



Biopolitics as an Enabling Function of Genocide: Revisiting Foucault's Theory of Biopower to Conceptualize Mass Mobilization for Genocide

Citation

Goetz-Charlier, Alexandra. 2023. Biopolitics as an Enabling Function of Genocide: Revisiting Foucault's Theory of Biopower to Conceptualize Mass Mobilization for Genocide. Master's thesis, Harvard University Division of Continuing Education.

Link

<https://nrs.harvard.edu/URN-3:HUL.INSTREPOS:37374998>

Terms of use

This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material (LAA), as set forth at

<https://harvardwiki.atlassian.net/wiki/external/NGY5NDE4ZjgzNTc5NDQzMGIzZWZhMGFIOWI2M2EwYTg>

Accessibility

<https://accessibility.huit.harvard.edu/digital-accessibility-policy>

Share Your Story

The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. [Submit a story](#)

Biopolitics as an Enabling Function of Genocide: Revisiting Foucault's Theory of *Biopower* to
Conceptualize Mass Mobilization for Genocide

Alexandra Goetz-Charlier

A Thesis in the Field of International Relations
for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

Harvard University

May 2023

Abstract

Why do people participate in genocide? This thesis seeks to answer the question of what prompts civilians to actively participate in genocide or, alternatively, to passively support genocidal policies. Through the concept of the “banality of evil,” Arendt, a political philosopher and Holocaust survivor, explains that participants in genocide are not necessarily fanatics or sociopaths but rather ordinary people who may be motivated by other aims than extremist ideology, such as professional success or peer pressure. Similarly, the recent political science scholarship questions the role of dehumanization and propaganda in mass mobilization for genocide, i.e., whether civilians simply hear dehumanization discourses on the radio or read about it in the newspapers and suddenly decide to participate in the commission of mass atrocities. This thesis relies on the writings of Michel Foucault, a French thinker who coined the concept of biopolitics, which refers to the state’s management and regulation of all biological aspects of a human population through modern technologies, e.g., birth control, marriage, food, religion, sexuality, and public health. As such, it revisits Foucault’s theory of biopower to explain mass mobilization in intrastate genocide, defined as cases in which a genocidaire government seeks to destroy one of its own groups. This thesis therefore argues that, well before genocide is planned or even intended, biopolitical restrictions taken by the state regulate – and call into question – the existential rights of the targeted group. As such, it argues that dehumanization and hate propaganda are *only* made possible whenever

compounded with pre-existing structural violence against the targeted group enshrined in laws and institutions.

Author's Biographical Sketch

I am an attorney specialized in international and EU law, currently working at the Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxembourg. This thesis was completed after a six-month secondment at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, the Netherlands, in 2019. During my time at the ICC, I worked in the Victims Participation and Reparations Unit (VPRS) and subsequently clerked in the chambers of Judge Perrin de Brichambaut. Having read countless testimonies of victims of grave human right abuses speaking of their ordeals, I wanted to investigate the crucial question of *why* civilians actively participate in genocide, or, at least, support, nefarious policies implemented by a state. This experience prompted me to expand the scope of this project beyond a mere theoretical exploration in search of a new framework of analysis for genocide. To understand the reality of genocide, I have relied, whenever appropriate, on accounts of live testimonies of survivors of the Rohingya genocide and analyzed contemporary hate speech and incitement to genocide on the social media.

With the limited amount of time and resources available for this project, I have sought to demonstrate that *biopolitics*, i.e., a term coined in the late 1970s by Michel Foucault, a French thinker, referring to state measures that regulate the biology and/or existence of a group, are a necessary component for intrastate genocide, i.e., cases in which a state turns its violence against one of its own groups and seeks to destroy it. While I claim that biopolitics are an enabler of intrastate genocide, I ought to specify that I merely argue that biopolitics create a context in which genocide, as a socio-political

process, is more likely to occur. I do not support the view that biopolitics implemented by a genocidaire government against the targeted group may be used as an excuse or justification to expunge individual responsibility for the commission of atrocities. In an ever more unstable global context, holding perpetrators accountable for their wrongs and giving voices to victims of human right abuses is a priority. I hope that this modest contribution to the legal and political scholarship will lead to further exploration and critical reflection on the biopolitical frame, as a possible tool for genocide prevention.

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge and give my warmest thanks to my thesis director, Dr. Rosie Wagner of the Committee on Degrees in Social Studies at Harvard University. Her guidance was invaluable and carried me through all the stages of writing my research. Her door was always open. She consistently steered me in the right direction whenever she thought I needed it.

I must also express my gratitude to my research advisor, Dr. Ariane Liazos of the Harvard University Extension School for her encouragement, guidance, and faith in this project.

Finally, I would like to give special thanks to my husband. Without his support and belief in me, this project would not have been possible.

Table of Contents

Author's Biographical Sketch.....	v
Acknowledgments.....	vii
Chapter I. Introduction.....	1
Definition of Terms.....	6
Background of the Problem	8
Research Methods.....	14
Research Limitations	22
Chapter II. Literature Review	23
The Literature on Genocide Prevention overly Focuses on Macro-Level Conditions	23
The Need for Micro-Level Analyses to Explain how Elite Ideological Narratives Reach and Are Acted upon by the Main Population.....	28
Foucault's Biopower Theory should be used to Explain Political Violence and the Progressive Process of Mass Mobilization for Genocide	30
Chapter III. Foucault's Theorization of Power and Mass Mobilization for Genocide	33
Foucault's Theory of Biopolitics	34
Change in Power Dynamics.....	36
The Normalization of Violence	38
Capture Mechanism in the Normalization of Genocidal Violence	40
Chapter IV. Comparative Case Study	44

<i>Step 2: Timeline of Events Leading to the Rohingya genocide</i>	46
Burmese independence (1948–1961).....	48
Military rule (1962–2011).....	50
The 1982 Citizenship Law and further measures affecting the Rohingya’s biological and private lives (1982–2011)	52
Burma’s transition to democracy and liberalization (2011–2021) and the rise of anti-Rohingya propaganda in the social media.....	60
The Rohingya genocide (October 2016–January 2017 and August 2017– present).....	65
<i>Step 3: Causal Graph and Theory-Building</i>	67
Relevance of the suggested conceptual framework	67
Operationalization of the conceptual framework.....	74
<i>Steps 4–5: Alternative Events/Choices and Counterfactual Outcomes</i>	79
Case study 1: The Rohingya genocide.....	79
Case study 2: The Holocaust.....	85
Conclusion of this chapter	91
Chapter V. Conclusion.....	93
Appendix 1. Map: The Rakhine state (formerly Arakan).....	97
Appendix 2. Causal Graphs	98
Appendix 3. Content Analysis of Anti-Rohingya Publications (early 2015–2018)	100
A- Methodologies and Results.....	101
Methodology	101
Results.....	103

B- Discussion	113
References	115

List of Tables

Table 1. Process Tracing for Causal Inference.	81
Table 2. Manual frame mapping based on semantic networks.	108

List of Figures

Figure 1. Process-tracing: Checklist.	16
Figure 2. Process-tracing: Types of Evidence.	20
Figure 3. Process Tracing for Causal Inference.....	80
Figure 4. Map of the Rakhine State.	97
Figure 5. Causal Graph of variables and sub-variables leading to civilian mobilization for genocide during the Rohingya genocide.....	98
Figure 6. Causal graph of variables and sub-variables leading to civilian mobilization for genocide during the Holocaust.....	99
Figure 7. Word Frequency.	104
Figure 8. Co-occurrence networks in anti-Rohingya publications.	106

Chapter I.

Introduction

On September 1, 2017, Rohingya villagers of Inn Din are hiding in the mountains, fearing that they might be captured by the Burmese army (Reuters, 2018). The Rohingya are an ethno-religious group, mainly made up of Muslims, in Myanmar, a country which is 90% Buddhist (UN Secretary-General, 2018). They are considered one of the most discriminated minorities in the world (UN Secretary-General, 2018). A few days before, members of the armed forces came to Inn Din to hire Buddhist villagers for so-called “clearance operations” (Reuters, 2018). As the Rohingya walked towards the beaches to look for food, a contingent of soldiers and local villagers arrived and detained ten men at the beach (Reuters, 2018). Witnesses reported that captives were meticulously taken to the local school to change clothes and eat their last meal (Reuters, 2018). The next morning, they were photographed again by the military, kneeling on the ground and shot in the head (Reuters, 2018). One of the soldiers explained that the paramilitaries shot each of the Rohingya men at least twice before burying them (Reuters, 2018). Some of the men survived and screamed while being buried alive (Reuters, 2018). The soldiers and villagers therefore beat them to death with machetes (Reuters, 2018). In January 2020, the International Court of Justice ordered Myanmar to stop the attacks and prevent a genocide against the Rohingya (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

Genocide is a term coined by Raphael Lemkin (1944), a Polish lawyer, who initially defined it as “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the

groups completely” (p. 79). The Genocide Convention (1948), however, provides a more restrictive definition of genocide, i.e., the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such” (p. 1). For international relations (IR) scholars, genocide does not erupt spontaneously: it “requires elite commitment, complex logistical coordination, and the work of specialized killers” (Valentino, 2012, p. 86). The IR scholarship explains genocide either through elite theory or extremist ideologies (Valentino, 2014, p. 94). Nonetheless, both schools of thought recognize that the support of the civilian population against the targeted group is an essential requirement for genocide to happen (Valentino, 2014, p. 94). According to Straus (2016), a Professor of Political Science and International Studies, civilians are “the labor and manpower of violence, without whom its execution would not be possible” (p. 94). They may also passively participate in genocide, either by supporting genocidal policies or by doing nothing to help stop the violence (Straus, 2016, p. 95). Yet, what prompts civilians to actively participate in genocide or to support genocidal policies? What mechanisms drive them to help soldiers identify victims, set fire to their homes, or commit rape?

To answer the question at hand, Arendt, a political philosopher and Holocaust survivor, (2006) introduces the concept of the “banality of evil” to explain the behavior of perpetrators of mass atrocities during the Holocaust (p. 112). For her (2006), participants in genocide are not necessarily fanatics or sociopaths, but rather ordinary people who may be motivated by other aims than extremist ideology, such as professional success or peer pressure (p. 112). While the “banality of evil” helps Arendt rule out pathological explanations of evil, it does not provide a positive explanation for people’s participation in genocide (Anderson, 2018, p. xiv). The IR literature mostly explains

civilian mobilization for genocidal violence through dehumanizing propaganda (Luft, 2019, p. 1). Dehumanization may be defined as “the act of perceiving victimized subgroups as not completely human,” by treating them either as animals or objects (Luft, 2019, p. 1). Sociologists argue that the relegation of others to the status of non-humans allows people to disapply moral norms (Luft, 2019, p. 1). In her analysis of the Rwandan genocide, Power (2001), a diplomat and Harvard professor of human rights, explains that Radio Mille Collines, the main radio provider in Rwanda, broadcasted names, addresses, and even license-plate numbers of people to kill. She observes that “killers often carried a machete in one hand and a transistor radio in the other.” This explanation is, however, debated in the most recent literature. Luft (2019), an assistant Professor of Sociology, asks whether “non-Jewish Germans or Hutu Rwandans simply hear dehumanization discourse on the radio or read about it in the newspapers” and suddenly “change their minds about their neighbors” (p. 1). In addition, individual motivations and behaviors can change over time (Luft, 2019, p. 3). During genocide, a same person may adopt different behaviors, e.g., commit murder and subsequently refuse to do so or even decide to act as saviors (Luft, 2019, p. 3).

