ran one school which was located at Tiom.[45] In 1973, the Catholic mission had had six lower Teachers' school (I. *Sekolah Guru Bawah,* SGB) which were located entirely in the coastal area: Biak (then moved to Jayapura), Fakfak, Merauke, Mindiptana (in Mappi), and Agats.[46]

At the micro-level, this demonstrates the powerful role that the missions played in New Guinea and the severe lack of the provision of public education by the Dutch and later, Indonesian government. Contrary to Benedict Anderson's simplification of colonial education in the 19th and early 20th century, in New Guinea education did not form "a single, if ramshackle pyramid"(1983, 129). Not only that colonial education in New Guinea did not see Batavia as the educational apex, but also the idea of "an archipelagic stage on which they had parts to play" was unknown to many of Papuan students. This is largely due to the powerful role that the missions play in New Guinea and their global, instead of regional orientation, and the severe lack of the provision of public education

[44] With some exceptionn in Sorong and Arfak areas, which are Catholic areas.

[45] Interview YPPGI, September 1, 2015.

[46] SGB Biak that moved to Jayapura in 1979 under the name of SGB Teruna Bakti Waena, SGB Fakfak, SGB Merauke, SGB Mindiptana (in Mappi), SGB Agats, and SPG Merauke. See YPPK archive, August 6, 1973).

by the Dutch and Indonesian governments. The spread of Malay which in other parts of the Netherlands East Indies enabled the emergence of Indonesian nationalism, does not give birth to the spread of this sentiment in New Guinea, showing the limit of language as a unifying entity in the region. In New Guinea itself, the unevenness of Papuan education has enabled the emergence of Papuan elites from certain ethnic groups, such as Biak and north coastal people (Sentani and Jayapura) in the Dutch Calvinist area and Mee from both the Catholic and American Evangelical Protestant areas.[47] Different from Indonesia, though, the ethno-linguistic marker would be entangled by the colonial and mission politics of race and civilizing schools, which made the formation of Papuan identities more complicated.

[47] In 1980/1981, for instance, 30 out of 70 students in SGB Teruna Bakti in Waena were Mee (YPPK archive). The rest were from Oksibil, Wamena, Intan Jaya and Puncak (llaga) (Yeimo's interview, October 29, 2015). Indeed until 1980, at least 25 Mee students from Moanemani were sent to SPG in coastal areas per year (Sjerps's interview, 5 October 2015).




Figure 2.1. The Dutch school system in the Netherlands New Guinea. In 1933, village schools were preceded or replaced by civilizing schools.

Civilizing Schools in West Papua

In the period before the World War II, one particular character of modern education in the Dutch New Guinea emerged, namely the formation of civilizing schools (D.*beschavingsscholen*)). It is my argument that civilizing schools were the privileged domain of racial politics of the Dutch colonial power, particularly after its turn toward more liberal and ethical policies in The Hague as well as in Batavia. While the Dutch used denigrating languages to talk about the natives, only in New Guinea the Dutch used the word 'civilizing' as a verb. And this began in 1933 when the colonial government passed a supplementary education budget for the emerging domain of education.




Figure 2.2. Civilizing school (*beschavingsschool*) in Enarotali, Wisselmeren in 1950. Collection: Tropenmuseum Amsterdam.

In the opinion of the government, the existing village school which lasted for three years failed to educate Papuans because of "too much scholarly character" in their programs (Soerabaijasch handelsblad 1940, 1). The article says that Papuans exhibited a tendency to wander instead of staying calm in the classroom. The Catholic missions found out that the Papuan students

could not meet the requirements of the folk school (Eijt and Hautvast 2002, 229).[48] In their early schooling mission, the Protestant even used the word 'degenerated' (D.*ontaard*) to refer to Papuan children. Therefore civilizing schools (D. *beschavingsscholen*) were invented and designed "to accustom the children to order and cleanliness"(1). A certain Mr. van Bael, reported by *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* wrote,

> "Papuans, who visited the so-called folk schools (the same kind of schools that had been on the Indonesian islands), seemed unable to understand the most primitive and rudimentary skills of reading, writing and arithmetic…This peculiar backwardness increased Papuans' reluctance to go to school. These difficulties are greatest in the south of the island. This is strongly related to their [weak] mind, which is more or less typical of all the Papuan tribes. That condition is partly reflected in the faith of the Papuans in miracles, in magic, which is a very strong power throughout New Guinea."[49]

It is a little wonder that the government officials and the Catholic Church who fervently promoted this type of school shared the same attitude towards the Papuans, which was "a mixture of pity and contempt" (Kamphuis 2016, 93). In *De Tijd*, a Catholic newspaper in the Netherlands, Pastor Mauwese, M.S.C. visiting from New Guinea told his interviewer, "As far as my experience goes, which concerns mainly the Mappiers, the intelligence of the Papuan is not high yet. Usually they learn nothing after 15 or 16 years old. They also cannot see the usefulness of education…"(1954, 12). [50]

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[48] See Hautvast 2002 and Suwignyo 2011, 229.

[49] "Papoea's denken dat kinderen op school toveren leren: Uiteenzetting in V.N. over Nieuw-Guinea" in *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 24 August 1950, 6.

[50] "Gesprek met pater Meuwese: Grote resultaten op Nieuw-Guinea, Beschavingswerk allereerste eis" in *De Tijd : godsdienstig-staatkundig dagblad,* January 2, 1954, 12.

In another discussion, the Calvinist ethics seeped into the conversation. Under a rather primitive circumstance of New Guinea, one Dutch commentator suggests, "Education should be given with caution. Caution, because one should not feed to the idea that children learn magic in school, instead they have to work hard and learn to earn a living"(*Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* 1950, 6). Therefore the first and foremost emphasis of civilizing schools is not the education itself, but "civilization". Papuan children from seven to 18 years old were schooled to learn basic principles of civilization. While the words "civilizing" and "civilization" came from the government, the Catholic and Dutch Protestant Church aggressively implemented this idea in their vast school networks.

In line with the school standardization in the Netherlands East Indies in 1936, the government transformed existing Papuan village schools into civilizing schools. Although Dutch colonial government, Dutch Protestant and Catholic Missions held this civilizing mission everywhere in the Netherlands East Indies,[51] the existence of civilizing school in New Guinea marked the unique approach that Dutch took to this region. In the Netherlands East Indies, bringing Christianity to the natives was seen as a task, a duty (D. *taakgedachte)*, not only in Calvinist term but also in the context of an ethical turn in the Dutch colonial policy. After the brutal forced cultivation in Java (1830-the 1860s), the liberal force within Dutch politics felt that the late 19th century was the moment where the Dutch should "repay with moral benefits the enormous debt incurred from all the material goods which have flowed so abundantly from Indonesia over the past 200 years"(Veth 1849, 4). Since it was not possible and advisable to evangelize Christianity to the majority of Muslim natives in Java and Sumatra, the heathen world of New Guinea became the

[51] As described in "The 'General Church Order' of 1643, schoolmasters –a typical Dutch Protestant bureaucrat assigned to run a native school—were "first and foremost to instill into the youngsters the fear of God, to teach them the fundamental principles of Christian religion, to teach them to pray, sing, to take them to church and give them religious instruction. Secondly, to teach them to obey their parents, those placed in authority over them and the masters. Thirdly, to teach them to read and write, as well as arithmetic. Fourthly, to teach them all kinds of good morals and manners, and finally to ensure that no language was used in the schools other than the Dutch language." See Kroeskamp 1974, 14 and Van Boetzelaer 1906, 325.

primary target of this policy. It was a historical conjuncture that this agenda took place concurrently with the expansion of Dutch territorial control in outer islands as I have mentioned.

I also argue that civilizing schools were a manifestation of old racialist ideas about European racial superiority. It was not so clear whether the Dutch was still attached to the idea of scientific racism that was quite popular among missionaries and colonial officers working in the Pacific at the same period. At the University of Leiden, an important institution that trained many colonial officers and to less extent, missionaries-anthropologists in the Netherlands East Indies, Wilken, the chair of the anthropology department made use of the Netherlands East Indies' ethnographic data to make an argument in support of evolutionist theories (Vermeulen 1998, 96).

However, it seems to me that rather than merely looking at race as an immutable biological category, the Dutch shared many of the attitudes of British and French settlers in other Pacific islands who saw Melanesians (whom Papuans are included) were inferior compared to, not only their Polynesian neighbors in the east but also Malays (or Asians) in the west, in terms of social organization, kinship, material cultures and their conception of spirituality and spiritual beings.[52] Both the Dutch missions and colonial government shared the understanding that it was their task to bring Papuans to light through education; as education developed "a systemic method of rational conduct with the purpose of overcoming the state of nature to free man from the power of irrational impulse and his dependence of the world and on nature" (Weber 119). This racial and paternalistic attitude would manifest most clearly in the politics of indigenous church and the issue

[52] In the words of Papuan pastor, Reverend Benny Giay, "The Dutch just could not find any temple here." This argument was actually used during the political dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Both, however, share the same attitude towards what they perceive as Papuans' primitiveness and the impossibility of Papuans to determine their own political futures. I explore this topic in the first chapter. Alfred Russel Wallace was one among early scientists that proposed a sharp racial difference between the Malays and what he calls "the negro." See Ballard 2008, 183.

of segregation between the Dutch and Papuan church, but we need to return to how the civilization schools would enable such formation.

According to Kamphuis, civilizing schools primarily aimed at shaping native children in such a way that they would become susceptible to school education (2016, 111), therefore basic skills such as reading and writing were secondary.[53] As the advisor for native education explained:

> "On a civilization school, the most primitive form of education is given to a population, who hardly have any organized society yet, and for whom the school is an entirely alien [*wezensvreemd*] element in that society. (...) Only when the school (...) has met response in the primitive society, the mental development can be taken up"[54] (quoted from Kamphuis 111).

In a budget request to the Netherlands' House of Representative (D. *Tweede Kamer den Staten-Generaal*), civilization school is described as follow:

> "When a particular area has been brought under control, schools of this type should be immediately set up. In the past, the way things were often the other way around; first came the Mission or a Mission with a civilization school, then the Board. In the first period, the emphasis was on civilization. When the mission adopted these children into the school, there was no age restriction, nor a curriculum. Children were taught by personal examples: garden works, manual labors, an instruction to instill a sense of hygiene, playing a flute, and learning basic Malay. If those items above have been cultivated and school attendance has become regular, children will be taught to read, writing, and arithmetic a little. Gradually, the focus will shift more towards education..."[55]

In 1938, the Director of Education and Religious Affairs in Batavia laid out the tasks and curriculum of civilizing school (Kamma 1953, 237-238) which included domains in which Papuans were perceived as good at, such as music ("if possible through the creation of flute orchestra, but this should be adapted to the 'cultural heritage' of the population"), story telling class using "aboriginal legends", and sports, including indigenous children's games. The second component of

[53] Compare Drooglever 2009, 284.

[54] See ANRI: Alg. Sec. GBB 3643, 'Wd. Adviseur inlandsch onderwijs', 1939.

[55] See *Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1949-1950 kamerstuknummer 1654 ondernummer 12, Vaststelling van de hoofdstukken XIII A en XIII B der Rijksbegroting voor het dienstjaar 1950,* 9.

the curriculum were geared toward instilling manners and orders to Papuan children, such as simple manual labor, such as the cleaning of the yard and school, the construction and maintenance of basic school gardens; the cultivation of a sense of order, cleanliness and hygiene; organizing school parties at national and other holidays; and in general, drawing the interest of the population to the school and its work. The last component consists of basic academic knowledge, which was counting from zero to 100, reading Latin characters, writing on the plates and paper, and basic Malay.

The conception of civilization school emphasizes on one hand, the inferior intellectual and cultural capacity of Papuans and the need to create new Papuan subjects that were much aligned with Dutch but particularly Christian concepts. Children were taken from their community and their cultures—in most cases, with coercion— and had to live in the boarding school with children from different places under the supervision of Dutch missionaries and or Ambonese or Keiese teachers.[56] Children usually had lessons from 8 o'clock in the morning until noon. They also had to work in the garden, in the missionaries' or teacher's houses as domestic helpers. In 1950, the number of civilization school in New Guinea was 358 (Tweede Kamer 1950).

The American Evangelicals in the Central Highlands

As the largest church denomination in the colony, the Dutch Reformed Church did not attempted to evangelize in the Central Highlands where the presence of the colonial government was absent until 1938. Right after the Dutch set up a small government post in Wisselmeren in the western cordillera of the Highlands, well-funded American mission the Christian and Missionary

[56] From several interviews that I carried out in the period of 2015-2016 with former pupils of civilizing school in West Papua (Interview PY, KB, NL), I found that Papuan children were separated, excluded, and removed from their community like what Aboriginal children in Australia but in New Guinea, children who did not do well in school could be returned to their parents/community. Parents, if they wished, also could visit their children in the school, through that was very rare. The stories that these former pupils shared in general were a mix of both pleasant and miserable stories (I. *suka maupun duka*), from feeling completely alone, stealing food from the school's dining hall, or the joy of knowing Papuans from other places. Moses Kilangin, an Amungme wrote about his experience attending a Catholic school of this type in his biography. See Kilangin 2009.

Alliance (the Alliance hereafter) requested a permission to carry out their missionization effort among the Mee.

For their late start, American evangelical Protestant missionaries reluctantly introduced the modern form of schooling in the Highlands. It is true that reading and writing is a mandatory prerequisite for being a good Protestant, yet the Alliance was careful not to mix up their task to evangelize the Bible with the business of education. This attitude also applies to their relations with the Dutch government. The American mission kept the Dutch colonial government at arm's length. In many cases where military forces were needed, the Americans would invite the presence and involvement of the Dutch but in many cases, they do not believe that the mission should be involved in the political affairs as said in Rome 13:7 "Give to everyone what you owe them: If you owe taxes, pay taxes; if revenue, then revenue; if respect, then respect; if honor, then honor." In many of their correspondences, administrative registers and tension marked the relation between the mission and the government, particularly in regard to the provision of public and mission infrastructure, such as airports, planes, and subsidies for school.

Right after they arrived in 1939, the Alliance built elementary schools in Enarotali, Dagoto, and Uwamini.[57] In the late 1942, there were seven missionary posts, each with a school in Mee-speaking area. At that time, four programs were central in the Alliance mission, namely Mee language's inscription, literacy programs, Bible translation into Mee language and the opening of Bible School for the natives (Lewis 2011, 404).[58] In 1948, the mission founded literacy schools (I. *Sekolah Pemberantasan Buta Huruf*, PBH) in Paniai with 24 Mee students, all were male. In 1953, Walter Post reported that there were 800 pupils in the Alliance 's public schools, or less than one per cent of the total population which was 60,000 at that time (Lewis 418). In 1957, Reverend J.

[57] In Enarotali, Ambonese teacher P. Pattipeilohy run the school. In Dagoto, it was a Dayak T. Tasing and an Ambonese teacher Ch. D. Paksoal led the school in Uwamini.
[58] See Lewis 2014.

Ellenberger and Gibbons established a witness school among the Damal in Ilaga. Reverend W. Cutts set up a similar school in Kemandoga. By 1966, there were 11,000 students enrolled. 4,756 graduates and could read unassisted (Lewis 407). The first graduation for the Preparatory Bible School of Enarotali took place in 1952. The Alliance also established two secular elementary schools in Paniai with subjects such as reading, writing, mathematics plus religion.[59] The Alliance also worked on Sunday school programs—which are not clear whether they taught literacy but in 1964, 13,204 students were enrolled in 127 Sunday schools in whole Papua (Lewis 412). In 1962, the Preparatory Bible School of Enarotali was relocated to Kebo and converted into the Bible School. The language instruction was changed from Mee to Malay. [60]

The Alliance set up Bible schools in Lani and Damal speaking area of Beoga and Pyramid (1963-1974). The total number of students in Kebo, Beoga, and Pyramid was 111 students. In 1964, in addition to these Bible Schools, there were four the preparatory Bible schools which used Indonesian as a language of instruction (Lewis 418). In 1969, the Alliance had 85 elementary schools and one teacher school. According to Rule (1977), in Lani speaking area of Bokondini, there were more than 30 literacy centers in 1972, with 120 literacy teachers. In another Lani speaking area of Karubaga, in the first half of 1973 the mission ran 24 literacy schools staffed with indigenous teachers and one American teacher.

Location	**Language of Instruction**	**Year of opening**	**First headmaster**
Kebo (Paniai)	Malay	1962 (from the Mee Bible school in	Walter Post

[59] The school was run by two teachers Reverend Wattimury and Alexander Unggu.

[60] I deliberately distinguish Malay from Indonesia. While this will be clear later, I refer Malay here as a language that was used during the Dutch colonial era which in West Papua lasted until 1963 and Indonesian as a national language of Indonesia that would be used in an official context in West Papua from 1963 on. Papuan Malay is a Creole language which has roots in the Malay being used during the Dutch era with a strong influence of Indonesian language.

		Enarotali)	
Pyramid (Lanny Jaya)	Lani	February 1963	James Sunda
Beoga (Puncak)	Damal	1963	Don Gibbons
Hitadipa	Moni	1967	W. Cutts
Mapnduma (Nduga)	Nduga	1971	A. van der Byl
Jayapura (Bible School R. Lesnussa)	Indonesian	January 1972	E. Bernard
Hetigima (Jayawijaya)	Hubula	January 1974	B. Karcesky
Sinatma (Wamena)	Indonesian	1977	T. Bozeman
Nabire (Theology school)	Indonesian	1980	J. Schultz
Abepura (Walter Post School of Theology)	Indonesian	1986	Benny Giay

Table 2. 1. The Alliance's Bible Schools in the Central Highlands. Source: Sunda 1963 and Lewis 2011.

Other Anglo-speaking missionaries, such as RBMU and APCM also established witness schools (Lani, *tekola paga*) and literacy classes in Lani-speaking areas in 1960, such as in Kelila, Bokondini, Karubaga, Kanggime, Mamit, Ilu, and Mulia. These missionaries used nine modules of literacy class. Those who passed these modules went to elementary schools (13-16 years old) and Witness School, preparatory Bible schools and Bible schools in Mulia and Karubaga (Pagawak 2007,154). In 1964, the Australian Baptist Church who also worked among the Lani built schools in at least 12 areas in the now-called Lanny Jaya.

One thing that mission and colonial government education achieved in West Papua is the designation of Malay as a language of church and education, and later on lingua franca of the region. In the language politics, the Dutch Reformed Church followed the more established policy in the Netherlands East Indies. In the Central Highlands, however, this took longer.

Since early on, the Alliance spearheaded the reduction of Papuan languages into writing and developed literacy education. The first attempt to document the languages of West Papua began in 1828 when Modera collected a wordlist of the Kamoro language in Mimika (Voorhoeve 1975, 117).

In the mid-19th century, this endeavor was intensified after the Dutch and German mission arrived in the western islands of New Guinea in 1855. Until the early 1950s or before the establishment of the Bureau of Native Affairs, all research about Papuan languages mainly came from these Protestant and Catholic missions, however most of these works focused on the coastal area and islands.

Under the Alliance, missionaries such as Myron Bromley, Gordon and Mildred Larson, Mary Owen, and John Ellenberger were trained in the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL)[61]. Compared to the Dutch Calvinist and the Catholic, the American evangelical Protestant invested a lot of energy and resources (linguists and anthropologists) to simplify, inscribe, and translate ethnic/vernacular languages of the Highlands into English, Dutch or Malay. Myron Bromley, a linguist and member of C&MA missions in the Highlands writes that the indispensable role of the missions in West Papua has is among other "the analysis and use of vernacular languages and with the teaching and spread of the national language…"(469). At the time of Bromley's writing, the evangelical mission had produced, Bromley says, "around five and a half million pages of literature which consists of over four million pages in vernacular languages, half a million pages in Indonesian and eight thousand copies of an intensive course in Indonesian for speakers of western Dani." He further claims that more than 30,000 Highlanders have been taught to read their own language in mission and church sponsored literacy programs (Bromley 1977, 469).[62]

[61] The Summer Institute of Linguistics was founded in 1934 by Mr. and Mrs. W. Cameron Townsend in western Arkansas, the peripheral of the 'deep south' of the United States. This couple was missionaries who worked among the Latin American Indians. A revivalist, the couple believed in the importance of linguistics as a tool of evangelization. Mr. Townsend read and was inspired by the work of Edward Sapir. See Hvalkof and Aaby 1981.

[62] In 1921, a survey of contemporary mission trends suggested that the Protestant missions ran about one hundred and sixty presses across the world. They printed about four hundred million pages of Christian literature annually. See Tucker (2004, 284) and Brown (1921, 127). Tucker mentions that after the World War II, specialized ministries emerged, such as the Christian Literature Crusade, The World Literature Crusade,

In this sense, the Alliance had relatively a bigger ambition, namely to translate the Bible, the Word of God to Papuans' own languages—which consist of more than 250 languages. Troutman says, "Linguistics has an important place in modern pioneer missions. It will shorten the time needed for new missionaries to learn the language. A language properly reduced and analyzed cuts in half the time needed for one to learn to speak and preach the gospel. *It is necessary for an indigenous church to be a strong one—to have the Word of God in their own language"(*Troutman 15, the emphasis is mine). [63]

This demonstrates that the Alliance' wanted not only to make legible the linguistic diversity of the Highlands, but most importantly, to create and consolidate ethnicity/ethnic identities through the identification of linguistic difference as a primary marker. While it is true that the Catholic and Dutch Calvinists also carried out such task to certain degree, the American Protestant seems to have a different agenda in mind and the terms "indigenous church" will be the key. Unlike their fellow Protestants and Catholics in the coastal areas, Christianity in the Central Highlands was not part of the broader claim to the Dutch imperial citizenship. The Alliance and many missions that followed are Anglo-Americans who had a highly different relation and politics with the colonial state. In New Guinea's context, the complicated relationship between the American church and Dutch colonial government was even more pronounced in the mid of the 20th century in parallel with the increasing influence of the US as a global empire and after the US government took a more active role in the New Guinea affairs. By virtue of their complicated relationship with the imperials in power and their approach to indigenity, this strand of Christianity has made possible the emergence of distinctive indigenous Papuan churches. Their belatedness in joining the God's kingdom would mark a sense of

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Operation Mobilization, the Evangelical Literature League, the Pocket Testament League, Evangelical Literature Overseas, and the Moody Literature Mission. See Tucker 285.

[63] K.E. Troutman. 1950. "New Guinea", in C&MA Annual Report, 1950, 13. C&MA Archive, 139-143.

difference, not only against the coastal Christianity but also particularly later against the Indonesian Christianity.

Women's Place is in the Missions

One aspect that is largely ignored in the conversation about missions and education in New Guinea is the role of women and the importance of gender politics in the colonial politics of Christianity. As I will demonstrate, American evangelicals' gender politics will mark their distinctive approach to race. In the 19th century, the first assistant Papuan teacher, or indeed the first Papuan teacher was a woman. Rumainum documents the role of Eli, the manumitted slave with unknown clan name in helping Augusta Letz in their school in Mansinam (Rumainum 1966, 76). In her exemplary study of Dutch missionary wives in the Netherlands East Indies in the late 19th century and early 20th century, Nabubhoga (2016) writes that women's role in the Dutch missionary efforts was merely considered as supplementary (67). Not until 1935 the Dutch Protestant church sent their first female missionary.[64] Examining letters from the four missionary wives of various Dutch denominations, Nabubhoga describes the variety of activities that these Dutch women did in their mission posts, which largely consist of homemaking and childrearing. They also carried out domestic skill trainings to native women, such as sewing and Bible lessons. While these activities were also carried out by wives of Anglo-American evangelical mission, there seems to be more room for American women to be involved and play a major role in the missionization efforts. Indeed in many

[64] The Catholic mission began sending nuns from the Daughters of our Lady of the Sacred Heart (D. *Dochters van O.L. Vrouw van het Heilig Hart*) to Merauke in South Netherlands New Guinea in the early 20th century. There they set set up a household course for native girls in Merauke in 1928. Similar to their Protestant fellows, women in the Catholic Church were largely neglected in history. During my fieldwork, however, I have encountered some senior Papuan women that were educated under Catholic nuns. There is one female boarding house (*asrama*) in Jayapura who is run by the Catholic mission. It used to be more before Indonesia came. See Kamphuis 2016 and Cornelissen 1988, 8.

cases these women trained and educated Papuan men and women in the public setting, particularly in school. This may have something to do with the period in which they worked, namely the 19th century for the Dutch and the late 19th and 20th century for the American, but there is also a context at home that make these two mission senders different in many ways.

North American missions began to send women for foreign missions in the 1820s.[65] Montgomery notes that by 1910 there were forty-four women's mission societies in the United States alone (1910, 243-4). By the 21st century, Tucker suggests that two-thirds of the North American missionary force consisted of women—both single and married (Tucker 2004, 14). In the home church, women constituted (and continue to do so) the largest and strongest church supporters. In the Alliance's headquarter in the United States, the position and role that women can play in the missionary efforts was subject to open debate. If the Dutch Reformed Church has a fixed policy about a supplementary nature of women's roles in the mission, in the Alliance mission women's role is more complex, and at times ambiguous. In the early 20th century, the Alliance had allowed women to fill various positions within their ministry. In one of their historians' words, the C&MA believes in the principle of egalitarian complementarinism (King 2009). This means that the C&MA is " intrinsically complentarian (affirming male headship) and at the same time granting virtually full freedom for women in ministry, including pastoral ministry and performance of all pastoral functions, providing latitude for both personal conscience and unity"(King 2009, 20). This is confusing for those who do not follow their history.

In 1893, A. B Simpson, C&MA founder wrote that "women has, according to the Scriptures, perfect liberty to speak and testify or preach the Gospel whenever the Holy Spirit qualifies her and sends her to do so; but that she has no right to exercise the official ministry of the church or govern

[65] The first single American woman to be sent for an overseas mission was Betsey Stockton (c. 1798–1865), an African American former slave working with the Presbyterian Church. She was sent to Hawaii by the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions in 1822. See Grimshaw 1989 for the roles of women in missionization of Hawaii and Montgomery 1910 for the history of female missions.

it as an ecclesiastical ruler. The ministry and leadership are given to man, and not to woman…" This position was reiterated in the 1997 General Council meeting that outlined their view on women ministry in a rather more orthodox manner. In one of the positions papers presented at the meeting, the C&MA believes that "the Bible reserves the 'headship' roles and duties (i.e. elder, pastor, bishop) for men…They (the Alliance and founder A.B. Simpson) have believed that women are not to hold the positions or conduct duties reserved for men" (C&MA 1997).[66] As King contends, this orthodox view does not represent the long history of debate within the mission. The publication of the book itself seems to me as an effort to intervene in this debate. King documents that the Alliance has officially appointed women as pastors since 1910.[67] In the first 75 years of the Alliance, he further contends, at least four hundred women had been ordained as pastors and another hundred as evangelists or other ministry workers (21).[68] In addition, women had also served as teachers at the Alliance's training institute. This demonstrates that in the Alliance male leadership and authority was preferred but women were not forbidden to serve in the leadership or authoritative positions. In

[66] C&MA archive, "An Alliance Historical Perspective", 1997. The theological debates surrounding this issue continue to be lively, and at time, confrontational. See Price 1977 and Andrews 1976.

[67] This recognition was also officially declared by the church hierarchy, such as one in 1927 when the Board of Managers of the Alliance authorized and funded women evangelists to preach and plant churches. As one may surmise this decision was followed by an equal right of pastors—male and female alike—to receive an equal salary or other financial rewards. Issues about the salary gap between male and female missionaries were raised more openly in the American Baptist church, such as demonstrated in the case of Adele Marion Fielde (1839-1916). She was sent to Thailand in 1865 to work among Chinese immigrants there. She appealed to the mission after she discovered that her salary as a teacher was half of the salary of male missionary. See Tucker 292. More research is need to look at the gap, if exists. See King 31.

[68] A.B Simpson staunchly opposed feminism, which in the context of the time (the early 20th century) was a major social movement in the United States. Interestingly, the Seneca Falls convention, the first women right convention took place not far from the Alliance Theological Seminary in Nyack, New York in a Wesleyan Chapel. Even more interesting, some core exponents of women suffrage movement come from the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) who had a strong root in evangelical Protestant congregations. Paul L. King suggests that Frances Willard, the president of the WCTU had been frequently invited as a speaker at the Alliance meetings and Simpson's church as early as the 1880s.

some periods, women leadership was even encouraged.[69] This position continued until the mid-1970s when the Alliance shifted their policy toward a more conservative stance. In 1981 the Alliance's General Council "began to limit the role of women in the ministry"(King 43). The more rigid restriction toward women leadership in the Alliance continues until today in the United States.[70]

In their global operation, however, each national church has flexibility to impose this policy. As a result, many national churches still appoint women in leadership positions. In some areas women play an even predominant role than their male counterparts. On this, Lilian Cole, a missionary says—without an irony I assume, "Perhaps the fundamental reason why the brothers stay at home while their sisters go to the foreign fields is because through the centuries they have trained us women to obey, and so when our God speaks we know nothing but to obey… Women are not God's first choice to send out into a rough country, a new field, for pioneering work, but they are such devoted creatures that He can trust them to do their little utmost, whether it be to sit at His feet or to be first at the grave."[71] This situation may explain first, the appeal of foreign mission for American women and second, their distinctive approach to women issues among 'the natives' in the mission field.

In New Guinea, the role of women in the Alliance mission cannot be neglected. Marion Doble had worked among the Mee and produced a quadri-lingual dictionary of Mee-Indonesian-Dutch-English (1960), a series of essays on Mee grammar (1962), at least five primers for language

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[69] Another interesting fact is that the idea of women leadership in the church has been well accepted particularly in Pennsylvania, New York, New England, Canada, California, Arizona and Hispanic ministry, and less so in the South and I assume in the Bible belt in the middle America. See King 37. I should emphasis here that women pastors and church workers have to fight to make their voices heard. See such a fascinating and funny incident in King 42.

[70] Ethnic churches, however, are more accommodating towards women.

[71] Lilian Y. Cole.1922. "Why the Women?" Alliance Weekly, July 15, 280.

learning (1958), and countless translations of the Bible. Mary Owen, another single female Alliance linguist worked on Nduga language and produced six primers by the 1960s. She singlehandedly run the literacy programs in vernacular in Nduga area that reached at least 2,000 people or one fifth of Nduga population at that time. Elizabeth "Betty" Greene's case, for instance, is also illustrative. She worked as a missionary pilot with the Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF), an aviation organization that served missionary workers in the Central Highlands from 1960-1962. Betty was indeed the first pilot and one of the founders of this organization.

Unlike their Dutch counterparts, however, wives of American missionaries also occupy a more public role and most of them received a theological, educational or medical training. In many stories of the Alliance missionaries in New Guinea, missionary couples met in the Alliances' theology or Bible school and married before they came to the field. In many cases, wives of missionaries' co-authored primers and books, such as in the case of William and Grace Cutts for the Moni language, Gordon and Mildred Larson for the Moni and western Dani language (1958), Shirley Maxey (wife of Edward Maxey) for the Ngalik language, Murray and Joan Rule on the Nalca language. In almost all the Alliance's missionary posts, it was the women who run the literacy program. Alice Gibbons is a great example. Alice is the wife of Don Gibbons who worked amongst the Damal and taught many Damal how to write. She was born in Glendale, California from a working class family. She went to the Simpson Bible Institute in Seattle where she met her husband. She wrote two books about her experience as a missionary in West Papua and she diligently contributed to *the Alliance Weekly* magazine in a regular basis. With her husband, she also produced more than 52 primers of Damal language. In her book entitled *The People Time Forgot* (1981), Alice dedicates half of the book to the story of Meyong, a Damal woman who she describes, suffers under the shackle of Damal adat. In her other book *Where the Earth Ends: Stone Age People Tell Their Story* (2009), Gibbons wrote personal stories of ten Papuans whose life has been transformed by the

arrival of Christianity. These people have left their dark past behind and greet the bright future, as the respected members of the new community of believers. No doubt, there is a strong humanitarian call in there, namely the mandate of [white female] Christians to save Papuan women from their tradition—and their men. But if there is one thing that these Anglo-American missionaries shared, it was this belief that Papuans have the capacity of belief, that there is an essential unity of humankind—under the church. Alice could occupy Meyong's place in the fictional and historical narrative of her suffering and framed her arrival in the Damal world as a sacred and humanitarian mission as an enlightened American subject. Cultural stereotypes of Papuans ("stone age", "primitive", "cannibal", "patriarchal," and "wives killing") were still there, but they believed that the Papuans would carry out their own salvation though the Papuan indigenous church.[72]

[72] As far as I am aware of, the Anglo-American missions never established a separate church for white communities in West Papua, except in the mining town (in the company's premise) and in Sentani where pilots' and missionaries' children go to an international school. Even then, Papuans are not discouraged or rejected if they want to join—as long as they can speak or understand English. I have met several Papuan elites sending their children to this school.




Figure 2. 3. A C&MA missionary (identified as Else Stringer) taught Mee pupils in Enarotali, Wisselmeren in 1954. Collection: Kantoor voor Voorlichting en Radio Omroep Nederlands Nieuw Guinea.




Figure 2. 4. A Mee teacher taught a group of Mee girls in 1955. Collection: Tropen Museum Amsterdam.

Papuan Subjects and The Idea of Indigenity

In 1944, during the opening of the Dutch school for Papuan bureaucracy (D. *Opleiding School voor Inheemse Bestuurs Ambtenaren,* OSIBA), Jean van Eechoud, then the school director and 'the father of Papuan people' declared, "In 1828 we came here, and since then, we have told you how things should be. Today you are called to take the administration of this country into your own hands. Today the new Papua is born"(Derix 1987, 133). Papuan students who attended this prestigious school were selected from the first crop of mission and government schools all over New Guinea, but particularly from the coastal areas and islands in the western and northern parts of the region.

All of the students had finished their primary education—the civilizing schools— and mastered Malay and few, Dutch language.

OSIBA was founded as part of the larger Papuanization efforts of the Dutch administration in New Guinea that took place right after the World War II. This coincided with the Indonesian war of independence that forced the Dutch to recognize Indonesian sovereignty in 1949. The Dutch government, however, managed to negotiate for the separation of Netherlands New Guinea from the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. While the Dutch and Indonesia negotiated the status of New Guinea, the Dutch government formulated a new policy toward the region in 1953 that recognized the status of New Guinea as a non-self governing territory in accordance with Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. The Dutch, as Kuitenbrouwer (2016) suggests, attempted to shift their mode of rule in New Guinea. Verhoeff frames it as a *task*. He says, "The people of the Netherlands are facing a magnificent task. It is not one of material gain or of 'colonial domination'; it is a task of great moral scope to help educate the people of the Netherlands New Guinea and to bring about their active participation in a Christian civilization. In so doing the Netherlands people have but one desire: to raise the level of the population of the Netherlands New Guinea to the point where its people will eventually be capable of making political decisions themselves. What they may decide will be their business—and theirs alone"(1958, 80).

In the period which Drooglever calls as direct rule, the Dutch colonial government increased funding for the education of indigenous Papuans, developed political institutions in local and regional levels, initiated major infrastructure projects, and drafted plans for economic development. In short, they began to prepare Papuans for their independence. Papuans, too, were excited to the possibility of their own nation-state. In 1961, the Dutch set up the New Guinea Council (D. *Nieuw Guinea Raad*) as a representative body of the Papuan people. The Council consisted of six Dutch and 23 highly educated Papuans who were elected through direct elections in the coastal areas and

through appointments in hinterlands and remote areas. Most of these representatives were Papuans educated in the mission schools in the coastal areas, with Karel Gobay being the only Papuan that came from an American evangelical school in the Central Highlands. While Indonesia saw this Council as the Dutch puppet, there is no doubt that Papuans were genuinely committed to the independence cause, as Penehas Torey, an OSIBA graduate declared in 1961, "We, the Papuans, a nation who live in this land, we are different from Indonesia. We want to stand on our own feet. We don't want to be colonized. We want the same right like other nations. We want to have our own government, with our own *bestuur* (bureaucracy) and our own sovereignty. That is our aspiration"(Griapon 2007,17).



Figure 2. 5. Twenty-three out of twenty-nine members of the New Guinea Council in 1961. Credit: unidentified, source: PNWP.

The establishment of the New Guinea Council in 1961 was a result of indigenization wave that began early from the Dutch churches and the Dutch colonial politics in New Guinea. After the recognition of Indonesian independence in 1949 and the establishment of the Indonesian evangelical church, the Dutch Calvinist mission felt the need to initiate a separated indigenous church for their Papuan congregations (Rumainum 1966, 25).[73] In 1956, the Dutch Reformed

[73] In August 1946, a year after Indonesia's declaration for independence, the Dutch Protestant mission in Indonesia held a conference in Jakarta to develop a new ecclesiastical policy in the former colony. The New

Church initiated the establishment of Papuan independent church, the Papuan Reformed Church (I. *Gereja Kristen Injili di Tanah Papua*, GKITP hereafter), almost a century after setting their feet there. Mawene, Papuan author takes this as a sign of paternalistic attitude in the Dutch mission side as, "Dutch missionaries consider that it is *their call* and *responsibility* as white people to guide other nations until those nations achieve an equal position with them"(Mawene 1989, 51, the emphasis is mine). While accommodating the Papuan leadership, most of the church high officials were still Dutch or Ambonese (from Indonesia) whom most Papuans consider as *amber* (foreigners) (Rumaseb 2014, 15). Until 1962, the Dutch Reformed Church also maintained two churches whose members were exclusively Dutch and in which Papuans and Indonesians were barred from the membership.[74] With the establishment of GKITP, the government immediately linked this church with the Pacific Conference of Churches, marking Dutch's decolonization politics in the region. However, after the transfer of New Guinea to Indonesia, many leaders at the GKITP collaborated or were forced to collaborate with Indonesia and subdued under the Indonesian national church. Due to the military pressure and persuasion of some Indonesian Christians, GKITP was even involved in the Indonesian campaign to take over New Guinea.

In contrast, since its early beginning, the Anglo-American missionaries had developed their vision to establish indigenous churches in West Papua (Mickelson 1951, 14-5). In the Highlands, the

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Guinea mission was represented by I.S. Kijne, a Jewish Dutch. The conference decided to accelerate the formation of independent church. After this conference, the path to an independent ecclesiastical church had been intensively discussed in the Netherlands New Guinea. See Drooglever 2009, 274-275.

[74] In the case of Papuan-Dutch Reformed church, the first head of synod was held by a Papuan from Biak, Reverend Rumainum, however the Papuan congregations resented the dominance of Ambonese, Sanger, and other Indonesians in the Council of church elders. Papuans also did not like the fact that the Dutch had their own congregations, different from the native one. These Dutch congregations were exclusively for the Dutch nationals and frequently did not adhere to the indigenous synod leadership. See Mawene 1989, 65. The politics of Dutch Reformed Church in West Papua is similar to those in South Africa, although in South Africa's case, the church clearly supported the apartheid system, something that did not officially exist in the Netherlands New Guinea.

establishment of independent churches or rather explicitly, indigenous churches took less than 25 years. I will argue that the most single important politics that the missions carried out in New Guinea was this politics of indigenity. In the Central Highlands, the Alliance's indigenous congregations formed the Kingmi Church in Beoga Valley in 1962. The Anglophone mission societies (APCM, UFM and RBMU) relinquished their power to the indigenous church of The Evangelical Church of West Irian (I. *Gereja Injili Irian Barat* or GIDI hereafter) at their conference in 1963, while the Australian Baptist Mission (ABMS) handed over the Baptist church to the leadership of indigenous Lani in 1966.

The concept of "indigenization" within church had been debated along the ideological spectrum in the early 20th century. After Christian missions were part or at least benefitted from the imperial expansion of European power in the 19th century, the movement to create indigenous churches marked the demographic and geopolitical shift in the world Christianity, namely a transformation of Christianity from a predominantly European religion to non-European (Wu 2017, 87).

But what does indigenous mean here? The conception of indigenous church in New Guinea proves to be highly contested. The Protestant churches had a hard time in welcoming 'indigenous cultures' in the church's liturgy and sacrament—the issue is still open to debates until today. However, the contestation over indigenity manifests particularly in the church government and its relation with the colonial governments. Dutch Protestants and Catholics and Anglo-American evangelicals produce cultural difference that is underscored by race. But the use of race in the Dutch Calvinist case has more to do with their theology and does not necessarily mark the indigeneity of the church. It is the *state structure* that makes certain church indigenous. In the Catholic Church, the possibility of Papuan leadership is almost absent, even until today when the Papuans stake claim to

many of their rights in the church. All five archbishops in West Papua are non-Papuans.[75] In terms of theodicy, the Catholic Church does not allow the birth of Papuan church. Church for the Catholics is universal one and centralized.

Indigeneity then was defined differently by different churches. For the Dutch, indigeneity did not necessarily mean the Papuans. Therefore, even though the first leadership of the church was held by a Papuan, the council of elders were (and continue to be) dominated by the Indonesians. The Anglo-American missions, on the other, have a clear definition what indigeneity means, based on their use of ethno-linguistic marker as a mode of church planting. In 1950, five missionaries working in New Guinea wrote a letter to the Alliance's Foreign Department saying, "Dr. Snead, we need more missionaries for our New Guinea work. With the political situation the way it is in Indonesia, we do not know how long we will be able to keep the eight *guru*s (teachers) we now have…. I feel the whole picture will be greatly elucidated when the Mission considers New Guinea a new and separate field from Indonesia, in the sense that we must start just as the work started in Indonesia —heavy on the missionary side up until the place when trained *native workers, indigenous to New Guinea*, can shoulder part of the load…"(8, the emphasis is mine).[76] In their meeting on April 10-12, 1951 the Alliance's Board of Managers passed the recommendation of the Foreign Department that the New Guinea work should be constituted as a separate mission [from Indonesia]" (37).[77] These two sources demonstrate clearly that along their Anglo-American

[75] West Papua consists of five dioceses: Jayapura, Agats, Timika, Merauke, Manokwari-Sorong, with all of them are led Indonesians (two Flores, two Javanese, and one Kei archbishops).

[76] C&MA archive. This letter was written by Jerry Rose, E.H. Mickelson, Mary McIlrath, Darlene M. Rose, and Marion Doble to Dr. Snead, undated but reached New York (CAMA's office) on September 25, 1950.

[77] C&MA archive, A.C. Snead's report addressed to Dr. H.M. Shuman and Members of the Board of Managers, dated August 30, 1951.

counterparts, the Alliance wished to nurture Papuan indigenous congregations led by indigenous Papuans. For them, race as an immutable category is still useful particularly in referring to indigeneity. Indigenous Papuan church is Papuan, not Malay or Indonesian.

However, in the Kingmi church like the Dutch Reformed Church, Indonesians from the Moluccas attempted to exercise their dominance in the church hierarchy, particularly because the Alliance employed many Indonesians as teachers and evangelists in the Central Highlands. The Indonesian dominance was more pronounced after Indonesia took over New Guinea in 1963. Papuans saw this take over as an invasion. Indonesia, on the other, acted like a new colonial power. They immediately replaced all the Dutch and American teachers, pastors, and priests with the Indonesian ones. The Ambonese and Kei teachers remained in New Guinea to continue teaching but Indonesia brought a new crop of Javanese, Batak, Bugis, Makassar, and Manadonese teachers under the scheme of Trikora teachers. Administered under the Ministry of Education and Culture, this initiative involved churches, such as the coordinating body of the Catholic Church (KWI, *Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia*) and The Association of Protestant Churches of Indonesia (PGI, *Persatuan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia*), marking the strong church approval to the Indonesian occupation in New Guinea.

It is clear from the beginning that what Indonesia aimed for was not only to civilize Papuans like their Dutch predecessors, but also to Indonesianize all aspects of Papuan life and to use education to Indonesianize Papuan children. Without proper guidelines and prior understanding of the Papuan situation, these teachers became the *avant garde* of Indonesian battle to win the heart and mind of Papuans. In many accounts of Indonesian teachers, they were so confused and shocked by the primitiveness of supposedly their fellow Indonesians. Similar to the "depopulation of Melanesians" discourse, the adjectives 'dirty', 'smelly', naked, primitive, and cannibal are easily found

in their memoirs.[78] An experience of violence under these teachers is all too familiar for Papuans.[79] In the church hierarchy, particularly in the Dutch Reformed and the Kingmi Church, the role of Papuans was increasingly marginalized. The Kingmi church itself was not integrated into the Indonesian national church until 1983 and this represented one of the fiercest battles within the Alliance's mission in Indonesia and the former New Guinea. After the 'integration', Papuans felt even more alienated from the church leadership as many church policies were decided in Jakarta.

In New Guinea, the indigeneity debates in the church by default engaged in the larger controversial discourse about the political status of the region. Here, we are confronted with a contradictory attitude of the American evangelical mission. Both Americans and Papuans came to the same conclusion that indigenous congregants should govern the indigenous church. In this position, it is the Alliance itself that has paved the way for the birth of the conception of indigeneity, particularly in regards to Papuan identity. Yet, like other contexts in which indigenous identity was born, Kingmi's Papuan congregants see themselves as indigenous Papuans *only after* and as *a result* of their encounter with the Indonesian state, not during the Dutch rule due to their minimal interaction with them. Thus the clash over what indigenization constituted and how to put it into ecclesiastical practice was not the only factor that defined this conflict. The problem was indeed underlined by a deeper political and historical problem at hand that is the political status of New Guinea within the Indonesian state after the transfer of this territory from the Netherlands to Indonesia in 1963. While Indonesia believes that its annexation of the former New Guinea's territory was a fight against colonialism, Papuans claim that the Dutch and Indonesia have violated their right to self-

[78] Bapak Yono, a former Trikora teacher from Purworejo, Central Java told his experience to his daughter here: http://monicariska.blogspot.co.id/2012/08/bapak-yesus-dan-pedalaman-papua-dalam.html.

[79] Papuans often write memories of their schooling that tell how their Indonesian teachers belittle them and denigrate their self-respect and dignity. Some examples can be seen in the entries of the Gerakan Papua Mengajar (Teach for Papua), also Bobi 2014 and Supriyono 2010.

determination. In other words, Indonesia arrived in New Guinea as a new colonizing power. In the following chapter, we will learn how Papuans' experience under Indonesia shapes the way they see Indonesia and themselves and how Christianity plays their role in this new situation.

3. The Death of Musa Mako Tabuni and Other Stories

"It may be useful to begin a consideration of the cultural roots of nationalism with death"
Benedict Anderson (1983, 10)

"The colonizer can kill us, but they also have taught us how to fight back. They have taught us to be martyrs for West Papua. All of us will be Musa Mako Tabuni."
Victor Yeimo, the chairperson of the National Committee of West Papua (2012)

The Death of Robert Jitmau[80]

Word of his death arrived at around noon, during the sudden frenzy of a chaotic monsoon. I called him a day before his death—we were going to meet in the city on Friday at noon. When the message arrived on my cell phone, there was a fatal stillness. Everything felt so murderous. I remember that day very well. The sun had been scorching since ten o'clock in the morning. Jayapura, the capital city, the glorious city—as their ruler has called it— is a noisy, hot airy place where salty water floats from the Pacific and dust flies from the roads that are constantly being repaired. It's the dust, the afternoon dust that is dense with dirt, bacteria, and bad news. In Jayapura, summer always feels long, hot, weary and dead. Alex Giay, a Papuan poet describes it as a place where blood is shed and the pain will not go away, where people are killed and the soldiers will not run away. Yet, when the news broke, sobs erupted all over the city.

The death of Robert Jitmau came as a shock, not only because the death of a close relative or friend brings such an emotional force (Rosaldo 1984), but also because his death can be understood as one of a series that may befall *any* Papuan. The night after the incident, the city was

[80] With a few exceptions, I use Papuans' real names to honor their life and their memory. Papuans insist that I use real names to refer to their heroes or themselves in order let the world know what they have gone through.

extremely quiet. During the week of Jitmau's death, there were four hit and run incidents that specifically targeted Papuan activists. Two activists were dead while another three were badly injured. During the period of January to June 2016, 18 Papuans had indeed been hit by cars, mutilated or killed under very mysterious circumstances. These incidents lasted during the entirety of 2016.[81] Jitmau's death created stories and stimulated conversations. It created fear, but also a sense of solidarity. Was he killed? Did he die naturally? Why was he killed? For what purposes? Who killed him? Who will be the next target? With a sense of foreboding, terror is reborn in the colony.

There are three versions of how Robert Jitmau died in that summer of 2016. The first version reports that Robert Jitmau killed himself by crashing his car into a concrete barrier near the Hamadi beach. He is said to have been drunk. Another account indicates that he was hit by a car. Later, a Papuan nurse in the police hospital added the twist. He testified that Jitmau was stabbed before a moving vehicle fatally killed him. The medical examiners found severe injuries in his head and eyes. The photos of these injuries were circulated immediately on the internet.

After a brief investigation, the Jayapura police force declared that it was a common hit and run incident. Two witnesses, however, attested that the incident was rather extraordinary. Around dawn on Friday, May 20, 2016, Robert Jitmau and his two friends sat on a concrete barrier near Hamadi beach, drinking beers, when a rapidly moving vehicle suddenly and deliberately hit three of them. One of the passengers left the car and beat the two witnesses, while another approached Robert Jitmau. The two witnesses were rendered unconscious. Not until they were brought to the hospital did they realize that Jitmau had died. Until today, there is no conclusive decision on how Robert Jitmau died or who killed him.

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[81] Ones Nesta Suhuniap from the National Committee of West Papua stated that after the arrest of Papuans in the Mobile Brigade's headquarter on May 2, 2016, there were four hit and run incidents whose targets were Papuan independence activists. Report on May 20, 2016. Also Wenas Kobogau.2016. *Pembunuhan Orang Papua dengan motif tabrak lari.* Online. May 2016. Also Dendi Stenli Payokwa.*Waspada Pembunuhan Orang Papua dengan Motif Tabrak Lari Meraja Lela.* Online. August 2016.

Robert Jitmau was an extremely well-known Papuan lawyer, having spent more than ten years of his life organizing Papuan women in Jayapura to demand fair and equal economic access to the city. There are a few places where Papuans can unite for a single goal, but *Solpap* (The Solidarity of Papuan Indigenous Traders), the organization that he led, is perhaps the single most important and successful civil organization in urban West Papua. With Papuan women, he advocated for the establishment of a market place in the city that would exclusively accommodate Papuan business owners. This was in response to a situation in which nearly all marketplaces and trade have been dominated by Indonesian migrants from Bugis, Buton and Makassar, which I will discuss in chapter 5.