I suspect that something more is at play to trigger mass mobilization for genocide than mere calls for violent action or dehumanizing propaganda. In this project, I propose to revisit Foucault’s theory of *biopower* to conceptualize mass mobilization for genocide. Foucault, a French philosopher, historian of ideas and social theorist, explains that a major shift has occurred in the modern world in the way power and domination are exercised (p. 181). While ancient forms of power entailed the power to punish and take life, modern power seeks to manage and regulate all biological aspects of a human

population through modern technologies, e.g., birth control, marriage, food, religion, sexuality, and public health, a concept which he calls *biopolitics*. In his own words (1998), “[i]f genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of a population” (p. 137). For Foucault (1998), genocide is at the extreme end of the continuum of biopolitics (p. 137). While this theory does not completely answer my research question, the recent events in Myanmar exhort us to reconsider Foucault’s biopolitics. The regulation by Myanmar of every aspect of the Rohingya’s biological lives – the restrictions put on these minorities in relation to citizenship, women, food, land ownership and religion – form part of what Foucault calls biopolitics. I suspect that these biopolitical measures have an impact on civilian mobilization for genocide. It is not uncommon for states to take such measures against a group that subsequently becomes the target in genocide (UN Economic and Social Council, 2000, p. 14). However, the relationship between these macro-level measures and micro-level participation or support for genocide remains unclear.

My hypothesis is that biopolitics are *one* necessary component of a more complex path that leads to mass mobilization in favor of genocide – not *the* sole causal factor for it. Put differently, biopolitics are a precondition to mass mobilization for genocide, albeit not the only necessary condition for genocide to occur. The capture mechanism is that – well before genocide is planned or even intended – biopolitical restrictions regulate, but also call into question, the existence of a group. These measures range from the limitation or deprivation of citizenship to restrictions related to the most basic aspects of biological

life, such as food, marriage, and religion. Because they relate so much to biology, I hypothesize that biopolitics activate much deeper signals within the population. The rationale behind this mechanism is that the population feels threatened by the targeted group for its survival because it undermines its access to food resources, family life, and religious matters.

To test this hypothesis, I shall conduct a comparative case study analysis. I selected two cases of genocide, a historic case, i.e., the Holocaust, and a contemporary case, i.e., the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar. Drawing on George & Bennett's (2005) recommended methodology, I seek to trace the causal process from my independent variable, biopolitical measures, to the dependent variable, mass mobilization for genocide (pp. 214-215). By following such approach (2005), I attempt to rule out "potentially intervening variables" and create a stronger basis for attributing causal significance to the remaining independent variables (pp. 214-215). I specifically focus on four biopolitical restrictions, i.e., nationality, women and family issues, food and land ownership, and religion. The sources for my primary sources include archives from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Visual History Archive at the USC Shoah Foundation.

Regarding the significance of my research, IR scholars have long sought to elucidate the determinants of war and peace in international politics (Lamont, 2015, p. 15). However, genocide is a relatively new field of the literature on political violence (Shaw, 2010, p. 145). In addition, although IR scholars have attempted to build a theory of genocide categorizing the "central elements in a genocidal conjuncture in the form of mathematical equations," genocide studies have largely failed to predict or prevent

genocides (Moses, 2008a, p. 1). Therefore, answering the research problem at hand may inform peace studies and help to predict or prevent genocide.

Definition of Terms

Biopolitics refers to:

the intersection and mutual incorporation of life and politics. In literal terms, it signifies a form of politics that deals with life (Greek: *bios*). [Its] ... prevalent meaning, took effect when Michel Foucault broke radically with this “naturalist” tradition by redefining the term in his writings and lectures in France in the late 1970s. For Foucault, life cannot be understood in terms of biological forces or determinants that exist outside of political processes. Instead, life must be understood as both an object and effect of political strategies and technologies. Biopolitics, he argues, refers to a historical transformation and development, beginning in the 17th century, whereby the sovereign right to seize, repress, and destroy life is complemented by a new form of power that aims to develop, optimize, order, and secure life. Foucault often uses the term biopower to denote this new form of productive power. Biopower is both individualizing and collectivizing: it intervenes through disciplinary technologies in order to control and manage individual bodies while it also intervenes at the level of the population conceived of as a social or biological corpus defined by its own characteristics and processes (i.e., birth rates, death rates, measures of health, and so on). (Oxford Bibliographies, 2020).

Dehumanization: refers to the act of perceiving victimized subgroups as not completely humans. (Luft, 2019, p. 1). It is a process whereby individuals are compared to animals or objects, and thus are denied uniquely human attributes (Luft, 2019, p. 1). Sociologists argue that dehumanization is not “simply a private belief but a cause and consequence of the importance of social boundaries” (Luft, 2019, p. 1). The relegation of others to the status of non-humans allows to deprive them of shared moral codes (Luft, 2019, p. 1).

Ethnic cleansing is defined by the United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect as follows:

As ethnic cleansing has not been recognized as an independent crime under international law, there is no precise definition of this concept or the exact acts to be qualified as ethnic cleansing. A United Nations Commission of Experts mandated to look into violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia defined ethnic cleansing in its interim report [S/25274](#) as “*rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.*” In its final report [S/1994/674](#), the same Commission described ethnic cleansing as “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas. (UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2021).

Genocide is commonly defined as “the deliberate and systematic destruction, in whole or in part, of an ethnic, racial, religious, or national group” (UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2021). However, the definition genocide is still subject to debate by political scientists and legal scholars (UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2021).

Article II of the Genocide Convention contains a narrow definition of the crime of genocide, which includes two main elements:

1. A mental element: the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”; and
2. A physical element, which includes the following five acts, enumerated exhaustively:
 - Killing members of the group
 - Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
 - Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
 - Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
 - Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group

...

Importantly, the victims of genocide are deliberately targeted – not randomly – because of their real or perceived membership of one of the four groups protected under the Convention (which excludes political groups, for example). This means that the target of destruction must be the group, as such, and not its members as individuals. Genocide can also be committed against only a part of the group, as long as that part is identifiable (including within a geographically limited area) and “substantial.” (UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2021).

Background of the Problem

Most genocides are carried out by states (Verdeja, 2012, p. 312). Verdeja (2012), a political scientist and genocide scholar, explains that states “have the military and logistical capacity to do so and often face minimal organized resistance” from the targeted group (p. 312). The local population, however, often plays a key role in the perpetration of genocidal policies, including actual killings (Valentino, 2014, p. 94). The media are the main conveyor of genocidal policies to the population (Valentino, 2014, p. 97). Therefore, the process of genocide emerges within a triangle made up of the elites, the main population, i.e., the local population except the targeted group, and the media which act as a conveyor belt of elite genocidal ideologies (Valentino, 2014, p. 97). It follows that political science scholars mainly explain genocide through ideology theories or, more recently, through rationalist theories from which genocide proceeds from a strategic choice by elites (Verdeja, 2012, p. 315). Valentino (2014), a political scientist, uses a strategic rationality model to explain genocide (p. 91). For him (2014), genocide is a strategic tool of policy attainment of last resort used by extremist leaders when other policies have failed (p. 98). In the same vein, Midlarsky (2005), a peace and security scholar, advances a theory of “loss compensation”. He (2005) argues that elites pursue

genocide when the nation has experienced significant loss in armed conflict and prior state strategies have failed to address the sources of the perceived “threat” (p. 64).

For these scholars, ideology is secondary (Verdeja, 2012, p. 315). First, if extremist political ideologies are common, they do not systematically result in genocide (Verdeja, 2012, p. 315). Second, ideology does not explain how and why radicalization occurs (Verdeja, 2012, p. 315). Therefore, ideological frameworks fail to predict why genocide occurs at a particular point in time (Finkel & Straus, 2012, p. 63). While these methodological concerns are true, rationalist theories also have limits. A rationalist model may not explain why elites perceive a specific group as a “threat” (Verdeja, 2010, p. 526). Thus, although the current scholarship has advanced our understanding of specific genocide occurrences, it lacks the theoretical frameworks to analyze dynamic changes in violence across time and space (Verdeja, 2010, p. 526). Comparative studies are needed to better explain variability in genocidal outcomes and generate better theoretical insights (Verdeja, 2012, p. 308).

To fill this gap, three main axes of research need to be furthered. First, most of the literature on genocide is at the macro level and fails to explain causal mechanisms at the group level (Finkel & Straus, 2012, p. 58). As pointed out by some scholars in their critique of the political science literature on genocide, if genocide is solely viewed as the ultimate outcome of macro-level factors, it does not capture more subtle factors that may explain variation across the state or at the subnational level (Verdeja, 2012, p. 313). By being limited to country-level analyses, case studies run the risk of misrepresenting the causes and dynamics of violence, by overrepresenting both the role of elites and macro-level factors (Verdeja, 2012, pp. 312-313). Second, while it is difficult to situate

when genocidal intent emerges among elites, the literature overly focuses on the elite calculus, as opposed to the process of genocidal violence, i.e., how violence escalates and de-escalates at the local level (Verdeja, 2012, p. 308). There is a pressing need to “disaggregate” genocide to conceptualize the propagation of violence at the individual level (Verdeja, 2012, p. 308). Thirdly, genocide research should be reconnected to the literature on political violence to understand how genocide and political violence are related temporally and spatially (Finkel & Straus, 2012, pp. 63-64; Verdeja, 2012, p. 308). The current literature provides historical descriptions of repressive practices and human rights abuses against a particular group in which genocide is presented as a final and unavoidable step (Chiot & McCauley, 2006, p. 17). Yet, little is known about the link between state-sanctioned political violence and genocide.

My project specifically seeks to explore follower-radicalization processes at the micro level, i.e., between groups. The genocide literature has largely focused on the question of *why* genocide happens, which is broader than the question at hand. The present research does not follow such an ambitious goal but rather focuses on the *how*, i.e., the enabling function of biopolitics on intra-group violence. Thus, my research purports to complement macro-level studies rather than contradict them. My methodology therefore takes into account variation in genocidal violence at the subnational level. I specifically focus on the role of biopolitics in the construction of ethnic hostility at the group level. In this respect, Verdeja (2012), a political scientist, argues that “perpetrators devote significant energy in defining enemies, the ways in which individuals are perceived and ‘othered’” (p. 314). Yet, genocide does not simply emerge based on extremist ideologies held by radical leaders (Verdeja, 2012, p. 317).