Before joining *Solpap*, Robert Jitmau had a bright career as a professor at the University of Cenderawasih's Law School. But he decided to quit and devote his life to *Solpap*. Robert Jitmau was also a member of an organization called the Garda-P (The Papuan People's Democratic Movement).[82] They exist under a larger resistance group called the West Papua National Coalition of Liberation, which constitutes the United Liberation Movements of West Papua (ULMWP hereafter). Formed in Port Vila, Vanuatu on December 6, 2014, ULMWP unifies several wings of West Papua's independence movements in their international campaign to gain West Papua's independence from Indonesia. The Saralana Declaration, as the unification is called, was signed by the three largest resistance organizations, namely the Federal Republic for West Papua,[83] West Papua National Coalition of Liberation, and West Papua National Parliament. Robert Jitmau was assigned to work on the issues of Papuan economic sovereignty in the context of the Papuan independence movement. After several years of negotiation with the Indonesian government in Jakarta and Jayapura's mayor, Indonesian president Joko Widodo decided to grant *Solpap* a space in the center of

[82] In Indonesian, *Gerakan Rakyat Demokratik Papua.*
[83] In Indonesian, *Negara Republik Federal Papua Barat* (NRFB).

the city—the Papuan women's market. Jitmau came under the spotlight, both as a successful advocate of Papuan causes as well as a threat to many parties attached to various business interests in the city; this included various units of Indonesian security forces who occupy many strategic plots in the city.

The police resumed their investigations, but for Papuans his death remains a mystery to this day. Unsurprisingly, many Papuans do not believe that it was a common hit and run incident, but see it as a symptomatic event. It is part of a larger narrative of death in West Papua, a narrative that is shaped by spectacular violence, a long series of shocks, and profound sadness. However, this narrative also inspires a courage to live, a narrative that stands in contrast with colonial anthropology of the 19th century and the 1960s.

As I have discussed in the first chapter, in the late 19th century, "the depopulation of Melanesians" was a big concern among colonial governments, missionaries, and anthropologists working in Melanesia. At this period, most analyses point to the cultural and psychological shocks that the Melanesians confronted after the arrival of Europeans. In the 1960s, attention shifted to the "internal problem" and character of Melanesian society, particularly through the study of the-so-called tribal wars. Gardner (1965) and Heider (1979), for example, examined death and its meaning for the Hubula (Dani) of the Central Highlands in the context of Hubula warfare (H. *wim*). Through violence, which has become a paradigmatic description of Highlands Papuan cultures, death is understood as a natural phenomenon as well as part of an endless ceremonial exchange that shapes the Hubula life. Gardner and Heider say,

> "The death of a Dani, especially if it has been caused by the enemy, changes the outlook of everyone allied to the losing side. The change is best expressed as a weakening or shrinking of their *etai-eken*, their seeds of singing. These seeds are continually active in the life-making process of every man and woman, and respond favorably or unfavorably to the events of each individual's career and destiny…"(1968, 96)

This long passage relies on the anthropological trope of the Hubula as a warrior society, of the centrality of warfare in the Hubula life.[84] This kind of narrative is reproduced in contemporary studies and media coverage about the Highlands's cultures (Diamond 1997 and 2012). Papuans and foreign anthropologists have criticized this one-dimensional approach. Kirsch, for instance, argues that Gardner's film *Dead Birds* in particular has established "perpetual violence as the norm for West Papua"(Kirsch 2002, 8 and Heider 1972, 24). Curiously, perpetual violence and concomitant death are indeed the norm in West Papua, but not as the result of violence that shaped the Hubula life in the early 1960s. This chapter asks, how do Papuans' encounters with new forms of violence change the way they understand their relationship with death? What is the impact of spectacular violence and pervasive death on Papuan cultures, on how they understand the meanings of their lives as Papuans?

Indonesia's Beginning

Papuans' encounters with outsiders (*amber*) are not always marked by violence, but arguments can be made that their encounter with Indonesia in particular has intensified the use and distribution of violence in the region. As I have enumerated in the introduction, West Papua has the highest concentration of security forces in the country. In West Papua, Indonesia's occupation fundamentally means a reinforcement of the role of the military within the Indonesian state. Along with military operations, the Indonesian administration issued a presidential decision prohibiting any political activity and establishment of any political party/organization in West Papua.[85] Jakarta is also

[84] Heider says, "Not only did the Dani (Hubula) continuously engage in war, but warfare made the Dani who they are"(1972, 35).

[85] See the Indonesian presidential decision No. 8/1963 on Political Activities in West Irian (I. *Penetapan Presiden Republik Indonesia nomor 8 tahun 1963 tentang kegiatan politik di Irian Barat*).

controlling and limiting access of foreign journalists to report on the region.[86] While it is true that West Papua is not unique (East Timor and Aceh suffered the same fate in the 1970s and 1990s respectively), today West Papua is the only place in Indonesia today where the state applies the category of political prisoners and uses articles 107, 110 and 87 of Indonesian the Criminal Code (I.*KUHP*) on treason and conspiracy to commit treason to charge Papuans. Papuan activists have also been charged under the colonial *haatzaai* (sedition) articles of the Criminal Code (article 154-157), Presidential Decision No. 11/1962 on anti-subversion and Presidential Decision No. 39/1962 on the internment and exile (these two decisions had been ratified by the Indonesian Parliament into Law No.5/1969) (Pompe 1992, 398).[87] The Indonesian military forces, however, do not need a legal pretense in order to enact their "own law," particularly in regard to their atrocities in the Highlands, and this will have profound implications for how Papuans see Indonesia and themselves.[88]

Contemporary estimates claim that up to 500,000 Papuans have been killed during the Indonesian occupation (1963-2010), but an exact figure is hard to come by due to the climate of repression and impunity. Indeed, the killing itself still continues unabated. Secondly, many deaths take place in the hinterlands, remote areas, and secret military detention centers. Ultimately, most human rights reports do not account for deaths that are not directly caused by state agents. In West Papua, it is fairly common to hear a story of a family losing one or several of their members due to

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[86] See the Human Rights Watch's report. 2015. *Something to Hide? Indonesia's Restrictions on Media Freedom and Rights Monitoring in Papua*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

[87] As Pompe suggests, anti-subversion law is directed to political acts aimed against the government, or construed as such. In West Papua, a participation in a peaceful demonstration demanding Papuans' rights to self-determination could be construed as anti-subversion. Cases like this are abundant. See reports by the SKP Jayapura, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. See Pompe 1992.

[88] Studies of Indonesian military have demonstrated the Indonesian military's involvement in many atrocities in Indonesia, such as in the post-1965 killing, Aceh and Timor Leste (1974-1999). See Anderson and McVey 1971. On the role of the Indonesian Armed Forces in East Timor, see Taylor 1991. On West Papua, see Supriatma 2013 and on Aceh, see Davis 2006.

illness, traffic accidents, crime-related incidents, 'tribal wars' and other 'horizontal' conflict. Local newspapers like *Cenderawasih Pos*, *Bintang Papua,* or *Tabloid Jubi* frequently report Papuan deaths in their crime section. Consider the two following events.

On Friday night, May 19, 2017, Pius Kulua was killed by the angry mob of Moluccas. The recurrent stabs in his stomach and the stiffness of his Papuan body testified to the incident. Early in the morning, Teresia Lampyompar, a Moluccas woman from Tanimbar was found dead. The Moluccas people set up a roadblock and screamed, "Hey, Wamena people!!" when Pius and his brother Yuvenas passed by. The Kulua brothers did not know who Lampyompar was or why the Moluccas people were there in the first place. They were beaten and stabbed with machetes but Yuvenas escaped and got home safely. His brother, Pius, on the other hand, found his destiny in the hands of armed Moluccas civilians. Indonesian police officers were at the scene but did nothing to prevent the killing.

A month later, a Papuan was killed in an altercation in the Youtefa market in Jayapura—a hotspot for Papuan homicide. Instead of being arrested, the assailant who is a Bugis man from Sulawesi was named a victim. The Jayapura police force named four Papuans who suffered from injuries as perpetrators. In the year of my fieldwork, I heard many stories like these. I encountered it on regular basis. Many Indonesian settlers kept telling me about Papuan violence ("Wamena people" or "Highlanders"), giving me advice about where I should and should not go, whom to make friends with—of course, not the "Wamena people" or "Highlanders".

In his policy studies, which I argue represent many Indonesian and foreign accounts of these kinds of incidents, Bobby Anderson (2015) contends that the so-called horizontal violence, such as vigilantism and "clan conflict" produces more casualties than state violence. While he points out that during the period of 2004-2008 West Papua had the highest number of violent deaths in Indonesia (2015, 19), he fails to understand a complex entanglement between state and non-state actors within

what he calls 'horizontal conflicts' (compare Kalyvas 2003). In Kulua's case, for instance, the killing took place not only under the gaze of Indonesian security forces, but also the killers are members of the Moluccas paramilitary group, which has been nurtured and funded by the Indonesian security forces.[89] Secondly, Anderson fails to explain why casualties from many of these incidents are almost always Papuans.

For anthropologists, ethnographic inscriptions of Papuan deaths are not difficult to carry out, due to their spectacularity and pervasiveness. I read reports from Indonesian sources, such as news reports, military reports, and reports from Indonesian human rights groups even before I arrived there. I also read reports by international human rights organizations and circulars from West Papua's international campaign, which generally use statistics and cases as a tool for persuasion. But there is something about death that always escapes such an easy rendition or a comprehensive tabulation. Death is part of what Stoler calls the objects of the everyday (2009, 233), yet it has an iridescent presence like a flapping wing of an angel under the Papuan sun, or an afternoon guest in Papua villages. It has a surging capacity to affect (Stewart 2007, 40). It can intensify. As an anthropologist, I have been impacted.

The Death of Musa Mako Tabuni

Two weeks before I first arrived in West Papua, Musa Mako Tabuni was shot dead. He stood in the corner of Perumnas III, not far from the new campus of the University of Cenderawasih, chewing betelnut and chatting with his Lani friends when six bullets pierced through his chest and spilled his blood. It was the seventh bullet that killed him there.

[89] A paramilitary group from Moluccas is always invited to the military parade in West Papua, for instance, during the commemoration of Indonesia's independence on August 17th. The group also participates in many pro-Indonesia rallies in West Papua.

In West Papua, some deaths can be explained, but most of the time Papuans are left with no explanation and no justice—not even a memorial. Some deaths are spectacularized and talked about incessantly. Some others are meant to be forgotten. They not even deserve a mention and are absorbed in the quiet night of the mountain. In some others, they are silenced. The funeral itself seems too dangerous for the state. But death always comes in different forms. One might be a hit and run, another a public execution. The death of Musa Mako Tabuni shows this powerfully.

The chairperson of the National Committee of West Papua (the National Committee, hereafter[90]) Musa Mako Tabuni was shot by the Indonesian anti-terrorist squad, the 88 Detachment on June 14, 2012 at around nine o'clock in the morning. The operation that killed him took place under the gaze of many Papuans and few Indonesian settlers. Right after the shooting, the Indonesian Minister of Politics, Law and Security and the Office of Chief Police Inspector of Papua province released a statement claiming that the detachment shot Tabuni out of self-defense. They accused Musa Mako Tabuni of being behind recent shootings that were happening in Jayapura and claimed that Tabuni resisted police arrest. None of the witnesses corroborated this version of the incident.

The fact that it was an anti-terrorist detachment that killed Tabuni reinforces the accusation that the National Committee of West Papua was a terrorist group (ICG 2010). The 88 Detachment itself was established after the 9/11 and the Bali Bombing in 2002 in response to the global war on terror. The 88 Detachment got their training and direct funding from the United States, in addition to other western allies of Indonesia.[91]

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[90] The National Committee of West Papua or Komite Nasional Papua Barat in Indonesian and is oftenly called KNPB. See Glossary.

[91] The 88 Detachment was established as a unit within the Indonesian Police Forces on August 26, 2004 under the leadership of Tito Karnavian, who later became the chief police inspector of Papua province (2012-2014). He became the head of Indonesia's national body for the eradication of terrorism in 2016. The United

Since 1999, Tabuni had been in and out of Indonesia's detention centers. He experienced his first arrest by the Indonesian Special Forces in 1999, who were suspicious of his involvement with Mathias Wenda, the general in the National Liberation Army of West Papua Independence Movement, the armed wing of the Papuan Independence Movement in Pyramid. In 2007, he was arrested for the same accusation, but was released without a trial. In 2008, Tabuni was tried for treason, but again he was released due to insufficient evidence. After the establishment of the National Committee on November 19, 2008, Tabuni became increasingly more popular—both among Papuans and security forces.

The National Committee of West Papua gathers young urban, educated Papuans in an effort to mobilize support for Papuans' right to self-determination through peaceful means. Hailing from different ethnic, linguistic and religious groups, but largely from the Central Highlands, the National Committee activists have been severely hunted, arrested, and even murdered. They have gained a notorious reputation due to their massive mobilization and radical platform against what they call the colonization of Indonesia. Over the course of my summer fieldwork from 2012 until 2016, they have organized more than 1000 rallies and actions.

According to Indonesian reports, there are at least two demonstrations taking place every week in West Papua. Most of these are organized by the National Committee (Indonesia UPR report, 2016). From April 2013 until 2016, more than 5,000 Papuans, largely affiliated with the National Committee were detained. The largest arrest took place in 2016, with 2,024 Papuans apprehended in the Mobile Brigade's Headquarter on May 2, 2016. More than thirty of the National Committee's leaders and activists have been murdered or died in mysterious circumstances. When

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States gave training and funding to the 88 Detachment through the Diplomatic Security Service. Reuters claims that the detachment has received at least $200 million of funding from Indonesia's Western allies. See Tom Allard and Kanupriya Kapoor. 2016. "Fighting Back: How Indonesia's elite police turned the tide on militans." *Reuters*, December 23.

the National Committee organizes rallies in Papuan townships, universities, schools and offices are closed. Indonesian shop owners put barbed wire fences across their doors. For the Indonesian administration, the National Committee is one of the most dangerous Papuan organizations in West Papua, second only to the National Liberation Army of West Papua Independence Movement.

Following Tabuni's assassination, Papuans were furious. They went around burning houses and shops near the Perumnas III in Jayapura. In other cities, rallies and demonstrations were organized. For days, the city was enveloped by a pervading sense of death, and rumors that there would be more killing circulated in Jayapura and the Highlands. People said that the atmosphere was similar to 2001 when the head of Papuan Presidium Council Theys Hiyo Eluay was assassinated by the Indonesian Special Forces—also with public knowledge. During the week of the killing, rumors about Dracula spread all over the city. At night in the corner of Perumnas III, Lingkaran and Expo, the points for crowds to gather for many peaceful rallies in Jayapura were empty. Papuans stayed at home and talked about the killing endlessly.

Tabuni's funeral took place two days later on June 16, 2016. Thousands of Papuans gathered in Pos Tujuh, Sentani, where Tabuni would be buried not far from Theys Hiyo Eluay's grave. Papuans wanted Tabuni's body to be buried near Eluay's, but the Indonesian authority did not grant permission, and even blocked the grave with a deployment of thousands of security forces. In the end, Tabuni was buried in a public cemetery up on the hill, two kilometers from Eluay's. Across the region, Papuans paid respect and went through the mourning period. The morning star and the National Committee's flag—red with a white star and the word "Fight"—were raised and women sang *de*, lament songs typical of the Baliem Valley. Tabuni's death sparked other deaths, like the one that I encountered in Keerom. I arrived in Keerom after a village head was shot dead by Indonesian security forces in July 2012. A curfew was imposed. Nobody was allowed to stay outside after 4 pm

in the afternoon except trucks carrying timber from Keerom's remaining rain forests. We talked about the killing of the village head in a whisper:

> "Was he an OPM member?" OPM refers to the armed wing of the Papuan Independence Movements.
> "He was."
> "Oh, no, he's just a village head."
> "People heard that he raised the morning star flag last week."[92] It was part of the ceremony of Tabuni's death but at that time I did not know it.
> "Is that true?"
> "Yes, indeed there was a flag raising."
> "Where?"
> "In the plantation."
> "And was it done by the village head?"
> "We don't know. We are not sure."
> "Keerom is indeed at risk (I.*rawan)*…" In the 1970s and 1980s, the National Liberation Army of West Papua Independence Movement ran their operation from Victoria Headquarter in Keerom.
> "But this is Arso. There might no longer be an OPM around."
> "There is another OPM group. So maybe…"
> "He just became a random target (I. *sasaran)*. He was not necessarily an OPM member."
> "That's true."
> Everybody sighed. It was dark outside and the famous Keerom mosquitoes attacked with vengeance.

Six months after Mako Tabuni was assassinated, another member of the National Committee, Hubertus Mabel was murdered. It was December of 2012. It had been raining for days, but the smell of the soil had gone. People chatted in their *honai,*[93] like a soft hum from a radio. "We are merely the remains of a bullet. What does life mean to us, to you? If we are lucky, we will live another year and tell a story. Of our own murder," Mabel told his friends, sometimes before the shooting. The National Committee members are so accustomed to threats, terror and killing. Most of them are in their twenties or thirties. Almost all of them are highly educated. If they wanted, they

[92] The morning star flag was decided as a national flag for the future state of West Papua in 1961. The Indonesian authority has prohibited the raising of this flag since 1963, except in 1999-2000 when President Abdurrahman Wahid granted permission to raise the flag as long as it's lower than the Indonesian flag.

[93] Hubula's roundhouse.

could easily become a local Parliament member, head of regency, or work as a government employee, but they do not, and perhaps this is one of the reasons why Indonesia considers them dangerous.

In the Baliem Valley, the National Committee has one of its strongest bases. It was Sunday morning. In the hills, dusk was falling rapidly and the road was forlorn all night. A few women and children went home from the church. One could smell a coffee roaster near the health clinic. It had been three years after General Kelly Kwalik was killed. Hubertus Mabel is said to have met all of the commanders of the Papuan Liberation Army, from General Goliath Tabuni in Cartensz Summit, General Puron Wenda in Lanny Jaya, General Kelly Kwalik in Timika to General Thadeus Yogii in Paniai. Hubertus Mabel belongs to a big Dani clan in the Baliem Valley. One of his grandfathers Kurulu Mabel was the head of the big war alliance, whom Harvard anthropologist Karl Heider met in 1961.[94] Mabel was one among the few leaders of the National Committee of West Papua, which has taken upon themselves a task to mediate different organizations and factions within the Papuan independence movement. Precisely because their struggle is anti-violent, they can manage to meet all armed groups of Papuan independence movements. That morning, a little after 11 o'clock when it was still cold in the Highlands, he walked with Natalis Alua, a member of the National Committee from Wamena. Like Kwalik, Mabel did not realize that he was about to depart to another world, the world that the missionaries promised would be full of gold. He was shot by the Indonesian anti-terrorist squad on December 16, 2012, in Kurulu district, Baliem Valley, West Papua. He was 30 years old.

After the killing, the Baliem Valley was quiet. Some Lani men from Tiom stood in the corner of the mission marketplace and people from Samenage walked hurriedly to the mission house.

[94] Karl Heider (in Hubula, Karoro) called him Gutelu.

"There was a funeral," Mr. Yohanes Asso also told the passers by. In the Baliem Valley, death occurs every day. It comes like the wind from a passing car, or a bird sitting in a broken window. It freezes time. There is sadness, a funeral, and pig-killing on a winter afternoon. People cry in the middle of the night. They sing,

> Hi my brother, our village is so far away.... *Ap yira... ninai walek helut etnogore.....*
> We come when the sun has already set in the west *Mo korok yi at wago yio*

Following the death of Hubertus Mabel, on the eve of the visit of Indonesian President Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono to West Papua, the body of Martinus Yohame, another young Papuan leader of the National Committee was found floating offshore near the city of Sorong.[95] The body was tied with his hands and legs in a plastic bag and weighted down with heavy rocks to drown him. Reports and conversations among the National Committee activists pointed to the involvement of the Indonesian state apparatus. There is a pattern that Papuans know too well. There is no secret about who killed whom and for what purposes. People stop asking questions.

Perhaps one remarkable characteristic of all of these killings is how the spectacle surrounding each event unfolds, as well as the public and performative character of the assassination. In his study of torture in West Papua, Hernawan has argued that the Indonesian security forces play with the partial invisibility and inaudibility of torture to maximize the effect of terror upon Papuans (2013). Hernawan says, "The power of spectacle does not lie in the act of inflicting actual pain and suffering but more in the act of communicating such an experience through the display of mutilated bodies"(164). In regard to the Indonesian state's violence, this mode of killing is not new (see Siegel 1998 for the *Petrus* killing and Oppenheimer 2012 and 2016 for

[95] See Wonenuka Sampari. 2014. "Tewasnya Martinus Yohame, Ketua Komite Nasional Papua Barat (KNPB) Sorong." *Kompasiana*, August 29.

the 1965 killings). It is true that the killings in West Papua are carried out to elicit terror, and to force the audience, the Papuans, to interpret their symbolic meaning exactly as displayed by the killers. Yet, I argue that Papuans as an audience, do not necessarily follow the script of the Indonesian military forces and most importantly, these killings are not merely a public display. There is a lot at stake for Indonesian security forces in West Papua, namely to maintain the integrity of the unitary Republic of Indonesia and to eliminate elements that are considered a threat to this vision. Compared to East Timor, West Papua occupies a more central position not only in the Indonesian nation-building project, but also in the imagination and the actual constitution of the country. The loss of West Papua would not only mean the loss of almost a quarter of Indonesia's territory, but more than that: the gold, copper, and natural resources, the business interests of each military and civilian actors, and the long-held *imperial* dream of Indonesia. On the other, I also contend that there is even a higher stake for Papuans not to become Indonesians, to persist in their demand for independence, to sacrifice their lives for this future anticipation. Life, in contrast to death, is one of them.

Generative Death: Funeral and Mourning in West Papua

In West Papua, mourning and funerals are sites where death and life are intertwined. On a personal and collective level, death is "a disruptive undoing of attachment"(Stasch 2009, 212).[96] Death breaks emotional and social bonds between the living and the deceased, between Musa Mako Tabuni or Rojit Jitmau and their Papuan friends and families but it is more than that. It is a process

[96] Compare Hertz 1960. Malinowksi suggests that the experience of death as the core of primitive religiosity. He says, "The ceremonial death which ties the survivors to the body and rivets them to the place of death, the beliefs in the existence of the spirit, in its beneficent influences or malevolent intention, in the duties of a series of commemorative or sacrificial ceremonies—in all this religion counteracts the centrifugal forces of fear, dismay, demoralization, and provides the most powerful means of reintegration of the group's shaken solidarity and of the re-establishment of its morale." See Malinowski 1954, 47, 51, and 52.

in which death is made meaningful not only politically but also culturally, a moment in which life is given a new meaning (Fabian 1972, 555 and Verdery 1999).

Wailing and rage greeted the death of Musa Mako Tabuni and Robert Jitmau. Rallies and funeral ceremonies were conducted throughout West Papua: in villages, schools, and churches. In Jayapura, Abepura and Sentani, daily activities stopped to make way for the mourning and funeral period. Victor Yeimo, leader of the National Committee, led the funeral in Sentani where thousands of Papuans gathered and prayed. Yeimo appealed to Papuans and told the audience—and specifically Indonesia—that the killing of their members would not make them retire. "The colonizer can kill us, but they also have taught us how to fight back. They have taught us to be martyrs for West Papua. All of us will be Musa Mako Tabuni." A martyr is a new conception in Papuan cultural worlds, informed not only by the ongoing killing of Papuans but also by Christianity. Indeed, the deaths of Papuans are increasingly read and understood not only in relation to the sacrificial death of Jesus, but also a Biblical interpretation of their fate. Attached to Tabuni's funeral flowers, the Federal Republic of West Papua quoted Psalm 116:15:

> Precious in the sight of the Lord
> is the death of his faithful servants

In his funeral speech, a representative of the Papua Independence Movement drew a parallel between the killing of Musa Mako Tabuni and the crucifixion of Jesus. He added that the Papuan's death would not be in vain, as the death is for the independence of the country. Christianity seems to offer grieving Papuans spiritual, psychological, and political resources to confront this loss. It gives them comfort, knowing that there is a transcendent purpose in this death. It also transcends their mourning beyond denial or repression (compare to Faust 2008 for post-Civil War United States). Reverend Benny Giay, a prominent evangelical pastor who was present at both Jitmau's and Tabuni's funerals—Tabuni was affiliated with his church—condemned the killing by using terms

that are both political and religious. He says that Mako Tabuni represented how Papuans "had to deal with a modern Pharaoh. Indeed, modern Pharaoh and Goliath are in control of West Papua. West Papua is still a land of mourning, land of trauma and bloodshed (Exodus 3:7-9)."

His use of Biblical foundations comforted the mourners and gave their lives a new meaning. Before the funeral, Papuans sent donations to Tabuni's family house in Sentani. Pigs were killed. Sweet potatoes and vegetables were cooked and distributed among the mourners. Flowers were arranged. Condolences and prayers were extended. Giay describes those occasions as follow:

> "We are rich, not only in wealth but also in cultures. We see in other places, people do not have cultures like us. We bring contributions to the families of the deceased. We cry together. We are together in this. We comfort and enrich each other."

Here he referred to the Melanesian processes of mourning. In Melanesia, death is seen as a social event, the starting point of a ceremonial process whereby the dead person becomes an ancestor. Mourning in Melanesia is the place and the moment where the community of mourners is constituted. In other words, mourning is a cultural form that reflects the relations between not only the living but also between the living and the dead. As an event, death and mourning become "the ground upon which collective memory and imagination built a cluster of tales, symbols, legends and imaginary reconstructions"(Portelli 1991, 1). I attended Robert Jitmau's funeral in its entirety, from when he was examined in the hospital until the 40th day commemoration of his passing. It was just three months after my own mother died so the void that she left was still wet with fresh blood. After the forensic examination, Jitmau's body was brought to the Papuan women's marketplace in the center of the city. Papuan women across ethnic groups and generations wailed, screamed, and cried for him. He was brought home to his family house and then buried the next day. During the seven days of mourning, Papuans gathered and prayed in the market place until the 40th day of his death. People say that women are prone to emotional floods during the funerals. Before the pacification,

Dani women would cut their fingers to express their sorrow. The women in Jitmau's funeral—myself included—no longer cut their fingers, but their cries echoed all over the city for days. I do not know how Robert Jitmau's soul could bear the wailing of Hubula, Mee, Biak, Serui, Moni, Sentani, Ayamaru, and Jayapura women in heaven but life continues. *Solpap* does. [97]

Papuans insist on designating the deceased as an individual—martyred, nonetheless. Like a death in Dani warfare, every death is counted and named. Perhaps it is an attempt to defy death's oblivion, or to reconcile with the difficult period of letting go. Both Mako's and Jitmau's deaths have created a series of commemorations and countless tales that are constantly narrated in different times and in different media. Their deaths are generative and loud. Contrary to silence in Das' case of women abductions and rapes during India's national struggle (1997) or Indonesia's 1965 genocide in Steedly's case (1993), Papuans are not silent. Papuans articulate their grief publicly. They cry. They scream. They send petitions. They write. They rally. They parade.

A lot of Papuans posted their grief on Facebook, the most popular media in the region. Some would write a book, a short story, a poem, or a letter to his or her congregation. Alex Giay, a young Papuan poet gathered Tabuni's speeches in his compendium of inspirational quotes, while Bastian Tebay, a novelist wrote a short story "I am, the seventh bullet." All Papuans have become Musa Mako Tabuni. All Papuans have become historians; they seem aware that "*even the dead* will not be safe from the enemy," if they do not become ones (Benjamin 2007[1935], 255, the emphasis is mine).

On June 14, 2016, I attended the fourth anniversary of Musa Mako Tabuni's killing in Perumnas III, Jayapura—an annual event commemorated everywhere in the region. Agus Kossay,

[97] During Robert Jitmau's funeral, Reverend Giay asked the mourners to make a commitment to continue Jitmau's struggle. Robert Jitmau did not belong to Reverend Benny Giay's church.

the first chairman of the National Committee of West Papua led the prayer and delivered a speech as follows:

> We are praying here in the remembrance of late Mako Tabuni.
> Exactly on this date, four years ago, he was killed. We come here to offer our prayers.
> He had done his service to this nation. We respect him as a hero.
> "God of the Papuan nation, the eternal God.
> We come here, we remember our fighter Musa Mako Tabuni.
> You had taken his life involuntarily through the hand of the colonizer
> in this land, in this place
>
> We remember his struggle, his love and his compassion
> We surrender our life to You, God of the Papuan nation
> Because You are the most powerful
> Grant us Your blessing, we are praying and praising You
> Hallelujah, Amen."
> Free West Papua!
> Long live Mako!

Agus Kossay then distributed pork, tobacco, and betel nuts to the mourners—mainly members of the National Committee— in the manner of his custom in the Baliem Valley. The group stayed for an hour: they smoked, ate the meat, chewed the betel nuts and talked in whispers. Passersby observed. Some stopped and joined. Motorbike taxis (I. *ojek*) and blue minibuses (P. *taksi*) parked in the corner of Perumnas III, their drivers—mainly Indonesians—sat in the driver seats with concern. The mourners dispersed around 8 o'clock in peace.

How the Death Is Remembered

The memorialization of Musa Mako Tabuni's and Robert Jitmau's deaths are not unique. Each year, Papuans visit the graves and sites of the killing of the so-called Papuan heroes, such as the graves of Arnold Ap in Abe Pantai, Theys Hiyo Eluay in Sentani, Kelly Kwalik in Timika, and Musa Mako Tabuni in Sentani. Indeed, there has never been a commemorative site of symbolic and physical battles with regard to Papuan deaths but graves. In May 2016, I traveled to Enarotali in the Central Highlands, where a few days before Christmas—a big day in West Papua—four Papuan

teenagers (Yulian Yeimo, 16 years old, Simon Degey, Alfius Gobay, and Alfius Youw, all were 17 years old) were shot to death by the Indonesian security forces. Too much ink has been spilled to report on this incident. At least eight special committees have carried out investigations, but not a single perpetrator has been prosecuted.[98] Stories and photographs of the killing circulated instantly—offline and online— among Papuans. Right after the killing, the four victims were buried in the Karl Gobay Field, right in the center of the town of Enarotali, surrounded by various military offices. Ibo Gobay said, "No more than two days after the shooting the families immediately built the graves in the field." It was a window of time when the military would not be able to prevent them from doing so. Once the cement hardened, the military could not easily remove it without inciting controversies and publications. Amidst cries and protests from Papuans, the military indeed could not remove it. The Papuans, like gods in the Greek *Iliad,* embalm the bodies of their children like Patroclus, Hector, and Achilles to keep them untouched in honor of their death. The Mee community in Enarotali even wanted to establish this tomb as a monument to Indonesia's human rights violation (I. *tugu peringatan pelanggaran HAM*). It is not a coincidence that the community chose to bury them during the commemoration of International Human Rights Day in 2014.

Building a physical construction of memory does not only apply to these teenagers' killings, but also the killing of other prominent Papuan figures, such as Theys Hiyo Eluay and Kelly Kwalik. As prominent figures, their graves are markers of their roles in the Papuan struggle. In the case of

[98] The Paniai case as it has been called involved police and military personnel who fired a peaceful demonstration at the Karel Gobai field on December 8, 2014. Four teenagers were found dead and at least 17 others were injured. The crowd gathered to protest against the beating of a child from Ipakije village by soldiers from the Special Team Battalion 753 of Enarotali that took place a night before. In 27 December 2014, President Joko Widodo publicly committed to resolve the case. In January 2015 the National Human Rights Commission (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, Komnas HAM) established a team to undertake an initial investigation into the case. After four months of work, the Commission reported that it found evidence of gross human rights violations as defined in Indonesia's human rights law (Law No. 26/2000). See a letter submitted by Kontras and Amnesty International to Luhut Panjaitan Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security Affairs Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law and Security Affairs dated December 7, 2015.

Theys Hiyo Eluay, several incidents took place, involving Papuans who insisted on painting the grave with morning star flags and Indonesian military forces that wanted to obliterate any trace of Papuan nationalism. In 2016, before the visit of Indonesia's Minister of Law, Politics and Defense Luhut Pandjaitan to Eluay's grave in Sentani, Indonesian security forces repainted the grave from morning star colors (right) into white (left) (see figure 1). The same goes with Kelly Kwalik's grave in Timika (see figure 2).



Figure 3.1. After and Before: The Indonesia's minister of Law, Politics and Defense Luhut Pandjaitan visited Theys Hiyo Eluay's grave in Sentani, West Papua. Before the visit, Indonesian security forces repainted the grave from morning star colors (right) into white (left). The picture was taken by members of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB). credit: Wenas Kobogau.



Figure 3.2. Before and After. Timika's police forces repainted the grave of Kelly Kwalik in Timika, West Papua. This picture was taken by the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB) Timika. Credit: KNPB

Graves are built to preserve the memory of the deceased, but also function to reconcile and maintain the residue of painful trauma that is associated with their deaths (Humphreys 1981, 5). Except Mako Tabuni's, the tombs of Eluay's, Kwalik's and four Mee teenagers killed in 2014 are not

built in a private cemetery, but instead in sites deemed to be historically important for Papuans. Some Papuan graves indeed have become monuments, with inscriptions that made for heroes who die in the battle. As Humphreys argues, "Prospective monuments represent the dead in his or her future existence... Retrospective monuments try to recreate the living as an anchor for memory"(1981, 272). This also points to the placement of individual death within the larger narrative of Papuan death. An individual, be it Musa Mako Tabuni or Yulian Yeimo ceased to be him or herself, but instead has become a figure whose "presence, as one of the dead, is forever a part of the existence of the group"(Vernant 1981, 285).

In 1982, Black Sweet, a Papuan pop band whose members were mainly students at the University of Cenderawasih, released a highly popular album entitled "The Tomb of the Unknowns" (I.*Pusara Tak Bernama*). Sam Kapissa, a highly talented ethnomusicologist and member of Mambesak music group wrote a song that became the title track of the album. He wrote,

In the caress of barren wind	*Dalam belaian angin gersang*
up in a lonely hill	*Diatas bukit nan sepi*
as you are lying	*Engkau terbaring*
In your deep sleep	*Dalam tidurmu yang lelap*
In the dim light of gray twilight	*Dalam temaram senja kelabu*
In a narrow hallway	*Disisi lorong yang sempit*
You're falling asleep	*Engkau tertidur*
In an eternal silence	*Di kesunyian abadi*
Your name is forgotten	*Engkau tak dikenal namamu*
In the bed of flower of your nation	*Di lembaran bunga bangsa*
Your service is forgotten	*Engkau dilupakan jasamu*
From a historical book	*Di lembaran sejarah*
The Tomb of the Unknowns	*Pusara tak bernama*

You are left behind, abandoned with dust	*Kau ditinggal, terlantar penuh debu*
The tomb of the unknowns	*Pusara tak bernama*
Who is your owner ever since?	*Siapa pemilikmu sejak itu…*
A hero…	*Pahlawan*

Kapissa, a Papuan from Biak wrote this song between 1977 and 1982. In Indonesia, the unknown hero is part of the Indonesian historical myth, but it is hard to point the reference to an Indonesian story. I suspect that it has something to do with 1977. In West Papua, they call it genocide. Musa Mako Tabuni was part of the story. Musa Mako Tabuni was born in Pyramid in the Baliem Valley in 1979. Since 1977, the area had been under a military operation (see chapter 6).[99] In the Central Highlands, the year 1977 is still alive. It never dies. There are different ways in which people talk about the year 1977. One of them is death, the death that never dies.

Reverend Masmur Asso, himself a Hubula wrote that the operation in 1977-1978 had killed 4,000-5,000 Lani and Hubula. He provided a list of every single warrior, chief, teacher, village head, and prominent person that were killed in the period (2016). "I could not identify the remaining victims: ordinary people, farmers, children, women and so many people that were also killed, tortured, raped or disappeared. There were too many of them," he cautions.

Musa Mako Tabuni's brother participated in the insurgency. Musa told a group of journalists during an interview in 2012, "I saw him tortured by the Indonesian soldiers. They escorted my brother to the military base. There, they hit him, tortured and interrogated him." Every August — Indonesian independence month— his father was arrested temporarily by the Asologaima district police. "The army called my brother a rebel. He was arrested. Then, my father was also in prison. Once when I was in fifth grade, I visited him in the prison. He told me not to blame my brother. My brother struggles for what he believes. He struggles for our dignity as a nation. He's true to his

[99] There is a list of military operations available from the military and other reports. See AHRC 2013 and Asso 2016.

conscience, to the Bible that we as Christians accept."

On a summer afternoon in 2016, I drove with a spokesperson of the National Committee, Bazooka Logo. He hails from the Central Highlands, from the Walak ethnic group in the edge of the Baliem Valley. Like Tabuni's, his family members have been killed, raped, or injured by the Indonesian soldiers during the worst military operation in the Highlands in 1977-1978 called the operation of extermination (I.*Operasi Kikis).* His parents live close to Pyramid. "You know, my grandfather was deaf so he could not hear when the soldiers came to our village and shot people. He just stood there in front of the house. The soldiers assumed that he was resisting so they shot him." His grandfather was a war shaman, but he failed to understand a new war that the Highlanders had to wage. Bazooka also calls himself a son of a bottle, but we did not really want to talk about how the Indonesian security forces raped and killed many women in the Central Highlands.[100]

His story is not unique. Most of the National Committee's members were born from parents who experienced the events of 1977. Some of them did not survive, others did. In a few accounts that are available to the public, such as Masmur Asso's and Reverend Socratez Sofyan Yoman's books, vivid and gruesome descriptions of the methods of torture and killings are enough to raise the accusation of war crimes, [101] but in Indonesia, there is a deafening silence. Papuan death seems to be irrelevant—for a nation whose constitution of unity is based on death of others like Papuans. Worse, the mass killings do not stop short at 1977. During 1995-1996, the Indonesian Special Force led by Suharto's son in law, General Prabowo, led military operations that killed hundreds of

[100] A comprehensive report regarding rape and other forms of violence against Papuan women during the Indonesian occupation can be read from "Enough is Enough: Testimonies of Papuan Women Victims of Violence and Human Rights Violations 1963-2009." The report was made by Documentation Working Group on Violence and Human Rights Violations against Papuan Women. 2009-2010.

[101] Both Masmur Asso's book and a report from the documentation working group on violence and human rights violations against Papuan Women, 1963-2009 provide an excruciating detail about how that happened and how many Papuan women have become the victims of the said operation.

Papuans of Amungme and Nduga ethnic groups near the mining site of Freeport-Indonesia. In 1998, the Indonesian security forces killed more than 150 Papuans in Biak (Kirksey 2012, Rutherford 2012). In 2000 and 2003, Indonesia killed more than 42 Papuans in Wamena at the heart of Baliem Valley. In 2001, four Papuans were killed, five disappeared, and thirty-nine were tortured in a series of protests against an Indonesian logging company in Wasior in 2001. In the mining town of Timika, during the year of my fieldwork, I witnessed at least two multiple killings of Papuan teenagers; none of the perpetrators of these killings were brought to court (see **Timeline**)

The multiple deaths, their emotional and cultural forces, and statistics create a nationalist narrative of suffering with a specific temporality and geography of death. Death itself has a regionally differentiated impact, but its experience and narrative constitute a single territorial unity understood as West Papua. Mako Musa Tabuni is no longer defined as a Lani, Robert Jitmau as an Ayamaru or Arnold Ap is a Biak. All of them are Papuans. The geography of death also articulates the nationalist geography of suffering. This geography refuses and shatters Indonesia's narrative of seamless absorption of West Papua into the Indonesian nationalist project and designation of "Papua, Land of Peace" (I. *Papua Tanah Damai*).[102] Papuans insist that West Papua is indeed a "site of mourning," "a site of collective trauma," land of mourning, in the emergency zone (I. *zona darurat*), or a site of "oppression and mourning."

Colonial Duration and Narrative of Extinction

Robert Gardner begins his film "Dead Birds" (1965) with a Hubula story about a race between a bird and a snake. Should men shed their skins and live forever like a snake or should they

[102] "*Papua Tanah Damai*" (Papua, Land of Peace) was coined by the Jaringan Dialog Papua (Papua Dialogue Network), an initiative to bridge a dialogue between Jakarta and West Papua. Established in 2010 by the head of Papuan studies at the Indonesian Science and Research Council late Dr. Muridan S. Widjojo and the head of Fajar Timur School of [Catholic] Theology and Papuan priest from Mee ethnic group Dr. Neles Tebay, the Papua Dialogue Network invites many Papuan actors, from churches to NGOs and the Indonesian government (including the military administration) in many of their consultative sessions.

die like a bird? In the story of the Hubula and Lani ethnic groups of the Highlands, the bird won the race. Reiterating his Hubula interlocutors, Gardner says, "Men because they are like birds, must die." They die in their houses, in their garden, in the forest, and recently, in a poorly equipped hospital. I witnessed two such deaths in Jayapura.

In 2013, during a summer visit to West Papua, I visited Caroline Asso, an eighteen-year-old woman from the Baliem Valley. I found her in a packed and gritty public hospital not far from the Jayapura luxury shopping mall. The electricity in the hospital had been shut off. There was nothing extraordinary about this. When the provincial government fails to dispense the special autonomy money to the hospital, the hospital stops its operations. The hospital has been billed hundreds of millions rupiah by the state electricity company. No medical equipment can work. Papuans say, "Hospitals are places where you die." But this is something new, because in the 1950s it was the best hospital in the South Pacific.[103] One month after my visit and without a proper medical diagnosis, she passed away. But what does her death mean for that wrecked hospital?

In late 2016, my friend and I visited Jen Ginuny, a friend and the wife of a National Committee's member, who had been sick for weeks. She received treatment from the same public hospital where Caroline died. We proposed to bring her to the Catholic hospital, which has better treatment and equipment. Her husband refused. "They have done everything," he said, but we knew he lied. Sometimes, there is no doctor available in the hospital—due to lack of personnel, but also because doctors prefer to open private clinics. We knew that instead of a doctor, Papuan nurses treat her—because most doctors are Indonesians. Ginuny died three days after our visit. She was 28 years old.

[103] See their annual report since 1956 entitled "Jaarverslag Centraal Ziekenhuis Hollandia-Binnen." Hollandia: Dienst van Gezondheidszorg Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea.

I stared at her cold body, covered in a white sheet in a small coffin in her family house in Sentani. It smelled of formaldehyde. Her son—three years old—tried to wake her up. I heard men singing *de* in Walak. Women cried all day long. I sat near the door, crying. Because I am an anthropologist with ndonesian citizenship, Papuans' corpses have acquired an expressive force for me. Papuans' death is not only an ethnographic moment, but also a graphic portrayal of the condition of colonial violence.[104] I have never heard of as many deaths as there were in West Papua. I went to too many funerals. Reverend Benny Giay once told me, upon his arrival after graduate studies in the Philippines, he found himself becoming a pastor of death. It was in the late 1980s. "I came back to Jayapura in 1989. In a week, I could go to four to five funerals. It was bad, so bad," he said. The 1980s began with the political killing of Arnold Ap, a high profile anthropologist and curator of the Anthropological Museum at the Cenderawasih University, a member of the music group Mambesak and Sam Kapissa's closest friend. In the 1970s, the killings took place mainly in the interior and the Highlands, but in the 1980s, killing had returned to the city of Jayapura.

Reverend Giay not only talked about political killings, but also epidemics, such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, undernourishment and hunger, and alcohol(ism). Sparked by liberalization and the sex industry, which intensified in the 1990s when thousands of sex workers arrived from Sulawesi and Java—mainly in big cities like Jayapura and the mining town of Timika, new epidemics and new lifestyles have become new threats for the Papuan population in the 1980s.[105] HIV/AIDS

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[104] Compare Siegel's study on New Order's killing of Indonesian criminals in the 1980s (1998) and Taussig 1984 for Colombia.

[105] In the campaign to win influence among the Hubula big men, Sukarno sent a group of female dangdut singers—a highly sexualized music genre— to West Papua. Papuans suspect that the military administration also brought thousands of sex workers. As official documents are hard to come by, one can only elicit from oral testimonies. Susan Meiselas acquired a photograph showing a *dangdut* show organized for the benefit of Hubula big men in Wamena in the Baliem Valley. See her exemplary project "Encounters with the Dani:Archive Projects (1991-2008)" also her book (Meiselas 2003).

was first diagnosed in West Papua in 1992. Today West Papua has the highest rate of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB among the Indonesia's provinces, with an adult-prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS of 2.4 (2006), or twenty times of the Indonesian national rate. Papuans also have the lowest life expectancy in the country[106]and its infant mortality is the highest with the rate that is triple of the national rate at 396 per 100,000.[107] And this is from the second richest region in the country and one of the largest contributors to the Indonesian national revenue.

Korneles Siep, a migrating Hubula from the Baliem Valley has an expression for this contemporary Papuan situation. "We have been destroyed," he told me. It was noon on the 13th of July 2015. The day was hot and sultry like most days on the coast of West Papua. The fog had descended from the Cycloops Mountain at four, but the dark would come later in the evening. In his homeland in the Highlands, the temperature has decreased to minus one or two centigrade. In some parts of the Highlands, it even reached -11 centigrade. In Agadugume, hunger struck [back], as farmers found their harvest destroyed by the snow. In Mbua, about four hours ride from the Baliem Valley, 41 children died in 2015, possibly due to hunger and malnourishment. During his visits to Mbua in 2016 and 2017, the Indonesian President Joko Widodo boasted of his current road construction project there, which he carried out in collaboration with the Indonesian Armed Forces. No single word was spoken about these deaths.

"There has been snow." Siep's voice was so soft.

"Do you think it will rain here?"

"Not anytime soon. It has been like this for a month or so."

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[106] As in 2009, Indonesia has the third largest TB prevalence in the world.

[107] See, for instance, Cininta Analen Ugaikagopa. 2007."Saving Mother's lives in rural Indonesia."*The Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 85(10):733-820.

"Have you seen snow?"

"No. We don't have snow, but those who live near the Cartensz Peak, they do have snow there."

I saw him sitting across the table with a certain dignity. "We just had an alliance meeting last month. I was thinking of you when we had that. You should have been there. Alas, you were still in America." He has this nice looking feature where the wrinkles of his age smoothly reflect on his skin. He must have been a bit younger than my father. His oldest son was attending a Catholic boarding school nearby. Like other Highlanders, he wanted his children to have better education, which is in the city, not in the Central Highlands. He looked at the door, which framed a pineapple garden, and then looked at me: "The government assumes that we, the Hubula, didn't have cultures, that we were empty."

I asked him what the meeting was all about and there was a moment of silence, a minute of hesitation. He told me about the ancestors, the Hubula ancestors, about the world that they are living, about the alcohol, about HIV/AIDS that makes people sick and about the debt that has not been paid.[108] I was thinking, "Did he say debt or death?"

I have heard the same lamentation from countless Hubulas. Indeed, most Papuans keep talking to me that way. Papuans use words like destruction or genocide to talk about their present and 'extinction' to refer to their future. If Siep uses the term rather figuratively, the National

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[108] Korneles Siep is a member of the Hubula band called Pikalu. One of their song talks exactly about this topic. Their lyrics are:

Pretending to go to school	*Sekolah lagi-lagi hopase nuknakhogo weago*
but you only deceive your father	
Pretending to go to school	*Suesika lagi-lagi hagosa nuknakhogo weago*
but you only deceive your mother	
You deceive yourself	*I uwe oka yire halik ha okaoi ao*
You just hang out along the bank of Uwe River	
You deceive yourself	*I sawe oka yire halik haokaoi ao*
You just hang out along the bank of Sawe River	
HIV/AIDS is the result; it is your own fault	*Aids hoporogo watlasigin atnagari hokoro*
Syphilis is the result; it is your own fault	*Sipilis hoporogo watlasigin atnagari hokoro*

Committee, for instance, writes literally, "West Papua Today, Genocide" (2016, 14) and "53 Years, Indonesia has committed genocide in West Papua" (2016, 26). They further say, "Colonial Indonesia has committed genocide against Papuans with new methods of killing: mutilation and hit and run. They introduced these so that the perpetrators will not be easily detected and investigated. They kill us this way so that they will not be accused of human rights abuses. That's West Papua today. In the past, they killed us with military operations. Now they change their method. We, Papuans must raise our rank of resistance. Even if we are silent, we will vanish anyway. It's better to be killed fighting than in silence"(2016, 14-15). In the following page, the National Committee features a table entitled "This is evidence of how Papuans will vanish in the hands of Indonesia," featuring a demographic figure comparing the number of Papuans to Indonesian settlers (22). Only 40% of the populations are Papuans.

The litany of genocide does not end there. Wendi Kambuaya wrote on his Facebook on May 31, 2017: "Our [Indonesian] friends always try to convince us that the Indonesian government can improve the situation in West Papua, but it is merely a conviction. The indigenous Papuans comprise only 42% (from the whole population of West Papua), and we are going extinct soon. Development has marginalized indigenous Papuans to the most marginal in the margin."[109]Fira, a graduate of the University of Cenderawasih wrote about an incident taking place in her hometown, Merauke on May 26, 2017. "The government utterly neglects little people. The office of health's ambulance is out of service, for how long? Does the family have to carry them by themselves every time this kind of incident happens? Where is the Catholic Church? She is a member of the Catholic Church! God, give us a mercy. We are vanishing slowly, we, the oppressed nation. When will the

[109] See Wendi Kambuaya (pseudonym).2017. "Kawan-kawan selalu meyakinkan kami…" May 31. 6pm. Facebook post.

cries of our children end?"[110] On May 20, 2017 Benny Pakage shared a poster entitled "WAYS TO PROTECT PAPUANS FROM EXTINCTION"(original in capital).

In Papuan narratives, two contradictory frameworks emerge: first, they see themselves as victims of the Indonesian state. They put a series of Papuan deaths within a single narrative of Indonesian colonialism, that "there is no future for Papuans within the unitary state of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia."[111] It will be difficult to verify whether each death is related to Indonesian colonialism, whether the use of the term genocide is superfluous or just legally wrong, or Papuans merely reproduce and mimic international human rights reports on West Papua. What anthropologists can do is not only to take their stories seriously, but also to analyze the persistent narrative of killing, the language of death and violence that suffuse Papuan narratives about themselves. What kind of specific historical conjunctures shape Papuans' understanding of their situation? I argue that it is precisely because there are stories that they tell themselves, the narrative of killing becomes a fruitful site of investigation. Ricoeur argues that *narrative* is a mode of ordering experience and making sense of it. It is a "working through" (Ricoeur 2004). I contend that Papuan narratives of death demonstrate how Papuans are undertaking "the work of culture (Obeyesekere 1990) to understand and explain radical transformations that they have been going through. Experiences with death have transformed Papuans society, culture, and politics, and forced them to seek meaning and explanation for their destruction, for an assault on their conceptions of how life should be, an attack that challenges their most fundamental assumption about their life's value and meaning.