Rather, it is a social phenomenon, wherein mass mobilization is a key element (Verdeja, 2012, p. 317). Due to time and space constraints, I am not analyzing the processes through which elites may strategically construct their enemies for genocide. Rather, my research disaggregates genocide as a temporally and spatially dynamic social process: it does not study the role of the elites but only deals with the process of mass mobilization, defined as the main population's active or passive support of genocidal violence against the targeted group.

The current literature argues that civilian mobilization for genocidal violence occurs because of dehumanizing propaganda (Luft, 2019, p. 1). Luft (2019) defines dehumanization as “the act of perceiving victimized subgroups as not completely human,” for instance, by referring to them as animals or objects (p. 1). In particular, sociologists argue that the relegation of others to the status of non-humans allows people to disapply moral norms (Luft, 2019, p. 1). In his analysis of the Holocaust, Bauman (2004), a sociologist and philosopher, concurs with this explanation and posits that, when genocide occurs, people are regarded as abstract categories, rather than as concrete others (p. 24). Similarly, Scheper-Hughes (2002), a trained anthropologist, claims that the human species has developed “a genocidal capacity” which is reflected in “all expressions of social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonalization, pseudo-speciation that normalize atrocious behavior and violence towards others” (p. 366). However, a growing body of research questions the link between dehumanization propaganda and the normalization of violence (Luft, 2019, p. 2). Luft (2019) asks whether “non-Jewish Germans or Hutu Rwandans simply hear dehumanization discourse on the radio or read about it in the newspapers” and suddenly “change their minds about their neighbors” (p.

1). Is dehumanization propaganda what causes people to approve or actively participate in genocide? While States may seek to normalize violence by depicting members of the targeted group as animals or objects, these actions do not tell us much about how they are acted upon by people (Luft, 2019, p. 2).

Genocide research has failed to unpack the mechanisms linking dehumanization or propaganda to the normalization of genocidal violence (Luft, 2019, p. 2). Case studies of the Rwandan genocide have examined the role of the radio in participation to the Tutsi genocide (Luft, 2019, p. 2). These studies have challenged the dominant explanation that propaganda has a primary role in participation in genocide (Luft, 2019, p. 2). For instance, Luft (2019) points out that less than 10 percent of Rwandan owned a radio in 1994 that broadcast range did not reach rural areas (Luft, 2019, p. 2). On the other hand, Danning (2018) argues that social practices around media consumption also matter (p. 529). In this country, listening to the radio is a communal practice that occurs in public settings, especially in bars, on the street, in the market or at work (Danning, 2018, p. 529). Therefore, he (2018) argues that the radio had a broader reach during the Rwanda genocide (p. 529). Thus, that there is a lack of evidence to show that dehumanizing propaganda prompts civilians to mobilize for genocide (Luft, 2019, p. 3).

Luft's research (2019) studies active participation of civilians to violence, which is narrower than the scope of my research on mass mobilization, which includes both active participation and passive mobilization, i.e., a population's support of genocide or the lack of resistance to genocide. Her analysis (2019) of dehumanizing propaganda is particularly persuasive (p. 3). She (2019) notes that individual motivations and behaviors

can change over time (p. 3). People who participate in mass atrocities may subsequently refuse to do so or even choose to save members of the targeted group (Luft, 2019, p. 3).

Other factors may also explain mass mobilization for genocide, e.g., peer pressure, obedience to authority, greed, or grievances (Luft, 2019, p. 3). Luft (2019) emphasizes that, during genocide, people are faced with “difficult decisions about whether or not to participate in genocide” depending “on their access to financial resources, who they’re being asked to kill, their proximity to extremists ordering the violence and the signals sent by local elites” (p. 4). Ultimately, she (2019) asks: “But ... how, exactly, [does] dehumanizing discourse enter into the brain and body and reforms social perception?” (p. 2). Based on a sociological approach, Luft (2019) argues that civilians who actively participate in mass violence develop cognitive adaptation to violence, i.e. “the more they kill, the easier killing becomes” (Luft, 2019, p. 4). Whenever compounded with dehumanizing propaganda, this mechanism transforms how members of the targeted group are perceived (Luft, 2019, p. 4). In this proposal, I question this explanation and suggest a competing hypothesis.

Mass mobilization for genocidal violence, whether active or passive, requires something more than a mechanism of cognitive adaptation coupled with dehumanization discourse. Neither can satisfactorily explain why civilians commit genocidal acts in the first place or to decide to support, or refrain from resisting, genocide. As stated before, it is difficult for political scientists to situate when genocidal intention emerges among the ruling elites (Verdeja, 2012, p. 308). Irrespectively, to borrow Luft’s words (2019), for such intention to be implemented, nefarious policies need “to enter into the brain and body” and “reform social perception” (p. 2). In this respect, the role of hate speech or

dehumanizing propaganda in mobilizing a population's support for genocide has been overestimated. Public speech that expresses hate or encourages violence against a group and the use of dehumanizing language are frequent during genocide. The Nazis notoriously referred to Jews as "rats" or "vermin" and Hutu extremists called Tutsi "cockroaches" or "snakes" (Luft, 2019, p. 4). Yet, evidence is lacking to show that either of them is enough to mobilize a population for genocide (Luft, 2019, p. 3). In this project, I suspect that something more is at play to trigger mass mobilization for genocide than mere calls for violent action or dehumanizing propaganda.

My hypothesis is that biopolitics are *one* necessary component of a more complex path that leads to mass mobilization in favor of genocide – not *the* sole causal factor for it. The capture mechanism is that – well before genocide is planned or even intended – biopolitical restrictions regulate, but also call into question, the existence of a group. These measures range from limitation or deprivation of citizenship to restrictions related to the most basic aspects of biological life, such as food, marriage, and religion. Because they relate so much to biology, I suspect that they activate much deeper signals within the population. The rationale behind this mechanism is that the population feels threatened by the targeted group for its survival because it undermines its access to food resources, family life, and religious matters.

Research Methods

Genocide is a complex socio-political process (Anderson, 2018, p. 5). This makes it arduous for political scientists to describe the causal mechanisms behind civilian support for genocide (Anderson, 2018, p. 5). My hypothesis is that biopolitics are *one* necessary component of a more complex path that leads to mass mobilization in

favor of genocide – not *the* sole causal factor for it. Since I assert a relationship of causality, large-*N* studies and statistical analyses do not shed light on genocide as a process, including the causal mechanisms behind mass mobilization in support of genocide. My methodology therefore combines process tracing with a comparative case study.

Through a comparative analysis, I undertake a systematic study of the link between mass mobilization for genocide, the outcome of interest, and biopolitical restrictions against the targeted group. To test my primary explanation, I analyze evidence that may both prove or refute causal inference (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 842). In my research project, mass mobilization for genocide encompasses both active participation by civilians in genocidal violence and passive support of genocide. I specifically focus on four biopolitical restrictions, i.e., nationality, women and family issues, food and land ownership, and religion.

These types of biopolitics are particularly significant for my study. First, the loss of nationality is a major aspect of biopolitics. While relating her own experience of the Holocaust, Arendt (1951) explains how the loss of nationality made it possible for persecuting governments to single out minorities as the “scum of the earth” (p. 269) or “superfluous people” whose only right was the right to live threatened” (p. 296). Second, biopolitical measures against women and girls are frequent prior to genocide but their impact remains largely under-researched (Salih, 2017). Third, food resources and land ownership are significant features of inter-ethnic competition. Finally, religious restrictions are frequent measures taken by governments before genocide occurs (UN Economic and Social Council, 2000, p. 14).

After listing the sources for my primary data, I justify my case selection and describe each of the steps of my research project. These steps are based on Bennett & Checkel's (2015) best practices for process tracing (p. 3), outlined in Figure 1 reproduced below:




Figure 1. Process-tracing: Checklist.

Source: Ricks & Liu (2018)

Sources of primary data

The sources for my primary data include the archives of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) and the Visual History Archive at the USC Shoah Foundation. The former provides archival records of Nazi laws and antisemitic legislation. The latter contains a database of oral testimonies from genocide survivors, including the Rohingya. These primary sources provide data to help me establish the sequencing of events and evaluate the value of my explanation.

Case selection

While there are no set rules for case selection, Gerring (2007) recommends using a “regression logic” when choosing cases, i.e., to select representative cases that may be regarded as “samples of a broader class of phenomena” (p. 20). As a matter of sound research, I need to justify my case selection. According to Hinton (2012), a genocide scholar, genocide studies have excessively focused on a handful of cases, while excluding others (p. 12). In particular, the Holocaust and twentieth century cases are overly represented in genocide case studies (Hinton, 2012, p. 12).

To avoid selection bias, I therefore attempt to narrow down my research to cases of intrastate genocide, defined as a genocide carried out against an intrastate minority, whether ethnic or religious, which occurs domestically, although it may subsequently spread outside the state’s borders. The scope of my study, however, excludes genocide during colonization. In this respect, the political science literature acknowledges that there are nuances between genocidal events (Shaw, 2015, p. 170). This literature increasingly provides typologies accounting for variations between cases of genocide (Shaw, 2015, p. 170). According to Charny (1994), a genocide scholar, there are six types of genocide, i.e., (i) “genocidal massacre,” which refers to “mass murder on a smaller scale”; (ii) “intentional genocide,” i.e., “an explicit intention to destroy a specific targeted victim group”; (iii) “genocide in the course of colonization or consolidation of power”; (iv) “genocide in the course of aggressive or unjust war”; (v) “war crimes against humanity that do not meet the strict legal definition of genocide”; and (vi) “genocide as a result of ecological destruction and abuse” (pp. 76–77). While other authors make further distinctions based on the breadth or scale of targeting or the political context, such as war

or colonialism (Shaw, 2015, p. 170), I specifically focus on cases of domestic genocide. Accordingly, to provide a more representative sample, I select two cases of genocide, an historic case, i.e., the Holocaust, and a contemporary case, i.e., the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar.

Step 1: “Identify the working hypothesis and the rival hypothesis”

Bearing in mind Ockham’s razor, I use hypotheses that relate to the outcome and are simple and testable (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 843). My working hypothesis is that biopolitics are *one* necessary component of a more complex path that leads to mass mobilization in favor of genocide – not *the* sole causal factor for it. My rival hypothesis is that dehumanization propaganda causes civilians to mobilize for genocide, without biopolitics as an intervening variable.