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[110] See Fira (pseudonym). 2017. "Kematian ibu hamil OAP terus terjadi…" May 26. 8.12pm. Facebook post.

[111] In response to killings of some Papuans during June 2017, the Ecumenical Working Group of Papuan Churches (I. *Forum Kerja Oikumenis Gereja-Gereja Papua*) released a statement saying, "For Papuans, there is no future within Indonesia." See the Ecumenical Working Group of Papuan Churches 2017.

There are many gaps and leaps in reckoning as Papuans look for theories to understand the deaths, to make sense of their situations. As I have demonstrated, death is crucial in the formation of Papuan historical consciousness in the context of colonial crisis duress. In many deaths that I saw in West Papua, the death of Papuans is a rebirth and affirmation of their solidarity as a nation. Mourning is the place and the moment where the community of mourners is constituted, namely as the Papuans (compare Verdery 108).

In regard to Musa Mako Tabuni's death, Benny Giay suggests, "The three days of mourning that we had after the killing of Musa Mako Tabuni was not something new. We only repeat what Papuans have gone through since the 1960s. Facing development policies that are biased in favor of the migrants (or *Indon* colonial policy)[112]… we are like the Javanese of Central Java in the 1900s, who were treated as second-class citizens by the Dutch (as Indonesian history books tell us today); or Black South Africans in the 1940s who suffered under apartheid policy"(2013).

Studies of Melanesian society have paid attention to ceremonial exchange and reciprocity as the core principles of Melanesian relationships. As I have described, reciprocity has also underwritten death and funeral ceremonies until today. Gardner and Heider suggest, "The Dani regard the killing of a comrade, wife or child personally as a physical and spiritual threat and as a spur to actions which will redress the unequal balance between themselves and the enemy. The sense of grief that all Dani experience when abandoned by someone close does not give way to mere revenge or self-pity. The need to reequalize the balance is only a partial cure, and it is a long time before anyone's death is forgotten, either privately or ritually, even when an enemy is killed and a victory has been celebrated"(1968, 96).[113] Witnessing so many deaths in West Papua, one will

[112] The word 'Indon' is a condescending term used by Malaysians and Singaporeans to call Indonesian migrant workers in their country.

[113] Compare to Strathern 1981 in other Melanesian contexts.

wonder why Papuans do not retaliate after their deaths? Why are there so few cases in which Papuans use violence to avenge the death of their fellow brothers and sisters? Why is there not an ongoing war? Or is there?

One thing that people fail to understand about the Papuan situation is the duration or the temporal experience of death. West Papua has resisted Indonesia's occupation more than fifty years.[114] Compared to what Indonesia claims as the Dutch occupation of Indonesia—which was about 350 years—the Indonesian occupation of West Papua is still the longest and perhaps the most costly political operation in Indonesia. For Papuans, on the other hand, this experience was rather new. While most Highlanders were introduced to Christianity and the conception of the modern state in the mid 20th century, the shift under occupation is unprecedented. It is correct to say that Papuans are extremely weak compared to dominating forces that come after them, but transformations under Indonesian occupation do not merely make Papuans hapless victims of Indonesian occupation. There is a transformation in cultures that is reflected, among others, in the militarization of Papuan resistance in the form of the National Liberation Army of West Papua Independence Movement (Kirsch 2010a), although as political observers point out their lack of armament and capacity to organize a large-scale resistance. This is the main reason the Papuans do not retaliate, so the argument goes. In the 1960s, Heider was puzzled by Gardner's take on Dani's violence, but I don't think that Heider fully understands the Dani's warfare principles. Not only did Gardner and Heider undermine reconciliation processes and peace negotiations in their film, but they also, and this is contradictory, failed to understand that warfare is still alive among the Highlanders, with a different articulation.

Enarotali (1969), Wamena (1977/2000), Wasior (2001), Biak (1998), Jayapura

[114] The New York Times reported in 1969 that Papuans have promised a long guerilla struggle against Indonesia. See the New York Times. 1969. "West Irianese Predict Long Struggle."May 16.

(1996/2000/2006), Timika (1974/1977/2006), and so on and so forth are not merely an inscription of deaths, but also an inscription of resistance, of life, of the existence of Papuans in West Papua. It is evidence that Papuans refuse to be designated as mere victims, particularly when it's framed this way by the international and national human rights advocacy networks.[115] In Enarotali in 1969, 30,000 "highland tribesmen" rebelled against Indonesia, the New York Times reported (1969).[116] In Wamena in 1977 and 2000, the Lani and Hubula took arms against the Indonesian military and settlers. In Biak in 1998, Biak people raised the morning star flag in the Biak water tower. In Timika in 1974, 1977 and 2006, Amungme men and women, Nduga, Damal, and Lani warriors fought against a mining company and Indonesian soldiers. We may have to talk Papuan insurgencies in terms of Gardner's reciprocal balance of violence, that for Papuans, there is a war and it is against Indonesia. With this, I argue that Papuan independence should be understood as warfare, as a mode

[115] In parallel with the Papuans' use of genocide, a number of academic and human rights reports use the term genocide to refer to the ongoing killings perpetrated against the Papuans. The first report, published by legal scholars at the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic Yale Law School in 2004 argues that based on evidence available from West Papua, there is "a strong indication that the Indonesian government has committed genocide against the West Papuans. Moreover, even if the acts described…were not carried out with intent to destroy the West Papuans as a group, a necessary element of the crime of genocide, many of these acts clearly constitute crimes against humanity under international law"(2004, 1). Referring to the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the report characterizes that 1) Papuans constitute a group under the Convention's definition of genocide; 2) the acts perpetrated against the Papuans are among those described by this definition, namely "a) Killing members of the group;(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group;" and 3) these acts were carried out with *intent* to destroy Papuans as a group. Using similar arguments, two scholars from University of Sidney Jim Elmslie and Camellia Web-Gannon claim that Indonesia has carried out slow motion genocide of Papuans (2013). Their argument is that Indonesia has committed "intentional killings and other acts in violation of the Genocide Convention" since West Papua's incorporation to Indonesia in 1962. They also add, "In aggregate many tens, if not hundreds of thousands of West Papuan people have been killed under Indonesian rule as the direct result of explicit government policies"(144). Reporting specifically on the pattern of mass violence in the Central Highlands during 1977-1978, the Asian Human Rights Commission argues that Indonesia's violence in West Papua constitutes the crime of genocide (2013). Papuans take this term and frequently reproduce it in political speeches or sermons in the church. For Papuans, genocide relates to the idea of extinction.

[116] The New York Times. 1969. "Radio Reports Indonesia Used Rockets in West Irian." May 6. Similar reports come from "the Star" (New Zealand), "the Sidney Morning Herald"(Australia), and "the Observer" (UK).

of fulfilling a reciprocal principle within the Melanesian society. Therefore, every death is counted; every killing is not an isolated incident, but a continuum under Indonesia. As Benjamin writes, the duration of this living is not a homogenous, empty time. It is punctuated by death, by also revolutionary moments.

The Opposite of Death

Indonesia, due to its history, has become a paradigmatic place in which nationalism is understood and theorized (Anderson 1984; Siegel 1986 and 1998; Geertz 1980; Keane 1997; Steedly 2016; Strassler 2010; Lee 2016); as Steedly argues, "the Indonesian struggle for national independence was the first successful war of liberation in post-World War II Asia. It became a model and inspiration for anticolonial and national struggle worldwide" (2013). Like nationalism in other places, Indonesian nationalism has also demanded human sacrifice. In addition to hundreds of thousands or even millions of Indonesians who were more than willing to give their life for the nation, there is the death of another kind that becomes the foundation of the Indonesian national[ist] project. The 1965 killing is one; the death of Papuans [and East Timorese and Acehnese] is another. Perhaps only by killing Papuans Indonesia has become the nation that we know today. But the question is why do Papuans endure?

It seems to me that the answer lies in the Papuans' narrative of death. As Steedly suggests, independence was the opposite of 'feeling colonized' (2013, 117), for Papuans, independence seems to mean *the opposite of death*. For them, independence is life.

4. The Capital of Gold: Mining and Meaning in West Papua

We drive on a gray afternoon a day after the shooting of several Papuan kids by the Indonesian security forces in Gorong-gorong, Timika. Some young male Papuans from the Highlands hang out near the utility poles while Kamoro women sell sago and fish in a wet, muddy market near the river. Company workers wearing their white helmets walk towards the bus station, ready to go to the job site. In the corner, a barracuda armored vehicle is parked, with some cops loitering. They are fully armed.

It has been raining for days in the south. It always rains in the south. The Kamoro, listening to the radio, gaze at the water with certain nostalgia. In 1932, British explorer Alexander Frederick R. Wollaston lamented, "The monotony of the river is beyond words, and one day is almost exactly like another…The jungle is as ugly as it can be, rank undergrowth, trailing rattans, and scraggy rotting trees. Altogether it is as gloomy and depressing as it can be, there is no view, not even a glimpse to show that we are near a mountain range. In the midst of all this, it generally rains hard and you arrive in the camp soaking wet" (Wollaston 1912, 72-73). In the year that Wollaston was in Timika, rain fell for three hundred and thirty days.

The afternoon fog conceals the fact that Timika has become the center of operation for the largest gold and second largest copper mine in the world. The steady rain is treason. When it rains, the streets are wet, and the rivers bring the tailings from the mining site into the sea. It makes everything visible. The town is packed with new Ford dealerships and new bourgeoisie. With a copper and gold rush that has lasted longer than the ones in California, Timika is a city with no past. Everything seems as if it were built in the past ten years or so. Residential buildings and stores are painted yellow or blue, with a fence made out of low quality, cheap steel. Places are named SP1, SP2

and the like, following the Indonesian New Order's unimaginative transmigration programs.[117] Others are gated communities, built by the company for their workers from the United States, South Korea, Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi. Gelael and Kentucky Fried Chicken are located downtown, where a Papuan street kid can be seen sniffing what looks like glue.

Timika is a place with thousands of names and a million stories. Capitalism is one. But there appear to be layers upon layers of stories: words spun in the air, a web of metaphors in the rain, calls, and voices on the street. Timika is drizzling rain today at 7 o'clock on a Sunday morning, followed by a long, sultry afternoon. A young Papuan is drinking at 1 o'clock on an overcast Monday. There's a muddy market in the center of the town. Out in the Highlands warfare continues in Kwamki Lama. The Indonesian Special Forces are in the Lamongan eateries, while thousands of Sulawesi people work away in 'illegal' gold-panning camps. There's a Catholic church led by a Kei, and we hear of deaths in the evening. Malinowski says, "In the field one has to face a chaos of facts, some of which are so small that they seem insignificant; others loom so large that they are hard to encompass with one synthetic glance" (1954, 419).

This part of West Papua has seen foreign visitors like Wollaston climb to the Highlands to measure the natives' heads, draw up maps, investigate the tropical snow, and bring out malaria and flu, propagating a foreign *hai* named Christianity, and later constructing the world's largest mine. The accumulation of these projects has transformed lives of indigenous people in unprecedented ways. The Dutch Catholics established a mission post in 1928, and by the late of 1940s, they had traveled to the Highlands to convert the Amungme as well as their neighbors to the north. When the first discussion of the "discovery" of gold in the Highlands took place in the 1930s, the Amungme walked through their seventeen valleys. They met their neighbors in the north such as the Damal, the Lani, Nduga, the Mee and the Moni, and to their south, the Kamoro, an agglomeration of tribes

[117] SPs (*Satuan Pemukiman*) are settlement units built by the Indonesian government to house Indonesian migrants from densely populated islands, e.g. Java.

that hunt and gather their food from confusing bodies of flowing water that bring their lives, their routes, and their stories into being. The place that was later called Tembagapura by the Indonesian president Suharto was a meeting place between the Highlanders. Timika did not even exist, because it was an indefinite landmass and the Highlanders did not even dare to swim in its rivers—there used to be countless crocodiles. But all the crocodiles have gone, as well as the *soa-soa*, most of the sago groves, and even the rivers that the Kamoro used to navigate. In its place, a new transnational entity with power takes hold of its landscape.[118]

Freeport Indonesia, a subsidiary of the American mining company Freeport McMoRan claims to give Papuans a chance to jump from the Stone Age to the steel age. "This is not a job for us, it's a religion," says James R. Moffet, its CEO of many years. And like missionaries, they claim that they have brought civilization, assuming that the Stone Age Papuans had none of their own.[119] The company proudly declares its operation in superlatives: the world's largest goldmine, the world's most profitable copper mine, the world's longest slurry pipeline, the world's longest single-span aerial tramway, the largest private employer in West Papua, the largest taxpayer to Indonesia, and so on and so forth.[120] But for many Papuans and others, the mining company is marked by two contradictory characteristics: its scale and invisibility. Its gigantic scale has attracted a great deal of attention, especially through its open pit mining techniques and environmental impacts in the Central Highlands and Timika.[121] Every day at least 200,000 tons of mine waste (tailings) are

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[118] By the mid-20th century, the Kamoro had accommodated mountain people, eastern people, Dutch people, and Chinese people in their stories, such as a story entitled "Warta Tina Tatakware" (translated by the Kamoro intellectual as "The Dutch and the Chinese").

[119] Tsing calls this an act of conjuring. See Tsing 2000/2008.

[120] Compare Wilson 1981; Pogolamun et.al. 1984; Freeport Indonesia's annual reports from 1960-2017.

[121] See Schulman 2016.

dumped directly into the Aijkwa delta. It creates a long, winding slurry that runs to the Arafura Sea. The Kamoro call it the runaway river (I. *Kali Kabur*).

The scale, however, conceals the mechanisms of the mining and the structure of capital that nurtures its growth. While mining operation is spectacular to the eyes, it is a closed information system, one that has given rise to extensive speculation, conspiracy theories, and imaginings. It is true that miles of steel fences and thousands of security forces personnel protect its operation,[122] but most strikingly, the company manages to survive the various scandals and controversies, as well as the rise and fall of Indonesian political regimes: from the Old Order to the New Order, and later into post-reform Indonesia. When mining in other parts of the region has been subject to what Ballard and Bank call 'resource war' (2003), Papuan communities, particularly the Amungme and Kamoro, remain largely powerless against the dominant forces of the company and the Indonesian state.[123] To some extent, corporate actors and the Indonesian state set the terms of the operation and what kind of information can flow out from the mining concession. To reverse Tsing's argument (2000), Freeport's operations in West Papua make use of the economy of *dis*appearances.

Freeport Indonesia is not the only mining company that extracts Papuan natural resources, but Freeport is central in the constitution of Papuan consciousness. This consciousness is not only national, but also global, and reflects the inner workings of American capitalism in collusion with the Indonesian state. In West Papua and Indonesia, discourse about Freeport is pervasive.[124] Those who support the operation view the importance of Freeport for Indonesian development and a pro-

[122] See Bonner and Perlez 2006, and Belford 2009.

[123] In many cases such as in Bougainville and Ok Tedi (Papua New Guinea), indigenous communities are capable of negotiating their contracts. See mining in the Pacific region, Banks and Ballard 1997 and 2003, Alex Golub 2014, Kirsch 2006 and 2014.

[124] There are countless books and articles written by Papuans on this topic. See Haluk 2014, Amiruddin & Soares 2003, and Tipagau 2016.

growth economy, citing, for instance, that since the Grasberg open-pit mining commenced operations in 1991. The Government of Indonesia has received over $16 billion in direct payments from them.[125] The discourse of Papuan independence activists and fighters, on the other hand, seems to offer a transparent interpretation. We can quickly identify this through their language of environmental destruction, death and killing, militarization, Indonesian colonialism, American capitalism, and so on. Music, the most popular art form in West Papua, exemplifies the role of mining in Papuan's imagining and understanding of themselves and their land. A lot of contemporary Papuan songs features words, such as "rushing rivers with flowing gold." A refrain from "Silent Song" (I. *Nyanyiang Sunyi*) by Sam Kapissa, a member of Mambesak from the Biak Island, goes as follows:[126]

What a beautiful land	Tanah yang permai
A rich land, but poor	Yang kaya melarat
Lying there	Terhampar di sana
In the east	Di timur merekah
And the sound of its waves	Dan bunyi ombaknya dan siul unggasnya
The whistle of its birds	
Singing together	Melagu bersama
Oh, a silent song	Oh nyanyian sunyi
An abandoned paradise	Sorga yang terlantar
That is full of smiles	Yang penuh senyuman
Seas of pearls	Laut mutiara
That is buried black	Yang hitam terpendam
And the rushing rivers	Dan sungai yang deras
Flowing with gold	Mengalirkan emas

[125] Freeport McMoRan 2016 annual report.

[126] Unless otherwise noted, all translations from non-English languages in this chapter are mine.

There is also similar imagery in the lyrics from the highly popular song entitled "The Land of Papua" (I. *Tanah Papua*):[127]

There,	Di sana
My beloved island that I always exalt	Pulauku yang kupuja slalu
The Land of Papua, a beautiful island	Tanah Papua, pulau indah
My forest and seas	Hutan dan Lautku
They are always silent	Yang membisu slalu
The bird of paradise, what a golden bird	Cenderawasih, burung emas
Mountains,	Gunung-gunung
Mysterious valleys	Lembah-lembah yang penuh misteri
I will always exalt	Kan kupuja slalu
Your fascinating natural beauty	Keindahan alammu yang mempesona
Your rushing rivers, flowing with gold	Sungaimu yang deras mengalirkan emas
Oh, Lord, I am grateful	Siyooo Tuhan, terimakasih

So when did gold and copper become an integral part of the Papuan imagination? How does mining produce particular conceptions of Papuan selves and others? How does mining's gigantic scale and its invisibility shape Papuans' national consciousness? I will answer these questions through the study of several forms of knowledge production that have been associated with Freeport's operations in West Papua. The first form of knowledge comes from the study of "I am, the Seventh Bullet," a short story written by Papuan author Bastian Teophilus Tebai. The second form pertains to various archival records stored by the company, the Indonesian National Archives, the National Archives and Records Administration of the United States, several universities in the United States, and document leaks in West Papua. Through the juxtaposition of these forms of knowledge, I challenge existing scholarship on Freeport that relies on the company's narratives and refuses to recognize a profound entanglement between the company's operations and state violence that has stemmed from this economy of extraction. My effort here also contributes to scholarship that wishes to "situate the formation of particular national spaces within the historical geography of

[127] The song is written by Yance Rumbino, a Biak teacher working in the Central Highlands of West Papua in the 1970s and sung by Trio Ambisi.

capitalist expansion and the consolidation of the interstate system" (Goswami 2004, 610). By accounting for the operation of capitalist expansion as constitutive in the formation of West Papua as an exemplary space, I wish to offer an analysis that puts the political and economic spheres within "one analytic field" (Cohn 1980, 218). Contrary to methodological nationalism or the privileging category of nation-states, this study also aims to develop a meaningful connection between West Papua, the Indonesian state, and the broader politics of the U.S Empire.

I am, the Seventh Bullet

> I am a bullet, made from the ore of Papuan land, deep down in the earth where we, the Papuans live, under the snowy mountain of Ertsberg. I was dug and dredged by a giant instrument, and then I was melted in an extremely hot furnace. I became soft like mud. Then, I was sent through a pipe, until I realized I was already inside a giant tanker. I am ore from this land. That tanker carried me when I was soft like porridge, like mud. Then I arrived there, in a city that I did not know. I heard people with red skins saying, "This is America." Yes, I remember it. It was the United States of America. I had arrived in the United States.
>
> I did not know how many days we sailed. I did not know how many nights or days we were in the tanker. Inside that giant tanker, I could not tell because there was an eternal light in there. They regulated the temperature. I could not move. I could not get away. I could do nothing but surrender. Then, after I arrived in a busy port, I was brought onto an enormous truck. In a massive factory, I was processed. There were so many ingredients that I did not know what else I was combined with and what they put into my body. Then I realized and was increasingly aware that my body was no longer soft like porridge. I became even softer and more fluid.
>
> We were separated. I was brought to a bullet factory where I was poured. Every machine there worked automatically. I could not see any human beings. Well, there were a few people there. By then I realized, I had become a bullet.
>
> Until then, I had just cried. I was aware that I was made to shoot, to kill enemies. My task is to hit them, to kill them. I realize, and indeed it has become a habit among the bullet folks, that it has become our pride if we can successfully penetrate our enemies' chests to kill them. But that was not for me. I was packed and given a label. Then I was carried into a huge room. I met many of my friends, the bullet folks. I realized then from the conversations I heard that I was on a ship, which sailed to Indonesia. Indonesia was foreign to me. Is it a city? Maybe it is a war zone. That's what I was thinking.

That is how Topilus Bastian Tebai, a young Papuan writer from the western cordillera of Central Highlands introduces his protagonist. He wrote this story entitled "I am, The Seventh Bullet" in 2016. Tebai, who was born in 1994, represents a young generation of Papuan writers who

have had access to higher education, and also publishing opportunities through online literary platforms such as sastrapapua.com. Tebai's story makes explicit how Papuans feel about Freeport's arrival and how Papuans see themselves in this constellation. Therefore, I use Papuan literature here to offer what Kirsch calls "indigenous modes of analysis" (2006).

The short story itself begins with the protagonist—the Bullet—running away from the scene of a killing. The Bullet runs and ends up in a confession room of a Catholic priest at the "Fajar Timur" school of theology and philosophy in Jayapura, the capital city of West Papua. There is no way that Tebai could write this story without Freeport, just like Gabriel García Márquez could not possibly write *One Hundred Years of Solitude* without the United Fruit Company. The difference is that Papuans never invited Freeport in the first place.[128] There are at least three ways in which Tebai's story reveals Papuans' sophisticated understanding of the mining operations. First, the story provides an analysis of the global commodity chain of copper that comes from Papuan land. Secondly, there is a geography in which a network of historical actors—the United States, Indonesia, and West Papua—are connected through copper and its extraction. Thirdly, the author establishes a direct connection between the copper that forms the bullets that kill Papuans. This story can be considered a material history that documents the killing of Papuans.

For Tebai, there is a significant relationship between the material and the place, between the copper and the Papuan soil.[129] This is not what the mining is all about. Mining is the process of alienating copper from the Papuan land; the detachment of this metal from the soil that nurtures it. In the non-fictional history that the Papuans have lived through, this began in 1936. A substantial

[128] Marquez writes, "Look at the mess we've got ourselves into just because we invited a gringo to eat some bananas." See Márquez 2003[1970], 223.

[129] It is not a coincidence that copper is the first metal known to man. For millenniums, copper has been used in buildings and as thermal and electrical conduit in electrical equipment such as telephones.

reserve of copper was "discovered" in the southern part of the Central Highlands when a Dutch geologist, Jean Jacques Dozy and his companions, Anton Hendrik Colijn, son of the then Dutch prime minister, and Frits Julius Wissel, carried out a 'scientific' expedition to the Cartensz (the southern part of the Central Highlands). These three Dutch men were sent by the Netherlands New Guinea Petroleum Company (*Nederlandsche Nieuw Guinea Petroleum Maatschappij*, NNGPM) based in Babo. NNGPM was founded in 1935 by the Shell Group under its affiliate Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij (BPM), Standard Vacuum Oil Co., and Far Pacific Investments (owned by Standard Oil of California).[130] The Rockefeller family owned both Standard Vacuum and Far Pacific Investments with a total ownership of 80% of the companies' shares. By 1959, the East Borneo Company (D. *Oost-Borneo Maatschappij,* OBM), a coal and petroleum company that leased its oil exploration rights in East Borneo to BPM in 1902 obtained an exploration permit to the Cartensz through BPM.[131] Due to a lack of capital and technology, OBM invited potential partners in Japan, as well as in the United States, for the venture, including Freeport. In February 1960, Freeport agreed with O.B.M. to carry out preliminary explorations for the reserve (Simpson 2008, 231).

There are two aspects of Freeport that distinguish it from other American or foreign mining companies. The first is the role of many prominent American figures in the operation of the company. The second is the company's involvement in the larger agenda of American imperial

[130] BPM held 40% of the shares, Standard also 40%, and Far Pacific held 20%. See Penders 2002, Forbes and O'Beirne 1957, and Visser and Hermes 1962. John D. Rockefeller and partners formed the Standard Oil Company of Ohio in 1870, after having entered the oil business in 1863 with the founding of Andrews, Clark & Company and later Rockefeller, Andrews & Flagler in 1867. The history of the company can be accessed through https://www.britannica.com/topic/Standard-Oil-Company-and-Trust. Archives of the company can be accessed through https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/taro/utcah/00352/cah-00352.html. Through various and highly complex corporate transfers and investment, the Standard Oil has become Exxon Mobil.

[131] The East Borneo Company was established in Den Haag in 1897. On the history of the company, see Lindblad 1985 and Magenda 2010, 25-26.

politics during the Cold War. Here we see how Tebai's story superficially gestures to this corporate history.

Freeport Sulphur Company was founded in 1912 in the city of Freeport, Texas. The company began with sulfur and then got into the mineral business, focusing on molybdenum, nickel, and copper soon after. In 1971, the company was renamed Freeport Minerals Company. In 1981, Freeport merged with McMoRan Oil and Gas Company and then became Freeport-McMoRan. McMoran Oil and Gas Company was founded in 1967 by William Kennon McWilliams Jr. ("Mc"), James Robert (Jim Bob) Moffett ("Mo"), who were both petroleum geologists, and Mack Rankin ("Ran"), a specialist in land-leasing and sales operations. Coming from the Mississippi Delta's culture and corporate tradition,[132] Jim Bob Moffett would be central in the growth of Freeport-McMoRan and their operations in West Papua.

Before establishing operations in West Papua, Freeport's nickel and cobalt facilities in Nicaro and Moa Bay in Cuba had been taken over by the Cuban revolutionary government led by Fidel Castro. The nationalization was published in the *Cuban Official Gazette* of October 24, 1960, but it was not made public until December 19th of that year. This nationalization wreaked havoc on the company's financial standing. "The operating losses, as reflected in the consolidated tax return, were the end of 1960, considerably greater than the profits of Freeport Sulphur against which they might have been applied. Also, a substantial tax loss may be realized as a result of the seizure by the Cuban government of the facilities in Cuba, although the effect for tax purposes of the seizure is not now clear."[133] The report further suggests that their facilities in Cuba represented approximately 65 percent of the total consolidated assets of the company. In their statement to the Government of

[132] For long, the Mississippi Delta's economy depended on the slave trade and cotton plantation. Two years before McMoRan was established, the Jim Crow laws enforced in this area. See Johnson 2013.

[133] Freeport Annual Report of 1961, 7.

Indonesia, Freeport says, "Freeport was perhaps more important than any other company in the development of Cuba's mining industry. Our last undertaking there—the Moa Bay nickel-cobalt was, in fact, the largest single privately financed venture in the history on that island."[134] At the end of 1961, the losses from the nickel-cobalt project again were considerably higher than the profits of Freeport. Freeport's debt, amounting to over $100,000,000, has been increasing at a rate of over $5,000,000 a year as a result of the accumulation of interest charges. How is this minor history of the corporation important in their move towards West Papua in the context of the Cold War?

The Contested Beginning

The opacity of Freeport's operations began with a highly contested beginning. The Indonesian government signed a contract of work (I. *kontrak karya*) with Freeport for the exploitation of copper in this area five years *after* the New York agreement and two years *before* the implementation of the Act of Free Choice in 1969 that would determine the status of West Papua—independent or being part of Indonesia.[135] Freeport was the first foreign company to sign a significant investment contract with the authoritarian regime of the New Order. Under the Indonesian foreign investment law passed in 1967 (UU No. 1 Tahun 1967), their mining concession is designated as a vital national asset (I. *obyek vital national*); this status places it under the jurisdiction of this international company and the Indonesian central government, and makes it subject to the protection of the Indonesian security forces.

[134] Memorandum FSC, March 30, 1966. Freeport's total consolidated asset in Cuba was valued at $100,000,000.

[135] See Tsing 2000/2008 for the definition of a contract of work.

During the confrontation and negotiation of the status of West Papua from 1949 to 1962, no official document from the Dutch, Indonesian, and United States' governments mentioned the existence of the reserve, which according to the estimation in 1966, contained 13 million tons of copper in outcrops alone.[136] Dutch historian Drooglever rightly states that big business had demonstrated little interest in New Guinea before World War II, except for the oil industry that had established itself in Babo and Sorong (2009, 291), but that was all, so the historian says. Indeed, until 1965 the Dutch-American political scientist Arend Lijphart still claimed that West Papua (or New Guinea at that time) had no economic potential. He wrote, "It is clear that West New Guinea was not a great economic asset to the Netherlands…The spectacular claims of wealth in gold and uranium have to be strongly discounted."[137] This claim becomes a foundation of his theory that colonialism is an emotional and psychological enterprise (1966).

Nevertheless, as Drooglever himself suggests, we must ask this critical question. Considering the central role that the United States played in the transfer of West Papua from the Netherlands to Indonesia, how much did the discovery of these metals influence American foreign policy toward West Papua? This question will have radical ramifications for how we understand West Papua today. Following Tebai's gesture, I will examine the network of historical actors through an examination of a series of archives from the Netherlands, United States and Indonesia, including newly declassified documents of the U.S Department of State that pertain to their discussion on West Papua and Freeport in the 1960s.

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[136] Telegram, Jakarta to U.S. State Department, Telegram 390A, dated April 13, 1966, 2-3.

[137] See Lijphart 1966, 48, 51.

It is clear from the Dutch records that the Dutch colonial government was highly aware of West Papua's rich mineral deposits.[138] Archival records at the Indonesian national archive and the national archive of the U.S., particularly pertaining to correspondence between the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta and the State Department, also demonstrate that since the late 1950s every party involved in the dispute was aware of the existence of not only massive copper reserves, but also abundant gold reserves in West Papua. That is to say, every party involved was aware except for the Papuans. An airgram of the State Department on April 14, 1966, for instance, demonstrates that the U.S. Embassy in Indonesia had met two Freeport representatives, Forbes Wilson and Robert Duke, and received a memorandum of their mining proposal on April 7, 1966. The memorandum was intended to "acquaint the responsible officials of the United States State Department with the interest of Freeport Sulphur Company in reviving its previous project for the further investigation and development of a *large copper-iron-gold ore deposit* located in West Irian, Indonesia"(1, emphasis is mine).

Secondly, early in the 1960s, various companies in the United States, Japan, France, and the Netherlands had bid to get the concession of these reserves. In the State Department's archive, two American companies, i.e., Freeport Sulphur and Guggenheim Exploration clearly declared their intentions to the U.S. representatives in Jakarta in 1966.[139] The archive also mentions the Japanese

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[138] After the expedition, Colijn published a bestselling book about the trip. See Colijn1937. Jean Jacques Dozy also published several journal articles about his discovery. See J.J. Dozy 1938, 1939. Also J. J. Dozy, Erdman, Jong, Krol, and Schouten 1939.

[139] For Guggenheim's interest, see Telegram 1352, the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta to the State Department, dated May 4, 1966, Subject: INCO-COPPER. For Freeport's interest, see Telegram 980A, the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta to the State Department, March 29, 1966. Transmittal Slip From the US embassy in Jakarta to the State Department, dated April 6, 1966 includes Freeport's letter to Major General Ibnu Sutowo, the Indonesian minister of Mines, Oil and Gas, dated April 6, 1966 and a "MEMORANDUM: Interest of Freeport Sulphur Company in the Development of a Copper Prospect in West Irian, Indonesia." Dated April 5, 1966. See Airgram Department of State, n.d, April 14, 1966.

government's move to couch the Indonesian government.[140] From the Indonesian archive, I found that Japanese scientists had been involved in an expedition to the Cartenzs in 1964 with the approval of Sukarno.[141] The Tjenderawasih Expedition used a scientific pretense to conceal their real intentions to prospect.[142] With the shift of power in Jakarta from Sukarno to military general Suharto, by 1967, however, the United States got their upper hand.

Henry Kissinger and His 'Dirty Business'

On July 8, 1969, Henry Kissinger, then the National Security Advisor to President Nixon, wrote to the President on the eve of his visit to Indonesia, "The West Irian 'Act of Free Choice' will be underway during your visit. It consists of a series of consultations, rather than a direct election, which would be almost meaningless among the Stone Age cultures of New Guinea…You should not raise the issue. If the Indonesians do, you should tell them that we understand the problems they face in West Irian."[143] Twenty years later, Kissinger would sit on Freeport-McMoRan's board of directors.

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[140] Memorandum of Conversation, the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta. Subject: Freeport Sulphur Copper Venture. Dated June 15, 1966. See Telegram 500, the U.S Embassy in Jakarta to the State Department. Dated August 25, 1966.

[141] See KOTI 1964; related film is at the Indonesian National Archive.

[142] This is similar to the American-Dutch missions. See Lindesay Parrot. 1959. "Dutch To Explore New Guinea Area" New York Times (1857-Current file); Mar 6, 1959; Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2001), pp.8. On French interest, see Tahija 1995, 158.

[143] Memorandum, from Henry Kissinger to the president, subject: Djakarta Visit: Your meetings with President Suharto. Dated July 18, 1969. NARA E.O. 12956, 7 and "Indonesia, Talking Points" NCV/II-7 Rev'd, July 20.1969, 9.

Henry Kissinger, a controversial figure in American foreign policy, has worked with Freeport since at least 1988 through his involvement as an individual, and through his consulting firm, Kissinger Associates, which he founded in 1982 with Brent Scowcroft, his assistant during his tenure as a national security adviser to Richard Nixon.[144] Henry Kissinger forged a powerful connection with the Rockefeller family, whose interest in New Guinea manifested early on through the NNGPM. Kissinger met Nelson Rockefeller in 1955. He was invited to The Special Studies Project, a study funded by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund to "define the major problems and opportunities facing the U.S. and clarify national purposes and objectives, and to develop principles which could serve as the basis of future national policy."[145]

In September 1991, Kissinger visited Freeport's job site in Grasberg in West Papua and met its American executives.[146] In 2000, he made another visit to the Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wahid when Freeport's term of contract was subject to reevaluation and political challenges in Indonesia.[147] As the Jakarta Post reported, Henry Kissinger "called on the Indonesian government to honor its contract with the copper and gold mining enterprise PT Freeport Indonesia amid growing criticism over the company's mining activities." While it is common for the former White

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[144] Scowcroft was also a former U.S. National Security Advisor under President Gerard Ford and George W. Bush. During the Nixon's presidency, he served as military assistant and deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs. Also, Kissinger invited Stapleton Roy, director of Kissinger Institute on China and the United States and the Former United States Ambassador to Indonesia to sit at the company board.

[145] Rockefeller Brothers Fund Archive. http://rockarch.org/collections/rbf/. See Leith 2003. Michael Rockefeller, Nelson's son disappeared in New Guinea in 1961.

[146] Freeport Indonesia celebration [includes correspondence], 1992. Henry A. Kissinger Papers, Part II (MS 1981). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

[147] See Terry J. Allen, "With Friends Like These; Kissinger does Indonesia." In These Times (Chicago, U.S.) April 17, 2000. See Associated Press February 28, 2000 and The Jakarta Post, Tuesday, February 29, 2000.

House's employees to work in the private sector, the involvement of Henry Kissinger in this venture is quite exceptional. As I investigated further, I found that it was not only Henry Kissinger who was involved directly in Freeport. Furthermore, the *Harvard Crimson* reported in 1997 that Harvard had invested an unidentified amount of investment, out of a $9 billion endowment, in Freeport-McMoRan (Granade 1997). But this is not so surprising considering that George Putnam III, a former treasurer of Harvard University and Chairman of Harvard Management Company became a member of the Audit Committee of Freeport and held shares in the company.[148]

To return to Kissinger, his consulting firm the Kissinger Associates provides, in his words, "geopolitical-economic advice'" and helps clients "'with their international planning" (Gelb 1986).[149] It is well documented that Henry Kissinger supported Suharto's annexation of East Timor.[150] Octovianus Mote, the vice chair of the United Liberation Movement of West Papua (the official representative of the Papuan liberation movements) and his West Papua Advocacy Team accuse, "In his capacity as National Security Adviser and subsequently as Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger orchestrated critical U.S. diplomatic and military support for this repression, including overseeing

[148] Freeport McMoRan Inc Prospectus. The prospectus is attached to an invitation to a special meeting of the stockholders of McMoRan Oil and Gas Co to be held on Tuesday, April 7, 1981, in Wilmington, Delaware. Freeport Archive, Harvard Business School's Special Collection. In 2014, he wrote a analysis on Freeport on Wall Street's Best Dividend Stocks entitled "Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold (FCX)." https://cabotwealth.com/topics/wall-streets-best-dividend-stocks/fcx-3/.
July 15, 2014.

[149] See http://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/20/magazine/kissinger-means-business.html.

[150] On the day of the invasion, US President Gerald R. Ford and Kissinger himself met with Suharto. Kissinger has famously said, "It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly," Kissinger said to Suharto. See NSA archive.

provision of U.S. OV-10 Bronco aircraft which strafed and bombed Papuan villages."[151] How should we understand the series of events from 1960 when Freeport expressed its interest in the reserve, the 1962 New York Agreement that forced a transfer of administration of West Papua from the Netherlands to Indonesia, the Indonesia-Freeport Agreement in 1967, and also the failure of the international community to secure a fair and democratic referendum that made West Papua become part of Indonesia in 1969? (**see Timeline**)

To answer these questions, we must critically examine archival records of the international negotiation about the status of New Guinea that was unfolding in New York and other places. In 1962, when the United States brokered a peace negotiation between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the status of New Guinea, the United States seemed to take a more careful approach. The wording of the New York Agreement that was signed on August 15, 1962, at least stipulates the need to hear Papuans' aspirations as follow:

Indonesia will make arrangements, with the assistance and participation of the United Nation Representative and his staff, to give the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice. Such arrangements will include:

> (c) Formulation of the questions in such a way as to permit the inhabitants to decide (a) whether they wish to remain with Indonesia; or (b) whether they wish to sever their ties with Indonesia;
> (d) The eligibility of all adults, male and female, not foreign nationals, to participate in the act of self-determination to be carried out in accordance with international practice, who are resident at the time of the signing of the present Agreement and at the time of the act of self-determination, including those residents who departed after 1945 and who return to the territory to resume residence after the termination of Netherlands administration.[152]

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[151] West Papua Advocacy Team: Open Letter to Westmont College on Kissinger and West Papua. http://www.etan.org/news/2013/10kissinger.htm

[152] Article XVIII, New York Agreement: Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian). As signed at the United Nations Headquarters, New York, August 15, 1962).

Although ambiguous, the wording offers a chance for the exercise of Papuans' democratic rights toward the self-determination. However, as we can see, in parallel to the change of regimes in the White House, the increasing pressure of the Vietnam War, and the success of military-led coups in Indonesia, the shift of attitudes from the White House were visible, if not from the archive, then from their political move toward the region.[153]

A close examination of the telegrams from the U.S. embassy in Jakarta to the State Department shows that there are two strands of conversations that may give us a clue as to what extent business interests in mining shaped U.S. policy in West Papua. The first set of documents is a record of conversations about the Papuan uprisings after the arrival of the Indonesian military forces in the region.[154] The second set of archives consists of mining and American economic interests in West Papua.[155] The strange compartmentalization of the correspondence on mining and the Papuan uprising is indeed jarring; we start to ask whether they are in fact talking about the same territory. Perhaps this is a deliberate move. From early on it is clear that the bureaucratic regime of the archive gives an illusion that the sphere of politics is separated from the sphere of economics. Records pertaining to mining and business interests are deliberately silent on the existence of Papuans. Only later were Papuans were mentioned in the documents. The terra nullius was indeed the order of the

[153] The involvement of the United States in the one of the world's bloodiest massacres and the overthrow of Sukarno has been subject to much discussion. See Scott 1985.

[154] This set of communications has been declassified and made accessible via the National Security Archive's website. Bradley Simpson (ed.). 2004. *Indonesia's 1969 Takeover of West Papua Not by "Free Choice": Document Release Marks 35th Anniversary of Controversial Vote and Annexation, Secret Files Show U.S. Support for Indonesia, Human Rights Abuses by Indonesian Military.* https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB128/.

[155] Some records have been declassified and available online via the National Archives and Records Administration. https://www.archives.gov/

day. In the uprising archive, however, U.S. archives show how Papuans actively resisted Indonesian incursions.[156]

From 1965 to 1967, the State Department records demonstrate that there had been an intensive discussion between the U.S. government, Freeport, and a committee of Indonesian military generals who had just toppled Sukarno under the pretense of an anti-Communist purge. Responding to the interests of an American company and the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, General Suharto sent the Minister of Oil, Mining, and Minerals and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to see the proposed site in West Papua with their own eyes before the Act of Free Choice was implemented.[157]

From 1965 on, the U.S. embassy also conducted a series of meetings with the Papuan nationalists.[158] The news of Papuan uprisings from 1965 was widely reported by their staff and American missionaries, so there is still a strong case to argue that the United States understood how Papuans felt about the Indonesian invasion.[159] The United States also received briefs and reports from the U.N. Secretary-General and Indonesian officials that informed them that Indonesia would

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[156] It should be noted, however, that American officials tend to undermine Papuans' voices.

[157] Telegram 933 from Jakarta to State, August 25, 1966, RG 59, Central Files, 1964-1966, INCO Mining, Indonesia.

[158] See Airgram, U.S. Embassy in Jakarta to the Department of State, Airgram, RG 84. Box: 00299. Folder: 0008 Document: 23 (this archive is still classified). See Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, A-221, December 12, 1967 (enclosed to the Airgram A-221, dated October 18, 1967).

[159] See Incoming Telegram Department of State, pol. 19, dated April 27, 1967. Incoming Telegram Department of Sate, 5595, dated May 19, 1967. Airgram Department of State, A-221, October 18, 1967 (this even mentions, "His most interesting observation was that "99%" of the Papuan population favors independence from Indonesia"). Airgram Department of State, A-570, dated May 10, 1968. Airgram Department of State A-641, dated June 18, 1968. Intelligence Note, U.S. Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, 632, August 9, 1968. Telegram Department of State, 366, dated August 20, 1968. Telegram Department of State, 2381, dated April 22, 1969. Telegram Department of State, 2827, May 8, 1969.

never let the Papuans determine their future democratically. By 1968, the U.S. Department of State claimed,

> "Retention of West Irian as full-fledged Indonesian province is a political necessity for Suharto government and Adam Malik…As Department aware, we are dealing here essentially with stone-age, illiterate tribal groups whose horizons are strictly limited and who would be unable to grasp alternatives involved in free plebiscite. A free election among groups such as this would be much more of a farce than any rigged mechanism Indonesia could devise."[160]

We can see here where Henry Kissinger's recommendation to Nixon came. The key to the question of the relations between mining and the fate of West Papua can also be examined from the U.S. State Department Archive from 1960-1965 which is still classified but there is a strong case to make that the existence of gold and copper reserves and the need for stability for American business interests contributed to the United States' *not pressuring* Indonesia to carry out the Act of Free Choice genuinely.

Since 1965, Freeport's officials have forged a powerful connection with the White House, among others, through the appointment of James Moyer, Freeport's ad and information director, as a White House staff member. Freeport, through Robert A. Lovett, had also been involved in the Clay Committee (the Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World) formed by the Kennedy Administration in 1963. Leith reports that during the most critical period in the company's history in West Papua, at least five prominent figures from the company had a secure connection with the White House. The chairman, John Hay Whitney, a Republican donor, is the grandchild of John Hay, Theodore Roosevelt's Secretary of State. He was also closely associated with Nelson Rockefeller during his tenure in the Office of Strategic Offices (Leith 2003, 59).[161] Board members,

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[160] Telegram 366, Department of State, dated August 20, 1968. Subject: The Stakes in West Irian's Act of Free Choice.

[161] The Office of Strategic Service was the intelligence agency of the United States during World War II. It was a predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

such as Admiral Arleigh Burke, were anti-Communists. Burke himself was an important actor in the Bay of Pig invasion.[162] One member of Rockefeller family, Godfrey S. Rockefeller, sat on the Freeport's board of directors for nearly 50 years.[163]

It is crucial to return to the Cuban case to understand the context in which this dispute took place. Two ideological mainstreams provide a framework here, namely the adoption of interventionist policies within the United States' foreign policy and the American war against Communism during the Cold War. As Westad (2005) convincingly argues, business interests have not always had a direct and decisive role in American interventions. Yet since President Truman and John Foster Dulles, a Republican Secretary of State under President Eisenhower (in office 1953-1959) were more than willing to arm a rebellion against the Sukarno government in 1958, and an anti-Communist purge from 1965 to 1969 that killed from 500,000 to three million Indonesians. The case of West Papua does not seem to be an outlier. Freeport represents a free market force that American foreign policy zealously defends. It was also an integral part of the American national security strategy against the spread of Communism. As for winning New Guinea, Sukarno had asked for military aid from Nikita Khrushchev.

During the Kissinger years, this approach would be intensified. *Realpolitik,* as Kissinger says, has been the order of the day in the White House. As a political philosophy, *realpolitik* is distinct from ideological politics in that it is not the ideology that dictates policies, but practical exigencies of the situation. As others have suggested, morality is out of the question for Kissinger and his

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[162] This refers to the failed military invasion of Cuba undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) using a Cuban anti-revolutionary paramilitary group Brigade 2506 on 17 April 1961. CIA documents pertaining to the invasion have been recently declassified. See Kornbluh 1998.

[163] Proxy Statement, Annual Meeting of Stockholders of Freeport Sulphur Company, February 1, 1939). Freeport Archive, Harvard Business School's Special Collection. On January 10, 1939, Mr. Rockefeller owned of record of 3,000 shares of Common Stock of Freeport Sulphur Company.

doctrine. As Leith has strongly argued (2003), Freeport has used the Suharto's patronage and the Indonesian military's protection to carry out business in Indonesia. I would add that the arrival of Freeport is not limited to providing the economic foundation of the New Order regime, but also that it created a particular state form through their dealings with the U.S. and the Indonesian states. If in Indonesia Freeport supports a military modernization "in which the armed forces asserted for themselves a dominant political role legitimized by their commitment to economic and political development" (Simpson 3), their dealings with the U.S state in the U.S. and beyond has strengthened the emergence of the United States as a hegemonic power. Therefore, in addition to post-war reconstructions in Europe, the war in Vietnam, the making of the third world, and annexations of foreign lands, American corporations are part and parcel of the U.S. Empire.

This brings us back to Tebai's short story. For Bastian Tebai, Octovianus Mote, and other Papuans, it is evident that the U.S. involvement in the West Papua dispute not only has benefitted them, but also implicated them in the larger design of the territory. In other words, what Tebai implies is that miners are historical actors. Secondly, contrary to methodological nationalism or the privileging category of nation-states, this study has developed a meaningful connection between West Papua, the Indonesian state, and the United States. It shows how the Indonesian state as a colonial power shapes and is being shaped by its relations with the U.S. The entanglement of mining and the Indonesian state will bring this further into relief.

The Second Commandment: Accumulation by Dispossession

> In Tanjung Priok port, we docked. I was unloaded. With me were my friends, ore from West Papua who have been transformed into bullets, weapons, and other armaments. For the first six months, I still could breathe because I felt safe. I was in the Indonesian military's arsenal. After six months had passed, I was transported to the port. With me there were so many soldiers joining. When I realized that the ship that I was sailing toward West Papua, I was so proud, really proud. I was so happy that I would return to my homeland.

> But if I knew from early on what would happen in West Papua later, it would be better if I could kill myself there, jumping into the sea on my way to West Papua. Argh, who knows about tomorrow, about the future? The only thing that I know is the succession of the present, which shapes the past and hopes for the future. That's all.
>
> I was loaded into a weapon of a soldier. I was there for about a month. The first several bullets were shot, I didn't know at whom. I didn't know because, at that time, I was still inside the weapon. I could not see it. But it was clear that all the bullets were unloaded in West Papua, my homeland, the land where I came from, deep down under the Snowy Mountains of Ertsberg.
>
> At that time, the bullets on the frontline had been shot. Then my turn arrived. To be a bullet, I was ready to hit whatever target my master, the soldier, shot. From the funnel hole where I exited, I saw. Above the ground, a Papuan man was lying on the ground. "Jesus," my voice stifled. "It is Musa Mako Tabuni!"

Musa Mako Tabuni, as we learned from chapter 3, was an Papuan independence fighter and the chairman of the radical group called the National Committee of West Papua. The Indonesian security forces killed him in 2012. Tabuni did not belong to the Amungme or Kamoro groups, nor did he ever live in the concession area.He symbolizes not only Papuan-ness, but also the Papuan nationalist struggle. This is what I refer to as the process by which Freeport's mining operations became a central tenet of Papuan national consciousness. Freeport indeed has provided a condition of possibility for the emergence of such consciousness.

In 1967, when the contract was signed, Freeport's concession covered approximately 24,700 acres of indigenous land. But in 1991, it was expanded to 4.8 million acres.[164] At the beginning of the mining operations, approximately 3,000 indigenous Papuans lived in the concession area.[165] These consisted of the Amungme ethnic group who lived on the mining site in the Highlands and the Kamoro who lived in the coastal and riverine areas in the lowlands.[166] As the state carried out an

[164] See Ballard and Banks 2009, 153.

[165] Numbers are contested. Tom Beanal, an Amungme leader claims about 1000 Amungme lived in the concession area in the late 1960s. See Kafiar and Beanal 2000.

[166] See Kafiar, Sumule, and Rumbiak 1997.

enclosure of large land areas for mining, these indigenous communities immediately felt the first impacts of mining. The Highlanders were removed from their land and forced to migrate to the lowlands. With this, the agricultural basis of the Amungme's traditional livelihood was also destroyed to make way for a new economy.

When construction began in May 1970 and mining operations in 1972, the Amungme were relocated from Tenggogoma (the Ertsberg mining site) and placed in what is now called Kwamki Lama (or Kampung Harapan) in Timika, an area that formerly belonged to the Kamoro ethnic group. In March 1973, Suharto officiated the mining and construction of a new company town called Tembagapura (copper town), Freeport's mining camp in the Highlands. Although there are a significant number of workers living in Tembagapura (approximately 20,000 people in 2016), most workers commute every day from the lowland city of Timika. From the Kamoro's former hunting and fishing ground, the company also built an airport and a port in Amamapare, about sixty miles from downtown Timika.

In 1978, a new Highlanders' settlement was established in the city called Kwamki Baru. In 1980, the Indonesian government and the company "encouraged" more Amungme to join resettlements in the lowland Timika but some clan groups refused and preferred to stay in Banti, Waa, and other valleys surrounding the mine. After the Amungme, the massive relocation of Damal, Moni, and Mee ethnic groups from the neighboring area of Tembagapura followed suit in 1982. The Lani, a traditionally migrating ethnic group began to migrate to lowland cities, including Timika, both after the military operation in 1977 and increasingly after 2000. Many of them also sought low-level jobs at the mining company. In 1986, the company and Indonesian government carried out a project to relocate the Amungme from Waa and Upper Waa Valley to Timika. In the 1990s, a new city was built. Kuala Kencana, as the city is called, was built for Freeport's office and residential complex covering an area of 17, 543 acres, which once belonged to the Kamoro ethnic group.

Timika, then, is surrounded by company towns, which are guarded by Indonesian security forces. The increasing mobility of populations from the Central Highlands to Timika created ethnic settlements, although porous ones. The company's settlements and offices, however, are closed off and highly segregated along racial lines; the white skilled workers and managers occupy the top level, followed by foreign Asians, Indonesians and the lowest, the Papuans. Timika in this sense is a buffer zone that mediates the closed spaces of the mining operation and the traditional indigenous territory.

In Timika, the arrival of the Damal, Nduga, and primarily Lani shifted the demographic composition of Kwamki Lama, as the Amungme moved to Kwamki Baru. Those who are affiliated with the company either live in the gated communities of Kuala Kencana—whose residents are primarily non-Papuans—Timika Indah, or Tembagapura. The Kamoro prefer to live near the sea or riverine system, such as in Gorong-Gorong, Sempan, Koperapoka, and the areas surrounding the Amamapare port. By the time I went to Timika, the majority of the Kamoro have been pushed to the outskirt of the city. By 1994, Kwamki Lama, the first Amungme settlement in Timika had become a mainly Lani settlement.

The arrival of the extractive industry has revealed two critical effects in this area. Firstly, it necessitated the reconfiguration of the Papuan universe, which included turning its landscape into an industrial and militarized space. In other words, urbanization in West Papua is marked by the arrival of the city to the rural, forested, and indigenous frontier space. Second, as many historians and geographers have suggested, the arrival of this industrial space took place in parallel with the introduction of new social relations based on capitalist values, new demographics dominated by Indonesian migrants, new institutions (the military, mining, and logging), new spatial formations (urban markets, streets, and settlements), new relations of labor, new understandings of nature, and

so on. In short, this is a new space with new relations of power.[167] The marginalization and dispossession of indigenous Papuans is inevitable.

First, Papuans from the Highlands were relocated from their rural homeland to an urban setting. The dispossessed Papuan agriculturalists could not be absorbed by the labor market that the mining industries created. Indonesian migrants who come with better skills and more capital perform better in the job market. Freeport shows that they hired approximately 33,277 local workers in 2016. From this number, only 8,413 are Papuans (25 percent), while the remaining workers are from Indonesia (24,864 workers, or 75 percent) (Freeport 2016). This figure, unfortunately, does not represent Freeport's workforce historically, as it has always been dominated by Indonesian workers. Early in the 1980s for instance, more than 90 percent of Freeport's local workers were from Indonesia.[168] Indonesian migrants work in Freeport or small, medium and large enterprises where they are hired as contractors and subcontractors to provide ancillary services such as construction, transportation, maintenance, cleaning, food provisions and so forth for the mining operations.

The economic growth of the area also continues to attract so-called 'spontaneous' or voluntary migration. As early as 1981, 'spontaneous' migrants from the Kei in South Moluccas and Bugis, Bone, and Makassarese groups from South Sulawesi began to flood areas near the Timika airport to look for better opportunities in the city (FI: np). The Kei of South Moluccas have migrated to West Papua since the early 20th century to work for the Catholic missions and the Dutch colonial government. Most Kei stay permanently in West Papua and form strong networks in the southern part of the region, a traditionally Catholic area, such as in Merauke, Mimika, Asmat, and

[167] See Marx 1967[1887], Williams 1973, Harvey 2006 and Li 2014.

[168] See Wilson 1981, 207. Wilson writes that in the mid-1979, 200 Papuans were working on the lowest ladder of the company jobs that do not need skills, such as road maintenance to sanitation (ibid., 208).

Fakfak. The recent migration of Kei and other ethnic groups of Moluccas origin was also intensified through interreligious and ethnic conflict in the Moluccas.[169]

In addition to voluntary migration, the Indonesian state has sponsored transmigration programs to Timika. Transmigration was a national program initiated to alleviate population density on Java island by removing poor peasants and encouraging them to go to outer islands, primarily Sumatra, Kalimantan and West Papua. Transmigration to Timika began in 1985 as part of the more massive transmigration schemes to West Papua that started in 1964. According to the office of transmigration of West Papua, from 1984 to 1990, Timika was projected to receive 9, 000 households (45,000 transmigrants) from outside West Papua (Kanwil Transmigrasi Propinsi Irian Jaya 1983). In 1989, West Papua was projected to receive approximately 751, 204 transmigrants from Java, Sulawesi, Bali and Lesser Sunda islands or 34% of the estimated population of West Papua that year. From the late 1980s to 1997, eight transmigration settlements were constructed to accommodate more Indonesian migrants. Today, there are 13 transmigration settlements in Timika whose residents come mainly from Java and Sulawesi.[170]

Tirtosudarmo suggests that in Timika, a radical shift in demographic figures has taken place since the 1980s, when the population growth increased dramatically because half of the population at that time were Indonesian migrants. In 1961 the population of Mimika comprised 97 percent indigenous Kamoro, three percent non-indigenous of Asian/Indonesian origin, and five percent European (FI 1998). According to the company survey in 1998, only 38 percent of the population

[169] In 2004, it was estimated that Timika had received at least 3, 021 refugees from the Moluccas conflicts. Detiknews. "Sejak 1999, 3021 Pengungsi Maluku masih di Timika." February 20, 2004. Online. Accessed on November 20, 2017.

[170] According to a 1994 report, each transmigration settlement consists of 300 households. This number has been expanded dramatically in recent years.

was Amungme and Kamoro, while the remaining people were Indonesians and Papuans from other areas (1998). In 2010, non-Papuans comprised more than 57 percent of the total Timika population (see **Figure 4.1**). Migration and transmigration have intensified the need for indigenous land and aggravated 'ethnic conflict' not only between Papuan ethnic groups, but also between the Indonesian migrants' groups, and the most obvious, between Papuan groups and Indonesian ethnic groups.



Figure 4. 1. Population of Timika in 2010 (Figure by author, tabulated from Biro Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Mimika, 2010)

The Killings and the Creation of a State of Emergency in the Mining Site

Every once in a while, General Kelly Kwalik, the Commander of the National Liberation Army of West Papua Independence Movement, boarded a boat to visit his friends and family members in Timika. Kwalik might have traveled this route a thousand times. He was a member of the second generation of Amungme people who went to the missionary school in Kokonao in the

1960s. His life trajectory was a biography of movements and relocations (Feld 1996). After Kokonao, he was sent to Biak, and then to Jayapura to attend the Teruna Bakti teacher school. In 1976, after long and intensive discussions with his Amungme seniors and classmates, he decided to leave the city and went to the Victoria Headquarter in the forested borderlands between West Papua and Papua New Guinea. In 1977, in the most coordinated insurgency against the Indonesian military forces, Kwalik returned to his homeland, first from Agimuga, then to Kali Kopi, a few miles from the city of Timika. He led around 2,000 forces walking from Jayapura to Amungsa (the Amungme country) to attack Freeport. They sabotaged and cut the company's slurry pipes. Following this insurgency, the Indonesian military conducted a military operation in the Central Highlands, including in the concession area, followed by the designation of West Papua as a military operation zone until 1998. Agimuga, a settlement of the Catholic Amungme was destroyed and bombed. At least 11,000 Highlanders—2,000 alone from the mining site—were killed or involuntarily disappeared while hundreds of thousands were displaced or forced to migrate to the lowland cities such as Jayapura and Timika, including many members of his family.[171]

In 1996, another insurgency took place in the city, and twelve employees of Djajanti Group were held hostage. The uprising began with a series of shootings in Freeport's concession in the Central Highlands on Christmas Day of 1995 by unidentified snipers. The "main" riot, however, broke out on March 10, 1996. Thousands of Papuans from Waa, Banti, and Timika attacked the company's facilities, including security posts, laboratories, and other buildings. They forced the company to halt its operation for three days with an estimated loss of property totaling two million dollars and nine million dollars in operations.[172] Following this uprising, Freeport—with the counsel of the commander of the Indonesian Special Forces, General Prabowo—agreed to spend one

[171] See AHRC 2013, Farhadian 2005.

[172] Warta Berita Radio Netherlands, Monday, January 2, 1996. Pratap Chatterjee, "The Mining Menace of Freeport McMoRan, *Multinational Monitor* 4, April 1996.

percent of their revenue on community development for the Papuan people. Part of the agreement was to distribute this fund to the so-called seven tribes (I.*tujuh suku*), instead of to the two customary owners of Freeport's concession (the Amungme and Kamoro). Interviews with several Freeport officials and Amungme leaders resulted in competing versions of the agreement, ranging from the argument that these seven tribes have kinship relations (I. *kekerabatan*) to the fear of the Highlanders' political power, to the military engineering of this process. One Amungme leader told me, "Ask Prabowo!" when I asked him about this subject. Since then, the one percent fund has created a divide, not only between those who agreed and disagreed with this "price of compromise" but also between Highlanders who stake different claims to the mining cake.

But this 1996 incident can also be told through another story in a human rights report from Archbishop of Jayapura, Father Munninghoff. The report begins with the story of Maria Katagam-In. Maria's husband had finished work when the soldiers arrived. He and his three younger brothers, members of the Kwalik clan, played cards by lamplight when the soldiers ordered them to get down to the ground. "You are the brothers of Kelly Kwalik? Yes?" shouted the soldier. The brothers said that they knew nothing about him, but the soldiers pulled them up and escorted them to the military vehicle. Maria pleaded to be allowed to go with her husband and brothers, but the soldiers pointed their guns and told her to stay.

The day after, Maria went to the army post of Koperapoka in Timika. She went there everyday and asked to see her husband, but it was not until over a month later, on November 10, 1994 that she was granted permission to see him. When she saw him, he was shackled in the dust outside a container with Freeport's name on it, and covered in bruises. The report says that he held a bloody cloth and told Maria, "This was drenched in my blood when they tortured me, and now I am sure I have no hope of staying alive. I can't stand it!" He pointed to a large bloody bandage on his calf. "I tried to run away so they would shoot me rather than torture me, but they shot me in the leg

and dragged me back." Before he could say more, soldiers surrounded Maria and told her to go home and come back in one week. When she and the other wives returned the containers were empty, and the soldiers said they knew nothing of the Kwalik brothers. Maria knew then that the men were dead.[173]

I know Maria and her sister Yosepha well. Yosepha went with her to the army barracks. When I met Yosepha in 2016, she no longer made any trips to Koperapoka. She did not tell me about her own fate: staying in a room knee-deep with water and human waste, without food or drink for a week, and another six weeks of torture and interrogation after her brothers-in-law disappeared. She has experienced this kind of incident several times. She is always the one who the Amungme call upon when things like this happen. She tells me, "I am dead inside." But she is alive. I go with her to a pig feast in honor of the inauguration of a new Catholic church in the Highlands. "This is our culture…We, the mountain people, we have these cultures… we raise pigs, plant sweet potatoes…eat together." She seems to understand the work of an anthropologist. She had barely finished fourth grade when her family members moved from the Highlands to lower Agimuga to participate in a 'community development project' initiated by the Dutch government and the Catholic Church around 1959. The Amungme of Agimuga were among the first workers to be hired to construct the airport. They were paid with corned beef. Hence, the Amungme always call the airport "corned beef airport." Kelly Kwalik rightly said, "There had never been any story in the world that the world's largest mountain of gold and copper was bought with 12 rolls of cowrie shells, 12 steel axes, ten cans of corned beef and 20 machetes." After Kwalik and John Ondowame staged an insurgency from Agimuga, no Amungme from Agimuga could work in Freeport. "They treat us like animals," Yosepha tells me. Jesus was also treated like that, I tell her. She is a devout Catholic, and she always says *Hail Mary* prayers at night. One night, she tells me how awful it was to

[173] See Munninghoff 1995 and Start 1997.

be in that container. "I cannot take a shower at night. My bones will crack." But she does not tell me about her sister's husband and his three brothers. "I see grief everywhere."

Freeport Indonesia consistently denies any relation to the continuing human rights abuses perpetrated by the Indonesian security forces (see Leith 2003). But Papuans like Bastian Tebai insist that it is the case. It is not a coincidence that the bullet kills Musa Mako Tabuni in the story. The Indonesian security forces' arrival in Timika coincided with the arrival of extractive industries. Since then on, their presence would significantly shape the city. I will even argue that their role amounts to military urbanism, which is the interpenetration of militarization and urbanism in city development and urban planning. This is clear through the logic of warfare that shapes the urbanism of the city, the deployment of military infrastructure as part and parcel of urban planning, the normalization of militarized practices of surveillance and demarcating borders, the use of political violence against and through common urban infrastructure, and a seamless molding of civilian-military life.[174]

While Freeport's close relationship with Indonesian security forces has been widely discussed, few studies have focused on the Indonesian companies' engagement with security forces in Timika.[175] With both Freeport and Indonesian companies, the security forces are involved not only in defending their operations, but also in the ownership of the enterprise.[176] While it is hard to audit Indonesian companies and to elicit comments on their engagement with the Indonesian security forces, Freeport has attempted to frame their engagement with the Indonesian security

[174] Compare Graham 2009.

[175] See Aditjondro 1983 and 1985.

[176] The case of Djajanti and Hanurata is a good example. These companies have a direct relation or whose shares are partly owned by the Indonesian security forces and Suharto's family, including the Indonesian Special Forces (*Kopassus*). See King 2004, 122 and World Bank 2001.

forces in a positive light. In 2006, Freeport, for instance, stated their position on the presence of the Indonesian security forces in their concession as follows, which deserves to be quoted at length,[177]

> "PT Freeport Indonesia, on the same basis as all businesses and residents of Indonesia, relies on the government of Indonesia for the provision of public order, upholding the rule of law and protection of personnel and property. The government has designated the Grasberg mine as one of Indonesia's national vital assets. In addition to the security provided by the Indonesian police, this designation as a national vital asset result in the Indonesian security institutions playing a significant role in protecting the area of company operations. The Government of Indonesia is responsible for employing police and military personnel and funding and directing their operations, because of the limited resources of the government of Indonesia and the remote location and lack of development in Papua, the government of Indonesia has looked to the company to provide logistical and infrastructure support as well as supplemental funding for these necessary services. The GOI continually assesses the security situation for the project area and adjusts the police and military presence as it deems necessary to provide adequate security to the mine as well as the surrounding area."

Two points are implicitly stated here. First, the designation of Freeport's concession as a vital national asset justifies the intensive process of securitization and militarization of this landscape. In other words, the security presence is carried out through a formal channel required by the state. Secondly, the company provides infrastructure and supplemental funding for this 'service.' In this sense, instead of replacing the sovereignty of the state, the company recognizes and enforces it. In other words, the arrival of the company became a platform to create this landscape as a state space (Scott 1998). This gives us enough reason to believe that the entwined project of Indonesian nation-state formation and transnational capital should be central in our understanding of the formation of a nation-sate. In the case of Indonesia, however, we should take the role of the military and its engagement with capitalism more seriously.

In both Indonesian and foreign companies' operations, the consequences of militaristic corporate policy is extremely material. Almost all units within the Indonesian military and police have built bases and headquarters in the city and along the companies' and concessions' routes. They

[177] Freeport Indonesia 2006, 30-31.

guard the entrances of all concession areas and are involved in various roles in the companies. Ballard and Banks (2009) suggest that the military build-up in Timika has increased, from about 100 security forces in the early years of their operation to 3,000 in 2009.[178] Freeport reported that in 2006, there were 2,625 Indonesian security personnel in their mining concession and that they spent the USD $9.2 million for this service.[179]

In 2016, I received a set of Freeport's internal documents that were circulated among journalists in West Papua. The power of secrecy is not total. Leaks, like tailings, are treason. I would like to call these 'wild documents,' as they are documents that are not authorized to circulate publicly. These documents demonstrate how much Freeport spends on various expenses ranging from "recreation and moral support" to office maintenance for nine military units and ten police units operating in the Freeport mining concession. The military payment covers the payments to the Papua Regional Military Command, the Mimika regional military command, the Navy, the Air Force, the Military Police, the Cavalry Battalion, the Aviation Unit of the Armed Forces, the Special Air Force Unit in the Mozes Kilangin Airport, and the Special Forces. The police payments include those to the Papuan Regional Police, The Mimika Regency Police, the Tembagapura Police Office, the Kuala Kencana Polic Office, the Mimika Baru Police Office, the airport police office, the Water and Air Police, the Police intelligence unit, the Mobile Bridge, and Amole Taskforce.[180] Anecdotal

[178] In the broader context, West Papua itself has the highest concentration of security forces in the country, with a per capita ratio of population and security forces of 99:1, compared to the rest of the country, which is 296:1. Supriatma also estimates that the total number of security forces in West Papua as 36,254 personnel. These consist of 21,400 TNI personnel (18,950 armies, 1,050 navy, and 1,400 air force) and up to 14,584 personnel of Indonesian police. See Supriatma. 2014.

[179] See Freeport Indonesia annual report 2006, 31.

[180] PT Freeport Indonesia, Security Risk Management Department. *Cost Report Annex A-VMSA Military Group, Periode Mei 2011.* Item 5. Cost Report Military Group, Mei 2011. The New York Times (Perlez and Bonner 2005) reported that from 1998-2004, Freeport had paid at least $20 million for Indonesian military officials.

evidence from the period from June 2009 to December 2011 suggests that Freeport's Security Risk Management Department spent more than three million US dollars per month for the Indonesian security forces.[181]

On top of the official security assignments, members of the military have engaged in various companies' operations and businesses. Maroef Sjamsuddin is a case in point. The Freeport director Maroef Sjamsuddin is a former head of the Indonesian intelligence agency (*Badan Intelijen Nasional*). He co-owns a security company, PT Harmoni Sinergi, which trains Freeport's local security officers. Some press coverage reported that the training was conducted under the tutelage of the Special Forces.[182] Sjamsudin's case is not extraordinary. As has been public knowledge in Timika, the Indonesian security forces have also been involved in the illicit economy of the mining town, such as in prostitution, alcohol trade, illegal gold panning, and so forth. Several sources in Timika told me that approximately 12,000 workers are working in the illicit gold panning operations along the Aikjwa River, where the company dumps their tailings and mining waste. The landscape of illegal panning gold can be seen from the air, with hundreds of bivouacs run by primarily Bugis migrants, although Papuans from various ethnic groups are also heavily involved. The most peculiar thing about this "illicit" gold panning is that it takes place in "the legal space" of the company's operations. The operations indeed take place in the mining concession where entrances are highly

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[181] The detail of the spending: the accommodation cost for the security forces in 2008 amounts to $924,768,422.00. In June 2009, a weekly transaction for the security forces amounted to $247,447.96. The cost of smoke and meals (smokos) for police in the period of January-December 2009 was $16,236.32. Phone card support for the same period amounts to $6,114.84. During the first half of 2011, the cost for the security forces (both military and police) is about $3,390,071.22 per month. All of this evidence is drawn from Freeport Indonesia, Security Risk Management Dept, Summary Cost Report By Unit Military and Police Group, 2011. For more recent transactions involving the Indonesian militaries, a blogging platform (http://freeportleaks.wordpress.com/) has uploaded several files detailing Freeport's expenses on security and military facilities.

[182]Muhammad Tahir. "Security Freeport Tahan 24 Security Baru dari Jakarta." *Harian Papua.* May 15, 2014.

guarded by the Indonesian security forces. Inside the area used for illicit gold panning, different blocs are run or protected by various units within the Indonesian security forces. Many violent conflicts that have taken place in Timika can be attributed to this economic competition.

How should we define this kind of place? Is that legal or illegal? How do we understand the role of the Indonesian security forces here? Are the company and the security forces not working together to grant access to these artisanal miners? We can see here that the Indonesian security forces have enabled the creation of a space that is both legal and illegal at the same time. The end of the dual role of the military and the 1998 democratic reforms does not end this practice.[183] The involvement of the Indonesian security forces in the extractive enclaves and various plantation projects in the border is not new and surprising, but the extension of the security forces' business to the previously privileged domain of the state is also widespread. In this particular juncture, state sovereignty seems to expand to the "competing networks of authority and accumulation" (MacLean 2008,143). As we can see from Freeport, there is a military build up of capitalist forces that are not too different from the 17th to 19thcentury colonialism of the Dutch East India Company (*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, VOC) or the British East India Company. Papuans like Tebai are correct to say that there is a strong connection between their marginalization and dispossession, and the workings of military capitalism. Indeed, Papuans seem to locate their political articulation in the interstice of these processes.

Mining and Meaning in West Papua

To return to Tebai's "I am, the Seventh Bullet," we have to revisit the spiritual sphere of the Catholic piety in the "Fajar Timur" school of philosophy and theology. At the end of the Bullet's

[183] The Dual role of the Indonesian military doctrine stipulates the military role in guaranteeing the security of the nation and sovereignty of the State, and secondly in the social and political sphere. This doctrine was held during the authoritarian regime of the New Order (1966-1998). See Crouch, 1988.

story, Father Kegou tells the Bullet, "That means you're the only eyewitness capable of telling the truth of Mako Tabuni's tragedy. And now you are their target so that they can eliminate all traces of the killing." The Bullet responds, "Yes. I am the seventh bullet that was shot right at the heart of Mako Tabuni. I am an eyewitness, and I want to testify. And that's why I came to you, Pastor. I need your protection."

This conversation is striking in the sense that we finally realize that there is no confession here. The protagonist does not confess his guilt, but instead, he describes a network of actors who have forced him to be an instrument of killing. In other words, this is a story about the origin of violence. The Bullet testifies to the religious authority and the readers that there is a network of accountability, consisting of the American industry, the American military aid scheme, the Indonesian security forces, and the Papuans. The Bullet is a witness to the unfolding of this system. It is not a coincidence that in the Papuans' lives, the network that Tebai describes is a network of impunity.[184]

When Freeport, the Indonesian state, and the United States deny any wrongdoing in relation to their operations in West Papua, I argue that "I am, the Seventh Bullet" makes use of ethical and religious frameworks to name the moral and political implications of the mining. As I use it here, Tebai's story then makes visible what is concealed by power. Here, literature emerges as a means to convey knowledge about how the mining operates, and Tebai's words extract new forms of political experience that reflect on the relationship between the mining and their dispossession as Papuans.

[184] Compare Kafka 2007(1914).

5. From Big Men to Big Women of Melanesia

In front of the Expo, a gritty complex of museum and model houses of Papuan ethnic groups, Papuan women from the Central Highlands sit under a mango tree and sell sweet potatoes, fruits, and greens on the street. They do not have permanent shops like the Indonesian migrant traders from Sulawesi, nor they peddle their vegetables like young men from Java. They sit there every day, from midday until evening, while their husbands work in the logging companies outside the town or run motorbike taxis from the corner of the Expo.

The Expo is a node within a vast network of Papuan women's occupation of urban space in West Papua. In the coastal cities, the sight of Papuan women selling their wares on the street or the periphery of the marketplaces is common. In the downtown area of Jayapura, a group of Papuan women traders have indeed organized themselves under *Solpap* (The Solidarity of Papuan Indigenous Traders),[185] an organization that aims to advance the interests of Papuan traders—almost all of them are women—against the dominance and competition of Indonesian migrant traders, particularly those from Sulawesi. I started visiting the indigenous women's market in the summer of 2012 when Solpap began to occupy a former bus station. Solpap is one of the most diverse organizations I have encountered in the region. Its members hail from the Central Highlands, those who belong to ethnic groups such as the Lani, Mee, Hubula, and Yali to coastal Papuans, primarily Biak, Serui, Sentani, and Jayapura natives. Compared to other organizations, it is also one of the new organizations that are run by and for women, even though the role of Robert Jitmau (chapter 3) was pivotal early in its foundation. Solpap uses a particular language and asserts claims to a political agency by identifying as the mothers of the market (I.*mama pasar*) or Papuan mothers (I.*mama Papua*). It is my argument here that the birth of these categories is a key to understand new politics in West Papua.

[185] In Indonesian, *Solidaritas Pedagang Asli Papua*.

In the previous chapter, I have recounted how the extractive economy has shaped West Papua as a distinctive space in its relation with the Indonesian state and the larger capitalist forces. In this chapter, I intend to explore the effects of the introduction of a capitalist economy and the arrival of Indonesian migrants to the domain of the everyday. Through the birth of the mothers of the market and Papuan mothers and its comparison with male-based political mobilization, I will examine how the every day becomes the privileged site of the emergence of a new political formation and consciousness in West Papua.

The Politics of Migration in Jayapura

I met Yuliana, a woman in her late twenties, early in 2015. She told me that she is from Tolikara in the Central Highlands.[186] "I decided to go to Java after finishing my high school. At that time, my boyfriend was studying in Yogyakarta. I wanted to study too, but I did not have money." She decided to stay with him for few months.

"Yogyakarta is very nice. I like it. Everything is cheap."

"But the food is too sweet, isn't it?"

"I plant sweet potatoes and some vegetables there."

"Can you?"

"Yeah, there are a lot of Papuans there. And we grow our food. We even have a pig feast there."

Wherever the Highlanders move, they bring their pig feast there. Indeed, the arrival of pig feasts in the low land and coastal West Papua and even in Java marks the arrival of Highlander's migrants.

[186] All names are pseudonyms unless noted.

Not long after moving, Yuliana broke up with her boyfriend. She returned to Jayapura, the capital city of West Papua, instead of Tolikara. "I live with my mother and my relatives." Circulatory migration is widespread among Papuans in West Papua, including groups of Highlanders who live in big cities like Jayapura, Timika, or Nabire. Most of them keep contact with their families in the hinterlands with regular trips back home. Yuliana works for an evangelical Protestant mission and manages to save some money. "I invest it in a motorbike workshop. A Javanese man runs it in Sentani's market. I want to go to college someday. I want to study on Java."

Her story is not extraordinary. During my fieldwork in West Papua, I frequently ran into stories like hers, which is to say, stories of Papuan migration. The Papuans often move from one place to another. Men are considerably more mobile than women, but women like Yuliana increasingly play an important role in regional migration. The experience of migration for Papuan women very much interests me. It is often believed that women tend to migrate to places closer to their homesteads. The women of West Papua, however, stand in contrast to this trend. In Papuan cities, Papuan women reveal a distinctive urban character through experiences of migration. This character manifests, particularly in the marketplaces and streets. Indeed, it is within the marketplaces and streets in the city where the politics of migration and its intersection with gender should be understood.

Highlanders, like Yuliana, continue to maintain their cultural institutions in the cities. They cultivate sweet potatoes, raise pigs, and carry out ceremonial and non-ceremonial exchange to preserve their identity as groups. Here, pig feasts are central to the continuation of Melanesian exchange. Melanesian societies, including the Papuans, are well known for its performative and dramatic ceremonial exchange. In contrast to commodity exchange, Melanesian exchange is considered as a gift economy in which relations are established through the exchange and gift of valuables, primarily pigs in the Central Highlands, but also kula and fabrics in the seaboard

Melanesia. An exchange of valuables marks most important social events in the society, such as marriage and death and here the pigs become the center object of the activities (Sillitoe 2010). While in many parts of Melanesia, the shift to a capitalist economy has decreased the frequency of pig feasts (see Brown 1995) in West Papua the arrival of cash from outside the Melanesian sphere has intensified the organization of the pig feasts. In today's West Papua, the pig feasts have been organized for church inaugurations and political campaigns during the election.

In the Melanesian exchange world, women are sources of wealth.[187] In their subsistence economy, Melanesian men clear and fence off the land that they own, while women plant and harvest. In the coastal areas, while men do heavy work in sago planting or travel to trade, it is the women who prepare the sago for daily sustenance. The Highlands women also take care of the pigs, the central animal and wealth item in Melanesian exchange.[188] Among the Highlanders groups, pigs are used as dowries, funeral payments, and war compensations, as well as in gift giving. In the ceremonial exchange, pigs are sacrificed and treat as wealth items that can elevate the men's prestige. In the Melanesian parlance, women produce pigs, but men transact them.

Yuliana's story demonstrates that we must carefully examine the continuation of women's relations with wealth amidst the transformation of the Papuan political, economic system, through the arrival of a monetary-based capitalist system and the arrival of Indonesian migrants in West Papua. Money earned from wage labor, government jobs, the marketing of garden produce, and other commercial activities have become increasingly important, if not central both for traditional exchanges and modern necessities, such as school fees. In this new situation, Papuan women play an

[187] See Weiner 1976; Heider 1979; Strathern 1988; Rutherford 2003.

[188] The subjects under my investigation are largely Highlanders women. On women from coastal areas, such as Biak, see Rutherford 2003.

important role in the household and urban economy of West Papua through a peasant subsistence sector. Consider Meiton's story below:

> My father went with the boss of a sandalwood logging company three months ago. He hasn't come home. Mommy goes to the garden every morning before I wake up. She leaves me some pocket money. Then I go to school with my friends. After school, I have lunch, usually fritters or instant noodles. From the garden, Mommy goes directly to the market to sell produce. She'll go home at night. I will already be asleep when she gets home. Mommy then cooks and leaves some food for me for the morning. In the morning, when I wake up, Mommy will be already in the garden. I eat the food that Mommy cooks before I go to school. [189]

Meiton's story reflects the arrival of money as a source of new wealth and the shifting relationship between Papuan men and women in the city. Like Yuliana, Meiton's mother is also from the Central Highlands. She and her family moved to the city following the intensive migration of the Highlanders to coastal cities in the late 1990s. In Jayapura, Papuan migration from the hinterlands and countryside began during the Dutch colonial era, particularly in the 1950s when Biak and Serui migrants moved from their islands off the western part of West Papua to work for the Dutch colonial bureaucracy and Dutch Reformed Church.[190] The Biak and Serui were followed by people from neighboring Jayapura, such as Genyem and Nimboran,[191] and Sorong in the Bird's Head Peninsula, who also worked for the Dutch administration.

The Highlanders first arrived in Pos Tujuh in Sentani during the early 1960s, spurred by the Anglo-American evangelical churches' activities. As early as 1969, for instance, two Lani ministers were called to establish an indigenous Lani church of the American evangelical type in Sentani,

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189 Meiton's story is written by his teacher at the Teach for Papua (Gerakan Papua Mengajar). November 27, 2015.

190 See Groenewegen and Kaa 1964. By the 1970s, Biak and Serui migrants have formed some associations in the city. See Griapon 2010.

191 See Rumbiak's study of Nimboran migration. See Rumbiak 1983.

marking the increasing number of Highlanders in the lowlands.[192] The missions also established schools that attracted students from the surrounding hinterlands to the city. To state the obvious, churches are important in facilitating the emergence of trans-regional migration and networks in West Papua. Conversely, Papuans migrating to the city also make use of churches as important urban networks and institutions.[193] After the Indonesian arrival, the landscape of migration in West Papua has become increasingly more complex. Upon arrival, the Indonesian administration opened the University of Cenderawasih, which attracts more students from the hinterlands. There was also a new arrival of migrants from Indonesia.

Migrants expand the city, but in the Highlands, they create it. In West Papua, it is not only people who come to the city. The city comes to them. Hence, when Yuliana travels, Ahmad arrives. "My son is assigned to Puncak Jaya," Ahmad, an Indonesian *ojek* tells me. He belongs to the Madura ethnic group in East Java, like many of the *ojek* drivers in Jayapura and the Central Highlands. His son is a member of the Indonesian Mobile Brigade, a special police operation force and paramilitary law enforcement within the Indonesian National Police. They are sent to the Central Highlands to conduct counter-separatist and counter-insurgency operations against pro-independence armed groups there. They are also tasked to secure government and private construction projects, like Indonesian president Joko Widodo's ambitious construction of a 4,300-kilometer Trans-Papua Highway that will connect cities in the north coast to the south coast. [194]

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[192] Farhadian 169 and Sunda 1963.

[193] Compare the migration of the Dani that Farhadian studied. See Farhadian 2005.

[194] In Puncak Jaya, in addition to the Mobile Brigade unit, the anti-terrorist 88 Detachment and the notorious Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) are also assigned here to carry out anti-insurgency against Goliath Tabuni and his warriors. General Goliath Tabuni is a high general in the Liberation Army of the Papuan Independence Movement and has resisted the construction of the Trans-Papuan road constructions in the Central Highlands. His reputation does not come from the power of his warriors—they are poorly armed—but their insistence on fighting the Indonesian forces since the 1970s.

Ahmad and his son represent two main actors in this migration drama: the first as a representative of state forces, and the other as a civilian settler. It is not a coincidence that the arrival of these foreign bodies is gendered. The Indonesian military and police personnel are almost entirely male.[195] Indonesia justifies the arrival of high numbers of Indonesian military and police personnel as a way to defend national security and development. The arrival of migrants is justified by the need of the nation to bring development to its periphery, as well as to overcome poverty and demographic pressure in densely populated Java, where more than 60% of Indonesia's population lives. A prominent Indonesian intellectual Rizal Mallarangeng argues, "[West] Papua should be opened up [for migrants]. Territorial re-division should divide this province into three administrative territories, instead of one as we have now. In fact, the province can be divided into six provinces" (2003). He refers to this as a California way, a method of modernizing and opening up lagged and backward territories like West Papua with the migrants and dividing it into several administrative units. It is not a coincidence that Mallarangeng uses California as a point of comparison. West Papua is the wild west of Indonesians.

In 2016, an Indonesian lawyer from Jakarta, Farhat Abbas, posted a Facebook status that enraged many Papuans. He wrote, "When Indonesia got its independence, West Papua did not participate. It's only later that Indonesia took over this territory from the Netherlands. So it's reasonable for West Papua to ask for independence. But I hope it will never happen because it will be a big loss for Indonesia. West Papua is vast, and its population is tiny. I urge the government to relocate half the population of Java Island to West Papua, to make the indigenous Papuans powerless and encourage mixed marriages so that their cultures will slowly disappear"(2016). As disingenuous as it sounds, Farhat Abbas' controversial statement merely mirrors Indonesian public

[195] This has a serious implication on how the Indonesian security forces carry out their military operations against the Papuans. I have touched some of these issues in chapter 4. However, a closer look at the sexual politics of Indonesian occupation merits further research.

discourses on West Papua. This statement also has a striking resemblance to remarks made by Dutch fascist groups, such as the Fatherland Club's program to colonize New Guinea in the 1930s.[196]

The arrival of security forces and migrants who are sent by the state through the transmigration program, or on their initiative, continues to characterize Indonesian rule in West Papua. Indonesian migration gives West Papua the highest population growth in the country, almost four times the national rate. With high mortality and low birth rate, West Papua's population growth can be attributed primarily to the migration. There are at least three ways in which Indonesian settlers arrive in West Papua. The first is the state-sponsored transmigration program. As I have narrated in the introduction, transmigration was a priority program for the New Order government and Indonesian military. General Benny Moerdani, who led an Indonesian military operation in the southern part of West Papua in the 1960s, contends that transmigration is the only development policy that has a direct linkage with national security and defense (Tirtosudarmo 1990, 163). He says, "The role of transmigration in the concept of basic defense is to populate the empty regions to support territorial military commands" (163-164). Titosudarmo notes that Brigadier General Edi Sugardo (1987) of the National Defense Institute, the 'think tank' of the Department of Defense, defines transmigration in the following terms:

> "From the 'geo-politic' and 'geo-strategic' point of view, transmigration policy is an effort, method, and means to achieve 'geographic-integration' which is a basic condition for the unity of the nation, to improve the people's welfare and awareness, and provide an opportunity to utilize natural resources. The achievement of geographic integration, on the one hand, will protect the nation from centrifugal tendencies, and on the other hand, strengthen centripetal forces. Geographic-integration is also a medium to build understanding, friendship, and cooperation with other countries. From the point of view of national defense, transmigration is supportive to the "Popular Defence and Security System" (*Sishankamrata)*, to resist the threat of subversion, infiltration, and invasion from abroad, particularly through the provision of human resources."[197]

[196] See Lijphart 1966, Drooglever 1980 and Rutherford 2012, particularly chapter 2.
[197] Sugardo 1987, 4-5.

The importance of the transmigration program for the Suharto government cannot be overstated. For the regime, transmigration was a national priority in which President Suharto himself took an active personal interest. "It is not an exaggeration to suggest that transmigration had become a sacred program, an article of faith that no one dared to oppose"(102). Almost all the head of transmigration program were military generals or Suharto's close allies.[198] In 1983, major General C. I. Santoso, a former regional commander of West Papua (1978-1982) became the General Secretary of the Department of Transmigration, asserting the importance of West Papua in the larger scheme of this program.[199]

Although West Papua has a receiving area for transmigrants since 1964, it was only from 1983 to 1984 that West Papua became the primary target of this program.[200] This coincided with the intensification of Papuan resistance against Indonesia in the borderlands and the cities. In West Papua itself, the transmigration program is a primary mode of expansion for the Indonesian state, on top of its military invasion. Indeed, I would argue that transmigration and migration are continuing invasions that structure the relationship between Indonesia and West Papua.

Before 1969, the transmigration program sent 268 households (approximately 1,231 individuals) to lowland areas (Merauke, Jayapura, Manokwari, and Nabire).[201] Most trans-migrants in

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198 This includes Brigadier General Boesiri (1964-1969) who later would become West Papua's governor, Brigadier General Soebiantoro (1969-1972?), and Major General Santoso.

199 Even after the 1998 Indonesian democratic reforms, the department of transmigration was still led by a military general, namely Lt. General A.M. Hendropriyono who would become the head of the Indonesia intelligence agency in 2001. He was preceded by Major General Soegiarto who became the minister of transmigration in 1988.

200 This coincides with the fourth Pelita (Five-Year Development Plan of the government of Indonesia).

201 Initially, the program was called a pre-PSP I. See Direktorat Penelitian dan Persiapan 1971, 3. The office states that there were 297 families sent to West Papua, but 29 families were returned to Java in 1966.

this period came from Central Java, with a lesser number coming from West Java. By 1970, rice farming had begun in Merauke in the southern part of the region. In its early period, transmigration was carried out under the coordination of the Transmigration Command team, which reflects not only the militaristic character of this demographic effort but also the involvement of the military forces in the execution of transmigration programs in West Papua. By the 1980s, the Indonesian government planned to relocate 200,000 households, or about one million of the population from densely populated islands of Java, Bali, and Lombok, to West Papua. By 1989, some 137,000 households were successfully settled in the region.[202]

While the relocation of Javanese was state-sponsored and funded by the government,[203]people from South and Southeast Sulawesi come to West Papua at their own expense as I have chronicled in the case of Timika. The people from Sulawesi come with their initiative, not only because they have a strong maritime and trade culture, but also because of poverty in their respective regions. In the 1960s, some of the migrants fled from the state or state control.[204] Sulawesi people, particularly Bugis, Bone, and Makassar ethnic groups have long become part of the regional trade network of the eastern part of the archipelago, primarily centering on the Spice Island of Moluccas.[205] To some extent, the western part of New Guinea was part of this network.[206] Thus,

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[202] See Aditjondro1986, i.

[203] The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank were involved in the transmigration programs since 1968 but not until the 1980s; they became major funders for the programs. See the World Bank 1988.

[204] The suppression of Islamist DI/TII rebellion in South Sulawesi was the prime motive of migration to West Papua during this time.

[205] See Lapian 2008.

[206] See Swadling 1996 and Widjojo 2014.

migration of people from Bugis, Bone and Makassar origins has been long underway. During the period of Indonesian war of independence (1945-1962), however, the Dutch colonial government in New Guinea terminated the migration of Sulawesi people, but it resumed after Indonesia arrived in 1963. Many of these migrants rode along with Indonesian military forces, particularly those who came from the Hassanudin Military Regional Command. Aditjondro shows that until 1971, migrants from Sulawesi composed of 29.3 percent of the whole migration to West Papua (14).

The Sulawesi migrants live in the city and aggressively occupy spaces and infiltrate the indigenous Papuans' lives, particularly in the domains of commerce, fishing, and forestry. Aditjondro estimates that during 1970-1985, at least 45,000-60,000 people from Sulawesi have settled in West Papua (14). Robin Osborne, on the other hand, provides a higher figure. He said that by 1984, "there were already about 150,000 non-Melanesian spontaneous migrants. The latter group, most of whom come from Sulawesi, especially the strongly Muslim southern areas, dominate local-level commerce" (1985, 1).

The difference between Javanese and Sulawesi seem to stem from their preferred professions and cultural differences. Those who came from Java were mainly poor farmers, with a smaller percentage consisting of government employees, teachers, and soldiers. Most of them were relocated to state-funded settlements with designated gardens and agricultural areas. Consequently, most Javanese live in gated communities called transmigrant settlement units. In 1986, there were already 37 transmigrant settlements like this in West Papua, primarily located in the borderlands.[207]

After the official transmigration programs ended in 2000, spontaneous migration has become the predominant mode of migration to West Papua. This was intensified in 1997 when financial crises hit Southeast Asia. More Indonesians, mainly of Javanese origin, arrived in West

[207] By 1994, the number reached 94 transmigration settlements. See Kanwil Departemen Transmigrasi, Propinsi Irian Jayap (1993, 9). Departemen Transmigrasi 1986, 40.

Papua. Using the data from the Papuan planning board, Papuan author Max Auparay wrote that from 2003 to 2008, the growth of Javanese migration to West Papua was 19.7% per year (2012, 13-4).[208] In general, the Javanese comprised the largest migrant population (57.5% in 2008), followed by people from Sulawesi (28.2% in 2008) (BPS Papua 2009). The religious riots in the Moluccas in 1999 also contributed to the rapid growth of contemporary migration from the Moluccas (see Aditjondro 2001). This is a third model of Indonesian migration to West Papua. The Moluccas from Ambon and Kei migrated to West Papua in the early 20th century to work for the Dutch colonial government and missions—the Ambonese for the Protestant and the Keiese for the Catholic missions. Both groups have played an important role as a mediator of colonial rule in West Papua. Contemporary migration of people from the Moluccas makes use of these existing structures, particularly kin relations or networks of the Moluccas Protestant Church (now the Indonesian Protestant Church) and the Catholic Church. Statistics are dubious in West Papua, and most Papuans think that the number of migrants is highly underreported. But by 2010, most cities in West Papua were occupied by the migrants. Indeed, the demographic figures of major Papuan cities demonstrate that Papuan cities have been heavily Indonesianized.[209] In the early 1960s native Papuans were dominant, but in 2010, more than 65% of the Jayapura population consists of migrants from Indonesia.[210] As more

[208] The rate of migration to West Papua is 16.33%. See BPS 2017.

[209] Demographic figures of Papuan major cities: Merauke (non-Papuans: 62.73%, Papuans: 37.27%), Nabire (non-Papuans: 52.45 %, Papuans: 47.55%), Mimika (non-Papuans:57.49%, Papuans: 42.51%), Manokwari (non-Papuans: 43.59%, Papuans: 56.41%), and Sorong (non-Papuans: 70.29%, Papuans: 29.71%). Figures are from BPS Papua 2010 and BPS Provinsi Papua Barat 2010. Outside the city, Keerom in the borderland is the regency with the highest percentage of the non-Papuan population which reached 59% in 2010. Papuans, on the other hand, comprised 41% of the Keerom's population. While these numbers are oftenly unreliable, it demonstrates that migrants become more and more dominant in West Papua.

[210] The 2010 census shows that the total number of Jayapura population is 255,389. The number of Papuans is 89,164, while non-Papuans reached 166,225. In the larger picture, urban West Papua is more Indonesian than the hinterlands. See BPS Papua 2010.

and more Indonesians swamp Papuan cities and the hinterlands, Papuans feel they are becoming a minority in their land.

In West Papua (and other transmigrant-receiving areas), the arrival of migrants has created broad-based resistance against the central government and settlers. Churches, the most organized social structure among the Papuans, see migration as Islamization and de-Papuanization of West Papua. Reverend Karel Phil Erari of the Papuan Reformed Church, for instance, remarks, "The national transmigration program has been formally terminated, but it is replaced by spontaneous migration. It is true that West Papua is deliberately treated like that so that there is a demographic shift regarding religious affiliations. The majority of populations in big Papuan cities now are Muslims. Indeed, I argue that *daqwah* drives much of this migration. Their motive is to change the demographic composition so that West Papua becomes a Muslim dominated territory"(2009, 4). There are two far-reaching implications of this process to Papuan politics: the first, the crises of Papuan political leadership, especially among the Papuan men, and the migrants' dominance in the capitalist economy of the region, including commodity exchange that is characteristically Papuan, such as the betel nut. This creates an entry for Papuan women in the marketplaces. I will begin with the second one.

The Political Economy of the Shift: the Marketplaces and the birth of 'mothers of the market.'

In Papuans cities, marketplaces (bazaars) become a paradigmatic site for the spatial politics of exclusion and segregation of indigenous Papuans. And this is where the Papuan women play their role. Marketplaces are the most important center of economic activity both for Papuans and

migrants.[211] Initially, markets emerged in response to Christian missions' need for Papuan agricultural produce. They dedicated space near their post for trade activities with the Papuans. That is the story of the Mission's market (I.*pasar misi)* in the Baliem Valley. In Jayapura, a produce market had started since 1971 when a few coastal women began to sell produce and fish near Nafri.[212] The pioneering spirit of Papuan women attracts Indonesian migrants who also open up stalls in the market.[213] With the increasing numbers of migrants and the formation of urban space, markets are essential for keeping a city running. Thus, city administrations began to create and operate marketplaces as part of their administrative tasks.

At a glance, marketplaces in urban West Papua seem to resemble Furnivall's plural economy, an economy that is racially differentiated. He says, "There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit"(1944, 446). The Sulawesi migrants own almost all kiosks and the best lots in the marketplaces. They sell industrial commodities, such as clothes and kitchen appliances that are produced in and come from outside West Papua by and through a set of Indonesian intermediaries with which Papuans have no access. On the other hand, Papuan women sell produce that comes directly from their garden or craft that they make themselves. This marks their lack of access to capital and their reliance on the local commodities and local networks of production and distribution. But this also refers to Geertz's description of spatial localization and 'ethnic' specialization (1978, 30).

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[211] I owe much of the history of the Youtefa market from my conversations with RO who researched the transformation of Youtefa bay which belongs to the Tobati – Enggros ethnic group into a marketplace in the 2000s. The transformation is part of the larger massive urban development of Jayapura that has been taking place since then on.

[212] SKP Jayapura 2013.

[213] Suhartawan (2017) gives some 2,821 merchants, but Sukoco (2015) provides an estimate of 4,000 merchants.

As Furnivall implies, this racial difference not only marks the ethnic, linguistic, and religious difference but also "economic castes"(450). If during the Netherlands East Indies, it was the Chinese who held the economic power of the marketplaces, in West Papua, it is the Indonesian settlers who are the holders of economic power and intermediaries of colonial relations. They create a relationship of dependence between the colony and the metropole to secure their position as an intermediary, mainly through their refusal to develop indigenous Papuans' economic power. Indonesian settlers organize themselves into various civic associations (I. *paguyuban*) and organizations that are usually based on ethnicity or origin. According to Benhur Tommy Mano, current Jayapura's mayor, there are at least 90 Indonesian civic associations registered in Jayapura.[214] In a small city like Nabire (population: 79,641 in 2015), there are more than 80 Indonesian civic associations. Indonesian civic association in West Papua are significant in advancing political and economic interests of the settlers, particularly through voters' mobilization during the elections and behind-the-door policy making (more below).[215] In the economic domain, civic associations control the labor market through discriminatory practices and hinder Papuans' access to credit, distribution,

[214] See Pasaribu, Seseray, and al-Makassary 2016

[215] Indonesian civic associations often exacerbate conflict between Papuans and settlers, particularly when the Indonesian civic association is transformed into or have a paramilitary group/wing in their organization. It is always difficult to draw a clear boundary between civic and paramilitary groups in West Papua when such group has been armed by or has a membership of the Indonesian military personnel. Several groups are explicitly created by the Indonesian military to suppress Papuan aspiration for independence, such as *Barisan Merah Putih* (the Red and White Guard led by Papuan from Sentani Ramses Ohee). Ikemal (*Ikatan Keluarga Maluku*, the Moluccas Association) is not precisely a paramilitary group like The Red and White Guard. However, some of their members have involved in many conflicts against Papuans—often end up in bloodshed. The Moluccas Association regularly sends their delegation to military parades (during the Independence or Heroes day). Some of them are armed. It is not hard to tell that they have a close and secure connection with the Indonesian military. They regularly parade in support of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia such as the one that they carry out annually to commemorate the heroism of Captain Pattimura. See reports here https://www.pasificpos.com/item/10815-peringati-hut-pattimura-ke-199-masyarakat-maluku-pawai-obor. I saw some of these parades in Jayapura and other cities, e.g., Timika (the mining town). Drooglever mentions that since at least the 1950s, Indonesians living in West Papua had set up paramilitary groups, such as the Bataljon Tjenderawasih whose members were hailed from Indonesian workers in the oil mine in Sorong. See Drooglever 2009, 521.

and marketing networks of industrial commodities. Some examples include how Javanese street food sellers tend to hire their labor from rural Java rather than hiring indigenous Papuans. Toraja construction companies brought their workers from Sulawesi, then hired Papuans. In other words, they exercise domination over labor relations, in which Papuans, especially Papuan men, are removed from access to employment. Therefore, most Papuans work in informal sectors and a poorly capitalized agricultural sector, like Meiton's father whom I mentioned earlier.

Instead of looking at this structural problem, the Indonesian government and settlers blame the slow development of Papuan economic capacity on their innate cultural characteristics. Papuans are considered unprepared for globalization and a new economy that is based on a capitalist and market system. The underlying assumption is that Papuans were too primitive to be integrated into a market-based economy. Papuans were considered lacking in work ethic. Thus they were ostensibly unsuitable for modern labor. Yet while Papuan men are unemployed or work in informal sectors, Papuan women are engaged in the capitalist economy in marketplaces. Women, especially from the Central Highland, use their skills as agriculturalists to compete in the city. Can we call the Papuan women's occupation with cash crops and markets a continuation of their traditional role, in other words, as providers of upbringing, nurturing, and food for the community?