Step 2: “Establish a timeline”

In a second step, I seek to describe the sequencing of events. I draw a timeline which starts with the “theorized causal variable” (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 843). The timeline has several purposes (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 843). First, it provides direction to my research (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 843). Secondly, it clarifies the temporal sequencing of events (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 843). Thirdly, it provides a preliminary assessment of the argument at face value (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 843). Fourthly, it identifies major events that may have led to the “outcome of interest” (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 843).

Step 3: “Construct a causal graph”

The third step entails producing a causal graph on the basis of this timeline (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 843). As stated by Ricks & Liu (2018), the causal graph “provides structure” by allowing to “focus on the link between the explanation and the concerned outcome” (p. 843). With this causal graph, I seek to identify all “critical junctures” that could have affected the result (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 844).

Step 4: “Identify alternative choice or event”

The causal graph identifies each moment on which an alternative choice or event could have occurred (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 844).

Step 5: “Identify counterfactual outcomes”

In the following step, I identify the “counterfactual outcome” that would have materialized, had an alternative choice or alternative event occurred (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 844). For instance, would dehumanization propaganda have occurred, if biopolitics had not been adopted beforehand? As stated by Ricks & Liu’s (2018) guidance on process-tracing, counterfactuals are an essential element of process-tracing, because alternative cases are not considered during this process (p. 844).

Step 6: “Find evidence for the working hypothesis”

The rationale behind this approach is to “systematically find evidence that the variable germane to the working hypothesis was the reason the concerned actor,” i.e., the civilian population, “pursued the timeline path” (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 844). It is

important to specify that not all evidence types bear the same evidentiary value (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 844). Some of the evidence are “necessary to establish causation,” while other pieces of evidence are “sufficient” or “neither or both” (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 844). I use Van Evera’s (1997) four types of evidence: straw-in-the-wind, hoops, smoking gun, and doubly decisive (pp. 31–32), summarized in Figure 2 reproduced below:

Table 1
Types of Evidence for Process-Tracing

		Sufficient for Affirming Causal Inference	
		No	Yes
Necessary for Affirming Causal Inference	No	1. Straw-in-the-Wind	3. Smoking Gun
		a. Passing: Affirms relevance of hypothesis but does not confirm it.	a. Passing: Confirms hypothesis.
		b. Failing: Hypothesis is not eliminated but is slightly weakened.	b. Failing: Hypothesis is not eliminated but is somewhat weakened.
	Yes	c. Implications for rival hypothesis: Passing <i>slightly</i> weakens them. Failing <i>slightly</i> strengthens them.	c. Implications for rival hypothesis: Passing <i>substantially</i> weakens them. Failing <i>somewhat</i> strengthens them.
		2. Hoops	4. Doubly Decisive
		a. Passing: Affirms relevance of hypothesis but does not confirm it.	a. Passing: Confirms hypothesis and eliminates others.
		b. Failing: Eliminates hypothesis.	b. Failing: Eliminates hypothesis.
		c. Implications for rival hypothesis: Passing <i>somewhat</i> weakens them. Failing <i>somewhat</i> strengthens them.	c. Implications for rival hypothesis: Passing <i>eliminates</i> them. Failing <i>substantially</i> strengthens them.

Figure 2. Process-tracing: Types of Evidence.

Source: Ricks & Liu (2018)

As a matter of sound research, I am aware that the evidence types need to both support my hypothesis and negate the rival hypothesis (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 845). I need to find smoking-gun evidence that links biopolitics directly to active civilian participation or passive civilian support for genocide. I may rely on several types of archival documents, including interviews of victims. I should not include data that fail the

meet the required evidentiary threshold to establish the salience of the primary hypothesis (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 845).

Step 7: “Find evidence for the rival hypothesis”

Pursuant to Ricks & Liu’s (2018) guidance on process-tracing, the final step entails repeating step 6 for alternative explanations. Accordingly, “exclusionary evidence,” i.e., the hoops test, is crucial (p. 845). This means that, if “hoops evidence” is absent, it rules out an hypothesis (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 845). Put differently, if the independent variable was absent when the event occurred, the rival hypothesis may be dismissed (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 845). According to Ricks & Liu (2018), if the rival explanation cannot be readily dismissed, it is necessary to look for other types of data to rule out the rival hypothesis (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 845). However, if I am unable to find evidence to the contrary, I am unable to reject it (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 845). Instead, I need to evaluate whether a rival hypothesis may better explain how the outcome of interest has occurred (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 845). In my case study, I should bear in mind that differing causal explanations do not necessarily exclude each other, and that both hypotheses may have explanatory leverage (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 845). If such situation arises, I need to undertake a fine-tuned qualitative analysis of the evidence to determine which hypothesis, of the primary hypothesis and the rival hypothesis, provides the best explanation for the outcome of interest (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 845).

All applicable protocols and policies of Harvard University’s Institutional Review Board for the use of human subjects in research will be complied with in this proposed thesis research.

Research Limitations

Since I am conducting comparative research, a major limitation relates to selection bias. I have provided a justification for my case selection in the above paragraph. In addition, in case studies, triangulation, i.e., the use of multiple sources, data types and different methods, may enhance internal consistency (Votoloni, 2017, p. 362). Therefore, I will rely on different types of archival documents.

Chapter II.

Literature Review

The following discussion tracks the broad trends and most influential works in the field of genocide prevention studies. Overall, there has been a central focus on macro-level conditions precipitating genocide, whether those are centuries-old ethnic and cultural differences or particular elite agendas. Foucauldian biopolitics has been leveraged in discussions of genocide but only in relation to possible explanations as to why governments carry out genocide, i.e., to exert biopower, understood as the power of life and death over human bodies. (Agamben, 1998; Hilberg, 2011; Bauman, 1989). While these studies have advanced our knowledge of genocide, I depart from this scholarship. More specifically, I argue that Foucault's biopolitical theory has been misplaced and has greater explanatory value in relation to the normalization of violence. Therefore, I situate my research at the group level and use a biopolitical frame to explain how dehumanization occurs in the "real world" between members of different groups. Thus, this current study offers a new methodology with needed interventions for the field.

The Literature on Genocide Prevention overly Focuses on Macro-Level Conditions

The scholarship on genocide prevention seeks to ascertain risk factors that make a country more likely to carry out genocide. These factors may include, for instance, ethno-religious differences, political upheavals and the type of political regime. One of the most influential studies by Dadrian, a sociologist and historian, focuses on the most intuitive causes of genocide, i.e., inter-ethnic and religious differences. It (2003) contends that the origins of genocide lie in preexisting differences between groups (p. 5). In his (2003)

historical analysis of the Armenian genocide, Dadrian explains that, under Muslim law, there was no equality between Muslims and non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire (p. 5). In fact, the Armenians, a Christian community, were regarded as “tolerated infidels” as long as they did not challenge their inferior social status (Dadrian, 2003, p. 5). By the end of the eighteenth century, large Armenian communities from Macedonia and Albania had, however, successfully challenged Ottoman preponderance (Dadrian, 2003, p. 181). Thus, they became viewed as a security threat (Dadrian, 2003, p. 197). Dadrian (2003) argues that, from this point in time, successive governments envisioned eradicating the group (p. 197). His main thesis (2003) is that, while earlier efforts to destroy the group were ineffective due to the country’s poor administrative organization, the genocide of 1915 was better organized than previous attempts (p. 206). In his view (1995), had the state’s administration been more efficient, the genocide of 1915 would have had even more dramatic consequences for the Armenians (p. 206).

Kuper (1983), a sociologist, concurs with Dadrian’s theory and posits that religious differences are “warrants for genocide” (p. 84). For him (1983), genocide occurs in so-called “plural societies,” i.e., societies that contain “persistent and pervasive” differences between racial, ethnic or religious groups (p. 84). In such a context, fanatical beliefs both induce and justify genocide (p. 84). From this analysis, he (1983) infers that genocide becomes the predominant means for the political, racial or religious elite to maintain power (p. 84).

By contrast, Horowitz (2002) posits that the type of political organization has an explanatory role in genocide, arguing that totalitarian states are more prone to genocide (p. 181). Based on a comparative case study of Nazi Germany, Stalin’s Russia, and

Mussolini's Italy, Horowitz (2002) breaks down the progressive evolution of totalitarian governments (p. 181). While, initially, such governments typically turn a poorly organized state apparatus into a disciplined and efficient country, they eventually seek to dominate individual citizens by using terror tactics and the secret police (Horowitz, 2002, p. 181). It follows that totalitarian states are more likely to resort to violence against their own citizens (Horowitz, 2002, p. 181). Horowitz (2002) therefore claims that genocide is more likely to occur in non-democracies (p. 181).

In the same vein, Rummel (1994), a political scientist, is a proponent of the "peaceful democracies" thesis (p. 3). He (1994) argues that democracies are less likely to resort to violence to settle disputes with other states and never wage war against each other (p. 4). For him (1994), mass killings and genocide are the result of indiscriminate, irresponsible, power (p. 3). Genocide may therefore be prevented by fostering democratic freedom and democratizing coercive power (Rummel, 1994, p. 3). Rummel's broad proposition is, however, questionable. It lacks evidential support and fails to consider alternative explanations. More importantly, this explanation has become outdated in light of the many contemporary episodes of genocide which have taken place in democracies.

By contrast, other scholars opine that genocide is more likely to arise in countries affected by national political crises. Melson (1992), a political scientist, conducts a comparative analysis of major attempts at genocide in world history and argues that revolution and war lead to genocide (p. 258). In his view (1992), genocide is the outcome of a complex process whereby revolutionaries reverse an old regime and subsequently attempt to build a so-called "pure society" according to ideological standards (p. 258). This theory also lacks explanatory value since genocide also happens in peace times.

In a study commissioned for Clinton's policy initiative on genocide early warning and prevention, Harff (2003), a professor of political science, provides a multi-variate model that identifies preconditions for genocide and politicide, which she defines as a subcategory of genocide, i.e., political mass murder (p. 57). Her study (2003) tests the effects of several factors, i.e., "the effects of prior conflict, elite characteristics, regime type, and international context" on the emergence of genocide and politicide (p. 57). Her research (Harff, 2003) is based on a sample of 126 cases of "internal war and regime collapse between 1955 and 1997," which includes 35 episodes of genocide and politicide (p. 57). As such, this study (2003) seeks to establish determinants of genocide, i.e., differentiate between factors that lead to genocide or politicide in the sample, and eliminate those which do not (p. 57). By using a case-control procedure and logistic regression, her model (2003) then identifies six preconditions for genocide that accurately explained the occurrence of 74% of the genocidal events during that period (p. 57).

Harff's study (2003) identifies six risk factors (p. 62). In particular, the extent of political upheavals, referring to "an abrupt change in the political community caused by the formation of a state or regime, through violent conflict, redrawing of state boundaries, or defeat in international war" and the occurrence of prior genocides and politicides are determinative factors in the emergence of genocide (Harff, 2003, p. 62). Harff (2003) argues that "the probability of mass murder is highest under autocratic regimes and is most likely to be set in motion by elites who advocate an exclusionary ideology, or represent an ethnic minority, or both" (p. 70). She (2003) also finds a negative correlation between global economic interdependence and the likelihood that a state affected by war and political instability will turn to genocide or politicide (p. 70).