In Jayapura, the Highlanders groups develop vast gardens collectively. These gardens are either attached to their homestead or in the outer periphery of the city. In many cases, Highlanders illegally occupy the reserve and forested areas to carry out their agricultural practices. Papuan men carry out the heavy labor: clearing out the forest and preparing the plot for agriculture. Women plant cash crops, particularly vegetables, banana, and sweet potatoes, and raise pigs. All the vegetables are sold in the market, and the pigs are treated as savings, either to be sold later to pay for school fees, a medical care, or to be contributed to the pig feast. From the afternoon until 9 to 10 o'clock in the evening, the women sell their produce in the market or on the street, while the men work as an *ojek*

drivers, work in the garden or stay at home. There is a continuation of a traditional division of labor between the Highlanders and coastal Papuans, in which Highlanders continue to work in agriculture and animal husbandry, while coastal Papuans tend to focus on fishing and sago planting. Among the Highlanders themselves, there seems to be a division of labor based on the traditional ethnic differentiation. Lani and Hubula women are prominent for their agricultural skills, while Mee women take the role as intermediaries. Mee women buy produce from their fellow Papuans and Indonesian migrants and sell it in the marketplaces. Many women also make and sell *noken* (net bags), Papuan souvenirs and betelnuts. But it is in the market where Papuan indigenous women gain visibility, not through their agricultural works in the garden, though these two are undoubtedly related.

The collective character of women's activity has a long history in Melanesian horticultural cooperation and rituals.[216]In the last five years, Papuan women traders have organized themselves and fought for better places in the market economy of the city. As in 2015, women have formed at least eight trade associations, including (Solpap) (Bintang Papua 2015).[217] In this context, Solpap's story is quite illustrative. Starting in 2003 with about 200 members, Solpap has aggressively demanded a place in the city for their members. Their claim is based on the history of the Nafri market, which has been relocated several times due to the city policy and urban re-development. Since 2009, the negotiation over the construction of a new Papuan women's market in the center of the city took place, in which the city, provincial and even central governments took a keen interest.

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[216] In Papua New Guinea, the term *wok meri* (Tok Pisin which means 'women's work') represents one of this precedence. See O'Brien and Tiffany 1984 and Sexton 1984.

[217] Other associations are the Association of Papuan Women's Traders of the Jayapura's Temporary Market (*Koordinator Mama-Mama Pasar Sementara Kota Jayapura*), The Association of Papuan Women's Traders of Hamadi Market (*Koordinator Mama-Mama Pasar Hamadi*), The Association of Papuan Women's Traders of Youtefa Market (*Koordinator Mama-Mama Pasar Youtefa*.), The Association of Papuan Women's Traders of Cigombong Market (*Koordinator Mama-Mama Pasar Cigombong),* The Association of Papuan Women's Traders of Expo Market (*Koordinator Mama-Mama Pasar Expo),* Association of Papuan Women's Traders of Phrara Market of Sentani *(Koordinator Mama-Mama Pasar Phrara Sentani*), and The Association of Papuan Women's Traders in the Old Market of Sentani (*Koordinator Mama-Mama Pasar Lama Sentani).*

The Papuan women's demand, however, is not only about the space but also against the presence of Indonesian migrants in their marketplace. They want an exclusive market for Papuans, where they can refuse any engagement with the migrant groups. In the downtown area, they managed to occupy the former bus station and remove Indonesian competitors from there. After years of advocacy against the city and provincial government, the Indonesian President Joko Widodo felt compelled to respond to these women's demands.

But what does it mean to call one's self a Papuan woman or a woman of the market? There are at least two forms of politics that we must consider. First, the conception of Papuan women or mothers of the market distinguishes them from Indonesian women (and men). Here it is a politics of difference. In my argument, this politics of difference is also a nationalist politics in the making. In Solpap, women no longer use their ethnic identity but adopt a national identity as Papuans. They no longer speak as a Lani or Biak. Secondly, the articulation as Papuan women and mothers of the market seems to imply that womanhood and motherhood are the basis of their politics. As Seligmann argues, women enter the market as an extension of their household task; hence, the claim as mothers is seemingly natural (2001, 3). In Papua New Guinea where women collectives adopt the term Wok Meri, national identity is irrelevant. Also, members of Wok Meri have a kin relation, compared to Solpap who are united by interests and racial/ethnic identity as Papuans. Members of Solpap call each other "mother" (*mama)*, evoking fictive maternal ties that exist between them. Women who are active in Solpap also tend to be at least thirty-five or forty years old. In other words, they have established a stable relationship with the community.

In their claims, Papuan women frequently define themselves through notions like "Papuan women as the backbone of West Papua" (I. *tulang punggung Papua*) and "the guardians of Papuan children" (I. *penjaga anak-anak Papua*). This is a double-entendre. To Indonesian ears, this language is in line with their framing of Papuans as the poor and the right bearing subjects of the Indonesian

government. For Indonesia, Papuan mothers and mothers of the market reflect a moral, political category of actors that not only drive the household economy of most Papuans but also the rationalized economy of the market. It is not a coincidence that in Southeast Asia, the role of women in the marketplace has received much scholarly attention. Studies in Southeast Asia emphasize women's traditional role in the marketplace (Alexander 1987; Brenner 1998; Hildred Geertz 1961; Leshkowich 2014; and Reid 1988). Writing about female roles in broader Southeast Asia during the 15th to 17the century, Reid says, "Southeast Asia women were playing an unusually influential role by comparison with later periods or with other parts of the world…Marketing was a female domain par excellence. Even today Southeast Asian countries top the comparative statistics for female participation in trade and marketing"(1988, 163).

I would further argue, however, that to call themselves women or mothers also fits with the Indonesian's state discourse of women, state *ibuism*. According to Suryakusuma who coined this term in 1988, state *ibuism* refers to the Indonesian New Order's gender ideology, which defines women as wives and mothers, whose role is primarily to maintain the family and *complement* their husband's public role.[218] While Papuans, particularly Papuan men may share this view, a closer look at the discourse gives us a more complicated picture. Consider a poem entitled *Building Hope of Love with Mothers* written by Ayosami study group in Maybrat.[219]

A mother symbolizes the land	Mama adalah simbol dari tanah
That gives us life	yang membrikan kehidupan
Mother, the provider of our life spirit	Mama pemberi roh kehidupan
And salvation	dan keselamatan
Mother, the beginning and the end	Mama awal dan akhir
With mothers, there is a prayer and hope	Bersama mama ada doa dan harapan

[218] The word *ibu* here refers to mother. Note the difference between the use of *ibu* and *mama*. See Suryakusuma 2011.

[219] The original title is *Membangun Harapan Cinta Kasih Bersama Mama*. The poem is published in sastrapapua, an online literary journal of which I am one of the editors. See http://www.sastrapapua.com/2016/09/membangun-harapan-cinta-kasih-bersama.html

With mothers, there is a life and death	Bersama mama ada hidup dan mati
If we love our mothers, we have to guard our land	Sayang mama jaga tanah
If we love our mothers, we have to defend our forest	Sayang mama hutanmu
If we love our mothers, we have to respect all women	Sayang mama hargai perempuan
If we love our mothers,	Sayang mama
we have to guard the bird of paradise	jaga cendrawasih
Our mother, our lives	Mamaku hidupku Mama ku
Our land	tanahku
Our mother, our homeland	Mamaku negriku
Our mother, West Papua	Mamaku Papua

This poem seems to conflate the politics of difference and the politics of motherhood that I mentioned earlier. We will see the pertinent conflation of these distinct forms of politics in the case of Mama Yosepha Alomang, an eminent Papuan mother figure.

The politics of Yosepha Alomang[220]

Yosepha Alomang is a mother of the market, an indigenous Papuan woman who brings Papuans' concern with economic marginalization and womanhood politics to the fore. Yosepha Alomang defines herself as a *pejuang* (a fighter, with a heroic connotation, see Steedly 2014), not only against the mining interest and Indonesia but also Papuan patriarchal cultures, particularly of the Amungme where she comes from. Yosepha Alomang was born sometime in the 1940s in Nusulanop, in Tsinga Valley, not far from the current gold and copper mine Freeport-McMoRan (see chapter 4). In 1959, when the Catholic Amungme decided to migrate to Agimuga, she came along. "I was still very little." She did not grow much. She is still a petite Amungme lady with a thundering voice. She was raised by her stepfather Philipus Alomang after her mother passed away when she was little. Her biography is a story of forced relocation and displacement. She dropped out of fourth grade when she was around 15 years old. She then got married to an Amungme named Markus Kwalik. As she tells Benny Giay and Yafet Kambai, "According to the Amungme custom,

[220] Since Yosepha Alomang is a public figure, I use her real name.

men should put bride payments before marriage and before they can bring the women to the man's house. But my own family does not receive marriage payments for me. Even until I have given birth to children, I have not been paid a single cent. The family of my husband does not care about it. They cannot be bothered by the fact that they haven't paid the bridewealth"(2003, 20).

Yosepha Alomang is a woman whose social relations are founded upon the exchange of valuables, where wealth structures relations and men's reputation. Among the Amungme, like many ethnic groups in the Central Highlands, a marriage is formalized when the groom and his kin pay bridewealth or marriage payment to the bride's family. In principle, bridewealth is an instrument of legitimation for a marriage. It symbolizes her worth to the community and compensates her family for the loss of her company and labor. The bridewealth consolidates affinal relationships between two marrying families. It is also a material pledge that protects the woman and her children, a guarantee that they will be well treated. Among the Amungme, bridewealth usually consists of a diverse array of cowrie shells (the pre-contact Amungme's monetary instruments), pigs, net bags, axes, machetes, and beads. The modern system now introduces monetary payments in rupiah, cooking oil, and home furnishings. [221]

As in the majority of American and Dutch missionaries' discourse, views that Papuan women need to be saved are pervasive in the Indonesian discourse, even those of the feminist circles. Indonesian discourse centers on the bridewealth as the core of Papuan patriarchal cultures, a symbol of the subjugation of Papuan women, of their treatment as a mere commodity in transactions. Several novels written by Indonesian women reflect this discourse best, such as *Isinga*, a

[221] Tom Beanal, an Amungme intellectual, lists at least six types of cowries' shells, beads, net bags (*noken*), axes, one pig to be slaughtered and two pigs for rearing. This applied to the condition before the arrival of the Catholic Church and the mining company. See Beanal 1997, 26. Carolyn Cook lists pigs, shells, food items, and home furnishings (blanket and cooking pots) in 2016. See Cook with Webster 2016, 14.

novel written by Dorothea Rosa Herliany, which won major Indonesian literary award in 2015.[222] *Isinga* tells a story of Irewa, a Highlander woman who is forced by her husband Malom to produce children constantly. This is how Herliany represents a stereotypical Indonesian view of the Highlands cultures.

> "After several days, Malom comes over. He asks Irewa to go home. Malom's parents have *bought* Irewa with some pigs as a marriage payment….She has to return to her life, a life that is hard and difficult. Inevitably, she has to keep living. No choice. From pregnancy to pregnancy, from miscarriage to miscarriage…Irewa has to bear children after children for Malom. That is the task that their community has assigned to women...Women are sources of fertility. Male children are useful for demanding recognition of the land and symbols of a succession of offspring. The more boys, the more valuable and the more dignified. More children, more land. Boys are also used to replace the deceased warriors. Girls are economically valuable. Women assure the payment of bridewealth (pig)"(the emphasis is mine).[223]

Isinga claims itself as an ethnographic novel, but it is clear that this novel gives a romanticized picture of gender relations in Melanesian society.[224] As we can see from Alomang's statement, Papuan cultures that *Isinga* describes are not inherently fixed. Bridewealth does not necessarily equate with subjugation. Interestingly, Alomang seizes the cultural, economic, but primarily political value of the marriage payment in Melanesia to assert her agency and to 'manipulate' it for entirely different purposes. After recounting her misfortune of not being paid bridewealth, Alomang states, rather matter-of-factly,

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[222] Another book by an Indonesian writer that is worth mentioning here is *Daughters of Papua* (see Thyaf 2008). Although portraying some Papuan women as victims, *Daughters of Papua* does not fall into a stereotypical portrayal of Papuan cultures.

[223] This is from the synopsis and blurb of the book.

[224] I found the claim problematic. Many ethnographic references in the book are just plain wrong. For instance, while describing Highlanders' cultures center on the pig, the author explains that the Highlanders eat sago. Where one can find sago in the Highlands (above 1500 meters above the sea)?

> "At the end, I collected money to pay my marriage payment. I paid my parents and my brothers. It is all my work and efforts. In my heart, I often ask, why other married women receive bridewealth, but I do not? Even if I already married and have children like this, the bridewealth for my parents and brothers are no being paid. I had to struggle to collect the marriage payment for myself. For that, I have so much sympathy for those who suffer from the same fate as mine. I always try to help families who have difficulty in paying bridewealth. I tell them, "It's alright. I'll help pay it for you." I help so many people. I feel like I can solve many people's problems…Thus I am increasingly convinced that I can do everything by myself. Why, then, I have to rely on other people, especially my husband?"[225]

In 1989, she divorced her husband after he committed domestic violence. She says that her family wanted to demand compensation from her former husband for what he had done to her. "They had never paid any bridewealth. But you know, I paid my own bridewealth. Nobody commented on what I had decided." Her repetitive recounting of the bridewealth payment seems to endow her with a sense of empowerment. She attributed her freedom and her agency when she seized the means of power in her community to bridewealth. The most compelling thing about Yosepha Alomang is not only her character but also about the way Benny Giay and Yafet Kambai wrote her biography. Giay and Kambai enumerate Alomang's accomplishments regarding what Melanesian anthropology calls "the big man." As Sahlins argues, a big man in Melanesian politics mobilizes loyalty and power through his capacity to amass wealth and to distribute generously to his people (1963, 291). Godelier adds that the big man's generosity includes "helping one of his kinsmen to assemble bridewealth in order to marry, or negotiating peace with a neighboring tribe and seeking a means to compensate its respective losses in men and goods," which is what Alomang has done.

Yosepha Alomang plays multiple roles in her community: the chairwoman of the church council, a midwife, and most importantly, the chairwoman of the *Kulalok* cooperative.[226] It is in her role in the *Kulalok* cooperative that her politics extends beyond the prescribed script of Indonesian

[225] See Giay and Kambai 2003, 20-21.
[226] In Amungkal, kulalok means wealth or fortune. It is interesting that Amungme and their neighboring tribes call Freeport's mine as *kulalok*.

politics of motherhood and urban market politics. Like members of Solpap, she worked as a farmer and sold produce on the streets of the mining town of Timika since the 1970s. Her clan is one of the owners of the Grasberg mine that I discuss in the previous chapter. The Amungme like her did not get a fair share of the wealth, but the gravest offense that the mining company did to her and her community was that they did not buy their produce and preferred to import their supply from Australia or brought it from Indonesia. She says, "We are just watching what is happening on our land, what are the military, Freeport and the people from other regions making from our land. We are mere spectators."[227] With her fellow Amungme women, Alomang took the matter into their own hands. She organized a women's group that became *Kulalok* in 1991. Like Solpap, the group aims to advance their interest as indigenous business owners. They mobilized their capital through the organization of a pig feast and the sale of their produce to Freeport. Here again, women seized the means of power in Melanesia through the ownership and organization of the pig feast. As for Freeport, the mining company began to buy their produce in 1985 but this, as she says, was primarily due to several well-publicized protests that they organized. In late 1984, the group mobilized Amungme women to stage a protest in Timika airport. Alomang tells us,

> We planned the protest in Elisabeth Beanal's home. We arrived at the airport in the early morning and the officer, a Javanese named Pak Totok, let us in. He did not know what our plan was. We talked only in Amungkal.[228] Once the plane arrived, we moved closer. We did not see any soldiers, except few Freeport staff. The officers discharged the vegetables from the Freeport plane and put it in giant carts. We stood orderly, and then, there we went. We chopped the vegetables…. We destroyed all the vegetables, cut them near the plane and threw them away. We destroyed all of the produce. The army came and launched some warning shots. I told them, "I am fighting Freeport, not the army. I am not afraid of you. I am not afraid of soldiers. We want to fight Freeport. Stand on your guard, ABRI (the Indonesian army). You cannot keep defending Freeport."

[227] Giay and Kambai ibid., 28.

[228] The Amungme refer to their language as Amungkal and their land as Amungsa. Me in Amungme applies to "the people."

They staged the same protest in 1986 and 1987. In 1992 Alomang led another uprising, this time against the construction of a Sheraton hotel on the Papuans' customary land. During the period from 1980 until 1996, she was in and out of Indonesian detention countless times. In 1996, Yosepha Alomang filed a lawsuit on behalf of herself and her community against Freeport-McMoRan in Louisiana State Court of New Orleans.[229] Alomang's complaint alleges that the company engaged in human rights violations, cultural genocide, and environmental violations at the Grasberg Mine in West Papua. Alomang claims that she is entitled to relief under Louisiana state tort law and she demands, "damages and equitable relief including an order that Freeport change its corporate environmental and security policies, cease and desist all open pit mining operations, and improve relations with indigenous people through the implementation of mediation panels and the creation of a trust fund for their benefit."[230] While the court reversed and remanded her allegations, the case successfully brought the Freeport's case to international attention.

Like Solpap, Yosepha Alomang's demand is not a demand for affirmative action, although there is a component of affirmation there. Here we see that Papuan women create a new political and cultural space where Papuan identities are constructed through the self-identification of Papuans as economic actors and their opposition to the Indonesians and the mining company. Papuan women activate urban spaces as a site of resistance, as politicized geography of claims (Subramanian 2009, 4). To put it differently, markets as a form of urban architecture become a critical node in the emergence of Papuan identities in the city. This marks something entirely new, namely the rise of Papuan women as important political actors in the Papuan liberation struggle against Indonesia.

[229] See the documentation of the case, Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran Inc. 1998 WL 601431 E.D.La.,1996.

[230] See ibid.

From Big Men to Big Women: Contemporary Politics in Melanesia

What kind of consciousness do Alomang and Solpap's members articulate? How do they deploy gender differences as constitutive of other differences? Through the study of a group of indigenous Papuan women who work as traders, I will reexamine the conception of power and gender in Melanesia. These women have organized themselves under *Solpap* and Yosepha Alomang, founder of the Kulalok cooperative. Anthropologists of Melanesia have discussed the relations between political life and gender formation in the region, and drawn our attention to the question of inequality and male personifications as a basis for Melanesian politics. Instead of following this line of inquiry, this chapter focuses on the quotidian politics of urban spaces where Papuan women assert their presence as market actors.

Therefore, this chapter has highlighted two crucial transformations within the Papuan sphere, namely the shift from a subsistence and non-capitalist economy to a market- driven economy; secondly, the arrival of Indonesian migrants as a new political and economic power has led to a shift in the relationship between Papuans and foreigners. Indonesian influence is primarily felt in the political leadership positions where Papuan men play a stronger role. With the aggressive encroachment of Indonesian migrants, spaces where Papuans, particularly men, can exercise their power in public space are far more limited.

After Indonesia's rule was established in West Papua, the question of Papuans' cultural difference and their loyalty—or lack thereof— to the Indonesian state and nationalist project became a fundamental problem in governing the region. With Indonesia's intensive deployment of military force against Papuans, how should Papuans be made to feel as though they are Indonesians? How should Papuans, as the autochthonous population in the region, be treated? On April 25, 1964, five years *before* the Act of Free Choice, Sukarno-appointed governor Eliezer J. Bonay, and invited representatives and leaders of local communities to attend the Irian Barat People's Assembly. This

assembly aimed to mobilize support for Indonesia's rule in the territory.[231] During the Act, as I have made clear in the introduction, instead of conducting a referendum with the principle of 'one-man-one-vote' as stipulated by the 1962 New York Agreement, Indonesia carried out *musyawarah*—Indonesia's *adat-istiadat*, the government argued—through the establishment of the Pepera Council (I. *Dewan Musyawarah Pepera*) whose members consisted of local leaders, including Theys Hiyo Eluay, one of the great Sentani ondofolos.[232] Not until 1971, however, was *adat* used to refer to the crop of leaders who participated in the Pepera Council and the structure or system from which these leaders come.

Like its Dutch predecessor, Indonesia makes use of *adat* not only to establish its hegemony, but most importantly to recruit Papuans' who will be compliant to their rules.[233] In the early 1970s, the military administration began to gather local and traditional Papuan leaders, particularly those from the lowlands, and showered them with gifts and positions. The Indonesian government also

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[231] Eliezer J. Bonay hailed from Yapen-Waropen Island in the western part of West Papua. Irian Barat was used to refer to West Papua during the Sukarno years, i.e., from 1963-1973. The *musyawarah* was also not only attended by the local autochthonous population, but also by Indonesians who had been living in New Guinea (mainly teachers and government officials/*bestuur*) and 13 Indonesian officials from Jakarta. For discussion of the assembly, see Musjawarah ke-I Rakjat Propinsi Irian Barat 1966.

[232] Ondofolo is the highest authority in the traditional Sentani polities. Sentani sources suggest that both the terms 'ondofolo' and 'ondoafi' refer to the same office.

[233] *Adat* (custom) began to be incorporated into the Dutch colonial legal systems in the early 20th century. The making of *adat* into the *adat* law was part and parcel of the Dutch policy to govern the Indies population with their "native laws" instead of European or Islamic law. During the Dutch period, the first *adat* law stipulation that included the Netherlands New Guinea was published in 1925. In his *Het Adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indie*, Cornelies van Vollenhoven designated New Guinea as one of the 19 law areas (D.*rechtsckringen*) in the Netherlands East Indies (Vollenhoven 1925). He says, "In adat law of the Netherlands East Indies the Dutch part of New Guinea, *of course,* should be discussed; but it is on *language and ethnological reasons* that this island unlikely belongs to Indonesian law foundation (*rechtbekken*)"(1925, 423, the emphasis is mine). In the second edition dated 1953, van Vollenhoven expanded his discussion by dedicating the whole 40th edition—amounting to 622 pages—on the adat of the Netherlands New Guinea. Van Vollenhoven's contradictory statement about the Netherlands New Guinea warrants more attention. He seemed of the opinion that his adat project in New Guinea dealt with a concrete political reality at that time which designated Netherlands New Guinea as an integral part of the Netherlands East Indies. Yet, on the other hand, New Guinea's cultural difference lends its specificity compared to the rest of the colony.

intensified research on Papuan *adat*, particularly those that are related to land tenure and traditional leadership. This research direction, of course, coincided with the intensification of development through extractive industries and transmigration programs in that period.

The problem with traditional leadership in West Papua is that there are many distinctly different types of them. While in Java, traditional leadership follows the rule of descent, not all Papuan communities share this characteristic. Papuans divide themselves into four types of traditional leadership (Mansoben 1995). The first type is the "big men," which is predominant in the Central Highlands and the Bird Head. Here, leadership is based on the manipulation of relations through ceremonial exchange. The second is the *ondoafi* system, which is based on inherited and traditional bureaucracies at a village level. The *ondoafi* system spreads from the north coast of West Papua to the north coast of Papua New Guinea. The third model is a kingdom, which most resembles the Indonesian model of a feudal system. This system is predominant in the Raja Ampat islands and Fakfak, where the influence of the Moluccas model is strongly felt. The last one is the mixed system, which combines the big men and more hierarchical and descent-based models like the *ondoafi* and the kingdom. With this complexity, the Indonesian administration deploys *adat* to institutionalize Papuans' political participation in the Indonesian system. The establishment of *adat* organizations during the New Order will illustrate this case.

In 1978, Theys Hiyo Eluay founded the first *adat* organization in West Papua. Having been active in local politics through his participation in the *Pepera* Council and later, the Indonesian Christian Party, he initiated the Sentani Customary Body (SCA) with the purpose to negotiate employment allocation for indigenous Sentani in government offices in Jayapura, and also to control policymaking and to resolve resource conflicts between the local autochthonous population,

Indonesian migrants and the government, and corporations (Griapon 2014, 8-9).[234] In 1984, another *adat* institution was set up that went by the name of the Customary Community Institution of Irian Jaya.[235] As a provincial-wide institution, its birth is subject to contested historical claims. Eluay testified that the Commander of the West Papua Regional Military Command initiated it. Another version stated that it was purely Theys Hiyo Eluay's idea after he did not get a seat at the local Parliament during the 1982 election. Whichever is right, the LMA aimed to brush aside Papuans' anxiety towards the increasing role of Indonesian trans-migrants in the Papuan political, economic and cultural sphere. Papuan men who traditionally hold political leadership feel highly marginalized by the entrance of transmigrants and military officials into bureaucratic offices in West Papua. These transmigrants began to take over offices in the village, district, regency, and provincial levels (Griapon 104). In the political systems that use hierarchical mechanisms, as in the North Coast, *adat* is aggressively mobilized to counter this foreign domination.

In the Central Highlands where political leadership is gained through a competitive exchange, the existence of big men is in crisis. During the 1970s, when the Indonesian military forces carried out military operations in the Highlands, many big men preferred to fight against Indonesia than to collaborate.[236] This is not to say that the Indonesian government did not attempt to coopt them. In recent years, Jakarta has appointed a Papuan liaison officer whom they call "the big chief of the Central Highlands" (*kepala suku besar Pegunungan Tengah).* Through the organization

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[234] Indeed, the emergence of such institution should be attributed to community leaders like Eluay. Thanks to their involvement in the Pepera Council in 1969, in the local Parliament (DPRD) and later in Golkar, Papuan community leaders had reliable access to Indonesian power. Compare Benda-Beckmann 2011.

[235] In Indonesian, the body is called *Lembaga Musyawarah Adat Papua Irian Jaya.*

[236] Without doubt, this choice is dictated by the rule of consent and legitimacy in the big men polity.

that he founded (that goes by the name of the Customary Community Institution or new LMA), Lenis Kogoya, a Papuan from the Lani ethnic group and raised by Indonesian parents receives generous funding from Jakarta and establishes his power as a representative of Papuan people.[237]

This cooptation is not unique to this *adat* organization. Papuan indigenous leadership, particularly those within systems that are based on inheritance, are easily co-opted by Papuan elites' and Indonesian interests. Where the cooptation does not work, the Indonesian government attempts to establish new structures and functions that resemble the chieftainship of the coastal polity. The cooptation of the Papuan male, elite leadership continues after the Indonesian reform in 1998 and the granting of a special autonomy status to West Papua. The granting of autonomy to the provincial governments is not unique to West Papua. However, the word 'special' adds a sense of privilege to the West Papuan case. The special autonomy status was granted only to two provinces: Aceh in the westernmost part of Indonesia (which had a secession group called the Free Aceh Movement) and West Papua. Yet compared to Aceh, West Papua gains an extremely high degree of autonomy and financial benefit from the scheme. This reflects Indonesia's weaker legitimacy in its easternmost province.

The most important aspect of these policies are how it has been influential in shaping West Papua's contemporary politics and economy, especially in the "widening of the arena of political mobilization" (Chatterjee 2004, 47). Special autonomy status offers an opportunity for Papuan elites to benefit from democratic transitions and allows them to participate in the democratic process, particularly through the introduction of electoral processes at the provincial and regency (*kabupaten*) level, and the proliferation of administrative expansion (*pemekaran*) as an integral process of decentralization reforms.

[237] In June 2015, Indonesia was recognized as an associate member and ULMWP as an observer. Indonesia has aggressively lobbied Fiji and Papua New Guinea to block the ULMWP's bid for the MSG's membership.

Special autonomy status stipulates that there should be a Papuanization of provincial political governance, especially in the Papuan People's Assembly (*Majelis Rakyat Papua*, hereafter MRP), the Papuan Provincial Parliament, and the Office of the Governor and Vice Governor. Following this stipulation, the governor, vice governor, mayors and heads of regency, and all members of the MRP are required to be indigenous Papuans (*orang asli Papua*), broadly defined as those who racially belong to one of the 261 Papuan ethnolinguistic groups.[238]All of them are to be selected democratically through the national and regional elections (called *Pemilu* and *Pilkada* respectively). These elections have prompted Papuan elites to participate, either by joining existing political parties or running as independent candidates.

The impact of this transformation is visible, particularly in the shift of the locus of political strength from the coast to the Central Highlands, where 60 percent of the native Papuans live (Chauvel 2008, 2010, IPAC 2013, 2). Spread throughout the region, but particularly in big cities like Jayapura, Timika, Nabire, and their "homelands" in the Central Highlands, the Highlanders have transformed themselves into a major political force in West Papua. In doing so, they are challenging the existing dominance of better-educated lowlanders. To the bewilderment of many lowlanders, Indonesian politicians, and political observers, Highlanders seem to be well-situated to occupy West Papua's leadership positions due to their significant demographic numbers, as well as their strong and long-standing ceremonial exchange. While coastal leaders depended on the approval of the Indonesian authority during the New Order, Highlanders mobilize votes through excessive performances of giving, particularly through pig feasts, and the mobilization of their clans, churches, and/or ethnic networks. In other words, democratic reforms have allowed for the re-emergence of a

[238] This category is defined by patrilineal clan associations. See Article 12, the Law No. 21/2001 on the Special Autonomy Status of Papua (http://www.refworld.org/docid/46af542e2.html). In the law, it is also emphasized that any Papuan candidate who runs for the public office has to be faithful to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

political model that resembles a big men polity. This new model, however, emerges under the framework of foreign control and a new capitalist economy.

This framework has several implications. First, it means that Papuan elites must bow down to Jakarta's interests and take into account the interests of the Indonesian migrants in West Papua during the elections. Secondly, money becomes central in the electoral politics in West Papua. As part of the special autonomy package, the Indonesian central government increased the allocation of its development budget to West Papua.[239] The Papuan provincial and regency governments also receive more money from the mining and plantation concessions that operate in their area. But instead of using it for 'development purposes' as stated in the government budget, Papuan elites use the money to mobilize support for their political careers and prestige by circulating the money through the existing Melanesian system of exchange, namely through pig feasts. The Indonesian central government and political observers are quick to point out that Papuan elites have committed graft and this accusation is used, again, to reassert the need for the Indonesian patronage in West Papua. For Papuan scholars and political leaders, however, the whole special autonomy status is no more than a novel technology of domination, an exercise of colonial power (Karoba 2004; Giay 2010; Ayorbaba 2012; Yeimo 2014; KNPB 2014). As Benny Giay puts it, "Whether you are a governor, head of a regency, member of the Parliament, government employee, personnel of the Indonesian military or police, as long as you are a Papuan, it is all meaningless. You have to be aware that we, the Papuans, just pretend that we are free. In reality, we are not free. We are living in prison."

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[239] From 2002 to 2016, West Papua has received at least 47.9 billion rupiahs or about 3.4 billion US dollar. See Media Indonesia 2018 and Gumelar 2018. According to the Law No. 21/2001 on the West Papua's special autonomy, West Papua receives 70% of the non-tax revenues from gas for 25 years, which will be reduced to 50% from the 26th year on, special revenues equal to the 2% of the National General Allocation Fund for 20 years, and additional revenues for infrastructure development to be decided by the Central Government and Parliament (DPR), based on the annual proposals submitted by the Provincial Government.

Here we need to reexamine the Melanesian conception of politics that centers on big men or great men that reduces not only political life to a single personality, but also social relations that are characteristic of Melanesian societies. As Godelier correctly warns, we have to raise the following important questions. In light of radical transformations of Melanesian communities in West Papua, what exists in these societies that allow the big men, or big women in my case, to assume the burden of supralocal interests? What kinds of shifts enable such processes? This requires us to not merely find the ideal type that falls within a prescribed anthropological category, but to expand the conception of politics to the every day, where ceremonial and non-ceremonial exchange takes place in a new temporality.

As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the transformation of the political and economic system has had a profound impact on Papuan politics, indigenous leadership, and gender relations in West Papua. Papuan men from non-elite backgrounds who traditionally hold trusteeship titles over land now face crises, as they have moved to the city. Their relations with land become somewhat more tenuous. Papuan elites, on the other hand, are forced to, or willingly participate in, a system where their political positions depend on the patronage of the Indonesian state. Here, contrary to their men, Papuan women make use of their access to wealth to challenge the dominant power of migrants. Money is a medium in which social relations are enacted within the Papuan circle of ceremonial exchange. Money has allowed Papuan elite men to mobilize support for prestige and political offices, and it gives latitude for the continuation of women's wealth through their involvement in the marketplace economy. The capitalist system makes it possible for Papuan wealth (pigs) to be created.

Pigs are the foundation of the big men system of power in the Highland societies. When power is in crisis, women seize the opportunity for empowerment. They do so not only as individuals, but also as a collective. Solpap and Kulalok are two instances in which women's power

is attached to the same-sex collective that already exists in Melanesia. In Melanesia, as Strathern says, what distinguishes men and women is "not the maleness or femaleness of their sexual organs but what they do with them" (Strathern 1988, 128). If women were once producers of power and men were transactors, today Papuan women are both producers and transactors. In doing so, they not only challenge the foundation of a big men polity, but also create their own category of politics beyond the politics of big men. In the next chapter, we will look further to the Papuan space of politics, beyond the space that is enabled by a capitalist economy and the Indonesian state.

6. The Origins of Papuan National Consciousness

When Indonesia arrived in Enarotali, the Central Highlands of West Papua, the New York Times reported, "30,000 highland tribesmen took up arms against Indonesia."[240] The *London Observers* and the *Auckland Star* wrote that the tribesmen had blockaded five airfields in Enarotali and Waghete, preventing Indonesian planes from landing. Early in May 1969, the mentioned tribesmen shot Brigadier General Sarwo Edhi Wibowo's plane and hurt his entourage. The military historians have a few words for it, among others, resentment. They would not realize that the resentment lasts as long as West Papua is under the Indonesian rule.

Five years before Enarotali, in the western part of the island, the West Papua Independence Movement (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, OPM) was born out of the Indonesian military's vocabulary. The Indonesian authority used it to refer to the first organized Papuans' uprising against them.[241] Papuans have their version of history, a song that I heard many times in political rallies in Jayapura during 2015 and 2016. The lyrics sound like the following.

	In Papuan Malay:
In 1965, on 28 July,	*Pada tahun 65, 28 Juli,*
The Arfai headquarters was attacked by	*Markas Arfai dibongkar oleh*
the Papuan Corps	*Laskar Papua…*

[240] The New York Times. 1969. "Radio Reports Indonesia Used Rockets in West Irian." May 6. Similar reports come from "the Star" (New Zealand), "the Sidney Morning Herald"(Australia), and "the Observer" (UK). See Telegram Department of State 058, May 1969.

[241] Some sources indicate that the use of OPM came from the organization The Liberation Organization of West Papua (*Organisasi Pembebasan Papua Merdeka*, OPPM) which was founded by Terianus Aronggear, Permenas Awom, Lodewijk Mandatjan and some other leaders who were involved in the Kebar uprising. See Djopari 1993. The use of the name Free Papua Organization (OPM) since the 1960s is confirmed with the Incoming Telegram of Department of State, dated May 19, 1967. NARA 969000. See also the Airgram of the Department of State, A-278, dated July 9, 1969. Compare Rutherford (2012, 93) and Djopari (1993, 100).

We finished them off, soldiers of	*Kami tentara sapu rata,*
The Cassowary Battalion	*Batalyon kasuari*
We vow to keep fighting	*Berjanji tetap berjuang*
until independence…	*sampai akhir merdeka*
	In Biak Language:
We don't want, and we really do not want	*Yame werooooo oo ooh yamewero yamewero*
We don't want to be slaves	*Yabe women kakero*
Regardless whether we will go hungry or full	*Yanan ke yanan bayo 2x*
We will keep fighting	Y*inemke…yinembayo 2x*
Until we get our independence[242]	*Ya marisen yo res ro mangundaya*

The song was written and made famous by Black Brothers, a group of Papuan musicians from Jayapura. It is not clear when it was created, though most probably in 1982 when Black Brothers were in exile in Papua New Guinea. Papuans sing it in political rallies or play the .mp3 version at home or campus. For me, the song is exemplary for its documentary character. Not only does it refer to a particular date and event, but it also makes explicit other anti-colonial narratives in West Papua. In line with the historical narratives that I have discussed in chapter two, the song also suggests a continuity of the Papuan resistance narrative, instead of a rupture or break. Amidst the Indonesian suppression of Papuan history, the narrative of resistance is continuously articulated. Later in the chapter, I will further discuss the importance of Black Brothers in this narrative.

Many studies of Papuan nationalism have focused on the emergence of Papuans' political consciousness during the Dutch colonial period, and emphasize the role of the colonial power in nurturing this consciousness since the post-World War II.[243] However, the discussion of Papuan nationalism under Indonesian rule is less convincing. While ample attention has been paid to the

[242] I thank HR for the Biak translation. The song can be heard from here: https://www.engagemedia.org/Members/traverser11/videos/batalyon-kasuari-remix.

[243] See Bone 1958; Chauvel 2005; Drooglever 2009; Penders 2002; Pouwer 1999; Saltford 2002; Webster 2001.

Papuan armed struggle, scholarship on the quotidian aspects of the political movement and the shift within the political movement itself remains thin.[244] Within Southeast Asian and Indonesian studies, scholars largely ignore Papuan nationalist claims by proposing it as a subnational/ethno-nationalist claim, comparing it to more heroic nationalist struggles, but also undermining its meaning for Papuans. This attitude I argue is similar to the discourse of the Indonesian security forces that view the Papuan national liberation struggle as separatism.[245] Indeed, the Indonesian government constantly switches from a rhetoric of outright denial to one that downplays the situation, saying that Papuans were too primitive to stage a political movement, or that Papuans protest due to their lack of development. In response to the involvement of Papuan police personnel in the Enarotali uprising, for instance, Mr. Sujarwo Tjondronegoro, the Indonesian minister in charge of Irian Barat stated, "We can understand why the police went over. They had been promised pay rises, but the promise was never kept."[246] The *Auckland Star*, however, contends,

> "The Irianese have been poorly treated, ignored, exiled from their own society and generally treated as lower castes by the new settlers since they began flowing in after the transfer of the territory to Indonesia on May 1, 1963…the timing of the uprising suggests planning: It has occurred six weeks before the beginning of the 'Act of Free Choice.' The Enarotali movement may cause a postponement of the act, and it may also encourage others to resist."

The Indonesian security forces maintain a denigrating view towards Papuan resistance groups, calling them "the wild security disturbers" (*Gerakan Pengacau Liar*, GPL), "security disturbers movement" (*Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan*, GPK), "the armed civilians movement" (*Gerakan Sipil Bersenjata*, GSB), "the armed criminal groups" (*Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata,* KKB), or simply

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[244] Literature on the Papuan armed struggle, see Osborne 1985; Elmslie 2002; Chauvel and Bhakti 2004; Kirksey 2012.

[245] See Department of Information Republic of Indonesia 1976; Dinas Sejarah TNI-AD 1978; *Sjamsuddin* 1989; and Kodam XVII/Cenderawasih 2011.

[246] Indonesia denies rockets used on Tribesmen, Star, May 7, 1969.

"unknown persons" (*Orang Tak Dikenal,* OTK).[247] As stated by Ondawame,

> "[Indonesians] attempt to discredit the movement by describing it as highly factionalised, dominated by internal rivalries and mismanagement, lacking leadership, clear direction, political commitment, and willpower. Indonesia claims that the opposition in West Papua exists only because of unequal development. It argues that dissatisfaction with 'development,' combined with the backwardness of the people hinders the improvement of social and economic conditions in the province" (2000, 9).

In another context, the Indonesian security forces also propagate the idea that the Papuan Independence Movement is a remnant of Dutch colonialism (Department of Information Republic of Indonesia 1976). Why Papuan resistance survives more than 50 years after the Dutch left remains unexplained.

On the other hand, the Melanesian-minded scholarship tends to focus on millennial characters of the movement, indirectly reinforcing the Indonesian discourse of aspiration. While the affective and mythical quality of nationalist aspirations should be central in our conversation about the Papua independence movements,[248] to focus solely on this characteristic leads to a failure to understand the fact that Papuan resistance under or outside OPM is modern and require a high degree of organization that involves trans-ethnic solidarity and mobilization. This chapter, therefore, aims to contribute toward a more nuanced understanding of the Papuan national consciousness and the importance of trans-ethnic relatedness within the Papuan independence movements.

To do so, the chapter will trace the history of anti-Indonesia struggle in West Papua, from the emergence of armed struggle in the hinterlands in 1965 until today, when the resistance has moved to cities and taken the form of non-violent, urban-based mass movements. By paying attention to Papuans' national consciousness against the backdrop of the changing modes of

247 Compare Kirksey and Roemajauw 2002.

248 See Rutherford 2003 and Kirksey 2012.

Indonesian governance in West Papua, this chapter asks: How do Papuans constitute their nationalist project after more than fifty years under Indonesia? How do Papuans respond to the changing approaches of the Indonesian state toward the issues of West Papua? What does it mean for Papuans' anti-colonial struggle? It is my argument here that Papuan resistance against Indonesia is rather one of a modern nationalist movement in which nationalist ideology is central to this resistance. Papuans, particularly youth, continue to fight for Papuan national liberation and therefore resist any closure on the question of nation and nationalism in Indonesia.[249] Secondly, this movement can be best seen through how Papuans make use of pre-colonial and colonial structures, from ethnic and kinship networks to modern and colonial institutions, such as schools and churches, to fashion their sense of national identity and resistance. The use of various forms of organizations, armed and peaceful, and the adoption of the language, infrastructure, and knowledge of the colonial power, represents the modern character of this movement. It this thus similar to other nationalist movements, such as that of Indonesia in the 1940s.

This chapter draws on interviews and ethnographic research among Papuan students and independence activists in Jayapura, West Papua, as well as additional archival research at the University of Cenderawasih and the Jayapura City Library, in Indonesia at the Center of History of the Indonesian Army and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Netherlands at the Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, the Dutch National Archive in Den Haag, and KITLV at Leiden University.

The Birth of a Movement

The song *Batalyon Kasuari*, or sometimes called *Mars Papua*, refers to the incident that took place in Manokwari, the second largest city in the Netherlands New Guinea, in 1965 (see

[249] Compare Anderson 1972.

Figure/Map 1). Papuan historian J.R.G. Djopari writes, " On July 28, 1965, around 4.03 o'clock in the morning, about 400 rebels with a mix of weaponry: guns, arrows, bows, machetes, and spears under the leadership of Permenas Ferry Awom attacked Indonesian military base in Arfai" (1993, 111). The "rebels" consisted mostly of Arfak, Biak, Serui, Ayamaru and Numfor ethnic groups. The attack killed three Indonesian soldiers and wounded another four. At noon, a morning star flag of the Papuan independence movement was raised in the office of forestry. As retaliation, thirty Papuans were killed by the Indonesian military forces. In the following days, Awom and his soldiers attacked another military post in Warmare and killed more Indonesian personnel.

John Otto Ondawame, a Papuan historian from the Amungme ethnic group, offers a slightly different version of the incident.[250] Ondawame was a member of the National Liberation Army of the West Papua Independence Movement (*Tentara Pembebasan Nasional/Organisasi Papua Merdeka,* TPN/OPM), a name that Papuans later adopted after declaring independence in 1971. He wrote that the rebellion broke out on July 26, 1965 when Papuan soldiers from the Papuan Volunteer Corps (D. *Papoea Vrijwilligers Korps*, PVJ hereafter*)*,[251] hundreds of civil servants in the Department of Forestry and Agriculture, and 14,000 Arfak militia led by Lodewijk and Barren Mandatjan attacked the Kebar military and police posts and raised a morning star flag. The Kebar uprising, as the incident was called, was followed by the July 28 uprising led by Permenas Ferry Awom, a Biak

[250] John Otto Ondowame wrote a dissertation that becomes my source of this account. See Ondowame 2000. Ondawame was born on November 30, 1953, in Wanamum, Noema Valley, Mimika regency, West Papua. He went to the University of Cenderawasih to study Economics in 1972 and graduated in 1976. He got the 1972 *President Soeharto Award for Academic Excellence.* See his CV here: https://westpapuapoint.wordpress.com/2007/08/27/john-otto-ondawame/.

[251] The Papuan Volunteer Corps (PVK) was formed by the Dutch colonial government on February 21, 1961. Drawing its members entirely from the indigenous Papuans, the PVK was prepared to defend the Netherlands New Guinea from the infiltration and attacks of the Indonesian Military Forces, particularly during the confrontation period (1959-1962). After New Guinea was transferred to UNTEA, PVK was dissolved. It is interesting that PVK's slogan was "I persist"(persevero). See Drooglever (2009) and Bruggen 2011.

sergeant in the PVJ. While Djopari and Ondawame have some political differences—Djopari worked as an Indonesian government employee, while Ondawame worked for the Papuan liberation group—both agree on the fact that this uprising was neither the first nor the last in the history of Papuan resistance to Indonesia's occupation. This history also opposes Benedict Anderson's analyses of Papuan nationalism, in which he claims that it emerged as a movement after the establishment of the New Order.[252]

In Enarotali, the uprising began in February and ended on August 30, 1969—before and during the period of the Act of Free Choice. Indonesia claims that the Dutch-educated Biak bureaucrat (D.*ambtenaar)* A.R. Wamafma led the rebellion.[253] In the Mee side, David Pekei, also Dutch educated and Karel Gobai, an American mission-trained is said to organize the mobilization of hundreds of Mee tribal chiefs (Djopari 113). The uprising also involved around 60 rifle-armed Papuan police officers. Reports claim that the Enarotali uprising killed at least 14 Indonesian soldiers.[254] In reprisal, the Indonesian military launched rockets at civilians and killed from 500 to

[252] See Anderson 2006 [1983], 181 and Anderson 1999. Indonesia declared its independence in 1945 after more than 300 years under the Dutch colonialism and three years of Japanese occupation. Sukarno, one of the founding fathers became Indonesia's president until 1965 (this period is called the "Old Order") when Suharto, a military general took power by killing many of Sukarno's supporters, particularly members or allegedly members of the Indonesian Communist Party, then the fourth largest political party in the country. Suharto was in power from 1968-1998 (this period is called the "New Order") with strong support from the United States. In 1998, Suharto was ousted by popular protests. References on the Indonesian New Order are numerous, e.g. Anderson and McVey 1971.

[253] Wamafma worked as KPS Tigi. I suspect that he was educated in OSIBA and worked for the transitional administration and then, Indonesia after the Dutch left. Another Papuan who was involved and could be identified was Herman Mambrisauw from Dorehkar. He was the one who shot Brig. Gen. Sarwo Edhie Wibowo's plane. Mambrisauw was also a graduate of OSIBA and the Dutch Police School of Base-G in Hollandia.

[254] New Zealand Herald mentions a figure between 11-29. See New Fighting in West Irian, NZH, July 11, 1969.

600 Papuans.[255]

It is difficult to trace the connection between the uprising in Enarotali and other places in islands west of the region during from 1965 to 1969, but the fact that the uprising in Enarotali involved a Biak demonstrated the emergence of ethnic and sectorial solidarity in Papuan political networks.[256] It was also not a coincidence that the first uprising began in the western part of the island, involving primarily Arfak and Biak people. First of all, these people have been integrated into urban centers and educated under the Dutch since the 19th century. Almost all leaders of these uprisings were trained as military men in the Dutch-created PVJ or teachers at the Papuan Reformed Church, such as two civilians in the movement leadership, Terianus Teopilus Aronggear, and Johan Ariks. Ariks, who was an Arfak, co-founded the New Guinea People Party (*Persatuan Orang Nieuw Guinea*, PONG) in 1960 and had declared during the 1949 roundtable conference in the Netherlands that Papuans wanted independence.[257] This modern network, however, did not diminish the strength of clan and ethnolinguistic affiliations, as shown by the mobilization of Arfaks by Mandatjan brothers and Johan Ariks. Most Arfaks were either agricultural workers at the Indo-European plantations in Manokwari or farmers in the Arfak Mountains, therefore a lot of them had been

[255] STAR, May 15, 1969, titled: New West Irian Trouble Feared. In the "Incoming Telegram of Department of Sate", dated April 27, 1967, the Kebar uprising is said to cause the death of 2,000 Papuans, which the Indonesian Foreign Minister and military denied. See also Department of State Airgram, dated October 18, 1967, divulging a conversation between Marcus Kaisiepo, A.F. Paulus Obinaru, and Francis T. Underhill, Director of Indonesian Affairs at the Department of State. See al Rahab 2006.

[256] The US Embassy in Jakarta reports that there was no contact between Manokwari and Enarotali dissidents but it admits that the anti-Indonesia sentiment has spread all over the region, with an estimation that between 85-90% Papuans are in favor of independence. See Airgram Department of State, A-278, dated July 9, 1969.

[257] Johan Ariks was born in 1897. His father, Jonathan Ariks was a former slave who was manumitted by Dutch missionary F.T.J. van Hasselt. Johan Ariks went to study at the Protestant seminary in Depok on Java Island and became a teacher at the mission school in Miei in 1931. He died in the Indonesian prison in Manokwari in 1967. See Miedema 1984 and Penders 2002, 154.

engaged in the modern economic and political system.[258] Secondly, information networks in the area were better than in the Highlands and the interior. And thirdly, in addition to Jayapura (D. Hollandia), they had suffered under Indonesia's early invasion that had taken place since the late 1950s.

Two years after the uprising began, Major Lodewijk Mandatjan fled to the forest and joined Permenas Ferry Awom, relocating the chain of command from urban cities to the hinterlands. The relocation of the site of resistance ran parallel to the arrival of more than 7,000 Indonesian troops to major cities and islands in the west, particularly Manokwari and Biak, and the brutal military crackdowns that followed. For some time, rural hinterlands would provide a safe base to escape Indonesia's control. This same process of ruralization took place in the north coast where the armed struggle relocated their center of movement from Jayapura, the capital city of the region to the Victoria Headquarters in Keerom, West Papua's borderlands with Papua New Guinea in the early 1970s. The Papuan Liberation Army that we know today was rooted in and expanded from this borderland.

In the cities, however, anti-Indonesia resistance continues as well. Since 1965 and 1966, the liberation struggle had gained support among Papuan members of the Indonesian police forces, Armed Forces and Papuan employees working in the Indonesian administration, and students at various Dutch schools in the city (Djopari 111).[259] They established clandestine organizations, distributed anti-Indonesia pamphlets, and declared their support for the liberation struggle.[260] Those

[258] See Drooglever 2009.

[259] Ondawame offers a different version. The OPM was established by the Mandatjan brothers on 26 June 1965 and later strengthened by Permenas Ferry Aworn during the first military uprising which occurred in Manokwari. See Subroto 2009. Soeharto met Mandatjan brothers on Saturday, January 11, 1969. Report can be seen in Dwipayana 1991.

[260] See Kirskey (2012, 52) for the list of the organizations.

who were involved in this struggle would make up the second generation of the OPM fighters and a lot of them came from Abepura.

Abepura, A Student City

Every day, Papuan young men and women walk on the pavement of a dusty two-lane road that cuts the city in two. They go to colleges and schools that dot that dusty road.[261] Since the Dutch years, the bustling city of Abepura has become the center of education and missions in the colony. Abepura is one of the fastest growing urban areas in West Papua, second only to Timika, the mining town on the south shore of West Papua. During the Dutch rule, it was called Hollandia Binnen, meaning the interior of Hollandia. Today, Abepura is the most crowded city in the Jayapura metropolitan area. A countless number of shops, military installments, universities and schools, student dormitories (I. *asrama*), and slum-like neighborhoods jostle around a small plot of hilly land.

Until 1962, the Dutch school for Papuan bureaucracy (*Opleidingschool voor Inheemse Bestuurs-Ambtenaren*, OSIBA) was located here. Not far from OSIBA, the government-owned Teacher Training College (*Opleiding Dorps Onderwijzers*, ODO) was established in Yoka, while the Catholic ODO was located in Waena. The Dutch colonial government also founded a high school (*Primaire Middlebar School,* PMS) and School of Agriculture (*Landbouw School*) in Kotaraja, about two miles from OSIBA.[262]

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[261] In the Papua province, the number of youth (15-29 years old) in 2017 is 919,100 (from 3,207,444) or 28.66% of the total population.

[262] This situation is radically different from Indonesia. After the Indonesia's independence in 1945, the Indonesian national government immediately nationalized Dutch higher education in Java. The University of Indonesia, for instance was established in 1945 as a consolidation of three Dutch colleges: the medical school/STOVIA (established by the Dutch in 1927), the law school/OSVIA (established by the Dutch in 1924, and literature school (established in 1940). This was followed by the Bandung Institute of Technology (from the Dutch Technische Hogeschool, established in 1920) and the establishment of Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta in 1949. See Thomas 1973



Figure 6.1. The Map of Jayapura Metropolitan Area. Credit: author and Feransis.

All of these schools were filled by Papuan students from across the region. Indonesia saw these schools as a symbol of the Dutch rule. The Indonesian security forces carried out night raids during November and December of 1962, when they arrested and tortured Papuan students who protested against Indonesia. [263] Reports from various sources suggest that a group of forty Papuan students of OSIBA and ODO fled to Papua New Guinea after these raids.[264]

Today, many universities and schools are located here, including the largest and most prestigious university, the University of Cenderawasih, a public university built by the Indonesian administration under Sukarno in 1962, the Dutch Reformed Church's theology school, now the STT Izaak Samuel Kijne (founded in 1954), the Catholic theology and philosophy school, now the STFT Fajar Timur (founded in 1967), and the University of Sciences and Technology of Jayapura (founded in 2003).[265] Urban redevelopment in the 1980s expanded the core of Abepura city to the neighboring Waena, following the construction of University of Cenderawasih's new campus in 1992, a number of government housing projects (I. *Perumnas*), and the Expo, a complex of museums and model houses of different Papuan ethnic groups built in the 1980s to promote tourism in West Papua. **See Figure 6.1.**

There is no place in the city that is more dense with historical significance than the University of Cenderawasih (hereafter, Uncen). Uncen was the second Indonesian institution that was established in West Papua, after the official representative office of the Republic. In other words, the university is a colonial institution, and by virtue of its colonial character, the university

[263] See Zaccharias Sawor's account on the raids (Sawor 1969).

[264] The Papuan New Guinea's newspaper, PNG Courier reported about the crisis during 1969.

[265] The number of students of STT Izaak Samuel Kijne was 151 students in 2016. STFT Fajar Timur has 137 students while the University of Sciences and Technology had 4,800 students in 2016. All data is from the Indonesian Ministry of Education, Directorate of Higher Education.

becomes the battleground between the Indonesian nationalist project and the Papuan one. During my fieldwork, I was affiliated with the university's department of anthropology and anthropology lab. The university was founded on November 10, 1962, six months after the official transfer of Netherlands New Guinea from the Netherlands to The United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). Sukarno, who was extremely aware of public relations and Indonesia's lack of legitimacy in West Papua, initiated Uncen as a campaign platform to win over the hearts and minds of Papuans, so that Papuans would vote for Indonesia during the referendum in 1969.[266] Murray Thomas (1973) wrote that the establishment of the university aimed "to demonstrate its ability to govern this wild and widespread land"(191).[267] This was to be carried out by a special ministry under Sukarno, the Coordinating Minister of Irian Barat Affairs which gave a mandate to a preparatory committee led by Professor Soegarda Poerbakawatja, a Dutch-trained teacher and founder of Gadjah Mada University and many teachers' colleges in Indonesia, Major General Prof. Dr. Moestopo, and Ismail Suny, S.H, an Acehnese legal scholar.[268] Robert Davée, UNTEA's representative in Jakarta, rejected the proposal, saying that UNTEA's mandate was limited only to the implementation of the New York Agreement.[269] He might have been well aware of the consequences of this Indonesian political move.

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[266] This is obvious from a petition sent by pro-Indonesia Papuans and signed by Frits Kirihio asking UNTEA to support Indonesia's initiative. The petition was made in Hollandia on October 29, 1962. In his speech in 1977, Prof. Soegarda Poerbakawatja stated clearly that the University was set up even for a propaganda purpose. In total, the motion to set up the University of Cenderawasih only took 1 month and ten days to manifest. See Universitas Cenderawasih 1977, 16.

[267] Compare Herlina 1990, 295.

[268] UNTEA administration is said to have a committee of higher education led by pro-Indonesia Papuan Fritz Kirihio. The two committees then decided to work together. See Jaspan1964, 264.

[269] See Cenderawasih 1962, 12-13.

The Indonesian government did not give up. They immediately approached the missions who worked in West Papua. Their first meeting with the Catholic Church took place on October 30, 1962. No commitment was made at that time. Their meeting with the Yayasan Persekolahan Kristen (YPK), the educational foundation of the Dutch Reformed Church, yielded a more favorable result. Their missionaries were committed to sending ten members of their congregation to the university as first students, who would also help the university with lending their building and furniture.[270] At its onset, Uncen consisted of two departments, namely the Department of Education, and the Department of Law, Commerce and Public Administration. The University occupies the former OSIBA's building which was deserted after the raids. They also borrowed mission school buildings. [271] Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro admitted, "To be honest, we seized UNTEA's power illegally because we could not wait any longer to work for the prosperity of the people, the people who were hungry for progress."[272]

Since the beginning, the number of Papuan students at the university has always been much fewer than non-Papuan students. Herlina testified that initially, almost all students were Indonesians. She says, "Where should the students (of Uncen) come from? All officials of the Indonesian Mission, as well as those from the Indonesian contingent who had graduated from the SMA (the senior high school), were enrolled as candidate students. It did not matter whether or not they had time to attend the lectures due to how much work they had to do. The question was to be enrolled

[270] Sejarah Cenderawasih 1962, 14.

[271] This situation is radically different from Indonesia. After the Indonesia's independence in 1945, the Indonesian national government immediately nationalized Dutch higher education in Java. The University of Indonesia, for instance was established in 1945 as a consolidation of three Dutch colleges: the medical school/STOVIA (established by the Dutch in 1927), the law school/OSVIA (established by the Dutch in 1924, and literature school (established in 1940). This was followed by the Bandung Institute of Technology (from the Dutch Technische Hogeschool, established in 1920) and the establishment of Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta in 1949. See Thomas 1973.

[272] See Universitas Tjenderawasih 1965, 47.

in order to trick the UNTEA and the Dutch."[273] This statement should make us cautious of the figure of Papuan students that the Indonesian government presented. In June 1963, the university reported that there were 26 Papuan students enrolled at the university while the non-Papuan students had reached 75. In 1964, the student enrollment increased to 287. The year after, there were 176 new students with 48 students were of Papuan ethnicities.[274] By the end of 1965, however, all Papuan students dropped out.[275] In 1968, the number increased to 341 students.[276] In 1970, there were 299 West Papua-born and 333 non-West Papua born students in the student body.[277] **See table**

[273] Herlina, ibid, 295.

[274] See Poerbakawatja 1966, 10.

[275] Poerbakawatja 1966, 11.

[276] This consists of 324 men and 17 women excluding the college of education. See Thomas 1973, 191. *The Europa World of Learning* gives numbers of the University of Cenderawasih's students from 1967-1975 as follow: in 1967-1968, there were 575 students and 33 professors/lecturers, in 1972/1973, 558 students and 36 professors/lecturers, and in 1974/1975, 605 students and 44 professors/lecturers. See Europa Publications 1996. In 1986, there were already 2,748 students in degree programs and 744 students in non-degree programs with 166 full time academic and 371 non-academic staff at the university. In 1987, there were 3,882 students with 212 full time and 153 part time staff. In 1967, excluding social sciences departments (which are very large), there were 1,741 students from West Papua and 1,234 students were non-West Papua born. See Brash 1988.

[277] I suspect that even from those who were born in West Papua, most of them were non-Papuans, most probably sons and daughters of the Indonesian military and civilian administration and Indonesian teachers. I encountered many of these cases personally. Until today, Indonesian students' domination at the University is still subject to an extremely heated debate, particularly after the subsidy that the University received under the 2001 special autonomy status. The subsidy is aimed to support affirmative actions for the Papuan indigenous students but as we can see from the 1970s case, it is Indonesian students who benefit from this scheme. Precisely because figures and compositions are political, the university and government attempt not to disclose it. The student board at the School of Medicine notes that from the total number of students of 1968 in the period of 2003-2015), only 889 students are indigenous Papuans (about 45% per cent). See http://tabloidjubi.com/16/2016/06/05/persentase-oap-kini-jadi-minoritas-di-fk-uncen/. In 1971, the university report claimed that there were 632 students at the university, with 333 students (53%) are West Irianese-born. Considering the previous figures and later, this is rather unreliable. 220 of these students got some form of scholarship. See Universitas Tjenderawasih (1971, 76). From the same article, out of 124 full time instructor, only one was a Papuan, namely Otto Wospaktrik (from Serui). See page 77.

6. 1 for a complete tabulation**.** The proportion of non-Papuans in the student body has been consistently higher, demonstrating not only the marginalization of Papuans at the University, but also the failure of the Indonesian state to fulfill its own promises to Papuans.[278] In the inauguration of the university on the Indonesian Heroes Day on November 10, 1962, Poerbakawatja stated that the University is "a symbol of Indonesia's higher and grander aspiration to liberate itself from colonization"(1962, 3). The university would work to achieve the following:

> "open a possibility for the development of the souls of West Irianese youth and the people of West Irian in general. The university will enable the people of West Irian to catch up the more advanced development of their brothers and sisters in other parts of the Republic. It will restore West Irianese's sense of dignity…It will open up and strengthen young Irianese's consciousness to the unity of Indonesia as their country and nation that has been declared by the Indonesian youths on October 28, 1928."[279]

The situation became worse, as most seats in the university administration were (and continue to be) occupied by Indonesians. All early lecturers at the university were Indonesians and screened for ideological and security purposes by the Indonesian Armed Forces.[280] The university presidium always had military members, such as Brigadier General Bintoro, the commander of the Cenderawasih regional military command (1966-1966) or Colonel A. Marpaung, S.H. Naipospos notes that during the Act of Free Choice, Brigadier General Sarwo Eddy Wibowo, the commander of the regional command frequently came and spoke at the university.[281] Since 1962, the University

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[278] Poerbakawatja, the university president noted that in 1966, the university had 307 students in the school of education (only 80 students were Papuans, 71 male and 9 female). In the department of law, administration and business administration there were 359 students, plus 38 students in the satellite school in Sorong (merely 67 Papuans registered, none were female). In the department of agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry, there were 23 students (only 4 Papuan students, all were male). See Poerbakawatja (1966, 14-15).

[279] See particularly page 3-4. See Poerbakawatja 1966 Indeed the first alumna of the University of Tjenderawasih was Dr. Soedjarwo Tjondronegoro, the head of the Indonesian delegation in UNTEA.

[280] Frits Kirihio, a Papuan who studied in Leiden was not appointed as a lecturer. Instead he was appointed as a member of the Parliament. By 1969, his attitude towards Indonesia had changed.

[281] See Naipospos 1971, 2.

has to forge a good relationship with the Indonesian security forces—who maintains several posts near the campus. Also, five out of nine university presidents are Indonesians.[282] Garnaut and Manning (1974) do not restrain themselves when saying, "Cenderawasih University…has been especially attractive to Indonesian public servants from other provinces…"(30). This situation persists today.

Year	**Papuan**	**Non-Papuan**	**Total of student body**
1963	26	75	101
1964			287
1965	48	128	176 (incoming students)
1966	151	576	727
1967			575?
1968			341?
1970	299 (Papua-born)	333	632 or 513 (Uncen 1978) (DO 48)
1971			638 (DO: 206)
1972			629 (DO: 182)
1973			626 (total)
1975			676
1976			808
1977			1040
1978			1348
1979			1659
1987			3,882
2012			21,050
2013			29,974
2014			28,180

Table 6. 1. Number of Incoming Students at the University of Cenderawasih

[282] See Garnaut and Manning 1974. The following is the list of University Presidents from 1962: Prof.Dr.R .Soegarda Poerbakawatja (1963-1967, Indonesian from Java), Prof. Ir. Soekisno Hadikoemoro (1970-1975, Indonesian from Java), Dr. Rubini Atmawidjaja (1975-1977, Indonesian from Java), Prof Ir. Rudy C Tarumingkeng, MF, PhD (1978-1988, Indonesian from Sulawesi) (also a member of Indonesian People's Representative Assembly (MPR-RI, 1982-1987), representing the Province of Irian Jaya (Papua)), Drs. August Kafiar (1988 – 1996, Papuan from Biak), Frans Alexander Wospaktrik (1996-2004, Papuan from Serui), Prof. Dr. Balthazar Kambuaya, MBA (2005-2011, Papuan from Sorong), Prof. Dr. Karel Sesa (2013-2015, Papuan from Sorong), and Dr. Onesimus Sahuleka (2015-2017, Indonesian from the Moluccas).

The process of Indonesianization did not stop short with the staffing, however. In addition to taking mandatory classes in Indonesian state ideology (Pancasila) and religious education,[283] first-year students at the University Cenderawasih in the 1960s had to undergo military training for two hours per week.[284] Starting in 1971, they had to participate in a state-sponsored development project called Koteka operation (I. *Operasi Koteka*) in the Central Highlands, lest they would not get their degree.[285] The University has been commissioned by the administration to study topics that are of interest to Indonesian rule, from transmigration, the national struggle in the manner of the Indonesian nationalist history, to land tenure.[286] Some Papuan students were sent to Java to meet their fellow students in 1964. In 1971, a faculty at the editorial board of the university magazine stated that Indonesian faculty at the University "should pioneer the civilizing efforts of primitive ethnic tribes in the hinterland, dig, cultivate, and nurture their lives and cultures for non-Irian audiences, to carry out research and exploit the treasures that are in it.[287] As the university president

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283 During the Sukarno's years, students at the University of Cenderawasih also had to take a course on "Manifesto Politik Indonesia". See Poerbakawatja 1966, 16.

284 See Jaspan 1964, 266 and Poerbakawatja 1966, 10.

285 See Universitas Tjenderawasih (1971, 1-2). October. According to the article, Koteka operation was carried out by 30 teams, targeting the Baliem Valley and Meeuwodidee (Enarotali and Waghete). Each team consisted of 10 members (two Indonesian military personnel, two students at the University of Cenderawasih, one translator, one official from the Office of Census, Office of the Land Fishery, Office of Agriculture, Office of Information, and one 'commander'. Each team stayed for six months in the Highlands. Since early on, the 20% of the members were drawn from the staff at the Research Body (Lembaga Ilmiah) and faculty of University of Cenderawasih. In 1971, the university signed an official document stating the cooperation with the Kodam XVII/Cenderawasih with Brigadier General Acub Zainal signed on behalf of the Kodam. See Universitas Tjenderawasih (1971, 68-69).

286 Poerbakawatja 1966, 7.

287 See Naipospos 1971, 3. Staff at the university publication was entirely Indonesians. The original Indonesian text: *harus memelopori pen-sivilisasian suku2 di pedalaman, menggali, mengolah dan menggarap kehidupan dan*

stated, by 1971, the university has become an "agent of modernization and agent of development."[288] This statement should be read in the broader context of the Indonesianization of education systems in West Papua that I have discussed in chapter 2.

Two months after the official transfer of West Papua from UNTEA to Indonesia on May 1, 1963, the Indonesian government established a section in anthropology, which would focus on conducting anthropological research and running a museum of anthropology in West Papua—the first and only museum of anthropology in the country.[289] Even if anthropology (and linguistics) only became a field of study at the university in 1978, anthropology has been central since early on. The museum itself (I. *Museum Loka Budaya*) was constructed in 1970 and was inaugurated on October 1, 1973, thanks to, among others, a large donation of the Rockefeller family. In the 1980s, the anthropology department and the museum would become one of the most critical nodes in the history of Papuan resistance against Indonesia.

As will be evident later, Uncen has become the battleground for various campus and national politics. These politics, though, do not take place solely inside the gates of the university. In Abepura, most students live in dormitories. Student dormitories reflect an architectural legacy of the missionaries and the Dutch colonial era. Catholic and Protestant missions both ran and operated schools with boarding houses or dormitories (I. *pendidikan berpola asrama*), from the elementary school to the high school level. Catholic and Protestant student dormitories still exist today, and

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kebudajaan muri itu untuk konsumen luar Irian Barat, meneliti dan mengeksploiter harta terpendam jang ada di dalamnja. In 1964, Drs. Anwas Iskandar, Uncen's faculty joined the operasi karya by the Kodam XVII/Tjenderawasih and resulted in a manuscript entitled "Irian Barat-Pembangunan Suku Mukoko". See Hadikoemoro 1971, 70-71.

[288] Ibid, 70.

[289] In its early establishment, Drs. Anwas Iskandar became an acting director. Iskandar has written several papers about the Hubula (Dani) ethnic group and a quite propagandistic book about the dual role of the Indonesian Army. The book was published by the center of the history of Indonesian Army. See Tjenderawasih 1971, 75-85. The establishment of anthropological lab can bee seen from the Decision of Minister of PTIP No. 82/1963.

most of them are in Abepura, such as the prestigious Teruna Bhakti High School (built in 1971) or Tunas Harapan dormitories (built in 1982). Both are affiliated with the Catholic Church. The Dutch (now Papuan) Reformed Church runs two student dormitories near their theology school. The American and Australian evangelical churches, on the other hand, set up their mission early on in Pos Tujuh in Sentani, near the airport, as it allows them to fly directly to the Central Highlands where many of their congregations live.

In Abepura, the largest student dormitory complex is at Uncen. They have two student dormitories in their old campus, six blocks of student dormitories in the new campus, and four units of public housings built by the government (I. *rusunawa)* near their new campus. Even though public housing serves non-students, most occupants are students of Uncen. The total number of Uncen students reached 28,284 students in 2017.[290] Recently, faith-based dormitories have decreased in number,[291] but in my tally, there have been more than 20 new dormitories constructed by the regency governments[292] and serve college students in Jayapura-Abepura-Sentani areas. After the introduction of special autonomy status in 2001 and larger financial allocation was given to regencies, there was an explosion of construction of student dormitories in the surrounding areas of Uncen's new campus and the Expo, where newly created regencies in the Central Highlands like

[290] Data is elicited from the directorate of higher education of the Indonesia's Ministry of Education. The number is for 2015/2016. In their report in 1980, the university had reported about the existence of student housings. In 1978, the campus housing merely accommodated 75 students in Jayapura and 40 in Manokwari. See Tarumingkeng 1980, 21. A document entitled "Programma Ruang2 untuk Universitas Tjenderawasih Sukaranapura Irian Barat" (Sukarnapura: 1964) suggests that there is one unit of male housing for 70 students (for 1,750 male students, they would need 25 units of housing) and a female housing for 50 students (they would need 5 units for 250 female students).

[291] See Papuakini. Pelajar Katolik Minta Uskup Jayapura buka kembali empat asrama. November 25, 2016. https://www.papuakini.co/2016/11/25/pelajar-katolik-minta-uskup-jayapura-buka-kembali-empat-asrama/. Access on January 11, 2017.

[292] Regency (I. *kabupaten*) is the lower administrative unit under a province.

Tolikara or Starry Mountain built palace-like student housing. In the Expo and Uncen areas alone, there are 22 student dormitories.[293] In Abepura, near the old Uncen campus, there are three dormitories for students from the Baliem Valley,[294] also dormitories for students from Nabire and Nduga. The system even exists in Java and in Sulawesi in Indonesia, where many Papuan students go to college.

In my hometown on Java Island, for instance, more than 10,000 Papuans are studying in various universities and colleges in Yogyakarta, a small city of 400,000 people.[295] There are at least 22 Papuan dormitories in the city, yet more students live in rented houses (I. *kontrakan*) or boarding houses (I. *kos-kosan*) outside the dormitory system. The city indeed has the first and oldest Papuan dormitory in Indonesia, which was established as early as 1967.[296] In addition to this, there are 40 Papuan civic associations (I. *paguyuban*) across the city, which are based on interests (sports, arts, and so forth), religious affiliations (particularly church denominations), fields of study, and regional or ethnic affiliations (for instance, the association of students of Dogiyai, the association of Amungme students), and so forth. Papuan students in West Papua and Indonesia organize themselves into

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[293] These dormitories include students from the following regencies: Fakfak, Tolikara, Pegunungan Bintang, Manokwari, Mimika, Puncak, Lanny Jaya, Yalimo, Biak, Yahukimo, Asmat, Paniai, Intan Jaya, Serui, Keerom, Mamberamo Raya and Tengah, Puncak and Puncak Jaya, Kaimana, Mappi, Maro (Merauke), Bintuni Bay, and Sorong.

[294] This consists of two male dormitories: Nayak I and II and one female dormitory).

[295] The exact number is hard to come bay but the figure varies between 7,000 to 10,000 students. See BBC Indonesia 2016 and Kusumadewi 2016. In Yogyakrta, 244,739 residents (or 78,7% of the total population of the city) are students. See Kompas, 08/04/2013. The actual number may be bigger as many students live outside the city proper. Papuan anthropologist Theodorus Kossay, himself a Hubula wrote an exemplary thesis on lifestyles of Papuan students in Yogyakarta (2007). Much of the ideas that I developed here was a result of many conversations that I had with him in Jayapura during my fieldwork in 2013, 2014, and 2015-2016. Jenny Munro had carried out a study among Highlanders students in North Sulawesi (2009).

[296] In 1971, Otto Wospakrik, a faculty at Uncen attended courses in the master program in the public administration in Gadjah Mada University. See "A brief description…" In 1964, the governor of the special region of Yogyakarta said that there had been some Papuan students studying in Yogyakarta. See his speech during the first assembly of people of West Irian sponsored by the Indonesian government. See Buwana1964 and Kossay 2007.

organizations or groups that best represent their affiliations or their aspirations. The primary purposes of student organizations are two-fold: 1) to strengthen the relationship ('a sense of brotherhood and sisterhood') among Papuan students,[297] and 2) to provide means for students to learn leadership and management. In addition to student associations, there are student groups which are created within the university system (the executive body of Uncen students, for instance) and independent groups outside the university systems whose purpose is explicitly political.

The popularity of student dormitories as a housing form is a response to the economic condition of most Papuan students, and countless cases of racial discrimination that they suffer from their so-called fellow Indonesians.[298] On Java, as in West Papua, housing discrimination is a typical story among Papuans, particularly the Highlanders (*orang gunung).*[299] Stereotypes exist, such as that Highlanders prefer to live in large groups, like drinking, and so forth. The construction of many dormitories in recent years also represents the increasing number of students coming from the Central Highlands and interior, the growing value that Papuans place on education, and the money that the regencies have received from the special autonomy fund granted to West Papua. In the larger context, this also represents the intensity and increase of Papuan migration from rural areas in the Central Highlands to coastal cities like Jayapura, and to cities in Indonesia, primarily Yogyakarta, Makassar, and Manado. This migration has taken place since the arrival of the missions and the aviation infrastructure that came with it. However, the intensification of migration from the

[297] Cooperation, reciprocity, and self-help are part of the group.

[298] Student dormitories do not require students to pay for rents (the regency government pays or owns it).

[299] According to Kossay, Highlanders particularly those from Mee, Hubula and Lani ethnic groups began to arrive on Java in 1983. Initially, most of them went to study theology or evangelism and sent by their churches but increasingly more students studied non-religion subjects. In 1988, the first civic association of Highlanders was set up in Yogyakarta called the Association of Jayawijaya-Paniai (Jawiyapan). See Kossay 2007, 12.

Highlands occurred in the late 1970s, primarily due to the intensification of urban development and the fact that more Papuans had finished their high school education. Among the Mee, migration is attached to their traditional character, but since the 1980s, new migration became a topic among Mee intellectuals.[300] Farhadian notes that the highest number of Dani (Hubula and Lani) from the Baliem Valley to enter schools in Jayapura occurred between 1980 and 1985. In the case of Manado in North Sulawesi, Munro notes that the Lani and Hubula students began to study there since the late 1980s (2009, 100).

Through dormitories, Papuan students are segregated from most Indonesians. Kossay suggests that the idea of "collective communalism" appeared among Papuan students in Yogyakarta (and I argue, also in other cities inside and outside West Papua).[301] Instead of forging solidarity, understanding, and affiliation to the national identity as Indonesians, Papuan dormitories outside and inside West Papua offer a platform for the emergence and or consolidation of new identities as Papuans, and/or ethnic-regional identities such as Highlanders, Biak or coastal Jayapura. In the dormitories, they speak Papuan Malay or other vernaculars, carry out pig feasts, organize religious services, and as I will detail below, mobilize themselves for demonstrations and political rallies in support of the Papuan independence cause. Like universities, then, Papuan students' dormitories become the birth sites of many Papuan student organizations. This indicates that the very institutions designed to instill colonial rule, a platform for Indonesian propaganda and integration, a place to transform Papuans into modern and Indonesian subjects have provided the infrastructure

[300] See Degey 1983.

[301] Kossay notes several lifestyles that mark urbanized Papuans: possession of cell phones, possession of transportation means such as motor bikes and cars, affiliation to housing forms (asrama, kos-kosan, kontrakan), affiliation of collective urban associations (asrama, civic organizations/ paguyuban), consumption of alcohol and these I add, tastes particularly in regard to music, and urban fashion. See Kossay 2007.

for producing Papuan identity and resistance. From these very places, student organizations and youth political consciousness is nurtured and articulated.[302]

Papuan Student Organizations and Youth Political Consciousness during the New Order

If the armed struggle had intensified from the western islands to the forested borderland between West Papua and Papua New Guinea, in the cities, Papuan student organizations began to mushroom, continuing the trend that had been taking place from before the formal Indonesian take over. Since the late 1950s, the Papuan political sphere had been active with the establishment of various Papuan political organizations and parties thanks to the Dutch's push for the decolonization of West Papua. After the Indonesian arrival, most Papuans who joined these parties went into exile in the Netherlands or Papua New Guinea. Approximately 4,000 Papuans crossed to Papua New Guinea during the Act of Free Choice. But a lot of them also worked with the new ruler, such as Eliezer Jan Bonay, who for two years became the governor of the Indonesia-controlled region. Nevertheless, the aspirations to have an independent state of West Papua have never died.

After the Manokwari and Enarotali uprisings, the Indonesian security forces carried out several military operations in Biak, Manokwari and the surrounding areas.[303] Under the leadership of Seth Rumkorem, a former soldier with the Indonesian Army and Jacob Prai, a former student at the University of Cenderawasih, TPN/OPM declared West Papua's independence on July 1, 1971, and continued the armed struggle from the borderlands. In the city, some pro-independence student organizations were formed. Jacob Prai himself was a founding member of the Preparatory Front for the Independence of West Papua (*Front Persiapan Kemerdekaan Papua Barat,* FPKPB), with Wim

[302] See Anderson 1972 for the Indonesian case.

[303] See Adang 1984 and Komando Daerah Militer XVII/Tjenderawasih 1965.

Zonggonau, Clemens Rumawery, Bob Kubia, A. Atabu, and Otto Wospakrek (sic.).[304] The list represents the diversity of the student body: Jacob Prai was from Web in Keerom, Zonggonau from the Moni group in the Central Highlands, Rumawery from Biak, Kubia from Sentani, and Wospakrik from Serui.

In 1975, students living in Catholic dormitories in Abepura established the Association of Students and Pupils of West Papua (*Persatuan Mahasiswa dan Pelajar Papua Barat* (PMPPB). The leadership consisted of Felix Amokowame and Otto Ondawame (both were Amungmes), Frans Boga and Josep Gewab (from Fakfak) with members coming from Uncen, the newly established Indonesian Administration School (*Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri,* APDN) in Yoka, and the Catholic theology school in Abepura. In addition, high schools and non-Catholic college students were also joining, such as members of the musical group Mambesak (almost all of them are from the Biak Island and members of the Papuan Reformed Church), Gabriel Goo, Charles Bless, David Huby and Philipus Kum (all of these students were from the Highlands).

Three major TPN/OPM fighters from the Highlands: Bonyfasius Anaya Niwilingame (an Amungme), Yulius Goo (a Mee) and Kelly Kwalik (an Amungme) attended Teruna Bakti Catholic School in Jayapura. Goo and Kwalik attended Teruna Bakti in 1971 before officially joining the guerillas in 1976. Papuan historian Beni Pakage mentions that during the years that Kwalik and Goo attended the Teruna Bakti, Papuans organized various forums and discussions on West Papuan independence underground.[305] "Kids were talking about Papuan independence and TPN/OPM's military struggle," he told me. Simon Amisim, Bonyfasius Anaya Niwilingame, John Otto Ondawame and some other Highlanders frequently came to the Teruna Bakti student dormitory in Waena and told their juniors about their activism. Pakage reported, "When their older 'brothers'

[304] The correct spelling may be Wospakrik, a family name from Serui. See Ondawame 2000,120.

[305] See Pakage 2013, 21.

came over, students at the Teruna Bakti schools gathered some money to buy food, drinks, flashlights, and batteries to be brought to the forest [for the TPN/OPM guerillas]…They gave a hundred, two hundred or five hundred rupiah"(26).

The fact that Pakage mentions many Amungmes is telling. Since its beginning, Uncen has been said to be dominated by students from the north coast and western islands, particularly from Biak, Serui, Sorong, and Cenderawasih Bay. In the 1970s, few Highlanders such as John Ondawame and Beni's father Robert Pakage—who also joined the TPN/OPM later— began to enroll. This was primarily due to the scholarship that President Suharto initiated in 1969. At that time, Suharto established a trust fund to send Papuan students, particularly from the Central Highlands to study at Uncen and universities on Java.[306] This should be read as an attempt to impose Indonesian hegemony over Papuan elites which was in line with Indonesia's mode of governance of this territory through development. This should not be contrasted with the continuing presence of the Indonesian security forces in the region, however. In other words, both development and security approaches to West Papua are complementary, not contradictory.

After the mining operation in the Amungme country was officiated in 1973, students from the Amungme ethnic group received more attention. Ondawame himself attended the University of Cenderawasih from 1974 to1976. Many of his fellow Amungmes went to Teruna Bhakti to study pedagogy or to the Fajar Timur Seminary to become priests. Those who belonged to evangelical church went to study in the Bible schools or to the evangelical teacher schools in Bokondini and Tiom in the Central Highlands. Teruna Bakti demonstrated the success of Catholic missions to educate native Papuans. If the first generation of educated Papuans went into exile or stayed to become church elites under Indonesia (this is true particularly for the coastal Protestants, members

[306] The President himself stipulated the decision through the Presidential Decision No. 93/1969. The trust fund was directly supervised by the president and managed by the Irian Barat Task Force within the Ministry of Interior. See Dwipayana 1991.

of the Dutch/Papuan Reformed Church), the second or third generation of Papuans, however, did not become ruling elites under Indonesia. Racial discrimination against the Papuans regardless of their class affiliation characterizes the Indonesian rule in the region. I estimate that almost half of these generations went to the forest to join the guerrilla struggle. Among the Mee, for instance, Alex Degey who was educated in Catholic school (VS) in Kokonao then a VVS in Merauke in the early 1950s, became one the most important leader at the TPN/OPM,[307]also two brothers, Yulius and Thadeus Goo, who went to Teruna Bhakti.

In early 1977, Osborne reported that thirty Papuans students were dismissed after a protest against Indonesia (1985, 64). The Uncen president indicated that about 20 students at the University of Cenderawasih left the university in the academic year of 1986/1987 to join the armed struggle.[308] I would argue that this is underreported, as Papuan students at Uncen were strongly connected with the underground movements. Another report from the University corroborates the fact that more than 20% of students at the University dropped out every year.[309] This figure might better reflect the actual number. Even if not all these students joined the armed struggle, this number demonstrates that contrary to the Indonesian media campaign, TPN/OPM leadership was (and continues to be drawn) from the most educated sector in Papuan society. *Pemuda,* as Anderson theorizes it (1972), are indeed the most important forces in the nationalist movements, including in West Papua. Secondly, in addition to ethnic and kinship networks, Papuans make use modern forms of networks like schools and churches to articulate and maintain Papuan nationalist struggle.

Ondawame suggests that the major objectives of student movements in the 1970s were to

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[307] Considering their clan names, one can approximately identify which part of Meeuwodidee (land of Mee) they came from. Alex Degey came from Paniai lake, near Enarotali while the Goo brothers most probably came from what now is called Dogiyai, near Moeanemani which was a Catholic mission center.

[308] See Brash 1988, 172.
[309] See Universitas Cenderawasih 1973, 12.

establish underground networks and supply materials and information to the Liberation Army (TPN/OPM) in the Victoria headquarter; to mobilize the public for a total military uprising; and to increase the public's national awareness by engaging youth in cultural promotion through, among other things, songs, theatre, poems, and handicrafts. Therefore, while there is a distinction between armed and peaceful struggle, both of them are intimately connected. Also, it seems to me that there is what I will call a geography of resistance in the making that resembles the conception of the national territory. We can see this from the uprisings in the Central Highlands.

The 1977 Uprisings in the Central Highlands

The Lani and Hubula of the Baliem Valley were among few communities in the world that were recently introduced to European rule in the mid-20th century, not long before the Indonesian rule arrived. The Highlanders quickly resisted this intrusion. The Highlander groups became significant in the Papuan national liberation struggle, particularly after TPN/OPM in the Victoria headquarter broke into two factions.[310] In addition, the Highlanders comprise the majority of indigenous Papuans (more than 50% of the total indigenous population). Major ethnic groups in the Highlands occupy an extremely vast territory with strong political and cultural networks that build on ceremonial exchange and warfare institution. Much of the cultures of the Highlands had been pacified, and evangelical Christianity of Anglo-American types had taken hold among these groups, yet Highlands farming communities were, and continue to be, organized along the Highlands warfare institution. The pig feast remains central to the Highlands' community-building and mobilization, particularly among the Lani, Hubula, Walak, Yali, and their neighboring groups beyond the Baliem Valley (e.g., Nduga, Amungme, and Damal). Indeed, without this warfare institution, I

[310] The TPN/OPM broke into two factions: those who supported Seth Rumkorem and those under Jacob Prai (PEMKA). Factionalization within the TPN/OPM sometimes is made along the ethnic lines, even if in many cases, ethnicity does not matter much. Rumkorem was a Biak while Prai was of a Keerom ethnicity.

doubt that the uprisings would have been as massive as in 1969 and 1977.

The first generation of Highlanders who joined the resistance against Indonesia had worked for or been schooled by the Anglo-American evangelical missions. In 1969, following the uprising in Manokwari and Enarotali, Lani and Walak students returned from their study at the Erikson-Tritt Bible Institute, a school established by the Evangelical Alliance Mission in Manokwari.[311] As Lovestrand, an American evangelical Protestant missionary notes, the Kebar uprising and military operations that followed discontinued the activities of the Bible School (1967). Lovestrand himself was arrested by the Indonesian Army with a charge of conspiring with the 'rebels.' While the charge was a sham, this incident reflects how the Papuan educated class became suspects, if not in mobilizing the uprising, at least in supporting it. It is not clear whether these returning students were involved in the Kebar uprising at all, but they began to talk about the uprising in their churches in the Baliem Valley. By 1969 another uprising against Indonesia was staged in Pyramid, a mission center at the Baliem Valley.[312] It was not a coincidence that after the Act of Free Choice was carried out and this uprising was suppressed, the Baliem Valley became the priority of the Indonesianization program, particularly through the koteka operation. The koteka operation was carried out by the Indonesian Army to replace koteka (penis gourds) with clothing. Central to the idea of the koteka operation was a program to civilize the Highlanders, if necessary, with force and make the Central Highlands part of the Indonesian state's space.

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[311] The school was established in 1959 and led by Reverend Harold Lovestrand. See "Sejarah Berdirinya Sekolah Tinggi Theologia Erikson – Tritt Manokwari" (http://www.stteriksontritt.org/ind/sejarah-berdirinya-stt-erikson-tritt). Accessed on December 18, 2017. Reverend Lovestrand was arrested by the Indonesian Armed Forces during the uprising. He wrote a memoir of his time in the Indonesian prison. See Lovestrand 1967. The US Embassy's documents associated with his arrest are declassified recently. See https://declassification.blogs.archives.gov/2017/02/10/the-curious-case-of-harold-lovestrand/.

[312] Some evangelical ministers told me that some Mee teachers who worked in Pyramid at that time heard about the uprising in Enarotali and told their friends and students about that.

In the early 1970s, a group of literate Highlanders went home from Jayapura. This included Obert Tabuni (Lani ethnic group), Daniel Yudas Kogoya (Nduga ethnic group), and Matias Wenda (Walak ethnic group).[313] These three Papuans had worked or been trained by the American Christian and Missionary Alliance in Pos Tujuh, Sentani and had joined the TPN/OPM in Victoria around 1974-1975. From Victoria, they made frequent visits to their villages in the Baliem Valley, and during one of these visits, Matias Wenda met Thadeus Yogii, a Catholic Mee who was attending an evangelical school in Bokondini (he was in school from 1973 to 1976).[314] Masmur Asso, an evangelical minister from the Hubula ethnic group, told me that before the uprising, Mathias Wenda and his peers organized training camps near Pyramid. The Walak sent some of their best warriors under the leadership of Balek Gilungga, Kuraly Kilungga, Kabo Kolago, Baturuga Wandikbo, Tombogolin Yikwa and Inggidaguk Kolago to this training camp.[315] The Lani and Hubula did the same thing. Through lengthy deliberations involving the Lani, Hubula, Walak, and smaller ethnic groups' tribal war confederacies, they agreed to attack Indonesian military posts, starting from Kobakma on April 21, Pyramid on April 25, Karubaga and Tiom on April 28, Bokondini, Kelila, and Kimbim in May. By mid-1977, the Baliem Valley was on fire. This was the largest insurgency that took place under Indonesian rule. More than 30 Lani, Hubula, Walak, Yali, and Nduga war alliances and confederations were involved in the uprising.[316] These groups from the Highlands used

[313] These three ethnic groups have become the strongest base of American and Australian evangelical missions, in addition to the Mee one. See the introduction.
[314] See Kirksey (2012) wrote a chapter about Thadeus Yogii.

[315] See Asso 2016, 52.

[316] In total, the Hubula have at least 54 clans that organize themselves in 26 moieties (confederations). I have to check the number of Lani (larger) and Walak (lesser). Several interviews with ministers of the Papuan evangelical churches suggest that there had been a "misunderstanding" about what was happening in Manokwari in 1965 and Enarotali in 1969. Listening sermons in the church, the Lani, Walak, and Hubula congregations who for a few years prior just quitted their warfare felt that there was a new call for war. "They happily joined [the uprising], "one of the ministers told me laughing.

territorial warfare to stage the insurrection. They used a war structure and ceremony that resembled their existing institutions of warfare.[317] The cultural foundation of resistance, however, was not limited to the organization and structure. The Highlanders groups indeed saw that the war against Indonesia was a *wim,* a permanent one.[318] Puron Wenda and Enden Wanimbo, two Lani leaders of one of the most violent factions within the TPN/OPM stated in 2015,

> "We declare a total revolution from Sorong to Merauke. This is an open declaration of war against all Indonesians in West Papua…The OPM command is ready for war. We don't want a dialogue. We will continue fighting for the independence of our country…We are freedom fighters."[319]

The use of the word 'war' here should not be equated with the Euro-American conception of warfare, however. As Heider suggests, the term war should be situated within the Highlanders' conception of reciprocity and peaceful settlements between the warring parties. What I mean by that is that the term war here does not mean the total destruction of the enemies' lives nor extermination, but a balance that is achieved after both parties end the war (concomitantly end the killing) and begin a peaceful settlement.[320]

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[317] This primarily could be seen from the leadership of *wim motok* (war commanders) in organizing the battle and the prayer and pig feasts that preceded the war. See Heider 2006 [1970]; Koch 1974 and Larson 1987.
[318] The conception of permanent war is exemplified by Hubula's conception of *sele wim*. *Sele wim* usually involves war confederations whose enmity is permanent.

[319] See Viva 2015 and Purba 2017. As of today, the most consistent attacks against the Indonesian security forces are carried out from the Central Highlands, including in the Freeport Indonesia mining concession areas. In addition to Puron Wenda's group, Goliath Tabuni commands a strong force from Tingginambut in Puncak. In 2017, a group under Hendrik Wanmang (an Amungme) attacked the Indonesian security forces in the Freeport mining concession in Mimika.

[320] Pierre Lemonier says the following about Papua New Guinea warfare, which I argue also applicable to the West Papua one. "Papua New Guinea warfare is neither totally oriented towards conquest and extermination nor a game; it is a competitive activity, coupled with a system of bookkeeping for balancing life and death which is central to the representations of inter-group exchanges." See Lemonier 1991.

For Indonesia, however, this declaration means total war. In 1977, it took the Indonesian press two months to report on the massive insurgencies and subsequent military operations in the Baliem Valley. Most Papuans told me that it was more catastrophic than the earthquake that took place a year earlier.[321] The daily *Angkatan Bersenjata*—the Indonesian Army's newspaper—wrote in a short report on June 3, 1977:

> "The strife that took place in Irian Jaya was not a rebellion. It is *little fights* between residents of the Baliem Valley that have been going on since the time immemorial…As a result of the strife, many people have fled to the border of Papua New Guinea even crossed it. Meanwhile, the Indonesian security forces merely act as a mediator of the conflict. The officer at the ministry of foreign affairs said, 'It seems to me that there is a foreign element here, such as [political] adventurers who call themselves OPM (the Free Papuan Movements) and their supporters who abuse this incident for their advantage.'"[322]

In a report on June 9, 1977, another officer in the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the Papuans' exodus from the Baliem Valley had nothing to do with the Free Papuan Movements.[323] At that time, the number of Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea was reported at 1 500 to 3000 refugees (see Osbourne 1985, AHRC 2013,17). The week after, on June 14, 1977, the minister of foreign affair Adam Malik stated that the Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea should return to their homeland. He promised that the Indonesian government would not punish Papuans who crossed the border. Malik's statement was made in response to the official letter of complaint sent by Papua New Guinea's minister of foreign affairs Maori Kiki, who expressed a grave concern

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[321] The earthquake occurred on June 25, 1976. It took less than two weeks for the news to reach Jakarta. President Soeharto himself asked the Irian Jaya's governor to report—on Saturday. He instantly declared the earthquake as a major national catastrophe and donated about $50,000 for the emergency relief. See the US Geological Survey https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eventpage/usp0000h1p#executive. See Dwipayana and Sjamsuddin 2003, 376. Compare to Kompas. 1976. "Irja Gempa, Ribuan Tewas." Kompas, July 9.

[322] See Angkatan Bersenjata. 1977. "Kerusuhan di Irian Jaya hanya pertengkaran antar suku." Friday, June 3, 1977, p.1.

[323] Angkatan Bersenjata. 1977. "Orang2 Indonesia yg kembali dari Papua Nugini karena pertentangan suku disambut baik." Thursday, June 9, 1977, p. ii.

toward the deteriorating condition in West Papua.[324]In his meeting with President Suharto, the Irian Jaya's governor Soetran—a former military general— denied any 'rebellion' going on in his province. He says, "No, not a rebellion at all. It's a tribal war, but of course, the Army should step in."[325] Until the end of the year when the Indonesian Army had hunted down Papuans all over the Baliem and more than a thousand of Papuans had died, the *Angkatan Bersenjata* still reported that nothing was going on in West Papua, even when West Papua was declared as a military operation area (*daerah operasi militer*, DOM), the first area in Indonesia to be in that category. The tone of their writing became more intense and nervous, however, as demonstrated by this passage:

> "The rebellion by the Dhani (sic.) primitive tribe in Kilila (sic.) and Bokondini against the government of Republic of Indonesia as has been written by foreign media is not true…[*He elaborated that what is going on is a tribal war*] The only regret was that before the security forces arrived, the tribal wars have produced a lot of casualties in the two opposing parties. Fortunately, the number is small because the security forces acted swiftly."[326]

In the entire year of 1977, the *Angkatan Bersenjata* wrote at least 37 reports on West Papua, but only a few of them indirectly talked about the uprising. In May 1977, the military operation was intensified in the valley, the newspaper, instead, wrote several pieces about the social rehabilitation programs. During the visit of President Suharto in December 1977, the *Angkatan Bersenjata* noted that the province had made impressive developmental progress, not to mention that the order has been restored after the tribal wars resumed.[327] *Kompas*, the largest Indonesian newspaper fares even worse.

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[324] Angkatan Bersenjata. 1977. "Menlu Adam Malik tegaskan: Pengungsi ke PNG yang kembali tidak akan di-apa2kan." Tuesday, June 14, 1977, p. i. See a different version of the report from the Tempo magazine.1977. " Menjawab Surat Adam Malik." Edition 17/07. Saturday, June 25, 1977.

[325] Angkatan Bersenjata, 1977. "Muspida Irian Jaya lapor Presiden: Gub. Sutran tegaskan tidak ada pemberontakan di daerahnya." Thursday, June 23, i and viii.

[326] Angkatan Bersenjata. "Tidak ada pemberontakan di Irja." Friday, December 2, 1977, i.
[327] Angkatan Bersenjata. 1977." Pres. Soeharto pada peresmian jalan Boroway-Genyem: Dalam 14 Tahun Irian Jaya telah capai kemajuan2 besar." Thursday, December 8, 1977, i.

During 1977-1978, the newspaper reported only once—on the 'tribal wars.'[328] One thing that is clear across the board is that the Indonesian government and public denied the existence of an uprising in its easternmost province.[329]

The magnitude of the uprising, however, betrayed Indonesian's utter denial of the incident. Unlike the earthquake, the uprising prompted high military officials and the president to visit West Papua, specifically the Baliem Valley and Papua New Guinea to ease the hidden crises within the body of the unitary republic. Early on, the vice commander in chief of the fourth territory, General R. Bintoro, visited the Baliem Valley on Thursday, May 12, 1977.[330] In September, the commander in chief himself visited the area. *Angkatan Bersenjata* said that the purpose of the visit was to "to inspect the security situation in the area."[331] In addition to the Soeharto's visit at the end of 1977, Minister of Defense and the Commander in chief of the Indonesian Army General M. Jusuf visited West Papua in November 1978.[332] Indonesia's new minister of foreign affairs Mochtar Kusumaatmadja

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328 See Kompas daily. "Pertentangan antar suku." June 3, 1977.

329 As far as I can tell, the only dissent comes from Tempo weekly, which published a special edition in 1979—at time when military operations were still going on— entitled "Irian, Irian, Irian…Sebuah Keresahan [West Papua, West Papua, West Papua…A confusion]." Tempo magazine No.24/IX, August 11, 1979. The magazine, however, did not say a word about the military operation. In the 1970s, Tempo weekly dedicated two special editions for West Papua. The 1973 edition mentioned the koteka operation. See Tempo weekly, June 2, 1973.

330 See Angkatan Bersenjata. "Wapangkowilhan IV kunjungi Irian Jaya." Tuesday, May 17, 1977, vi.

331 See Angkatan Bersenjata. 1977. "Kunjungan kerja Pangkowilhan IV ke daerah-daerah Wamena." Monday, September 19, 1977, vi. The newspaper says that he went to "inspect the security situation."

332 See Kompas daily. "Jenderal M. Jusuf di Biak: Main paksa, hanya membuat rakyat bersifat konfrontatif." Tuesday, November 7, 1978.

went to Papua New Guinea in December 1978.[333] The president himself was scheduled to visit the country in 1979.[334] The same newspaper reported in November 1977 that the military sent an additional combat unit from Central Java to confront armed groups who wished to hound the unity of the country.[335] In 1978, however, the United States made a commitment to giving Jakarta military aids worth of $15 million.[336]

The Papuan uprising, subsequent military operations in the Highlands, and the designation of the province as DOM were intersected with Indonesia's media blackout. Osborne (1985) argues that the operations were indeed meant to be secret, then where his phrase "Indonesia's secret wars" came from. Secondly, and this is extremely surprising to me, there is no legal, juridical basis for the decision to make West Papua into a military operation area. Without any precedent in Indonesian history, except for East Timor, the designation of DOM was the privilege of the military forces, not the civil administration. Until today, no legal framework or instrument allows for such decision made by the civilian government including the president.[337] In a belated report in 2013, the Asian

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[333] See Kompas daily. Menlu Mochtar Kusumaatmadja di Papua Niugini dan Di Australia 14-17 Desember." Tuesday, December 12, 1978.

[334] See Kompas daily. "Presiden Soeharto harapkan kunjungi PNG tahun depan." Tuesday, September 19, 1978.

[335] See Angkatan Bersenjata. 1977. "Yonif 406 yg akan bertugas ke Irja diinspeksi kesiapannya." Friday, November 18, 1977, vi.

[336] See Angkatan Bersenjata.1977. "US$15 juta bantuan militer AS kepada Indonesia." Saturday, August 27, 1977, p.i.