More recently, the Early Warning Project, a joint initiative of the Simon-Skjoldt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the USHMM and the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College, assesses the risk of mass atrocities, including genocide, in countries around the world. By relying on both quantitative and qualitative data, this project seeks to identify countries where mass atrocities have not begun, but where the risk of such violence is high. According to the Early Warning Project's most recent report (2022), each year, one or two countries experience a new episode of "mass killing," defined therein as "1,000 or more civilians deliberately killed by armed forces (whether government or nonstate), over a period of a year or less, because of their membership in a particular group" (p. 1).

According to the Early Warning Project (2002), most episodes of genocide entail mass killings coming within this definition (p. 1). Therefore, this initiative (2022) uses, *inter alia*, the frequency of mass killings as a predictor of genocide (p. 1). It (2022) provides a list of 30 priority countries where genocide is most likely to occur, including Pakistan, Yemen, Burma/Myanmar, Chad, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Afghanistan, India, Sudan and Somalia (p. 8).

Ultimately, the literature on genocide prevention has grown into a sophisticated body of knowledge. Yet, research remains overly focused on the macro-level conditions of genocide and insufficiently considers group dynamics.

The Need for Micro-Level Analyses to Explain how Elite Ideological Narratives Reach and Are Acted upon by the Main Population

A more recent school of thought argues that the interests and political goals of national elites are determinative of genocide (Valentino, 2014, p. 95; Verdeja, 2012, p. 315; Midlarsky, 2005, p. 64). Some scholars argue that extreme ideologies only have a secondary role in genocide (Valentino, 2014, p. 95; Verdeja, 2012, p. 315; Midlarsky, 2005, p. 64). This group of scholars posits that genocide, as a socio-political process, emerges within a triangle that includes the ruling elites, the main population, i.e., the local population except the targeted group, and the media, i.e., the main conveyor belt of elite genocidal ideologies (Valentino, 2014, p. 97). It therefore concentrates on the strategic behavior of elites and explains genocide through strategic rationality models (Valentino, 2014, p. 95; Verdeja, 2012, p. 315; Midlarsky, 2005, p. 64). Valentino (2014) takes the view that genocide is a tool used by extremist leaders to achieve radical policy aims (p. 91). For him (2014), genocide is a last-resort tool against a particular group viewed as a threat when other strategies or less radical policies have failed or are inadequate (p. 95). Through his theory of “loss compensation,” Midlarsky (2005) further argues that elites resort to genocide against a national group only when they are losing war or have experienced too many casualties (p. 64).

While this approach is particularly persuasive, the literature does not sufficiently address how ideological narratives promoted by extremist leaders are followed up and carried out by the main population (Verdeja, 2012, pp. 313–314). Elite and follower-radicalization processes lack modelling (Verdeja, 2012, p. 307). In this respect, Verdeja (2012) argues that scholars should disaggregate genocidal “intent” “over time and space”

and trace how it emerges and is followed at the grassroots level (p. 307). Microanalyses may explain why violence spreads and reaches the intensity of genocide (Verdeja, 2012, p. 313). Yet, the genocide scholarship neglects the sociological aspects of genocide and occludes the process of mass mobilization for genocidal violence (Shaw, 2010, p. 8; Luft, 2019, p. 3). So far, genocide research has deferred the explanation of mass mobilization for genocide to a subjective psychological enquiry (Luft, 2019, p. 3).

Yet, genocide scholars acknowledge the significance of popular discourses in the execution of genocidal policies (Luft, 2019, p. 3). Mass mobilization is often framed as “an appeal to traditional myths of victimhood” that emotionally resonate with people (Verdeja, 2012, p. 313). It relies on artificial distinctions between in-groups and out-groups and a radical devaluation of the outgroup (Verdeja, 2012, p. 315). While phenotypical markers, such as skin color, height or facial features, are often used in official propaganda, they often prove inept to identify individuals viewed as outcasts (Verdeja, 2012, p. 314). Tangential markers, e.g., dress, occupation, and places of residence, are more effective signifiers of identity to target the group (Verdeja, 2012, p. 315). Although political scientists accept that genocide is made possible through dehumanization (Luft, 2019, p. 3), the socio-political process whereby the main population starts viewing the targeted group as a threat to its own subsistence and joins state genocidal efforts is, however, left unexplained.

It follows that genocide research should take into consideration the role of political violence (Verdeja, 2012, p. 307). As such, it should seek to unveil the temporal and spatial link between political violence and genocide (Verdeja, 2012, p. 307). To this end, I rely on Foucault, who links genocide with the nature of modern power itself. While

power has evolved so as to govern life processes, I argue that, well before genocidal intent emerges, the daily existence of the targeted group is constrained by biopolitical measures. Put differently, the state strictly regulates the existence and the most intimate aspects of the life of the group. Accordingly, I place biopolitics within the wider scope of political violence and argue that these measures have a causal relationship with genocidal violence. In this respect, my contribution differs from the earlier scholarship on biopower and genocide.

Foucault's Biopower Theory should be used to Explain Political Violence and the Progressive Process of Mass Mobilization for Genocide

I argue that the relevance of Foucault's biopower theory for genocide has been misplaced in earlier studies. Many scholars have used this theory to categorize the technological means used by the Nazis during the Holocaust as biopolitical measures, prompting them to explain genocide as a thrust for biopower, understood as power over human life (Agamben, 1998; Hilberg, 2011; Bauman 1989). For them, genocide is plainly a by-product of modernity (Agamben, 1998; Hilberg, 2011; Bauman 1989). I do not question the legitimacy of this statement. Historical accounts of life in the ghettos or in concentration camps provide rich descriptions of the extreme measures used by the Nazis to control the biological functions of inmates. Nonetheless, the simplistic argument that governments thrive to rule over human bodies, and thus to eliminate an undesirable group, has little explanatory value with regard to mass mobilization. The political science literature has therefore used Foucault's theory only as an exploration of the motives of genocidaire governments, but not as an essential ingredient to secure mass support.

To provide a brief overview, Hilberg (2011) posits that the Nazi machinery of destruction “was structurally no different from organized German society as a whole” (p. 17). For him (2011), the Holocaust was a textbook case of scientific management and modern bureaucracy (p. 17). In the same vein, Bauman (1989), explains that the Holocaust was caused by the evolution of modern society (p. 12). In his view (1989), ideological, technological and organizational factors that made the Holocaust possible were all part of the rationality of modern society (p. 12). Thus, the Holocaust was “a rare, yet significant and reliable, test of the hidden possibilities of modern society” (Bauman, 1989, p. 12). For both authors, the government’s choice of physical extermination to eliminate the outgroup was the outcome of routine state bureaucracy. This choice arose out of “a genuinely rational concern” and “was generated by bureaucracy true to its form and purpose” (Hilberg, 2011, p. 17). It proceeded from a rational means-end calculus, budget balancing, universal rule application (Hilberg, 2011, p. 17). In short, both of these authors regard modernity as having an enabling function in genocide. They explain genocide through a conceptual framework that links pseudoscientific and eugenic ideologies, on the one hand, with the rationalized murder of the extermination camps, on the other (Shaw, 2010, p. 8). These authors make a shortcut by explaining that modern society and the extreme biopolitics used in the camps during the Holocaust make genocide. They also fail to explain what prompts the main population to help a genocidaire government implement a nefarious agenda.

Accordingly, I do not focus on biopolitics as an outcome but on the socio-political process which induces the progressive normalization of violence towards a specific group. For clarity, I investigate the use of biopolitics *before* genocide, as opposed to *once*

genocide has started. Put differently, examining the use of biopolitics in ghettos or concentration camps is unhelpful to decipher the causes behind mass mobilization. As a caveat, I do not argue that biopolitics are part of genocidal intent. In my view, a genocidaire government does not intentionally put in place biopolitics against the targeted group in order to make genocide possible. Rather, it pursues this path unwittingly. Yet, the implementation of such measures leads to a socio-political context in which genocide is more likely to gather the main population's support. For the sake of clarity, I argue that, when biopolitics arise, they lead to a dramatic change in power dynamics within society, an important tenet of Foucault's theory. Biopolitics are part of an evolution of human relations in modern society, which, in the specific context of genocide, help activate mass support in favor of genocidal violence. Similarly, I do not examine the motives that may explain why a government contemplates genocide, e.g., racism, or extreme ideology, or economic opportunism. Rather, I seek to trace the slow and progressive socio-political process of mass mobilization for genocidal violence.

Chapter III.

Foucault's Theorization of Power and Mass Mobilization for Genocide

The connection between Foucault's theorization of power and mass mobilization for genocide is not obvious. In the 1960s, peace and security scholars started reflecting on the explanatory value of structural violence to understand power relations. Johan Galtung (1969), a Norwegian sociologist, was a precursor in connecting institutionalized power to international peace (p. 167). Essentially, Galtung (1969) makes a distinction between physical violence and more subtle forms of violence (p. 167). In his (1969) view, state-sponsored structural violence refers to pervasive forms of violence embedded in social structures, laws or institutions (p. 167). Put simply, for Galtung (1969), institutionalized inequalities generate unequal life opportunities for human beings, whether economic, political or social (p. 167). In some cases, they even prevent individuals from meeting their basic needs (Galtung, 1969, p. 167). It follows that such forms of violence pave the way for physical violence against individuals with a subordinate status (Galtung, 1969, p. 168). Thus, Galtung's argument shows the relevance of structural violence in peace and human rights studies to explain why some individuals are more likely to experience targeted violence, while others are not.

While this argument is a starting point to understand inter-group relations, Foucault's work provides a more sophisticated framework that may be revisited in peace studies in the very specific context of genocide. In the following paragraphs, I describe Foucault's theorization of power in detail and use this conceptual frame to explain mass mobilization for intrastate genocide, i.e., the main population's active or passive support of genocidal violence against the targeted group. In particular, I argue that, before the

outbreak of intrastate genocide, biopolitics generate a specific form of structural violence towards the targeted group, which creates a hierarchy between human lives and undermines the value of some lives.

Foucault's Theory of Biopolitics

Foucault's theory of biopolitics is relevant to understand power relations in modern society and their link with the normalization of genocidal violence. According to Foucault (1998), a radical shift has occurred in the modern conception of power (p. 136). In archaic societies, power was understood as the power to take life or let live (Foucault, 1998, p. 136). With the advent of modern technologies and scientific progress, power has become concerned with the management of life itself. For Foucault, this is explained by several factors. Since the beginning of the 19th century, scientific knowledge has taken a prominent place in society. Scientific advancements, coupled with agricultural development, prompted a decline in epidemics and famines (Foucault, 1998, p. 143). As such, they provided a measure of relief from these biological threats (Foucault, 1998, p. 143). The professionalization of medicine led to increasing medical intervention and the widespread use of technology in fundamental life processes. Similarly, the sexual revolution led to taboo-breaking research in human sexuality, e.g., the invention of hormonal contraception and the legalization of abortion and homosexuality in many countries.