[337] According to Made Supriatma, the decision for DOM both in West Papua (1977-1998) and Aceh (1989-1998) was made by the Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces. This does not necessarily require a president's approval, although he is sure that the President or at least the minister of defense has to have knowledge on this matter. Supriatma also suggests that West Papua is slightly different from East Timor in that in East Timor the Indonesian Army explicitly declared their presence as occupying forces. I think this is not entirely true because the Indonesian Army also carried out military operations upon their arrival in West Papua and acted like an occupying force. According to Adam Malik, then the Indonesian minister of foreign affairs, at least 10,000 soldiers had been deployed in West Papua in February 1968 (see Telegram of

Human Rights Commission states that more than 4,000 Papuans were killed during and after the military operations, not to mention victims of torture, rape, involuntary disappearance, and other gross human rights violations. As far as I know, this is the only comprehensive report available about the 1977 military operations.[338] Papuans continue to talk and write about the occurrences, noting that more than 11,000 Papuans were killed, although little attention has been paid to the Papuan version of these events. The 1977 events ("*Peristiwa 77*") have taken on great symbolic importance among Papuans, including those of rural origins (Asso 2016). I argue that the Enarotali and Baliem Valley uprisings represent the critical role of 'tribal' farming communities of the Central Highlands and the emergence of new political consciousness among these people.[339] The 1977 events are also a continuation of the history of Papuan resistance against the Indonesian rule, and significantly, a political conjuncture that marks the shifting geography of Indonesian rule in West Papua. It marks an intensification of Indonesian military rule (and role) in the region via the designation of West Papua as a military operation area (DOM), and the solidification of Papuan identity in the rural Highlands. This took place in parallel with an uprising in Jayapura, which went

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Department of State, dated February 1968, NARA 969000). Another report states that the number of soldiers had doubled during the AFC, from about 8,000 to 16,000 soldiers (see Telegram Department of State 360, July 1969). The difference is that the Indonesian administration somewhat attempted to establish a civilian government in West Papua, something that might not be the case with East Timor. Supriatma, private correspondence, January 18, 2018. To read Indonesian military operations in East Timor, see the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation 2013. For Indonesian military operations in Aceh, see Davis 2006 and Good 2015.

338 See The Asian Human Rights Commission 2013.

339 I am bit wary to call these agriculturalists peasants. Papuans still maintain much of the ownership of the land in the Central Highlands and there has not been any development of a plantation and other exploitative agricultural system in the area. Not that the Dutch, American mission, and Indonesia did not try but Highlanders selectively transform their agricultural practice according to their need and resist any intervention that runs against their ecological imperative or are not beneficial for them. Many Highlands communities, for instance, quickly adjusted themselves to producing cash crops, primarily vegetables and coffee.

through an uprising of another kind.

The Idea of Blackness

It was Black Brothers who brought the sentimental sound and cosmopolitan air to the Papuan radio sphere. In the early 1970s, when general Acub Zainal became the governor of West Papua and introduced a development approach to supplement the Indonesian security approach, a young man from Manado named Henky Merantoni arrived in Jayapura. Influenced by the British rock band Deep Purple,[340] he performed in shipping lines and composed several songs, five of which are sympathetic portrayals of sex workers. Merantoni was quickly absorbed in the lively atmosphere of Jayapura's music scene. In the 1970s, Angkasa and Hamadi were centers for Jayapura's hip culture. Young elite Papuans and Indonesians started some bands, the most famous of which were Iriantos Primitive, Black Sweet, Black Papas, Coconuts Band, Varunas,[341] and Airmood Band. For the 1970s and 1980s Jayapura youth, the idea of blackness slipped into music and t-shirts, hairstyles and dance, study groups and afternoon chats at the University of Cenderawasih campus and beyond. Terms like '*kribo*' (frizzy hairs) or '*hitam*' (black/blackness) were widespread. In an interview with the Jakarta-based weekly publication *Tempo*, Ajamiseba said that an Indonesian official asked Black Brothers to replace their name as "it suggests the backwardness of Irian people"(1979, 25). But for Black Brothers, blackness, which refers to their skin color, connotes power.

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[340] On December 4 and 5, 1975, Deep Purple had a blockbuster concert— attended by more than 150,000 people— in Jakarta, Indonesia. Reports on the concert: http://sahabatrockers.blogspot.com/2009/10/deep-purple-membakar-senayan-1975.html and Rolling Stone, January 29, 1976: " Indonesia Nightmare Strikes Deep Purple." This marked the Indonesian improving economic situation thanks to the rise of oil price under the New Order.

[341] One of their members was Pance Pondaag, http://cdp.khoirilanwar.com/2017/04/03/opa-tami-saksi-hidup-era-orde-baru-dan-kini/.

Reverend Benny Giay who went to study at the University of Cenderawasih in 1974-1979 wrote, "In the late 1970s, there was a shift of consciousness among Papuans who lived in the city. They began to stand up and challenge their position as slaves, 'secondary citizens,' 'people who lived on trees' whom Jakarta has designated. Papuan peoples who lived in the city were awakened from their lullaby. They used anti-violence tactics, cultural resistance. Previously, the OPM fought in the forest, in remote areas, and in the borderland [but] in the 1970s and 1980s there emerged a Papuan national awakening. This urban resistance was the result of the OPM's program to spread their message to the city"(2008, 97). I would also contend that this was also a response to increasing Indonesia's cultural hegemony, particularly among the Papuan elites.

Merantoni joined Iriantos, a band whose members consisted of fashionable young Papuans under the leadership of Andy Ayamiseba, son of Dirk Ayamiseba, the speaker of the first Indonesian Parliament in West Papua (DPRGR).[342] With an elite pedigree, Andy Ayamiseba has played music with many bands in Jayapura, including the Indonesian army and navy's bands. He envisioned Iriantos Primitive as a musical dance group. As a Cenderawasih Bay islander, he seems to inherit the musical talents that many western islanders have—particularly Biaks. "I created that group to perform in Papua New Guinea. We did not get permission from the Office of Education and Culture, however. So we decided to move to Jakarta," he said in an interview. In 1976, they moved to Jakarta and tried their luck in the music industry with a new name—Black Brothers. Hugely popular,[343] Black Brothers could not help themselves from being described by the Indonesian

[342] Iriantos consisted of Benny Betay (bass), Jochie Phiu (keyboard), Amry Tess (trompet), Stevie MR (drums), Hengky Merantoni (lead guitar), Sandhy Betay (vokal), Marthy Messet (lead vocal), Agus Rumaropen (vokal) dan David (saxophone).

[343] Their first album was launched in 1976. Their second album sold about 300,000 copies. See Tempo. "Mempertahankan Identitas Irian." August 11, 1979, 25.

observer as "infiltrated by the Free Papuan Movement's agenda."[344] Like many Papuan bands that came later, Black Brothers always included Papuan songs in their album, songs sung in one or two Papuan languages, something that the Indonesian authority found unsettling. In the words of Tempo weekly's music critic, Black Brothers combined music from their region without being too regional (Tempo 1979:25). In 1978, Black Brothers performed in Jayapura and then went to Papua New Guinea. In 1980 they asked for political asylum from the Netherlands, and in 1983, they moved to Vanuatu after the invitation of President Walter Lini, a prominent figure behind the idea of Melanesian socialism, signing off from their contract with EMI Netherlands.



[344] Gerry Setiawan."Kehancuran Black Brothers Akibat Agenda Politik." Kompasiana, June 17, 2013.

Figure 6. 2. Black Brothers. Credit: Black Brothers.

After Black Brothers, Mambesak, another band led by Biak musicians emerged from the University of Cenderawasih.[345] Those who grew up in the 1980s remember well how their uncles and aunts who studied at the University brought Mambesak recordings home on cassettes. Indeed, Mambesak was born out of three different forces that played out in Papuan sphere at that time, namely 1) an imperative of reforms within the Papuan Reformed Church (GKI) to return to Papuan cultures in their liturgy, particularly music, 2) the political reawakening of educated Papuan elites, primarily at Uncen, and 3) the popularity of radio and the arrival of cassette technology as a new mass medium. Members of Mambesak were entangled with these three processes simultaneously. The story of Mambesak began in 1972 when Arnold Ap and Sam Kapissa (both were Biak and anthropologists by profession) were invited to play music in the Harapan church in Abepura, an historically important church for the Papuan Reformed Church in West Papua.[346] Realizing that all the music in the church was western and either in a Dutch or Indonesian language, Ap, Kapissa, and Demianus Kurni began to compose songs in Biak Numfor under the tutelage of Daniel C. Ajamiseba, an America-educated linguist who led the Museum of Anthropology at Uncen.[347]Their Biak-ness does not only refer to the language, but also in rhythm Starting in 1978, they performed Papuan songs and dances that they 'excavated,' documented or inventoried through anthropological research across West Papua or through the involvement of Papuan students from various Papuan

[345] For other bands, see http://rastamaniapapua.blogspot.com/2017/03/band-asal-papua-yang-populerkan-reggae.html
[346] See Aditjondro 2000, 109.

[347] Daniel C. Ajamiseba graduated from the English pedagogy at the University of Cenderawasih in 1968. He then got his MA and PhD in linguistics at the University of Michigan. He has been involved in the Summer Institute of Language's works in West Papua.

ethnic groups in the Mambesak itself. As clear through Arnold Ap's working chart, he was inspired by anthropological projects in "saving" Papuan cultures from extinction, but also by the potential of artistic practices to transform this condition.[348] The radical use of anthropology will be more interesting in the case of the formulation of Papuan identities as Melanesians, but it suffices to say here that there had been a reawakening of Papuan political consciousness under the increasing hegemony of Indonesian cultures and forces in the 1980s.

Radio has always been a popular medium in West Papua, especially since the introduction of New Guinea Radio Broadcast (*Radio Omroep Nieuw Guinea*, RONG) in 1950.
Indeed, radio became an important propaganda tool both for the Dutch and Indonesia during the confrontation in the 1950s and early 1960s (see Herlina 1985). In the later period, radio was more popular thanks to its affordability. Compared to the television which was highly centralized under Indonesia and was more expensive, radio enables local content and regional expression, such as music and dialects, two sonic characteristics that differentiate Papuans from Indonesians. As also apparent in the adoption of cassette technology, Papuan-ness is not only characterized by skin color and bodily movements, but also by their sonic attributes. Cassettes arrived in the region in the 1970s but not until in the 1980s that Papuans began to produce recordings using this technology. As Aditjondro remarkably notes, in the 1980s the Papuan recording music sphere was dominated by Biak church music (2000). Groups like Apuse, Sandia, and Sanoni were famous for their Christmas recordings in Biak language, while Black Brothers and Black Sweet (another pop group whose members were Uncen students from Merauke, southern West Papua) sold hundred of thousands of pop albums mainly in the Indonesian language. Mambesak would use both the existing and emerging sonic technologies of their time.

[348] Until today anthropology students at the University of Cenderawasih have to take mandatory classes in the anthropology of Southeast Asia (primarily Indonesia), anthropology of Oceania, and anthropology of West Papua.

Papuans in the villages listened to the Jayapura Public Radio or brought a boom box to the garden or sea. If Black Brothers borrowed from American and British rock bands, reggae, Black Panther, and disco, Mambesak borrowed modern music to bring Papuan-ness into the air. Contrary to Ayamiseba, Arnold Ap and his close working partner Sam Kapissa advocated an inventory and reinvention of traditional dance and music materials. Ap says, "It is still too early in Irian Jaya to busy ourselves with 'creative dance' because that type is suitable for regions that have already exhausted their local dance material. We need to direct our attention to unearthing traditional dance material which is still abundant and preserve it so that it can then be worked on in 'new creations'" (Ap 1983a, 123). Many of Mambesak's songs came from vernacular musical traditions and were sung in vernaculars.[349] It sounds that they would get along very well with Indonesia's ministry of culture and education who always wishes to represent this kind of idea[350] until they wouldn't. Contrary to the Indonesian project of reviving traditions as a foundation of Indonesian national cultures, Ap's conception of Papuan cultures did not aim to strengthen the Indonesian narrative of nationalist cultures. On the contrary, it was a way to move away from Indonesian nationalism. It was a conception of Papuan cultures that gave meaning and structure to Papuan nationalism.

Arnold Ap himself worked as a curator at the museum of anthropology at Uncen and activist at the non-governmental organization the Foundation for the Development of Rural Population (Yayasan Pembangunan Masyarakat Pedesaan, YPMD). A sort of Margaret Mead of Papuan anthropology, he ran a broadcast every Sunday in the Jayapura Public Radio entitled "Pelangi Budaya" (Rainbow of Cultures), the multiculturalism of Papuan cultures (Strassler, personal comm.), and "Pancaran Sastra" (The Ray of Literature), which were highly popular among Papuan

[349] See Mambesak's lyrics in Suryawan 2015.

[350] See Pemberton 1994 and Mote and Rutherford 2001.

listeners. Every weekend in the museum of anthropology, Arnold Ap, and his young Papuan staff screened a variety of ethnographic films. Cool kids of Jayapura who loved to hang out in the Lingkaran[351] and involved in some gangs became interested in politics when Arnold Ap incorporated music, literature, and films in the programs. In the hands of Arnold Ap, anthropology became radicalized.[352]

Arnold Ap shared Ayamiseba's vision for Papuan identities as Melanesians, as Blacks. He formulated conceptions that became popular among Papuan youth, such as 'black is beautiful,' 'black is good,' and 'black is black' (Giay 2017). Papuans wore t-shirts with these slogans. It was their social media. As Giay notes, "They (Uncen's students) printed t-shirts and wore it during sports competitions for the commemoration of the Indonesian independence every August 17th. Who wore those? Uncen's students who at that time were like celebrities. They were proud of their frizzy hairs. They wore *noken* everywhere. I remember, they wore t-shirts 'black is good' when they played volleyball in front of the military office in Abepura. The message was "it is okay to be Blacks. It is Indonesians who found it a problem" (2017, n.p).[353] It was not a coincidence that Papuans followed the arrest and killing of Steve Biko (Bantu Stephen Biko), a South African anti-apartheid activist who championed the black consciousness movement in the 1970s. Giay, again, said, "The news of the killing stirred the world. We heard it on the radio"(2017, n.p.). As Strassler suggests, here radio and

[351] In the 1970s, sociologists at Uncen began to research and write about teenage delinquency (*kenakalan remaja)*. See Sakri 1977 and 1978.

[352] Before he was assassinated by the Indonesian Special Forces in 1984, he was promised to get a scholarship on curatorship at the University of Hawaii.

[353] Another in a t-shirt is worn by activist Selpius Bobii: *Ada saatnya dari Negeri Hitam Keriting Bangkit Pemimpin Bagi Bangsanya* (There will be time that from a country of black men and frizzy hair will emerge a leader of their own nation).

cassette tapes seem to function as media of modernity and trans-ethnic national communication, a vehicle of transnational, cosmopolitan radical blackness.[354]

There are multiple sources of the Papuan conception of blackness. Under the Dutch rule, the idea of Melanesian-ness was discussed in the New Guinea Council (D. *Nieuw Guinea Raad*) and the participation of Netherlands New Guinea in the South Pacific Commission (later, the Pacific Island Forum) since 1947. In the Council, the conversations about their identity as Melanesians were crucial, not only in regards to the regional politics in the Pacific at that time, but also within the Papuan intellectual circle. Highly educated Papuans, such as Nicolaas Jouwe, for instance, formulated their racial identities through their encounters with the African Americans during the World War II. In an interview with Charles Farhadian in 2000, Nicolaas Jouwe said,

> "The most important thing that happened in our part of New Guinea [during World War II] was the presence of the black Americans, the *Negros*, which were an engineering battalion that built up Hollandia in one week time. In one week, they fixed all the roads from Tanah Merah to Hollandia (north coast). It was done by the black Americans. That opened the eyes of the Papuans. "You see black people can do those things." You see, before that point, only white men were capable of doing such things. Black people were to be humble and not do the important jobs. We were sometimes used as slaves by Indonesia. But, in wartime, *American Negros* came there. They did everything. There were black Americans and under them were white Americans serving. That was a surprise. That opened the eyes of the Papuans. Then, at once, the national feelings came out. We're not Indonesians. Before that, we had very few Dutch. The entire administration was run in the colonial period by the Indonesians. And the Indonesians treated the Papuans like slaves, unlike the Dutch" (Nicolaas Jouwe and Farhadian 2007, 157-8, the emphasis is mine).

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Dutch and Australian colonial bureaucrats talked about the possibility of building a Melanesian Federation. This federation was envisioned as an independent entity that would unite Papuans in the east (which was under Australia) and in the west (which was under the Dutch) for an independent nation-state of Melanesians. The unifying identity would be

[354] I would like to thank Karen Strassler who helped me articulate this argument.

the race. Although it did not materialize, the idea of unity as Melanesians between Papuans in the east and west of the island would survive western and Indonesian political impositions, such as in the conception of a territory from Sorong (West Papua) to Samarai (Papua New Guinea) popularized in contemporary songs and political slogans, like the song from Ingram and Twin Tribe, "from Sorong to Samarai" (2016).

In 1962, Papuan elites, members of the New Guinea Council traveled to Africa to campaign for their independence. The accompanying pamphlet entitled "Voice of the Negroids in the Pacific to the Negroids throughout the World" (1962) emphasized their alignment and calls for racial solidarity with pan-African and global black movements. The pamphlet declares, "Dutch New Guinea is New Africa" (1962, 3). Nicolaas Jouwe wrote in the pamphlet, "We Papuans know that we are an independent people and this is the time we want to fight before the international forum to remain ourselves. We do not want to be slaves anymore…WE ARE PAPUANS AND WANT TO REMAIN PAPUANS" (5 and 13, capital in the original).[355]

This eloquent expression of blackness resists any simple explanation about the root of Papuan difference, but we can see that the emergence of Melanesianness in Papuan political and cultural discourse is multiscalar. At the local and regional levels, the explosion of the idea of Melanesian-ness in the 1970s and its recurrent emergence later, such as in the 1980s and 2000s, has something to do with a circulation of this idea in urban centers such as Jayapura and regional networks in the Pacific. As Lawson points out, after Papua New Guinea gained independence from Australia, Papuan intellectuals in the eastern island propagated the idea of indigenity through the conception of the "Melanesian Way." The Melanesian Way was popularized by Bernard Narokobi in

[355] I would like to thank I Ngurah Suryawan for making this archive available. See also Pengantara. "Papoea-Negroide Berdjuang Bersama-sama." *Pengantara*, March, 21, 1962, 1. Telegram of the Department of State from the US embassy in Jakarta states, "Reports indicate expatriate opposition groups attempting to mobilize African sentiment against AFC using race (brown Indons oppressing black Irianese)." See Telegram of Department of State, 920, dated August 7, 1969, 2 from Galbraith.

a series of articles in Papua New Guina Post-Courier between 1976-1978. In 1980, he published his book "The Melanesian Way" with critical commentaries and a foreword from Henry Olela, a Papuan philosopher who was well versed in Négritude ideas (Lawson 13).[356] The same discussion had emerged elsewhere in Melanesia, such as in New Caledonia—which has been under French colonialism— and Vanuatu—which was under the British and French rule— at the same period. In 1976, Jean-Marie Tjibaou, a Sorbonne-educated ethnologist, and leader of FLNKS (Socialist National Liberation Front of New Caledonia)[357] wrote a book entitled *Kanaké: Melanesians of New Caledonia* in 1976.[358]In 1980, Father Walter Lini, an Anglican priest who would become first Vanuatu's prime minister articulated his ideas on Melanesian socialism, partly influenced by Julius Nyerere of African socialism in Tanzania.[359] We should situate this idea in the larger context of pan-Africanism and global blackness movements. For instance, Aimé Césaire (Martinique) and Léopold Sédar Senghor (Senegal) had promoted an idea of self-determination without state sovereignty, a term that they called a democratic federation in a transcontinental polity" since 1945 (Wilder 2015). It is not a coincidence that Senghor was a supporter of West Papua independence.

The Melanesian Way was (and continues to be) a political term that not only speaks to the colonial and racial legacy of European colonialism in Melanesia through the appropriation of *kastom* (custom), the politics of anthropological knowledge in the Pacific, but also to the predominant and

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[356] Bernad Narokobi had worked as an attorney for several Papuan refugees in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. He was also active in West Papua solidarity networks. See Osborne 1985.

[357] Le Front de libération nationale kanak et socialiste (FLNKS) was established in New Caledonia in 1984 whose members consist mainly indigenous Kanaks. Some of the members were former students who were radicalized after the 1968 Paris.

[358] Tjibaou was trained as a Catholic priest but left his career as a pastor to become a full time political activist. See also Tjibaou 1976.

[359] See Tabani 2000.

hegemonic influence of Pacific Islands countries in regional politics. With their conception of 'Pacific Way'—initiated by Fiji's first prime minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, in an address to the UN General Assembly in October 1970, shortly after Fiji was granted independence by their British ruler—, the Pacific Island countries claim their relatively political advancement and civilization compared to their Melanesian neighbors—which are seen as 'failed states'. Their conception of Pacific Way revolves "around notions of tolerance and consensus"(Lawson 9), in which their path to independence was not marked by violence like most places in Asia, Africa, and Melanesia. It is a strange coincidence that this sense of superiority is in line with anthropology's analyses of political power in the Pacific, as exemplified particularly by Sahlins's landmark study of big men polities (1976).

Sahlins constructs ideal-types of hierarchy and equality to compare a larger-scale Polynesian hierarchical society based on chiefs and sub-chiefs with Melanesian big man polities, implying that Melanesian societies were less advanced and more unstable than their Polynesian neighbors. Regional political identities and politics of anthropological research continues to become a significant political factor for West Papua, particularly through the establishment of the Melanesian Spearhead Group in 2007. Papuans evoke the conception of Melanesian-ness, not only as an epistemological resistance, but also as a way to formulate their own identity and cultures under the Indonesian cultural hegemony in West Papua, the denigration of Papuan cultures, and the Indonesian administration's instrumentalization of Papuan cultures through the conception of *adat* (custom) and tradition.

After disappearing in the 1970s from the public sphere, the idea of Melanesia re-emerged in the public sphere with the establishment of the Republic of West Melanesia by Dr. Thomas Wainggai and Drs. Alberth Kailiele. They organized a flag raising ceremony in the Parliament Office in Jayapura on December 14, 1988. Dr. Wainggai, an America-trained scholar, worked as a civil

servant in the provincial government in West Papua.[360] Indeed the 1980s was marked by the various flag-raising ceremonies and armed attacks in the borderland against the arriving Indonesians within the framework the transmigration programs. After Dr. Wainggai's death in Indonesia's detention in Jakarta, the discourse of Melanesian-ness would return in 2015-2016 with force.

Civil Society and Its Discourse in West Papua

Since the 1970s, Indonesia had witnessed the emergence of voluntary and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as a counter-weight to state power. This emergence was a result of two trends. First, after the World War II, we witnessed the proliferation of non-governmental organizations and the increasing role that they play in global politics. NGOs have become powerful actors that mediate the relationship between state and citizens (Davies 2014). Secondly, in Indonesia, the emergence and proliferation of NGOs was also a response to the New Order's development policy and the dual function of the Indonesian military that wreaked havoc on democratic rights of the citizens.[361] Two major Indonesian NGOs were born in this era, e.g. YLBHI (the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute), founded in 1970 and WALHI (Indonesian Forum for the Environment), the oldest and largest environmental NGO, which was born in 1980. These represent two major critical discourses that were, and continue to be, the most important issues in the country, namely human rights and environmental protection. These global and national developments had a profound impact in West Papua where human rights violations and environmental destruction continue to take place on a daily basis and a large scale.

The first NGO in West Papua was founded by civil society activists, academics, and churches in 1980, three years after the implementation of the military operation area status for West

[360] Jean-Luc Godard made a short film in his honor in 1991. Jean-Luc Godard's Pour Thomas Wainggai (1991) is part of a compilation of French short films entitled "Lest We Forget" commissioned by Amnesty International.

[361] See Sinaga 1994; Fakih 1996; Ganie-rochman 2002; and Hadiwinata 2003.

Papua and the shift of transmigration program from western Indonesia to West Papua (see chapter 4). This history began with the establishment of the Ecumenical Task Force (Kelompok Kerja Oikumene, KKO) by the Catholic Church (represented by Theo van den Broek, then a Dutch Franciscan), the Papuan Reformed Church (Agustinus Rumansara and Philip Erari), George Junus Aditjondro, a prominent NGO activist and scholar from Jakarta, Arnold Ap representing the University of Cenderawasih and Michael Manufandu representing the Yoka bureaucracy school (APDN) (Setyanto 2007, Foker LSM 2007). In 1982, they created a new initiative under the University of Cenderawasih called IrjaDisc. In addition to carry out community empowerment programs, IrjaDisc also conducted research and documentation of Papuan cultures and environment where Arnold Ap was heavily involved. IrjaDisc became a foundation in 1983 with a new name, the Foundation for the Development of Rural Population (Yayasan Pengembangan Masyarakat Desa, YPMD).

With the assassination of Arnold Ap in 1984, YPMD became increasingly vocal in bringing up issues that matter for Papuans. They published a widely read monthly bulletin "Kabar dari Kampung" (News from the Village) in 1984 which covered issues facing local populations, such as transmigration programs, environmental destruction associated with logging and mining activities, education, and healthcare (see YPMD reports). After YPMD, more NGOs were established in Jayapura and other cities, such as Yasanto (the Foundation of St. Anthony) in Merauke and PPM Jayapura. The Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (YLBHI) also opened up their branch in Jayapura, as Todung Mulya Lubis, prominent Indonesian lawyer leading the organization said "West Papua has the highest number of cases of human rights violations in the country." By 1991, 11 NGOs established a Cooperation Forum of Papuan NGOs (Forum Kerjasama LSM Papua). In 2011, this number would grow to 118.[362]

[362] See Dale 2011.

While OPM and students movements continued to bring up the agenda of West Papua independence, in the 1990s two principal issues that were of concern for civil society actors were human rights abuses against the Papuans and the excessive exploitations of Papuan natural resources. The release of the first human rights reports from the mining concession of Freeport Indonesia by Elsham, a leading Papuan human rights organization in 1995 was one of many human rights reports that would come out from the region.[363] As Dale suggests, the use of the human rights framework in West Papua centers on the role of international bodies such as the UN and the Indonesian state, two actors whom Papuan independence activists accuse as the biggest human rights violators against them (pers. comm.). This marks NGOs' political distance with the pro-independence and student movements, at least on the surface.[364] This is also due to the fact that while NGOs were critical to the state agenda, many NGOs worked (and continue to work) within the framework of the Indonesian state nationalist discourse. What I mean by this is that NGOs working in West Papua address Papuans' rights as citizens of Indonesia, which excludes Papuans' right to self-determination. This explains their limits in addressing West Papua issues.

The proliferation of NGOs and the popularization of human rights discourse have put the region under the radar of the national and international advocacy networks, particularly through their supporters (including churches) and media. Indeed in these national and international circuits,

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[363] Elsham (The Center for Human Rights Studies and Advocacy, Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia) began as the Irian Jaya Working Group for Justice and Peace in 1995.
[364] As has been discussed by others (Mambor 2007; Dale 2011), Papuan NGO activists are more sympathetic to the independence cause while the Indonesian ones are more careful, with a few exceptions like George Junus Aditjondro who shifted his position to more supportive later in his life.

West Papua is better known for its human rights record than its aspiration for self-determination.[365] Domestically, NGOs are influential in expanding West Papuan issues in the government circles and on the ground among the educated rural and small towns population. After the cessation of "Kabar dari Kampung," Foker LSM published *Tabloid Jubi* in 2001. *Jubi* is a Biak word for arrows, a weapon that is used across ethnic groups in West Papua. Jubi also means "honest speech" (I. *jujur bicara*). *Tabloid Jubi* and *Kabar dari Kampung* share similar characteristics. Both are journalistic platforms that address local social concerns. Their perspective is uniquely local and Papuan. Therefore, they stand in contrast with the mainstream media in West Papua, which is heavily aligned and controlled by the Indonesian military administration, as we can see from my previous discussion of the 1977 uprising.

In 2007, after some difficult transitions, Victor Mambor took over *Tabloid Jubi*'s editorial team. I got to know Victor in one of many NGOs and civil society meetings that I attended in West Papua. He was trained as a playwright but then worked as a journalist in the newspaper "Pikiran Rakyat" on Java Island from 1996 to 2002. One cannot overstate his power and network in the Papuan civil society and beyond. He is one of the most important journalists working in this military-controlled region. This is how he defines himself:

> I have been working as a journalist since 1993. I have worked for several local, Indonesian and foreign media companies such as *Al Jazeera*, Radio New Zealand, and French24. I chose to work as a journalist because I believe that journalism is one of the most powerful weapons to achieve radical transformations for West Papua, a nation who is now under foreign occupation. I believe that as long as West Papua is part of Indonesia, Papuans will continue suffering from injustice and discrimination.

Victor Mambor represents a new generation of Papuans who were trained in Indonesia and familiar with Indonesian civil society and cultural movements during the late period of the New Order. He returned to West Papua in the 1990s and became active in the civil society movement and

[365] This also relates to the international politics of human rights that forecloses the question of self-determination in West Papua, as seen by the work of the International Coalition for West Papua. See Dale (work in progress).

journalism in the region. Under his leadership, Jubi went online in 2008, the first media in West Papua to do so.[366] In 2010, Jubi became independent, separated from the NGOs world that nurtured it. The birth of *Tabloid Jubi* might be one of the most important accomplishments of Papuan social movements in this period. Its rise in the later period and the digital platform that it uses would change the landscape of Papuan independence movements in the 2000s, but before that, we should go to Jakarta in order to return to Jayapura.

After the Indonesian Reforms: The Return of the Repressed

Following the 1998 Indonesian democratic reforms and East Timor's independence from Indonesia in 1999, Papuans were ecstatic with new hopes for their own independence. Here democratic reforms in the metropole were taken up by the colonial subjects to push democratization from below. As I have narrated in the introduction, the Indonesian government responded Papuans' demand by granting West Papua a special autonomy status in 2001. Where did NGOs position themselves in this period? Contrast to the Papuan spirit of the time, most NGOs working in West Papua supported the autonomy on the ground that it could be a win-win solution for the West Papua conflict.[367]

Most Papuans, however, consider the special autonomy status as a political means to divide and destroy Papuans' unity and struggle for self-determination. Secondly, instead of benefitting Papuans, the special autonomy gives more room for top Indonesian security forces generals and government officials to profiteer through the expansion of new administrative structures in the regency levels. Two major components of the special autonomy did not materialize, namely the

[366] In Indonesia, the first generation of online news portal emerged in the early 1990s in conjunction with the arrival of the internet in Indonesia and the banning of three media outlets by the New Order regime in 1994. See Raoni 2017.
[367] See Dale, ibid.

creation of human rights court and the truth and reconciliation commission and the granting of a right to compensation for all victims of past human rights abuses. Indeed, as contemporary reports testify that more human rights violations take place in West Papua.[368] By 2010, thousands of Papuans conducted a rally in Jayapura to return the Papuan special autonomy status to the government of Indonesia.

Papuans' demand for independence continues unabated. It has even intensified with the establishment of various organizations that openly aim to advance this cause. While TPN/OPM maintains the armed guerrilla struggle in the forest, borderlands, and mining concession, moderate Papuan elites are comforted with the special autonomy status, while students and youth organizations continue their independence struggle in the city. Old organizations have died but new organizations have come forth, such as the Papuan Students Alliance (*Aliansi Mahasiswa Papua*, established in 1998 in Jakarta), United Front of Papuan People Struggle (*Front Persatuan Perjuangan Rakyat Papua Barat* or Front-Pepera-PB, established in 2005 in Jayapura), Anti-Colonial Movement (*Gerakan Anti Penjajahan*), and The Movement for Women Empowerment of West Papua (*Gerakan Perjuangan Pemberdayaan Perempuan Papua Barat*), the Movement of Papuan Youth and People (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Papua Pemuda dan Rakyat Papua* or GempaR, established in 2013 in Jayapura), the Student Forum for Independence (*Forum Independen Mahasiswa*), the National Committee of West Papua (*Komite Nasional Papua Barat*, KNPB, established in 2008), and so forth. In response to this increasing Papuan activism, Indonesia sponsors student organizations that are mainly based at the University of Cenderawasih and whose agenda is to support West Papua within Indonesia, such as the Papuan Student Movement for Indonesia *(Gerakan Mahasiswa Papua Indonesia* or GMPI, established on June 13, 2007) in addition to paramilitary groups created specifically to defend Indonesian presence in the region.

[368] Tim SKP Jayapura (Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian, Keuskupan Jayapura) publishes an annual report entitled "Memoria Passionis di Papua" since 1990.

Among the many Papuan organizations that emerged during this period, the National Committee of West Papua (*Komite Nasional Papua Barat*, KNPB hereafter) has become one of the most important actors in the urban-based, non-violent movements in West Papua. Maria, an Indonesian filmmaker and I started filming the KNPB on April 13, 2016, and we spent at least four months with the KNPB members in their headquarters called Vietnam.[369] Vietnam occupies one of the student dormitories at the Uncen's new campus.

Vietnam is like a *honai*,[370] in the sense that it is dominated by males, but also it is a place where people gather and work. KNPB frames their role as a media, and we will see why this is the case. Most KNPB members are drawn from various campus, schools, and student dormitories in major Papuan cities like independence organization that came before them. Their leadership comes from major post-reforms Papuan student organizations, primarily the Papuan Students Alliance and the Association of Students of the Central Highlands of West Papua (*Asosiasi Mahasiswa Pegunungan Tengah Papua se-Indonesia*, AMPTPI). KNPB marks the birth of a new Papuan anti-colonial movement, which can be characterized by several features. First, KNPB manages to mobilize various sectors in the Papuan society, mainly students and youth but also church ministers, government employees, and the Papuan urban poor in the urban areas. KNPB has 28 branches spread across West Papua with representatives (consulates) in student cities in Indonesia. Their methods of mobilization are informed by this new type of population and the geography of urban milieu, with rallies, occupation, and disruptions of the public sphere, and the use of digital media are predominant. By and large, their resistance is non-violent.

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[369] Musa Mako Tabuni named it to refer to the site of resistance and where the American power failed.

[370] Honai refers to a traditional round house which is very popular among ethnic groups of the Central Highlands. In its traditional function, honai is a male house. See Heider 2006[1970].

Most KNPB members are conversant in Papuan history and international politics. They are aware of the global liberation movements, such as Palestinians' resistance against the Israeli occupation and more importantly, they build alliances with progressive Indonesians, something that the previous movement failed to make. Along with this line, they follow the Indonesian democratic principles and legal framework and effectively use those to their advantages. They claim their democratic rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and free press to express their wishes in public. KNPB also reflects a more institutionalized resistance. While ethnicity and clan associations play out in its politics, its aspiration is nationalist, even international.

KNPB as a Media

> "If the colonial media and journalists do not report on West Papua, Papuan people will report, write and publicize in their own ways, as demanded by the progress of time. Papuan people who are fighting against the colonial rule today are Papuan people who are aware of information and technology."("West Papua Diisolasi, Kolonial Indonesia Lancarkan Operasi Cyber," *KNPB News*, Volume 3, Year II, June-August 2016)

Resistance organizations, such as KNPB harness the power of digital media and capitalize on it. The rise of KNPB itself, I argue, is largely due to its aggressive mobilization through social media. Since the arrival of the Internet, the technology has become one of the most important platforms for West Papua independence movement. Beside the existing oral medium and photocopy, the Internet has become the site of mobilization for anti-Indonesia sentiments. This not only opposes the long-standing stereotype that Papuans lived in a Stone Age civilization, but also to the deliberate sabotage of Indonesian authority to control and censor media sphere in West Papua.[371] Indeed I

[371] Foreign journalists have been restricted to freely report on the region since 1969. For a complete report about this matter, see the Human Rights Watch. 2015. "Something to Hide? Indonesia's Restrictions on Media Freedom and Right Monitoring in Papua." https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/11/10/something-hide/indonesias-restrictions-media-freedom-and-rights-monitoring-papua

argue that if the radio and cassette have become the medium of Papuan awakening in the 1980s, it is the internet that becomes the medium of the 21st century. While the internet bandwidth remains low, Papuans use the internet on a daily basis. Various independence groups host websites to advance their campaigns. On Facebook, Papuans converse about the Indonesian occupation freely. Papuans also follow and re-post updates of Papuan independence movements from the Pacific (Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea) and other places. Contrary to Indonesia's claim, there is a strong connection between Papuans in West Papua, and Papuan exiles and the internet is the most important platform for this connection.

The internet also becomes the battleground for information wars between the Indonesian security forces and their media, and Papuan media. After *Tabloid Jubi*, which is highly popular among Papuan readers, an explosion of Papuan online news portals followed suit. *Suara Perempuan Papua* (Voices of Papuan Women) went online in 2008, followed by *Suara Papua* (Voices of Papua) in 2011, *Selangkah* Magazine in 2012, and so forth. These media are created by Papuans with the clear objective to fight against the Indonesian media's one-dimensional reportages of West Papua.

KNPB's framework as a media outlet should be situated in this context. During my fieldwork in 2015 and 2016, KNPB organized biweekly rallies in major cities in West Papua to respond to two political processes at the regional and international levels. The first was the gathering of 79 nations for the 8th Summit of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP) heads of state and government in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, 30 May-June 1. The second was the Melanesian Spearhead Group's summit meeting in Honiara, the Solomon Islands, whose agenda included deciding the nomination of United Liberation Movement of West Papua for full membership at the group. Since its establishment on December 6, 2014, The United Liberation Movement of West Papua has actively lobbied for membership at The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), a sub-regional political grouping founded in 1986 to accommodate Melanesian countries and

aspirations. MSG members include state actors, such as Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, but also liberation movements, such as the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front of New Caledonia (FLNAK). As a geopolitical group, MSG makes use of their Melanesian-ness as a political weapon against the dominance of Polynesians in the Pacific political groupings, notably the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). The MSG's meeting was held on July 14-16, 2016, after twice being postponed.

The issue of West Papua was one of the most important and dividing matters at the MSG. While culturally Papuans are recognized as Melanesians, politically big Melanesian states like Fiji and Papua New Guinea are on Indonesia's side.[372] Indonesia strengthens its presence in the Pacific and grants economic aids to these two countries. Indonesia also sought membership at the MSG, arguing that Indonesia also has a Melanesian population. If West Papua international campaigns use anthropological and cultural arguments to make their case, Indonesia also follows suit through, for instance, organizing an Indonesian Melanesian festival in 2015 and building a coalition of five governors whose provinces are designated as having a sizable Melanesian population. This includes two provinces in West Papua, Moluccas, North Moluccas and the East Nusa Tenggara. The Indonesian government also mobilizes anthropologists and archeologists to defend this political move. Therefore, if during the New Order, Indonesia tried to remove the racial basis of Papuan identity,[373] during the democratic era Indonesia grabbed and appropriated it.

KNPB's rallies in West Papua were organized to support ULMWP's struggle regionally and internationally and also aimed to counter Indonesian propaganda that ULMWP merely represented the interest of Papuan exiles. Indeed, as the rallies demonstrated ULMWP is hugely popular and gain

[372] Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the FLNKS (*Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste*, The Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front) are strong defenders of West Papua's cause.

[373] See Webster 2012.

a lot of support from the Papuan population. The establishment of ULMWP office in the Baliem Valley adds to the Indonesian injury. Here we can see that the use of Melanesian-ness in West Papua is a response to the racial character of Indonesia's rule in West Papua and the accomplishment of Papuan independence movements in amplifying Melanesian identity in their struggle for the right to self-determination. [374] In the fraught space of political contestation over West Papua's place within the Indonesian nation, West Papua chose to move away from the Indonesian state and nationalism. What does this mean for our understanding of the Indonesian state and nationalism?

In this chapter, I have constructed narratives of the Papuan liberation movements that are modern and nationalist in character, which counter dominant accounts both by the Indonesian state and by scholars on West Papua. From the emergence of armed struggles in the hinterlands in 1965 until today, when the resistance moved to cities and took the form of non-violent, urban mass movements, the making of Papuans' national consciousness has taken place against the backdrop of the changing modes of Indonesian governance in West Papua. It is my argument here that Papuans consistently create spaces of politics in order to articulate their agency and experiment with conceptions and practices of *self*-determination. Secondly, I draw a strong relationship between Papuan forms of resistance and their media. This too is contingent upon the availability of media technology in the region. As I have suggested, politics has shaped media, but the media also shapes the way politics are carried out. Following Anderson's discussion on the role of print capitalism in spreading nationalism (1984), I argue here that Papuans use various forms of media: print, electronic and digital media in articulating their own nationalism, a nationalism that runs against the Indonesian nationalism. In the final chapter, I will assess the impact of Papuan national consciousness not only

[374] In the Melanesian world, another identity politics plays out with the term *wantok* which is rarely used in West Papua and *kastom* that is being used intensively in Papua New Guinea. On the history and politics of the term Melanesia, see Lawson 2013.

on how Papuans understand their history but also how we understand the Indonesian state and nationalism in West Papua.

7. Colonialism and Papuan Historical Consciousness: An Epilogue

In the summer of 2000, during the Second Papuan People's Congress in Jayapura, Reverend Benny Giay was elected as a member of the Papua Presidium Council. Representing the Kingmi church, currently the second largest denomination in West Papua, he was charged, using the term that was recently popular in post-reform Indonesia, "to rectify (straighten out) the history of West Papua."[375] The congress itself was organized as the continuation of the First Papuan People's Congress held by the New Guinea Council on October 19, 1961. The discussion about the need to rectify West Papua's history took place even before the formal congress began. In the decision made by the Fourth Commission of the Papuan People's Congress, history is positioned at the front and center of the Papuan struggle. The statement of the commission says, "The Papuan nation must

[375] In Indonesian, *meluruskan sejarah Papua*.

uphold, rectify, and carry out our historical rights that have been twisted and manipulated by the Indonesian, Dutch and American governments, and the United Nations" (Alua 2000, 69).[376]

Rectifying or straightening history is an expression that quickly gained critical popularity after the 1998 Indonesian reforms (Adam 2001 and 2007; Adam and Purwanto 2005; Strassler 2008; van Klinken 2001; Zurbuchen 2005). Massive protests successfully ended 32 years of authoritarian rule by President Suharto, whose power relied on excessive and deliberate manipulations of history. During the New Order (1966-1998), Indonesian history was "primarily…a product of social and political engineering rather than an appropriate scholarly apparatus" (Purwanto 2011, 111). History was instrumentalized to the point where the discipline became the cornerstone of state ideology. Against this backdrop, two major Indonesian historians Kuntowijoyo and Asvi Warman Adam propose their agenda of rectifying Indonesian history. This agenda aims to bring the history of victims, a history that comes from below, and a history that accounts for victims' voices within the mainstream Indonesian historical discourse.[377] In the post-reform context, this means rectifying the history of the 1965 killings of alleged members of the Indonesian Communist Party.[378] Their programs consist of efforts to publish "forbidden history as accounted by victims of the purge, critical academic historical texts, and biographies of exiled figures" (Roosa, Ratih, and Farid 2006).

In West Papua, on the contrary, rectifying history is a political program based on the epistemic struggle of a colonized nation. It is a movement that involves many Papuans, illiterate or

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376 In addition to the history agenda, the Congress that was attended by more than twenty-five thousand Papuans from all over the region and abroad also asked Indonesia and the international community to recognize the independent status of West Papua. See Alua 2000.

377 See Adam 2005 and Kuntowijoyo 2007. For an extensive yet limited discussion about post-reform Indonesian historiography, see Klinken 2001.

378 Nugroho Notosusanto, a historian and military official, is the leading and official historian of the New Order Indonesia. He published numerous books on the "rebellion" of the Indonesian Communist Party, therefore, justified the killing of more than one million of Indonesians by the hands of the Indonesian military and paramilitary. See Notosusanto 1968 and 1980 and McGregor 2007. For a critical examination of the 1965 event, see Anderson and McVeys 1971, Roosa 2006, and Oppenheimer 2013 and 2014.

otherwise, in a new phase of their struggle for their right to self-determination from Indonesia. In the previous chapters I have chronicled Papuans' experience under Dutch and Indonesian rule, and how Papuans form a distinctive political consciousness as a nation. In this final chapter, I want to examine how Papuans' experiences under these colonial regimes makes history an extremely high-stakes agenda in Papuan politics. Furthermore, I will demonstrate how Papuans, through their encounters with colonial powers, articulate a new historical consciousness that is characterized by their resistance against the *amberi* historiography. I argue that this new historical consciousness has allowed for the emergence of a new historiography of West Papua. West Papua's case offers two insights for our present situation. It revitalizes the 'colonial present' debates in anthropology and history, as well as challenges colonial historiography that considers coloniality as a past historical reality. Secondly, West Papua helps us reframe the agendas of contemporary decolonization, and the need to decolonize colonial history. In West Papua, the decolonization of colonial history consists of at least two fundamental programs, which include a program to rectify Papuan history, and another program to rewrite a new Papuan history.

Rectifying Papuan History

Reverend Benny Giay sets out to clear the ground for a new historiography of West Papua, as his first argument states,

> "Elite and government-approved historians conceal some aspects of the history of contact between Papuans and foreigners: the fact of racism, the history of robbery and slavery by foreigners to Papuans… In the history that is being hidden by Indonesian historians, West Papua is a mere object of pillaging, headhunting, and slavery" (2011, 24).

As I have discussed in the second chapter of this dissertation, Benny Giay belongs to the Mee ethnic group, the first group in the Central Highlands who converted to Christianity. Benny Giay went to an evangelical elementary school in Paniai before continuing his studies in the Lani speaking area of

Tiom. He remembers, "I was just twelve years old when I boarded this small plane. Before I boarded, I made sure that I threw away my *koteka* (penis gourd). At that time we were so afraid that we would be expelled and killed if we kept wearing *koteka* in *ogai*'s world." [379] He entered the *ogai*'s world and became one.[380] In 1993, he started writing about his relative Zakheus Pakage, who attracted so many native followers that American and fellow Mee evangelists became suspicious of his political power. Pakage was deemed a heretic by C&MA missionaries and expelled from the mission in 1951. Pakage, however, established his own communities and developed what Giay calls "indigenous religious discourse" (1995), a new religious discourse that was born from Christianity and the Mee indigenous belief. Using primary sources from oral accounts of his people and missionary accounts in various archives, Giay vehemently rejects the historiography of American and Indonesian evangelical missions, particularly in writings about Zakheus Pakage and his communities. Using life histories as a method of historical excavation, Giay offers views that are opposed to missionaries' accounts of Zakheus Pakage. What his historical projects aim to achieve is to "hand back the history to the people" (1995, 256).

Benny Giay is the most appropriate figure to conclude this dissertation, not only because he, like Reverend Socratez Sofyan Yoman who opens this dissertation, is a Papuan who raises his voice through writing and speech. He also develops a new Papuan history through his influence on the younger generation of Papuan writers, his initiative to set up his own publishing house Deiyai in 2000, and his role as the founder of Walter Post School of Theology and the Zakheus Pakage

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[379] *Ogai* (Mee language) refers to men and women of letters. For the Mee, the word *ogai* commands respect, and it does not necessarily refer to foreigners. The Mee uses the word *degee bage* to refer to white men (and women), *iyoo woyaa* for Indonesians (literally means straight hair people), and *buna bage* (black people, perhaps referring to their interaction with the Kamoro in the southern coast) for coastal Papuans.

[380] Reverend Benny Giay went to The Asian Theological Seminary in the Philippines to study theology then taught at the Jaffray Theology College in Makassar, Indonesia from 1983 to 1987. He finished his Ph.D. in social anthropology in The Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam in the Netherlands in 1995.

Institute for Social Sciences and Pastoral Studies in Enarotali. Benny Giay has written more than ten books on subjects ranging from Papuan theology to history, and his works represent what I would call a new Papuan historiography. This is a new historiography that allows for Papuan historical narratives to emerge. It is a historiography that has been repressed under the so-call *amberi* history of West Papua. He deliberately uses a Biak word *amberi,* instead of using his own vernacular, not only to serve a broad Papuan audience, but also to represent a new consciousness as a Papuan subject (compare Chauvel 2008, 54). It is a discursive strategy to enable himself as a Papuan to speak. In his historical narratives, *amberi* occupies a central place. He historicizes them.

The First Definition of amberi: Eliezer Bonay

To describe the *amberi*, Benny Giay quotes Eliezer Bonay, a Papuan exile and nationalist living in the Netherlands. Bonay defines the *amberi* in the following terms:

> "These Malays are truly *amberi* (the word *amberi* is derived from the verb 'to steal,' 'to rob'). Steal, loot! The Malay came to rob, to take everything from us, the Papuans. They never asked. Back then they captured us and sold us as slaves. The Papuans ran to the Highlands. After the *hongi* expedition had ended, we returned to the coast. And what did we discover there? Those *amberi* again! Those robbers that had been brought by the Dutch to govern us" (Giay 2011, 22).

Bonay's explanation of *amberi* speaks to the prolonged historical contact between who both Giay and Bonay call the Papuans and the Malays. This extends from the period of the 17th century, when the western part of New Guinea was integrated into the Netherlands East Indies' slave trade, all the way to the subsequent century of *hongi* expeditions in which the Dutch and their local soldiers, mainly from the Moluccas, carried out punitive expeditions to control disobedient Papuan polities. This period stretches to the 1960s, when West Papua was transferred from the Dutch government to Indonesia. Bonay's definition of *amberi* also addresses the role of Indonesian power at the interface of Dutch colonialism in New Guinea. However, Bonay's definition departs from existing

literature on *amberi*. Rutherford suggests that the term *amberi* speaks to the colonial hierarchy in West Papua (2012,161). In her study, *amberi* has incited ambiguous responses from the Biak, the Papuan ethnic group living in the western part of the territory that has been in contact with the *amberi* since at least the 17th century (2012). She says, "The word might have evoked the sporadic attacks Papuan communities suffered at the hands of powerful outsiders. The referent for such an expletive is not a particular entity; it is a particular frame of mind: the wonder, shock, fear or anger that led Biak speakers to shout Amberi!" (Rutherford 2002, 22). There is little doubt that Giay, who appropriates Bonay's definition, no longer shares the sense of wonder that the Biak felt towards the *amberi* in the early 20th century. In his definition, *amberi* are predatory foreigners who have become Indonesians. Benny Giay and his communities write and speak to these *amberi*, who later became the colonizers themselves.[381]

The Second Definition of amberi: Acub Zainal

Giay writes about Acub Zainal and his account of the arrival of Indonesian soldiers in West Papua in 1963. In his memoir, Zainal who was the commander of the Cenderawasih Military Regional Command from 1970 to 1973, and the governor of the province from 1973-1975 writes,

> "All facilities that belonged to the Dutch were transported to Indonesia: military equipment, office supplies, household instruments, everything. Chocolate, candy, or beers that were only available in Irian were also confiscated. Bottles that were used as fences were dug out, taken, and transported. I carried carpets. Terror was inflicted upon the pro-Dutch population. Letters and printed materials that came from the Netherlands or were written in Dutch were also burnt. Therefore, any valuable information about West Irian was completely erased" (Hendrowinoto 1998, 30).