For Foucault (1998), the overwhelming place of medicine and sexuality in modern society means that the administration of life has become the state's primary concern (p. 136). The old power of death that symbolized sovereign power has been replaced by a new power, which focuses on the human body (Foucault, 1998, pp. 139–

140). Scientific developments caused political power to foster life and reject death (Foucault, 1998, p. 138). Therefore, for Foucault (2003), the main concerns of modern power are the productivity of the population and the maximization of human life (p. 243).

For Foucault (2003), politics became concerned with the “calculated management of life,” which thus gave rise to so-called “biopolitics” (p. 242). Essentially, biopolitics involve all types of measures that a government may employ to control the overall biological processes affecting a population, such as birth, reproduction, diseases, and death (Foucault, 2003, pp. 242–243). As such, the state has progressively asserted control over essential life processes, e.g., through the regulation of contraception, the maintenance of a birth registry and the treatment of diseases (Foucault, 2003, p. 244).

Under this conception of power, the government resorts to diverse techniques, including statistics, to study the population and regulate these processes (Foucault, 2003, pp. 242–243). In “Society Must be Defended,” Foucault (2003) explains that modern society has become obsessed with lowering the mortality rate, increasing life expectancy, and stimulating the birth rate (p. 246). It follows that a life-administering power consistently puts in place corrective mechanisms to achieve an equilibrium between births and deaths and compensate for random variations within the main population (Foucault, 2003, p. 246). Modern society is equally concerned with the prevention of endemic illnesses. As Foucault (2003) states, although these diseases are not necessarily deadly, they sap the population’s strength, lower its productivity in the workplace and are costly of public funds (p. 244).

It follows that biopolitics are not concerned with individuals, but only with human bodies to the extent that they form part of a global population. While individuals are

technically free, they are part of a wider corpus to which their bodies belong and whose biology is under constant supervision. Although citizens may think that they are free, they are unaware of the political conquest over their bodies. In the Foucauldian analysis of power, their individuality is lost in contemporary politics. Accordingly, Foucault's theory assumes that individuals have a lesser role in mechanisms of power. The role of individuals as political agents is somehow subsumed by the population, as a passive object of biopolitical measures. Therefore, the human being, as a subject of human rights, loses significance in the political apparatus.

Change in Power Dynamics

The main takeaway from Foucault's theory (1998) is that biopolitics induce a change in power dynamics. From the moment government gave itself the function of administering life, mechanisms of power changed in society (p. 138). Through modern technological methods, power started assuming responsibility for life processes and thus, gained "access to the body" (Foucault, 1998, p. 142). By taking charge of life, these various techniques subjugate the bodies. This subjugation is not only biological but political. It transfers to the political sphere and thus allows to control the population, a process which Foucault (1998) calls biopower (p. 140). Contemporary politics therefore involve the relentless conquering over the human body. Modern power may be equated to an ever-greedy power that insinuates everywhere and investigates the most intimate aspects of human life.

In this respect, Foucault (1998) further observes that power relations are not "in a position of exteriority" with respect to other sets of human relations (p. 94). Power is immanent in economic processes, or processes pertaining to the circulation of knowledge,

or even sex and race relations. As such, Foucault does not conceive power through a traditionally vertical hierarchy. Power is not a right that can be owned in the same way as a commodity (Foucault, 2003, p. 13). Therefore, it should not be understood as a dichotomy between those who retain it and those who submit to it (Foucault, 2003, p. 15).

Similarly, Foucault distances himself from the traditional understanding of sovereignty, based on an exchange model. The classic juridical theory of power, the idea of a social contract, represented through the metaphor of the Leviathan, states that citizens agree to give up their freedoms and submit to authority in exchange for the protection of their rights and the maintenance of the social order, with the end goal of preventing chaos (Foucault, 2003, p. 34). For Foucault (2003), however, power can no longer be explained through the existing paradigm of the social contract (p. 13). In his view (1998), historical formations of science, technology, and medicine show that power no longer focuses on the maintenance of a legal order but has changed to become life-administering power (pp. 139–140).

For Foucault (2003), political organization is structured like war (p. 15). The structure of war was transposed to politics (Foucault, 2003, p. 15). Politics are cyclical and function in the same way as war. To take a concrete example, alliances form but they may shift (Foucault, 2003, p. 16). Politics involves oppositional struggles and often end up in a battle of strength (Foucault, 2003, p. 16). In short, Foucault's (2003) main claim is that power relations are warlike, i.e., they entail a perpetual war that is internal to the state (p. 16). Ultimately, political power replicates this relationship of force within the state apparatuses (Foucault, 2003, p. 16).

It follows that modern power must be analyzed as “something that circulates” and only functions as part of a chain (Foucault, 1980, p. 98). First, institutions, which exercise power, are “only the terminal forms that power takes” (Foucault, 1998, p. 92). Secondly, power cannot lie within the hands of individuals. Instead, Foucault (2003) claims that it circulates through individuals, whose bodies are merely a relay throughout which power passes (p. 30). Thirdly, Foucault’s (1998) idea of power means that it is an agency-less diffuse type of power. This soft political power widely circulates “in state institutions, the formulation of the law, economic equalities, language and even the bodies of individuals (pp. 92–93). Then, if violence is so prevalent in our society, why do individuals not rebel? Foucault (1998) preempts this question and states that, although power is mostly visible through state institutions, in fact, power masks itself (pp. 92–93). There is good reason for that. Power is only tolerable in a modern society on condition that it is concealed (Foucault, 1998, p. 86).

The Normalization of Violence

For Foucault (1972), unlike physical violence which may trigger rebellion, soft violence grows inconspicuously to individual citizens who unknowingly acquiesce to it (p. 216). The mechanics at play with structural violence are more subtle. Power is instantiated in rules, language and institutions, which are viewed as legitimate by individuals, and thus are uncontested (Foucault, 1972, p. 216). It follows that the reason why soft violence is widely accepted by society relates to the circularity of power and knowledge (Foucault, 1972, p. 216). There are rules in modern society, determining who is qualified to decide on whether something is “true”. These rules set conditions on who has the privilege or that right to speak and on what topic (Foucault, 1972, p. 216). Often,

“truth” is entrusted in the hands of men of science who ritualize and systemize the appearance of truth (Foucault, 1972, p. 216). As a result, truth is a product of multiple forms of constraints. For Foucault (1972), this means that we are limited in our judgment (p. 216). Discourses have become so normalized in our everyday lives that we stop questioning them and gullibly accept them as true (Foucault, 1972, p. 25). In fact, our personal views are shaped by these so-called scientific discourses. These subtle mechanisms of power set in motion a disciplined and obedient society.

The law facilitates the operation of the power-knowledge discourse even further. In a disciplinary society, new technologies of power are enshrined through the code of the law, which operates as a mechanism of normalization. Put differently, biopolitics are largely supported by the law, which confers them formal legitimacy in the name of science. For Foucault (2003), the law is unable to act as an equalizer against biopolitics because it is equally ruled by war relations (p. 50). In his words (2003), “beneath law, war continues to rage in all the mechanisms of power ... War is the motor behind institutions and order” (p. 50).

Furthermore, since normalization operates through scientific and legal discourses, it does not require physical violence. In Foucault’s (2003) view, there is no need for weapons or physical violence (p. 50). Modern power may be compared to a “gaze” that is omnipresent and that each person will interiorize without questioning it. As a result, it manages to reach “into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives” (Foucault, 1980, p. 39). It follows that it is much more potent than physical violence.

Capture Mechanism in the Normalization of Genocidal Violence

A Foucauldian framework is useful to analyze political developments linked to discourses surrounding issues of health, reproduction, hygiene, and the sustenance of a country's population. In this respect, Foucault was keen that his readers would actively engage with his thinking and further develop his theorization of power (Foucault, 1974, pp. 523–524). He hoped that his work would be used as a toolbox and have practical application in other areas (Foucault, 1974, pp. 523–524).

I would like my books to be a kind of toolbox which others can rummage through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area ... I would like [my books] to be useful to an educator, a warden, a magistrate, a conscientious objector. I don't write for an audience, I write for users, not readers. (Foucault, 1974, pp. 523–524)

I use Foucault's theorization of power to explain mass mobilization for genocidal violence. The starting point in Foucault's theory is that all issues relating to the human body have become the new political rationality. First, individuals may be virtually free, they are part of a population whose biology is tightly managed by power. Since biopolitics are legitimized by law and medicine, individuals do not challenge these measures. Thus, if power is exerted over a mass population viewed as a single entity, there is no point in approaching early manifestations of genocidal policies through the prism of individual human rights violations.

Secondly, Foucault (2003) argues that the modern state inevitably introduces divisions into its population between races, based on biological considerations (p. 255). For Foucault, there is a racist element in any modern type of government. By managing the distribution of resources, the government will establish a racial hierarchy based on the perceived worth of competing races (Foucault, 2003, p. 255). When asked about

genocide, Foucault (2003) made a short comment that a modern government will inexorably seek the purification of the population (p. 255). In his analysis of Nazism, Foucault (2003) explains that racism is a prerequisite for deciding who must be killed and exercising the right to kill (p. 256). Thus, in his theorization of power (2003), genocide is a possibility, a form of biopower which is at the extreme end on the spectrum of biopolitics (p. 255).

From this, some genocide scholars have inferred that the Holocaust was a by-product of biopolitics (Agamben, 1998). Admittedly, the Nazis exerted extreme biopower over the livelihood of European Jews in the ghettos and concentration camps and organized their deaths. In my view, this argument is, however, a shortcut to explain genocide. This is not sufficient to give an explanation as to why the main population helped a genocidal government to implement its nefarious agenda. Accordingly, in my research, I do not focus on biopolitics as an outcome but on the socio-political process which induced the progressive normalization of violence towards a specific group. For clarity, I investigate the use of biopolitics before genocide, as opposed to once genocide has started. Put differently, looking at the use of biopolitics in ghettos or concentration camps is unhelpful to decipher the causes of mass mobilization. By the same token, I do not claim that a government must willfully employ biopolitics, in full awareness of what they are, to carry out a genocide.

Rather, I argue that, when biopolitical measures are taken against a defined group in a society which is prone to genocide at the macro level, they lead to a dramatic, albeit discrete, change in power dynamics at the individual level. As argued by Foucault, biopolitics are part of an evolution of power in modern society. While all modern

societies employ such measures to regulate the wellbeing of their population, this also implies that biopolitics are instrumental in how societal power is exerted. On that basis, I argue that, in the specific context of genocide, biopolitics taken against the targeted group help activate mass support in favor of genocidal violence.

For the sake of completion, I should also specify that I do not focus either on the root causes which may explain why a government may contemplate genocide, e.g., whether they proceed from a belief that a population needs to be purified, i.e., racism, or extreme ideology, or economic opportunism. Rather, I seek to delineate the slow and progressive socio-political process of mass mobilization for genocide.

Thirdly, I attempt to unravel the capture mechanism at the heart of genocidal violence. To this end, I isolate all components of Foucault's theory to build a bespoke conceptual framework for the mobilization of genocidal violence. As such, biopolitical measures (i) target a population, as an object of government; (ii) tackle all types of issues that may affect the life of the population from various angles, with an emphasis on the population's biological needs (e.g., how much food individuals are allowed to get, how many children they may have); and (iii) aim at achieving a state of equilibrium or regularity within the population. Although biopolitical measures may be deemed justified on legitimate grounds, e.g., public health, hygiene, they accentuate social inequalities through the power/knowledge divide, and thus create "subjugated knowledge." Put differently, citizens are subjected to the invisible coercion of biopolitical measures, adopted for the greater good. These measures are embedded in a scientific theoretical discourse which can hardly be challenged, and thus legitimate and privilege a particular discourse. Ultimately, they lead to the formation of in-groups and out-groups. Through

this process, Nazi ideology, for instance, progressively became normalized within the German population. Yet, this fundamental change in power dynamics presupposes that violence permeates all social relations. The insidious violence in biopolitical measures helps manufacture hostility against a specific minority through a slow, yet powerful, process of normalization. Foucault's framework of analysis prompts us to rethink pervasive mechanisms of mass mobilization which urge us to think "in the same way" through normative assumptions and unchallenged discourses.

Accordingly, I seek to test my primary hypothesis that, when a state employs biopolitical measures against a defined group, in a country where the risk of genocide is greater due to macro-level factors, these measures affect power relations at the local level and facilitate mass mobilization for genocidal violence. In my comparative case study, I analyze local strategies of biopolitics through various lenses: (i) the denationalization process of the targeted group, as a pivotal point in the mass mobilization for genocide; (ii) biopolitical measures relating to food and subsistence, which mainly include economic measures and restrictions of educational opportunities; (iii) issues relating to marriage, reproductive rights and birth registration; and (iv) religious restrictions. My analysis seeks to delineate the various phases of mass mobilization and the progression of a government's genocidal agenda. I am aware that local strategies of biopolitics may vary depending on cultural practices, historical periods, and the economic power of a given state. While this research may not be transferrable to all cases of genocide, it attempts to understand mechanisms of mass violence in cases of genocide that is internal to a state but may extent to other countries.

Chapter IV.

Comparative Case Study

Chapter 4 provides a comparative case study of the Rohingya genocide and the Holocaust. Since my methodology involves process tracing, this chapter follows a step-by-step approach, as explained in Ricks and Liu's (2018) guide on process tracing (p. 842). The required steps for process tracing are described in depth in the research methods section of Chapter 1. For ease of reference, they are as follows: *Step 1*: "identifying hypotheses"; *Step 2*: "establishing a timeline of events"; *Step 3*: "constructing a causal graph"; *Step 4*: "identifying alternative event(s)/choice(s) at each critical juncture"; *Step 5*: "identifying counterfactual outcomes," i.e., what would have been the outcome, without the variable, i.e., had the event not happened.

Regarding *Step 1*, as described in Chapter 1, my primary hypothesis is that biopolitics are an enabler for intrastate genocide, defined as a genocide carried out against an intrastate minority, whether ethnic or religious, which occurs domestically, although it may subsequently spread outside the state's borders. This comparative case study therefore seeks to test the primary hypothesis that biopolitics are a precondition to mass mobilization for intrastate genocide, understood as the main population's active or passive support of genocidal violence against the targeted group. The capture mechanism is that – well before genocide is planned or even intended – biopolitical restrictions regulate, but also call into question, the existential rights of the targeted group. The rival explanation to the primary hypothesis is that hate propaganda or dehumanization, i.e., the process of denying individuals of their humanness and treating them as "less than" humans (Haslam, 2006, p. 252), cause mass mobilization in intrastate genocide.

As to *Step 2*, this chapter begins the theory-building process for the first case study, i.e., the Rohingya genocide, by retracing the emergence of biopolitics after Burma's independence from British rule in 1948. Through a basic analysis of the data, it conducts descriptive process tracing, i.e., it provides a detailed historical narrative of the process that led to mass-scale attacks against the Rohingya in late 2016 and, later, in August 2017. Put simply, Chapter 4 provides a chronology of the Rohingya genocide, which lays the foundations for my theoretical explanation of genocide, i.e., biopolitics are a necessary requirement, albeit not the only condition, for civilian mobilization to grow. Accordingly, chapter 4 also justifies why a new conceptual framework is needed in genocide studies to explain mass mobilization.

Moving on to *Step 3*, the timeline of the Rohingya genocide is subsequently used to unpack variables, and persuasive steps within these variables, that may explain mass mobilization for intrastate genocide. Due to the constraints of the current project, this chapter does not replicate this step for the case study of the Holocaust. Yet, it provides a causal graph for each case at hand to better visualize the variables and pervasive steps that may cause mass mobilization for intrastate genocide (please see Appendix 2: causal graph 1 (the Rohingya genocide) and causal graph 2 (the Holocaust)).

Finally, regarding *Steps 4 and 5*, this chapter assesses the probing value of the evidence in support of both the primary hypothesis and, where appropriate, the rival hypothesis. To do so, it provides a historical analysis of mass mobilization in both cases and identify alternative event(s)/choice(s) and counterfactuals. Since my comparative case study involves both a recent case and a historical genocide, the methods to assess the evidence slightly differ. With regard to the first case study, this chapter measures the

level of causation of biopolitics on mass mobilization for intrastate genocidal violence based on the four tests suggested by Van Evera (1997), i.e., straw-in-the-wind, hoops, smoking gun, and doubly decisive (pp. 31–32). Appendix 3 further analyzes how biopolitics affected narratives within dehumanization propaganda by performing content analysis of anti-Rohingya publications, i.e., pamphlets, poems and public statements issued by political parties and Buddhist monks' associations against the Rohingya. For the second case study, this chapter historically analyzes mass mobilization during the Holocaust based on secondary sources, including in-depth studies of mass mobilization conducted by Holocaust scholars and historians, and a qualitative assessment of counterfactuals.

In these multi-variable cases, it is quite difficult to establish causality with a high level of confidence (Gerring, 2007, p. 172), i.e., in this case, which variable – biopolitics or dehumanization or propaganda – causes mass mobilization. Yet, a historical analysis of both cases at hand and the assessment of the evidence persuasively support the argument that dehumanization or propaganda without biopolitics are unlikely to succeed.

Step 2: Timeline of Events Leading to the Rohingya genocide

The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic group of Burma located in the North Rakhine state, Burma (also called Myanmar since 1989) (UN Secretary-General, 2018). The Rakhine state was formerly known as Arakan until 1989 when it was renamed by the Burmese government (Leider, 2018, p. 2). It is situated on the western coast of Burma and bordered by the Bay of Bengal to the west and the Chittagong Division of Bangladesh to the northwest. Mountains to the east separate Rakhine from central Burma

from North to South. The capital of the Rakhine state is Sittwe (or Sittway) (please see Appendix 1: Map of the Rakhine state).

Like many parts of Burma, the Rakhine state has an ethnically diverse population (Lindblom et al., 2015, p. 5). While the main ethnic group in Burma includes Bamar people, 40 percent of the country's population is made up of other ethnic minority groups (Lindblom et al., 2015, p. 5). Nonetheless, the country does not have much religious heterogeneity (Lindblom et al., 2015, p. 5). Most of the population is Buddhist, with smaller religious minority populations (Lindblom et al., 2015, p. 5). A large population of Muslim Rohingya lives in North Rakhine and is mainly based in the three northernmost townships, i.e., Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung (Lindblom et al., 2015, p. 5).

The Rohingya's origins are complex. While the Rohingya claim that they are an indigenous group in Rakhine, the Burmese government has consistently maintained that they are a foreign ethnicity, i.e., descendants of Bangladeshi immigrants who migrated to Burma under British rule (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 8). While this question remains open and debated, the colonial history of Burma (1824–1948) provides insight as to how this complexity arose (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 9).

From 1824 to 1885, Great Britain and Burma fought three wars (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 9). In 1885, Britain ultimately annexed Burma and controlled Rakhine from India (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 9). Under British rule, the Rakhine state enjoyed a government representative of the various ethnicities and religions present in Burma (Myint Win, 2015, p. 1). At the time, the British colonial power sought to realize the commercial potential of the fertile Rakhine land in the North-West of Burma (Zarni & Cowley, 2014, p. 693). As such, it developed a wet-rice agricultural economy and opened

the door to laborers from India and Bangladesh (Zarni & Cowley, 2014, p. 693). In 1852, after the opening of the Suez Canal, the Irrawaddy Delta became one of the main kernels of rice production in the world (Chakravarti, 1971, p. 79). The economic prosperity and mass immigration in the region generated hatred and fear among many mainland Burmese that Indian immigrants would take over the resources of the country, which created dire political instability (Myint Win, 2015, pp. 1-2). From this point in time, the Rohingya became widely perceived as more affluent, due to their proximity with farming and food growing, and thus became subject to social stigmatization (Myint Win, 2015, p. 3).

Since then, anti-Rohingya sentiment has been a constant throughout Burma's history (Abdelkader, 2013, p. 394). The Rohingya people have suffered protracted persecution, which escalated to genocide in late 2016 (Abdelkader, 2013, p. 394). The Rohingya genocide occurred in two phases. The first phase occurred from October 2016 to January 2017 and the second phase started in August 2017 and is still ongoing (International Crisis Group, 2017). The following paragraphs retrace the timeline of events leading to the Rohingya genocide.

Burmese independence (1948–1961)

The British separated Burma from India in 1937 (Abdelkader, 2013, p. 394). When Burma gained its independence in 1948, the country faced a similar period of political instability between ethnic and religious communities, which escalated into armed conflict (Abdelkader, 2013, p. 394). The Buddhist population believed that the Rohingya had been unjustly favored by the colonial power (Abdelkader, 2013, p. 395). Immediately after the country's independence, Buddhist Burmese based in Rakhine

replaced Muslim Rohingya government officials (Yegar, 2002, p. 37). The new government also encouraged Buddhists to settle in Rakhine to reclaim lost land (Yegar, 2002, p. 37). In response to the measure, Mujahid rebels in Rakhine, called for jihad against local Buddhists and for the independence of Rakhine (Yegar, 2002, p. 37). Although the uprising was small-scaled, i.e., it involved 2,000 to 5,000 men out of approximately 100,000 to 120,000 Muslims in Rakhine, it further accentuated ethno-religious tensions (Yegar, 2002, p. 37).