[381] One can sense that a historical construction of race is at play here. Unlike Chakrabarty's Indian subjects, the Papuan self-division as a colonial subject is not only historical but also racial. In West Papua, the Pacific and Oceania in general, this relates to an extended anthropological understanding of the region. There has never been any place in the world where impacts of colonial anthropological research are more profoundly felt and have strong ramifications in the political sphere. For further reading on the background, see Lawson 2013 and Chakrabarty 1992.

Giay cross-references Zainal's account with the account of two Papuan bureaucrats working under the Dutch, Dorus Rumbiak and Amapon J. Marey. Rumbiak witnessed the looting that took place after Indonesian soldiers arrived in Jayapura. He recalls, "As soon as the Indonesian soldiers and officials arrived, I saw that the looting took place. They looted every house. They brought big suitcases full of merchandises from the Dutch houses. Indonesian soldiers and officials came to plunder. We were so astonished" (Visser 2013, 124). This is an Indonesian history in West Papua that has been concealed by mainstream Indonesian historical writing. This is a history that Zainal himself has forgotten. Soon after his looting story took place, Zainal launched the infamous *koteka* operation, which forced Papuans to get rid of their penis gourds and adopt modern clothing. This operation was conducted all over the Central Highlands, but particularly in Hubula and the Lani-speaking area of Baliem Valley and the Mee-speaking areas of Waghete and Enarotali. Wyn Sargent, an American photographer, met him in Jayapura and said, "Zainal's attitude toward the Hubula was paternalistic. He referred to them as "children." He had, at one time, promised the world to put clothes on all the natives by the end of 1972 through his Operation *Koteka*"(Sargent 1974, 13). His civilizing program stems from his understanding that the most challenging problem of development in West Papua is "isolated ethnic groups and penis gourds" (Hendrowinoto, xviii).

The Third Definition of amberi: The Civilized Indonesians

On Wednesday, May 27, 2015, the Indonesian national news agency Antara broadcasted the kidnapping of two members of the Indonesian military in Enarotali by a so-called armed group (*kelompok bersenjata*). The journalist reported that these two members had been cooked and supposedly eaten (Mambor 2015). The news quickly spread through online networks and reached

millions of Indonesians who do not realize that the Mee ethnic group in Enarotali had never been documented as having a tradition of cannibalism.

When I ran into Benny Giay in Jakarta, he was deeply upset and asked me to get a copy of *Savage Harvest* (Hoffman 2014), a book about the disappearance of Michael Rockefeller, the son of the United States' Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, in New Guinea. Michael Rockefeller went with the Harvard Peabody Expedition to the Baliem Valley in 1961 and continued his trip to Asmat in the south coast of New Guinea where the headhunting tribe lives. According to the tale produced by journalists, 'amateur' anthropologists and writers, Rockefeller was eaten by the Asmat. This story alone has been used to justify the gross generalization that Papuans were cannibals. The tale about Asmat's cannibalism is well known, not only in English literature, but also among Indonesians and Papuans. Travelogues, stories in the Euro-American popular press, as well as anthropological and missionary accounts of the region reproduce this story again and again. This is what Subramanian calls historical sediments (2009,7).

Scholars have attempted to identify from where the cannibal stereotype emerged. Derksen (2016) traces it to the roles of Moluccas people during Dutch colonialism (see Forrest 1779). Ligia Giay (2014) argues that stereotypes against Papuans, whether as cannibals or slaves, have survived for centuries because such tales have been constructed and circulated not only by Euro-American missions, explorers, journalists, and anthropologists, but notably by "locals" (compare Andaya 1993).

These locals include civilian and military researchers. Indeed, one might be confused by the conflation of scientific and military interests in many research projects about West Papua. The case of Koentjaraningrat is exemplary. Koentjaraningrat, the founding father of Indonesian anthropology, tells us in 1970,

> "Since 1964, the integrated development activities were conducted by the *Karya* Operation of the *Kodim* military office of 1712 of *Kodam* XVII/Tjenderawasih with one of many of their principal tasks being to help develop Wamena communities in particular and Djajawidjaja in general. This operation pioneered the rural development efforts that are extremely difficult, but done extremely well by the military" (Koentjaraningrat 1970, 44).

The flattering depiction of the military's role in the development of West Papua represents the overall tone of Koentjaraningrat's study of Papuan societies. He was sent to West Papua by Sukarn's administration in 1963, two years after Indonesia's invasion of West Papua. He visited Baliem, Ilaga, and Swart Valley in April of 1963, and then continued working in swampy villages on the north coast of the region during the Easter and Christmas holidays of 1964. In total, he claimed to have spent four months in West Papua, the longest fieldwork he ever did in the region.[382]

In 1964, President Sukarno sent a scientific and military expedition under the supervision of The Highest Operation Command of the Indonesian military to Carstensz summit via Mee and Moni areas in the Central Highlands (Komando Operasi Tertinggi 1964).[383] While this expedition merely produced one expedition book and no anthropological manuscript, research with military involvement in the team or in the supervisory body would become the primary mode of study in West Papua. After Suharto replaced Sukarno, scientific research in West Papua declined significantly. The lack of research funding hinders Indonesian anthropologists from visiting West Papua; foreign researchers and journalists are banned from visiting the region, with a few exceptions. Indonesian universities with significant anthropology departments, such as the University of Indonesia, the University of Gadjah Mada, and the University of Cenderawasih in West Papua send some of their

[382] His research was funded by the Secretary of the Office of Irian Barat Affairs, the National Research Affair Department, and the University of Indonesia in Jakarta.

[383] Sukarno founded Komando Operasi Tertinggi (KOTI, the highest operation command) on July 19, 1963, few days before Dwikora was declared with the principal task is "security operations to all the government programs, particularly on the field of confrontation against any element of colonialism and imperialism and their manifestations and security operations in the area of economic programs." The President himself led KOTI as the highest commander of the Indonesian military.

anthropologists to work on government and private sector projects, but they, unfortunately, produce only a few publications. The common research initiatives that are endorsed and funded by the government are development-oriented in nature and/or involve the Indonesian military. As recently as 2016, the research institution that Koentjaraningrat co-founded collaborates with the Indonesian military, this time with the Special Forces to carry out a 'scientific expedition' in the western part of West Papua.

While this kind of 'scientific' research is not new to West Papua, the anthropological research that Koentjaraningrat did is exemplary in many ways. Koentjaraningrat was the first Indonesian anthropologist who graduated from the first anthropology department in the country. He hailed from Yogyakarta, the heart of Javanese court cultures, and finished his dissertation at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, where anthropology courses had been first introduced in 1940. Three Dutch anthropologists were appointed to the faculty, namely G.J. Held, the former linguist at the Universal Biblical Society and author of *The Papuans of Waropen* (1947/1957), F.A.E van Wouden who worked in East Nusa Tenggara, and Elizabeth Allard who became Koentjaraningrat's principal dissertation advisor. Both Held and van Wouden came from the Leiden School of structural anthropology. Before his doctoral study, Koentjaraningrat also went to Yale for two years (1954-1956) to work with G.P. Murdock, author of *Social Structure* (1949) and creator of *Human Relations Area Files* (E.K.M Masinambow 1997, 18).

As an armchair anthropologist, Koentjaraningrat wrote a book based on his students' library research entitled *The Population of Irian Barat* (1963) and a subsequent number of publications on the region, such as "The Diversity and Multicolored Population of West Irian" (1970). He is the only Indonesian anthropologist who founded his career on research in West Papua. This sounds exemplary in a country with more than 700 ethnic groups, but in the University of Indonesia, where anthropology gained status as an independent discipline and department in 1957, two Dutch

anthropologists had offered only two focused areas of study, namely New Guinea and Central Borneo (Gaillard 2012, 286). At the National Research Body (*Majelis Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia*, then *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia*) where Koentjaraningrat was a founder,[384] The Institute of History and Anthropology was set up in 1959, and only lasted for six years before it saw its own demise after the rise of the Indonesian military government of Suharto in late 1965.[385] Koentjaraningrat also taught several Papuan anthropologists and helped set up the department of anthropology at the University of Cenderawasih in West Papua. He also taught at the Academy of Military Law in 1968-1971 and gave several courses in the Army Academy (SESKOAD).[386]

Koentjaraningrat's anthropology is a curious mix of Dutch structural anthropology and American evolutionist anthropology. His anthropology aims to "realize contact between different ethnic groups" in the context of Indonesia as a multiethnic nation-state (Visser 1988, 751). He believes that Indonesia's national integration should be based on a national culture that comes from the existence and synthesis of cultural variations in the country. In the context of the study of Papuan societies, he quickly points out not only their apparent differences, but also focuses mainly on the ostensible lack of 'culture' that Papuan communities have in comparison to other communities in Indonesia. However, like Sukarno, he insists that West Papua has always belonged to Indonesia, despite their racial and cultural differences. His studies make a case for Indonesia's civilizing missions in West Papua, and suggests that anthropologists should play a role in these processes.

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[384] The institution was founded in 1956 under the Ministry of Research.

[385] Presumably due to the high proportion of left-wing scientists there but this needs more research.

[386] See Aziz and Sutarto 2014, 316. He was appointed as a professor in SESKOAD.

In his first book on West Papua, he poses several problematic characteristics of the indigenous Papuans early on, such as the liberal character of their customary laws, the uncertain principles of their kinship system, the extensive use of witchcraft and magic among many Papuan societies, and the many millennial movements in the region (1970, 6). He says, "Papuan experts have known the liberal character of customary laws among ethnic groups in Papua for a quite some time, and this classifies them as *cultuurimprovisator*. It seems to me that the Papuans live in a society without strict codes of conduct, without a strong grip on coherent customs, such that Papuans can flexibly improvise their social attitudes and cultures depending on the situation. A Papua expert J. van Baal once problematized the liberal character of Papuan cultures and finally concludes that this symptom is a result of general characteristics and attributes of the Papuans, who have *ingrained indiscipline* that causes them to avoid any pressure from anything and anyone" (1970, 7, emphasis is mine).

While Koentjaraningrat's view of the natives as lazy—a stereotype that the Dutch applied to he and his fellow Indonesians in the 19th century—is not at all surprising; his take on cannibalism, however, is beyond belief. In his writing on the Hubula, he tells us, "One of the prominent issues here is that the Dani who speak South Dani, Dani Canyon and Hablifuri dialects are said to still practice cannibalistic customs. Meanwhile, other Dani speakers, such as Aikhe Dani and Wamena Dani no longer practice cannibalism, or if they did, they quit long before the missionaries came" (13). In talking about the impact of the new civilization, particularly the construction of Wamena city for the Hubula, he reinforces his view. He suggests that development is good for the Hubula, as it slowly eradicates "the custom of cannibalism or eating human flesh" (43).

Koentjaraningrat's tone can be heard across various ministries responsible for the development of the region, regardless of whether they were liberals or communists. In 1983, for instance, the New Order's Minister of Social Affairs Nani Soedarsono said, "They [the Papuans] are designated as isolated groups and sufferers of social problems, such as neglect, poverty, victims of

natural disasters, and so on. They must be lifted up; we need to help them so that they can be free from backwardness and the social problems that they are suffering from. Therefore, in the future development plan they can be together with us on the ship of national development that aims toward a prosperous society."[387]

Before being detained by Suharto due to his involvement with the Indonesian Communist Party, Dr. Soebandrio, who was the Indonesian Minster of Foreign Affairs during the Sukarno years (1957-1966) said, "Our government is to get the Irianese (Papuans) down from the trees, even if we have to pull them down."[388] In 2001, a new book written by Subandrio was published by a left-wing publication *Hasta Mitra*. The book is curiously entitled *Rectifying the History of Struggle of West Irian*, which is a response to the Papuans' request for a straightening of the history of West Papua. In it, he insists that Papuans do not understand their own history, so Subandrio wanted to teach them a lesson. Subandrio's project, however, should be situated within the longer historiography of the Indonesian history of West Papua, a historiography that is characterized by the heroic struggle of the Indonesian nation and the erasure of Papuans' agency.

Amberi and their Historiography

Benedict Anderson argues that the conception of Indonesia comes from the cartographic imagination of Nusantara, where a dot in the vast West Papua territory had become a site for the internment of Indonesian nationalists (1983). He writes, "The internment, and often the internment of nationalist martyrs, gave West New Guinea a central place in the folklore of the anti-colonial struggle, and made it a sacred site in the national imagining: Indonesia Free, from Sabang (at the northwestern tip of Sumatra) to—where else but?—Merauke [in the south of West Papua]. It made

[387] Berita Buana, December 26, 1983

[388] See Paul Spencer Wachtel, "A heartless transplants" in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 27, 1989.

no difference at all that, aside from the few hundred internees, no nationalists ever saw New Guinea with their own eyes until the 1960s. But Dutch colonial logo-maps sped across in the colony, showing a West New Guinea with nothing to its East, unconsciously reinforced the developing imagined ties" (176).

Anderson correctly analyzes how Indonesian nationalists such as Muhamad Yamin and Sukarno made use of the nationalist and anti-colonial sentiment in claiming this territory. However, Anderson fails to understand the imperialist tendency subdued in this claim and the role of electronic media in propagating the West Papua campaign to the Indonesian audience. In a series of debates that took place between May and August of 1945, though particularly during the heated session from July 10th to 11th of 1945, the Preparatory Committee for the Indonesian Independence discussed the topic of Papuans and West Papua in the decision about the state territory and population. Muhamad Yamin, a Minangkabau nationalist, argued that West Papua's position, as a launching pad to the Pacific, was important for Indonesian national security and integrity, not to mention that West Papua had been part of the Netherlands East Indies (BPUPKI 1995, 140). Muhamad Hatta, his fellow Minangkabau nationalist, challenged his conception, saying that Indonesia would imitate the imperialistic attitude of the Dutch—their colonizers—by claiming West Papua, a territory much different from the rest of the archipelago. He was in the position to see Papuans' sociological difference as enough reason to grant them rights to self-determination. In Hatta's point of view, Indonesia was not in a position to assume responsibilities towards this lagged territory (BUPKI, 147-148). Yamin was overwhelmingly supported by prominent members of the Committee, including Sukarno who later became the Indonesian president and a proponent of the Indonesian invasion of West Papua. Sukarno, however, refused the proposition that Indonesia's territory should be limited to the former Netherlands East Indies' territory. Indeed, his territorial conception is based on the Japanese colonial holding *Dai Nippon Teikoku* (BUPKI, 152). He also

cited *Negarakertagama*, a book written by Prapanca, the official historian of Majapahit Empire (1200-1400 AD) which declared Wwanin in southwest West Papua as under their sphere of influence. [389]In the final vote of the Committee, 39 out of 66 members supported Sukarno and Yamin. This final decision included West Papua, but also the territory of present day Malaysia (Malay peninsula and North Borneo), Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Timor Leste, and the neighboring islands.

Indonesia regards itself as an anti-colonial and moral force whose mandate is to "liberate West Papua" from the shackles of Dutch imperialism and colonialism (Soekarno 1961, 9; Subandrio 2000, 207). During the 1955 Bandung conference, this position was reasserted and supported by newly emerging nations such as India. The Indonesian official history of West Papua treats Papuans as passive victims of Dutch colonialism. Without asking the population themselves, the question of West Papua's place within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*, NKRI) is final for Indonesia. Following the New York Agreement in 1962 and The Act of Free Choice in 1969, West Papua was returned to the 'bosom of our motherland.' In an explanatory memorandum for the General Assembly in 1954, Indonesia asserted, "West Irian [West Papua] is and always has been—historically as well as constitutionally (legally)—an integral part of Indonesia, that is to say, also, the Netherlands East Indies."[390]

This position was reiterated in 2001 and 2003 when the Indonesian Permanent Representative in the United Nations released a document saying that:

> Indonesia's right of sovereignty rests on two grounds: first it had succeeded the Dutch sovereignty over the whole of the Netherlands East Indies, including Irian Jaya; second, there were historical ties between the rest of Indonesia and

[389] After becoming the Deputy First Minister/Minister of Information under Sukarno in 1962, Yamin reiterated his position in a speech delivered on the national re-awakening day in Jakarta, May 20, 1962. See Yamin 1962.

[390] U.N. Doc A/2694, August 18, 1954. Jennings (1963, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law) rightly points out that in the same period, Ceylon was also part of the Netherlands East Indies.

Irian Jaya.[391]

Indonesia's political claim to West Papua is legal and justified, because "sovereignty over Papua had already been transferred to Indonesia under the terms of Article 1 [of the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty] and that the issue was only how the administration of Papua would be transferred."[392]In West Papua, this claim is translated into a slogan promoted mainly by the Indonesian security forces and right-wing paramilitary groups, but also by Indonesian press and civilians as "NKRI harga mati" ("the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia or die!").[393]

This slogan represents, to borrow Nancy Rose Hunt's work in Congo, a colonial nervousness (2016). It reflects the uncertainty of Indonesian legitimacy in the region. This slogan is also reflected in the Indonesia's particular historical understanding and writing on West Papua that is best exemplified by the reading of Indonesian history textbooks published by the Indonesian government, research institutions, and most prominently, by the Center of History of the Indonesian Armed Forces (*Pusat Sejarah TNI*). This genre includes memoirs of military generals, textbooks for various history lessons from the elementary school to the university levels, and oral and digital forms circulated in the Indonesian-speaking world.

The Center of History of the Indonesian Armed Forces was founded in 1964 with the goal to fight against the Indonesian Communist Party's program (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) to publish a new historical textbook on national struggle (Pusat Sejarah TNI 1964). The establishment of this center demonstrates the significance of history for defending the Indonesian military's rights

[391] See the Indonesian Permanent Representative to the United Nations 2001.

[392] See the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations 2003.

[393] The slogan generates a song entitled "NKRI harga mati" (https://www.youtube.com/user/1708194NKRIhargaMati) and many visual renderings of the slogan.

to political power, and the serious threat that the Communists posed for this aspiration. This center for the history of the Indonesian Armed Forces has published militarized content for Indonesian National History textbooks and a series on the "History of National Struggle," which includes a discussion on the Indonesian military operation to 'liberate' West Papua. These books and their version of history have been read in almost all Indonesian schools and universities and are popularized by television, film, and other media. Textbooks should be considered as part of the larger *discourse networks* on West Papua, which include publications from civilian publishers and ministry of information during the Sukarno and Suharto years, films, and radio and television programs.[394]

Indonesian Electronic Media and the West Papua Campaign

The Indonesian campaign to win West Papua coincided with the peak period for cinema going in the country and the arrival of new mass technology: television. Cinema was an old media in Indonesia. The territory had produced films since the 1920s. After independence, fiction films were popular, but also newsreels and documentaries. During the post-independence years, Indonesian Film News, a government-owned film production company produced newsreels of events that were deemed critical for the new country. From 1946 to 1949 they made at least thirteen documentations of historical events. In 1961, their journalists went to Yogyakarta when Sukarno launched his Trikora (Three People Commands). The Trikora was broadcasted in Indonesian cinemas on February 17, 1962. Beginning at least 1961, a newsreel program was created under the banner of *The Spirit of Indonesia*, which by 1962 had reached almost 500 series. *The Spirit of Indonesia* is a collection of

[394] In Indonesian, the department is called *kementerian penerangan* which can also mean the ministry of propaganda.

newsreels from all over the archipelago and regularly screened in Indonesian cinemas until about 1965.[395]

We can see the influence of cinema on Indonesians during the 1950s and 1960s through box office figures. Since the post-war period, ticket sales had increased dramatically. In 1952, for instance, more than 200 million tickets were sold, but in 1960, this figure more than doubled with over 450 million tickets.[396] This makes clear how, in addition to radio, cinema was a highly popular medium. The television, on the other hand, was introduced in 1962 during the peak period of Indonesia's campaign on West Papua. Sukarno use both old and new media not only to popularize himself, but also to amplify his revolutionary messages, including the West Papua campaign. Sukarno himself was a radio political figure. It was through his voice that most Indonesians knew Sukarno, not through his writings. When TVRI began their broadcasting on August 17, 1962, *The Spirit of Indonesia* moved to the television screen. The programs ran for 10 minutes, and each title was screened for a week.[397] In its first year of broadcasting, at least 10,000 households possessed a television set (primarily sold by National Panasonic).[398] Since 1961, West Papua issues were a staple of this broadcast.[399] After the rise of the New Order, President Suharto replaced *the Spirit of Indonesia* with *the Spirit of Development*. Although the figure changed, the content was quite similar. Broadcasts on West Papua shifted to a more developmental approach. The combination of media that were

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[395] Every film screening (be it Hollywood, Bollywood or Indonesian films) had to be preceded with this broadcast.

[396] The Indonesian cinemathèque's data. The figure of Anwar Congo in the film "The Act of Killing" came precisely from this period.

[397] Frequently *The Spirit of Indonesia* broadcasted a special program which could last for 20 minutes.

[398] On the history of Indonesian television, see Kitley 2000.

[399] See the Indonesian National Archive (ANRI), DVD 340 DVD-RK; 352 DVD-RK; 418 DVD-RK, 425 DVD-RK; 464 DVD-FILM; 642 DVD-FILM.

available at that time and the emergence of the electronic medium were pivotal in popularizing West Papua campaigns to the Indonesian masses. I will argue that in an archipelagic country like Indonesia, media play a strong, significant role in consolidating this national consciousness. During the Sukarno years, the revolution narrative framed the West Papua issue within Indonesia; yet by the time of the New Order, the Indonesian historical narrative relies on the nationalist narrative of struggle—of which Papuans did not partake (see Steedly 2013).

Textbooks

During the New Order, textbooks became a vehicle of Indonesian nationalist narratives. The Center of History of the Indonesian Armed Forces has published history textbooks that deal with the Indonesian 'liberation' of West Papua. Some titles worth mentioning include *Tales of Heroism: War for Independence 1945-1949 and Battles to Liberate West Irian I and II* (1993),[400] *West Irian's Issues at the United Nations* (1961),[401] *Raise the Red and White Flag in West Irian* (1961),[402] and *West Irian is a Demand by All Indonesian People* (1961);[403] countless official books were published about the history of Indonesian military, such as *Ten Years of the Military Area Command in Papua 1963-1973: Potentials, Roles and Dual Roles of the Armed Forces in Papua* (1973),[404] *Fourteen Years of the Military Area Command in Papua* (1978),[405] *History of Liberation Operations of West Irian* (1971),[406] and recently, *52 Years of the Infiltration of*

[400] *Kisah-Kisah Kepahlawanan: Perang Kemerdekaan 1945-1949 dan Perang Merebut Kembali Irian Barat 1 and 2.*

[401] *Masalah Irian Barat di Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa.*

[402] *Kibarkanlah Sang Merah Putih di Irian Barat.*

[403] *Irian Barat adalah Tuntutan Seluruh Rakjat Indonesia*

[404] *10 Tahun Kodam XVII/Cenderawasih (Dasawarsa I) 1963-1973: Potensi, Peranan dan Kekaryaan TNI AD di Irian Jaya.*

[405] *Catur Dasa Warsa, Empat Belas Tahun Kodam XVII/Cenderawasih (1963-1977).*

the Storm Troops in West Irian (2014).[407] All these books narrate, eventalize, and legitimize history and historical events deemed important by Indonesia, though especially by the Indonesian military. Their historiography consists of enumerations of important dates and figures, such as the importance of Sukarno's People's Triple Command (*Trikora)*, the list of military operations and the military generals that were involved, the success of Suharto's development agenda, and so on. Rarely this history gives a place for Papuans or Papuan stories, such as the stories of looting that I mentioned earlier. An example from a high school history textbook (grade 9) demonstrates this nicely.




Figure 7.1. Tales of Heroism: War on Independence 1945-1949 (1993)

[406] *Sedjarah operasi-operasi Pembebasan Irian Barat.*

[407] *52 Tahun Infiltrasi PGT di Irian Barat: Bertahan & Berburu di Belantara Irian.*



BAB 11

PERJUANGAN BANGSA INDONESIA MEREBUT IRIAN BARAT

Tujuan Pembelajaran

Pada bab ini kalian akan mempelejari tentang perjuangan bangsa Indonesia dalam merebut Irian Barat dan setelah mempelajari materi bab ini kalian diharapkan mampu mendeskripsikan perjuangan bangsa Indonesia merebut kembali Irian Barat melalui perjuangan diplomasi dan perjuangan secara radikal termasuk pelaksanaan Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat (Pepera).

Sumber: 30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka

Kata Kunci

- Diplomasi
- Radikal
- Soasio
- Karel Doorman
- Trikora
- Komando Mandala
- Hari Samudra
- Infiltrasi
- Eksploitasi
- Konsolidasi
- Rencana Bunker
- UNTEA

Bangsa Indonesia yang mempunyai kepribadian Pancasila dalam kehidupan sehari-hari maupun dalam pergaulan antarbangsa, selalu menjujung tinggi hak asasi manusia serta mengutamakan musyawarah untuk mufakat dalam menghadapi persoalan, termasuk dalam menyelesaikan masalah Irian Barat dengan Belanda. Imperialis Belanda sebenarnya masih ingin menjajah Indonesia yang subur makmur dan kaya akan hasil bumi, maka dengan dalih memperjuangkan kemerdekaan Irian Barat lepas dari pemerintah Republik Indonesia, Belanda selalu menunda untuk menyerahkan Irian Barat kepada Indonesia. Oleh karena sikap Belanda yang demikian, maka dalam rangka merebut kembali Irian Barat bangsa Indonesia melakukan perjuangan baik perjuangan diplomasi maupun perjuangan secara radikal.

Bab 11 Perjuangan Bangsa Indonesia Merebut Irian Barat 197

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Figure 7.2. Danang Endarto, Supraptono, Haryono S. and Nahar Rifai. *Ilmu Pengetahuan Sosial 3*. Jakarta: Pusat Perbukuan, Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, 2009 (the title page reads, "Indonesian Struggle to Take Over West Papua").

The textbook was published by the Ministry of Education and used across Indonesia—including in West Papua's schools—to teach the Indonesian version of history.[408] It presents a state-centered historiography where there is no single mention about Papuans' aspirations or agency. Nor does the book mention the military operations that killed hundreds of thousands of Papuans. The textbook says, for instance, "The people of West Irian were aware that they were part of the Indonesian nation, and they did not want to be separated from their [Indonesian] brothers and sisters. Therefore, the Pepera Council unanimously voted to remain within the Unitary Republic of Indonesia" (Danang 2009, 202). For students outside of West Papua, this chapter represents their

[408] The topic of the history of West Papua is also taught in the history class for grade X (high school).

only encounter with Papuan history (or rather the state history of Papuans). But for Papuan children, they are forced not only to believe in this version of their history, which depicts their subjugation to a foreign power, but also to memorize this over and over again during their nine years of mandatory schooling.

Moments and Monuments

In addition to book publishing, the military history of West Papua gave rise to the construction of monuments of liberation. Nearly all of these monuments were built by the Indonesian military to commemorate the roles of the Indonesian armed forces in the "liberation" of the region.[409] Some examples are The Act of Free Choice Monument, Yos Sudarso Monument, and Benny Moerdani Monument in West Papua, as well as the Liberation of West Papua Monument in Makassar, Indonesia. Such monuments dot the Papuan landscape. They are often attached to military offices, which in West Papua exist in every single district in the cities, coastal areas, borderlands, and regencies in the hinterlands.

Following the monuments, there are also commemorations of days of national importance, such as May 1st as the day of the Liberation of West Papua. In West Papua, all Indonesian national days are celebrated in an almost spectacular fashion, one rarely found in other regions in the country. I argue that Indonesia deliberately intensifies the national day's celebrations in West Papua not only to make sure that Papuans identify as Indonesians, but also, and most importantly, to test Papuans' loyalty to the nation. Commemorations of Indonesian national days are sites for the performance of the Indonesian state .They not only reinforce the state's power, but also the Indonesian version of history, mainly through public readings or official addresses given on these

[409] Commodore Yos Sudarso was a naval officer killed during the battle of Arafura Sea in 1962. L. Benny Moerdani was a prominent military general and former Minister of Defense and Security. He fought for the strategic command (RPKAD and Kostrad) during the early period of Indonesia's invasion of West Irian (1961-1963). He's a close aid to Suharto.

occasions. Like the Surakarta court during Dutch colonialism, Indonesia pays meticulous attention to the commemoration's detailed rules. These imposed rules range from the regulation of attire, ranks, and personal conduct, to whether Papuans follow those rules (Pemberton 1994). Even a mundane weekly flag ceremony brings the question of Papuans' loyalty to Indonesia into sharp focus. There have been a lot of stories where Papuans—children and adults alike— are forced to attend flag ceremonies, the Indonesian Independence Day, the anniversary of the Indonesian Armed Forces, and National Heroes Day. Almost all flag ceremonies last for about two hours. They are carried out in a city or district square, usually under the scorching Papuan sun, where attendees are required to salute the red and white flag, sing the Indonesian national anthem, and listen to the official addresses given by the leaders in attendance. For Papuans, all of these actions are carried out under the malignant gaze of the Indonesian police force, military officials, teachers, and other authoritative figures. An example can be presented to illustrate this point.

On one summer evening in 2015, my Papuan friends Sampari and Armando and I went to watch a soccer match in the Mandala stadium in Jayapura. We watched West Papua's Persipura football club playing with the prominent Persija club from Jakarta. The Indonesian President Joko Widodo attended and inaugurated the game. The security procedures were highly strict, but that was not uncommon in West Papua. Thousands of police officers and soldiers from different military units in West Papua guarded the stadium and conducted checks at all eight gates. On the stage, a military corps sang nationalist and pop songs, followed by a scene of Papuan dances. Spectators were prohibited from carrying a flag, except the Indonesian red and white. This was based on previous experiences when Papuans brought the morning star flag to a match. Increasingly, Papuans disguise the morning star flag in their attire, dresses, headdresses, bracelets, net bags (*noken),* and even tattoos on their bodies. Today, the security forces have begun to police this.

During the singing of Indonesian anthem, most Papuans did not stand or salute the flag, let alone sing the anthem, while the Indonesian audience duly stood and saluted the flag. In 2015, Persipura's captain, Boaz Solossa refused to sing the Indonesian anthem while representing Indonesia in the Asia Cup. Solossa's resistance is not unique. Despite the forced attendances at these commemorations, Papuans continue to celebrate their own national day every December 1st and sing their own anthem. This date recalls the day when the Dutch allowed Papuans to raise their morning star flag along with the Dutch flag for the first time in 1961. Papuans also build their own monuments, mainly via the designation of a particular status to specific cemetery of Papuan figures, as I have described in the third chapter.

The imposition of Indonesian history on Papuans is only possible by undermining, and to an extent *erasing Papuan histories*. The narrative assumes that before Indonesia's arrival, Papuans lived in homogenous, empty time. To fill this void, Indonesia created a historical fiction through a publication of books about the Papuans' supposed participation in the Indonesian struggle, in the creation of national heroes from West Papua, and in the faked participation during Indonesian nationalist rites. I argue that this continuous narrative of an Indonesian colonial mandate to save West Papua and Papuans from the shackles of European imperialism has survived the Sukarno, Suharto, and reforms years. We can see how the *amberi* narrative of West Papua consists of a complex agglomeration of different forms of colonial narratives. Some narratives, such as the primitive and cannibal trope came from the period of European colonialism. Other narratives emerged from and were developed during Indonesian rule. But together, these narratives form a linear narrative of subjugation for Papuans.

Benny Giay is particularly adept at attacking this kind of narrative and Indonesian historians who produce, support, and circulate this narrative. Reiterating his conception of Papuan history, he says, "In the 1960s, without shame, the *amberi* presented themselves as a liberator of West Papua, a

liberator from the Dutch colonialism and backwardness. They have done this while hiding their culture of pillaging that they inherit [from their colonizer]…" (Giay 2009, 28). He further elaborates, "State violence in West Papua is no more than a reflection of racism and the mentality of robbers and pirates that have plundered West Papua for centuries until today. Only since the 1960s have the old a*mberi* appointed themselves as civilized people and positioned Papuans as primitive, stupid, lazy, tree-dwelling people" (31).[410]

I think that Giay's concern is for the claim of Indonesian history that has facilitated the pacification of the region. He argues strongly that Indonesian historiography is problematic for Papuans because the Indonesian history of West Papua conceals the fact of racism, the history of robbery, and slavery by foreigners to Papuans. In this historiography, Papuans have for centuries been, and continue to be, used and treated as slaves. He argues that the imagination of Indonesia and Indonesian-ness relies on the history that conceals racism and slavery against Papuans. Since the early 1960s, *amberi* historians have utilized many tactics to convince themselves and Papuans to accept their version of history. He says, "Indonesian academics and intellectuals that were born and grew up in this kind of society promote the powerful's version of history, a version of history that conceals *amberi*'s racism and violence" (2011, 34). Giay rejects Koentjaraningrat's anthropology, as well as Harsja Bachtiar's historical text entitled "The history of West Irian," which portrays the interaction between Papuans and Indonesians from the *amberi*'s point of view.

Along the same lines, he criticizes the role of Koentjaraningrat and Budi Santoso during the touring exhibitions of Asmat arts in Europe in June 1989, which were organized by the Indonesian

[410] This statement is a reaction to a statement by Dr. Soebandrio, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia (1957-1966) saying that "our government was to get the Irianese (Papuans) down from the trees, even if we have to pull them down." See Wachtel 1989. In 2001, a new book written by Subandrio was published by a left-wing publication Hasta Mitra. The book is curiously entitled *Meluruskan Sejarah Perjuangan Irian Barat* (Rectifying the History of Struggle of West Irian).

government.[411]In his particular attack on Indonesian intellectual Rizal Mallarangeng, he quotes him saying, "Papuans, like other Indonesian citizens, have to become modern. With their present potential, the avenue to modernity can only be reached if the area can open itself to migrants," to which Benny Giay adds, "whose characters are portrayed by Acub Zainal and Dorus Rumbiak …" (Giay 34). For Papuans, the *amberi* supremacy over Papuans is the ideological foundation of the destruction of Papuans' self-respect and dignity. For Papuans like Benny Giay, historical narratives that reproduce, legitimize, and strengthen this supremacy have facilitated the further colonization of the territory. Rewriting Papuan history is then a first step towards decolonization.

Some Agendas for Papuan History

"I travel across Java to 'socialize' the agenda of straightening of the history of West Papua to the young generation of Papuans, also to our Indonesian friends who care about the struggle of Papuans," said Filep Karma in November 2016.[412] Filep Karma is a highly respected former political prisoner. He was detained twice due to his role in raising the morning star flag in Biak and Jayapura in 1998 and 2004 respectively (see Rutherford 2012). During the fall of 2016, he visited several cities on Java Island and talked to Papuan student groups about "the history of the nation and the struggle for the independence of West Papua" (2016). His activities were reported not only by newspapers and news portals, but also on social media, where pictures and reports of the events quickly circulated in the Papuan online sphere.

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411 Suharto administered these exhibitions through his Yayasan Kemajuan dan Pengembangan Asmat which was chaired by Kharis Suhud.

412 "Dialog Sejarah Papua, Filep Karma Tur Keliling Jawa." Papua Post accessed on https://papuapost.wordpress.com/2016/11/18/dialog-sejarah-papua-filep-karma-tur-keliling-jawa/. He reiterates this call on December 2, 2016. See Arnold Belau. "Pelurusan Sejarah West Papua Harus disosialisasikan ke Semua Rakyat Papua." Suara Papua accessed on December 9, 2016.

Filep Karma himself has written a book entitled *As If We're Half Animals* (2014), a widely read book about his experience as a Papuan and his conception of Papuan national liberation. He also actively participates and attends political rallies in West Papua and Indonesia. I attended one such session in the summer of 2016. These young Papuans read Indonesian history in school, though they listen to and read Papuan history from their family and friends, and online.

Filep Karma, like Benny Giay, proves that while West Papua has been constructed as a site of slavery and oppression, Papuans have transformed this site into one of creativity. It is a generative site that creates a condition of possibility for the birth of a new Papuan historiography. In his book *Towards A New Papua* (2000), Benny Giay proposes some aspects of a new Papuan history. Papuan history, he argues, is

> "a collective discourse with memories of Papuans from various socioeconomic backgrounds and classes who fight against the culture of racism and slavery of the *amberi*"(Giay 2011, 19-20).

It is a history that challenges the historiography of the colonizer. In other words, this is a historiography of the colonized. And by no means is he alone in these efforts. Tom Beanal, a Catholic Amungme who co-led the Presidium, advised the members of the Presidium on how the rectification of Papuan history might be achieved. Tom Beanal proposes that the history of Papuan struggle as a nation should begin with the birth of a new consciousness in the souls of Papuans, such that they can become subjects who struggle for their emancipation and liberation. Papuan history, according to Tom Beanal, begins when Papuans become aware that they have been colonized. Thus, for Tom Beanal, the rectification of Papuan history does not begin with the history of the Dutch arriving in West Papua and controlling the territory. Nor does it begin from the history of Ternate and Tidore who colonized West Papua. According to his point of view, this kind of history is necessary but not primary. This kind of history functions merely as a complement, because the real Papuan history begins with Papuans' consciousness. It is through their consciousness of their

situation as the colonized, then, that they rise and fight to seize their independence. The birth of such consciousness, according to Tom Beanal, is the beginning of the history of Papuans. In other words, Papuan history begins when the Papuans become subjects of history (Giay 2009, 13). But then how do Papuans write their history if they do not have an archive?

Archives of the Colonized

> "It is unnecessary to point out that the Nambikwara have no written language…Nevertheless, as I had done among the Caduveo, I handed out sheets of paper and pencils. At first, they did nothing with them, then one day I saw that they were all busy drawing wavy, horizontal lines. I wondered what they were trying to do, and then it suddenly bore upon me that they were writing…"
>
> —(Claude Lévi-Strauss, 1963)

In the movement to rectify history, the historical records of the Papuan people are located "in the historical experience and self-understanding of the Papuan nation"(Giay 2001,1). For Giay, Papuan people are reliable sources and witnesses of history (Benny Giay 1). To qualify themselves as sources of history, Papuans challenge historical documents as the foundation and paradigm of historical imagination (Ginzburg 1999 and Strassler 2008). Benny Giay argues that documents for the rectification of Papuan history should be found in West Papua, because the actors and victims of Papuan history are Papuans. Secondly, Papuans have historical experience that has never be written and given space, and these conditions have shaped the character and self-knowledge of Papuan people today. In his argument, Papuan people are living documents.

Living documents and living archives are new terms that inspire young Papuans like Alex Giay. Alex Giay was born in 1990 in a village on the shore of Tigi Lake, not far from Benny Giay's village. He is a poetry editor for an online Papuan literary journal, but he is more than happy to write weekly poems for the journal himself. His Facebook page is full of poems written with a tone somewhat romantic and patriotic. In the summer of 2016, his friends showed me a draft of his book, which has a lengthy title that reads something like "A high dose of motivational and

inspirational words from the fighters of West Papua's liberation struggle." As the title suggests, the book is a collection of inspirational quotes taken from thousands of Papuan speeches, social media statuses, random chats, and conversations with Papuan independence fighters. He copies Buchtar Tabuni's speeches, for instance, such as "We are fighting because of history." Upon his release from the Indonesian prison, Tabuni says, "I am not freed, I am just relocated from a small prison to the big prison" (Alex Giay 2016, 12).

Like Walter Benjamin's collector, Alex Giay is obsessed with classification and order. When he finally emailed me the draft of his book, he had neatly composed his collections into different chapters with each file focusing on a certain subject. His poetry and the collections of speeches themselves are files and documents of everyday life. They are generated from the process of life. They possess the qualities of both photographs and oral histories. If files are located between spoken and written language (Vismann 2008, 8), Alex lives between the spoken and written regimes of the contemporary Papuan situation. His work forms a living archive.

In the minds of the young generation like Alex Giay, documentary evidence of the past does not necessarily manifest in written inscriptions stacked in the national or regional archives. Most of the documents and records of the Papuan past have been burned or deliberately destroyed [by the *amberi*], or eaten away by the passage of time. The making of archives is indeed part and parcel of the Papuan historiography. It is a way to decolonize the Indonesian history and its historiography.

Memoria Passionis

Since the late 1990s, the Catholic Church has deployed *memoria passionis* as a popular term. It is not only used in human rights circles, but also in many conversations about West Papua's history. Derived from the conception of the German Catholic theologian, Johann Baptist Metz, the Secretariat For Justice and Peace of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Jayapura (SKP Jayapura) defines

memoria passionis as "a shared memory of suffering under Indonesia" (van den Broek and Hernawan 2001, 66).[413] At its core, the *memoria passionis* that SKP Jayapura proposes is a project to chronicle human rights violations against Papuans. In their *memoria passionis*, SKP Jayapura makes it explicit that the causes of this suffering are the Indonesian state, their development policy, their poor human rights records and violations in West Papua, and the high presence of security forces in the region. *Memoria passionis* of the Catholic then asserts a mainstream human rights discourse that represents Papuans as victims of Indonesia's state-sanctioned violence.

By its form, SKP Jayapura's *memoria passionis* is geared towards advocacy and legal proceedings. For Benny Giay, it is much more. Here, terms like evidence and experience are subject to contestation, particularly in the local, national and international networks of human rights advocacy in which SKP Jayapura is implicated. Through their presence at the United Nations, SKP Jayapura via the Franciscan International has made use of several international and Indonesian national human rights instruments to bring about the case of West Papua, and to mobilize Papuans' suffering as evidence of violations. SKP Jayapura's audience is clear, namely the Indonesian state and its apparatus, as well as various international human rights communities (including in the United States).

While Giay agrees on the use of this term, he suggests that *memoria passionis* not only reflects the shared feeling and memory of colonialism, but also "a mirror and the source of Papuan power to fight against the Indonesian government" (2000, 57). He further elaborates that *memoria passionis* in West Papua has given rise to a vision of a better future, namely a new West Papua, an independent

[413] The office of justice and peace is a structure under The Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace (*Justitia et Pax*) dedicated to the international promotion of justice, peace, and human rights. The office of justice and peace in Jayapura was directly under the direction of Jayapura's Archbishop. In West Papua, there are five dioceses (Jayapura, Merauke, Sorong, Timika, and Agats in Asmat), which run their own office of justice and peace. Unfortunately, the office of justice and peace in Jayapura was dissolved, and the whole structure was transferred to the Franciscan Friars in 2013.

West Papua.[414] These two diverging views express the two different trajectories that the Catholic Church and the Kingmi Church take in regards to the case of West Papua. While SKP Jayapura has been involved in advocating for Papuans who have suffered, the Catholic Church of West Papua, in its institutional context, has not produced a particular conception of Papuan suffering theology. This is in contrast not only to the roles that the Catholic Church played in Latin America, but also, closer to home, Reverend Benny Giay's and his evangelical church's stance, which powerfully expresses a conceptualization and articulation of Papuan suffering theology.[415]

For Giay, *memoria passionis* is a theology. He says, "This theology struggles with a silent history of those who are enslaved and colonized, the minority who is often not accounted for as human beings, or those who because of the cruelty and brutality of a certain political regime, are forced to flee…" (2006, 21). This theology also views that the *memoria passionis* is not a mere décor or supplement to the Christian theology. It is not a reason to pull one's self from the reality, but it is one of God's unfinished projects in the world. He says, "What project? A project of justice and salvation… In this context, the church's mission should be the salvation of history, our history. It needs to be done by nurturing a culture of remembrance. Our history should be celebrated.

414 Compare McLeod 2016.

415 For instance, in the Kingmi theology school (STT Walter Post) students must take a class in Papuan theology with a syllabus that was devised by Reverend Benny Giay. I attended the lecture on March 18, 2016. My field notes say, "Reverend Giay gave a lecture on local theology, namely contextual theology, or Papuan theology. What he meant by this is 'pandangan orang Papua tentang keTuhanan, masa depan, masa lalu, masa sekarang, dll.' It can also be called a 'teologi penderitaan' (suffering theology), a theology that comes from the experience of suffering. He read a CAMA report dated 08.01.1989 about the earthquake in Yahukimo. He mentioned the Black Death incident in Europe, where 75 millions of Europeans died in four years. He facilitated a discussion on the reports. Talking about death. Then he spoke about the 1977 military operation, from April-July of 1977 in the Highlands. He spoke of a figure of death. How Christianity deals with the death?"

Regardless of the risk, the church should make its mission to not forget their history" (23-24).[416] As a theologian, Giay interestingly positions his history as the history of Papuan people, those who reject the imposition of Papuans as slaves and second-class citizens. It also presents the history of Papuan churches who find themselves in the middle of this colonial situation. Here we can see the unique role of Christianity in West Papua's decolonization projects. Christianity becomes both the language and object of decolonization projects. Here one can see the confluence of different conceptions of Papuan history that also draw the history of the Papuan church vis-à-vis the evangelical and other *amberi* churches. Giay's historical consciousness was born through these histories, but it creates its own historicity. For him, decolonizing Papuan history from their *amberi* influence is not merely a political project. It is a moral project, a reformed and theological project.

Final Remarks

Rectifying history is not specific to West Papua, that in West Papua, this agenda delinks and does not draw from the rectifying history agenda in Indonesia. West Papua's rectifying history contests, delegitimizes, de-narrativizes, and de-eventualizes Indonesian history. From 2000 to 2009, the Indonesian authorities banned several of these books. Sendius Wonda's *The Sinking of Melanesian Cultures*[417]was banned on November 27, 2007. On June 11, 2006, the government prohibited the circulation of an atlas containing the Papuan morning star flag. The Indonesian Attorney General's Office banned Reverend Socratez Sofyan Yoman's books on June 26, 2008 and December 22, 2009,

[416] In his report as a head of the synod of the Kingmi church of West Papua (2010-2015), Giay even sprinkles his prose with a discussion on new evangelicalism. This may merit more consideration.

[417] The Indonesian title is *Tenggelamnya Rumpun Melanesia: Pertarungan Politik NKRI di Papua Barat.*

respectively.[418] In 2004, the Jayapura District Prosecutor General banned the publication of Benny Giay's *The Killing of Theys: The Death of Human Rights in West Papua* (2003).[419] The books, the Office states, have "violated the Law No. 4/PNPS/1963, dated on April 23, 1963 about the 'clearance' of printed materials whose content can disturb public order" (the Indonesian Institute of Social History 2010).[420] In the Netherlands too, the rectification of Papuan history seems to meet a strong opposition from the government, as demonstrated by the case of the publication of Pieter Drooglever's book *An Act of Free Choice*. The book, based on research that the Netherlands' Minister of Foreign Affairs commissioned in 2001, is the first historical study of their former colony. [421] The Netherlands' Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Bot refused to take responsibility for the publication of the book. Or in other words, the Minister whose father was involved in the transfer of sovereignty of West Papua in 1962 did not approve this version of history.[422] This incident returns

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418 The titles are "The Genocide of Melanesian Ethnicity: To Break the Silence of History of Violence in West Papua" (*Pemusnahan Etnis Melanesia: Memecah Kebisuan Sejarah Kekerasan di Papua Barat*) (2007) and "The Church's Voice for the Oppressed: Suffering, Bloodshed and Tears of God's Flocks in West Papua Have To Be Ended"(*Suara Gereja Bagi Umat Tertindas:Penderitaan, Tetesan Darah dan Cucuran Air Mata Umat Tuhan di Papua Barat Harus Diakhiri*) (2007).The decision was made with the Surat Keputusan Jaksa Agung No KEP-052/A/JA/06/2008 and the Keputusan Jaksa Agung Nomor KEP-140/A/JA/12/2009, December 22, 2009.

419 The Indonesian title is *Pembunuhan Theys: Kematian HAM di Tanah Papua*.

420 The law was issued by Sukarno's administration, ironically to fight against the spreading of liberal ideas or publication by the imperialists/capitalists' organizations and henchmen, such as USIS (the United States Information Services) in Indonesia. The campaign against book banning can be seen here:https://sites.google.com/site/sejarahsosial/pelaranganbuku.

421 Drooglever states that since 1999, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs had spoken about the new development in West Papua. He mentions the request of the Dutch Parliament's members E. van Middelkoop and J.C. van Aartsen to conduct a thorough research about the 1969 Act of Free Choice. See Drooglever 2010, 11-12.

422 Bernard Rudolf Bot (born in Jakarta, November 21, 1937) was a Dutch politician of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) who served as the Dutch minister of foreign affairs in 2003-2007. His father, Theo Bot served as the State Secretary of the Interior for the Netherlands New Guinea (West Papua) (1959-1963) in the De Quay cabinet who was responsible for the New York Agreement. Theo Bot also served as

us to the 1962 event when the Netherlands surrendered their control of New Guinea to their former colonial subjects, Indonesia.

Throughout the dissertation I have used the term "a colonial present" to refer to the trans-temporality of colonialism in West Papua, to the ways in which Papuans frame their condition under both emergent and residual forms of colonial rule. I hope by examining West Papua's colonial history and the experience of the Papuans in a colonial present, this study offers a new approach to the ethnography and historiography of colonialism and help orient various programs of decolonization.

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The present study is partly based upon published and unpublished documents. Research has been carried out in the archives in West Papua, Indonesia, the Netherlands, and the United States of America. To this end, the following archives and repositories have been researched:

- The Kingmi Church of West Papua
- Yayasan Persekolahan dan Pendidikan Katolik (YPPK)
- The Catholic Archive at STFT Fajar Timur
- Yayasan Pendidikan Persekolahan Gereja-Gereja Injili (YPPGI)
- The Christian and Missionary Alliance Archival Services
- The Jayapura Public Library (the Papuan Collection)
- The Research and Development of the Mimika Regency
- The Special Collection at STT Jakarta

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the Dutch Minister of Education, Culture and Science (1963-1965), and Minister for Development Cooperation (1965-1966).

- KITLV Collection at Leiden University
- The International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam
- The Indonesian National Archive
- The Center of History of the Indonesian Armed Forces
- The Library of the Indonesian Ministry of Defense
- The Library of the Indonesian Ministry of Informatics and Telecommunication
- The Indonesian Cinématheque
- The National Archives of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
- The Baker Special Collection at the Harvard Business School
- The National Archives and Records Administration of the United States
- The Kissinger Papers at the Yale University Library
- Cornell University Library.

Selections of documents from these archives have been digitized and are available online.

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