In the late 1950s, to assert a distinct ethnoreligious identity for the region's Muslim community, Muslim leaders and students in North Rakhine started using the term "Rohingya" more commonly than other denominations existing at the time (Leider, 2018, p. 2). By contrast, Burmese officials refused to do so. This was one of the first attempts to challenge the Rohingya's social identity. At present, state officials still reject the term "Rohingya" as an ethnic denomination and refrain from using it when referring to the minority (Leider, 2018, p. 2).

In 1960, to alleviate political tensions, Prime Minister U Nu made Rakhine an autonomous region of Burma (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 13). In addition, Muslim political parties proposed a bill providing for equal representation of Muslims and Buddhists and the alternative appointment of Muslim and Buddhist leaders on a rolling basis (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 13). In 1961, the Burmese government granted the Mujahideen the "Mayu Frontier District," a Northern district in Rakhine, as a semi-autonomous region directly administered by the Burmese military (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 13). Two years later, the new military junta, however, dissolved the district to consolidate power throughout the country, leading to 50 years of authoritarian military rule (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 13).

Military rule (1962–2011)

In March 1962, General Ne Win, head of the Burmese army, called “the Tatmadaw” in Burmese, led a coup and dissolved the parliamentary government (Turnell, 2011, p. 79). The military junta maintained a highly centralized and tightly controlled government exerting direct control of the economy, education, and the press (Smith, 1999, pp 199–200). The government took significant measures against the Rohingya (Yegar, 2002, p. 55–56). The country started issuing identity cards to all citizens, but excluded the Rohingya from this process (Yegar, 2002, p. 55–56). Before then, national Registration Cards (NRCs) were being used as “*de facto* proof of citizenship” (Leider, 2018, p. 14). Burmese authorities, however, simply stopped issuing them to the Rohingya and, whenever possible, seized their existing NRCs (Leider, 2018, p. 14).

The question whether a person belonged to a “national race” (“taingyintha”) was used to determine political affiliation (Cheesman, 2017, p. 14). After the coup, it led to further civic exclusion of the Rohingya by the new military administration, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), replaced in the early 1990s by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) (Cheesman, 2017, p. 14). The government also nationalized the country’s economy, which triggered the first mass migration flow of Rohingya out of Burma (Turnell, 2011, p. 79). According to Yegar (2002), from 1963 to 1967, more than 300,000 Indian and 100,000 Chinese people migrated outside the country (p. 52). The departure of business owners, especially Muslims of Rakhine, left the country in a financial crisis (Yegar, 2002, p. 52). The economic crisis led to the formation of a Muslim militant movement in Rakhine, which included the Rohingya Independence Force and the Muslim National Liberation Party (Smith, 1999, p. 219).

A second episode of forced migration occurred between 1971 and 1979, due to external events (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 15). In 1971, Bangladesh's struggle for independence from Pakistan prompted Bengali Muslims to flee to Rakhine to escape violence (Yegar, 2002, p. 54). Due to the growth of the Muslim population in Rakhine, ethno-religious tensions further developed (Yegar, 2002, p. 54). Muslims became increasingly persecuted in Burma and fled to Bangladesh (Yegar, 2002, p. 54). In 1974, the Rohingya were issued Foreign Registration Cards instead of NRCs (Lindblom et al., 2015, p. 7). Since many schools and employers did not recognize these cards, the Rohingya's ability to access educational and job opportunities became limited (Lindblom et al., 2015, p. 7).

Due to increased ethno-religious tensions, the government expressed concern over violence attributed to "illegal immigrants from Bangladesh" (Yegar, 2002, p. 54). The Tatmadaw therefore decided to launch Operation "Naga Min" (Dragon King) in 1978, a census aimed at identifying immigrants and compiling demographic data in Burma (Yegar, 2002, p. 54). The Rohingya lost their citizenship, and thus considered "illegal" in Burma (Doctors without Borders, 2021). Naga Min forced thousands of Rakhine Muslims out of Burma, since they were unable to produce identification documents, despite not having received them in 1962 (Yegar, 2002, p. 55–56).

Rohingya refugees were subjected to violent abuses at the hands of Rakhine Buddhists and the Tatmadaw (Egretteau & Jagan, 2013, pp. 132–133). Although Muslim Rohingya were ultimately allowed to return from Bangladesh as "bona fide Burmese citizens," the repatriation process was burdensome (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 15). The state required refugees to provide evidence of residence in Rakhine in order to enter the

country (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 15). In most cases, they were unable to return to their place of residence since Buddhist settlers had taken over their houses (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 15).

The 1982 Citizenship Law and further measures affecting the Rohingya's biological and private lives (1982–2011)

The 1980s marked the beginning of the Rohingya's denationalization process and led to the progressive deterioration of their livelihood conditions. During that period, the government adopted major legal reforms that led to their impoverishment and social exclusion. In 1982, the government of the military junta passed the Citizenship Law to regulate immigration and create a unitary society, with the aim of ending the diverse society put in place by British settlers (Knie & Pride, 2018, pp. 15–16). Three main factors were claimed to support the adoption of the law, i.e., the hostility against Chinese and South Asian immigrants in Burma, the increased number of Muslims in Rakhine, and the perception that the previous Citizenship Law adopted in 1948 had failed to control immigration (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 16).

The 1982 Citizenship Law set the date determining citizenship eligibility as of 1823 (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 16). This date coincided with the beginning of the war with the British and their decision to actively encourage immigration from India (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 16). Knie & Pride (2018) explain that the law created three categories of citizenship: (i) natural citizens; (ii) associate citizens; and (iii) naturalized citizens (p. 16). Under the 1982 Citizenship Law, so-called “natural citizens,” i.e., belonging to the Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Burman, Mon, Rakhine or Shan ethnic groups, shall enjoy full rights associated to citizenship (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 16). By contrast, individuals

categorized as “associate citizens” or “the offspring of mixed marriages with at least one parent being a natural citizen,” shall only enjoy the right to work in Burma but are not allowed to hold government office (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 16). Third-class citizens, i.e., naturalized citizens, include the descendants of illegal immigrants during the colonial era, such as the Rohingya (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 16). Although the Rohingya had been recognized as citizens by three successive governments after Burma’s independence, from this point in time, they became regarded as a foreign ethnicity (Zarni & Cowley, 2014, p. 681). As such, the 1982 Citizenship Law openly embraced anti-Muslim and anti-Rohingya bias (Zarni & Cowley, 2014, p. 681). This marked the beginning of a long process to uproot the Rohingya from Burmese society (Zarni & Cowley, 2014, p. 681). By law, the Rohingya were no longer recognized as legitimate members of society. Following the 1978 census, the denationalization of the Rohingya became the first step in removing the group.

In 1988, pro-democracy protests, supported by the Rohingya, led to the resignation of General Ne Win (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 16). During that year, Burma was renamed Myanmar (Doctors without Borders, 2021). The new regime, the SLORC, violently stopped the demonstrations (Knie & Pride, 2018, pp. 16–17). Although the SLORC organized the country’s first elections to the lower house in 1990, it refused to acknowledge the victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD), a democratic party supporting Aung San Suu Kyi, a long-standing advocate for democracy (Hodge, 2015) and placed her under house arrest (until her release in 2010) (Hodge, 2015). In 1991, she won the Nobel Prize for her long-standing work on democracy and became a highly respected political figure in Burma (Hodge, 2015).

Due to the Rohingya's participation in pro-democracy demonstrations, both government authorities and locals in Rakhine severely punished the Rohingya, causing them to flee again (Egreteau and Jagan, 2013, p. 149). A so-called "third wave of forced migration" ensued from 1988 to 1992 (Yegar, 2013, p. 63). Many Rohingya left Burma to go to Bangladesh (Yegar, 2013, p. 63). By July 1992, the number of refugees in Bangladesh had increased to 268,551 (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 17). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reports that approximately 228,000 of them were Rohingya (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 17). The Burmese government was heavily criticized by UN bodies for committing severe human rights violations during the protests and refusing to repatriate refugees from Bangladesh (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 17).

Burmese authorities considered many of the refugees to be "illegal migrants from Bangladesh who ha[d] no right to claim an identity that did not exist officially" (Leider, 2018, p. 16). They increasingly used the term "Bengali" to refer to the community (Leider, 2018, p. 16). In April 1992, the Burmese and Bangladeshi government entered into a repatriation agreement for the refugees (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 17). Despite this agreement, the repatriation process was not facilitated by local authorities and involved brutal violence against the Rohingya (Leider, 2018, p. 16). In late 1996, approximately 200,000 Rohingya with refugee status were repatriated in Burma (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 17).

Although the 1982 Citizenship Law is regarded by many scholars as a milestone in the history of Burma since it made the Rohingya *de jure* stateless, Cheesman (2017) convincingly argues that, after 1989, hundred thousand Muslims became *de facto* stateless by a "deliberate breach and selective application" of this law (p. 14). The

arbitrary nature of the state's treatment of the Rohingya and their bureaucratic exclusion from citizenship after 1989 are central elements of their denationalization process (Cheesman, 2017, p. 14). By the late 1980s, people were required to give up their identity papers to obtain color coded Citizenship Scrutiny Cards (CSCs) (Leider, 2018, p. 14). Throughout the 1990s, policies of civic exclusion and state harassment intensified (Leider, 2018, p. 14). The Nasaka (also referred to as "Na Sa Ka"), a hybrid unit of police, intelligence, and border control officers, perpetrated policies of harassment against the Rohingya, creating hardship for the Muslim population (Leider, 2018, p. 16).

In this respect, interviews of victims of genocidal violence available on the visual history archive of the USC Shoah Foundation, show that state harassment increased from 1992 (Mawaha Nurul Kamal; March 6, 2018; 23/59). Some interviewees also claim that, at the time, they were told by local authorities to "go back to [their] country," i.e., Bangladesh (Mawaha Nurul Kamal; March 6, 2018; 23/59). After 1995, most Rohingya were provided Temporary Registration Cards, referred to as "white cards," meaning that they were only regarded as temporary residents (Leider, 2018, p. 14). The denationalization process was not only limited to a legal recognition of their status as non-nationals, but was also enforced through aggressive administrative practices. Crucially, at this point in time, the political narrative that the Rohingya were affluent and associated to food-growing faded away and was replaced by a narrative pertaining that they were legal aliens (Leider, 2018, p. 14).

The denationalization process of the Rohingya paved the way for further measures affecting the group in relation to marriage, food, access to education, traveling, and religion. During this period, the government imposed a requirement for the Rohingya

to apply for permission to marry (U.S. Department of State, 2012, p. 23). Current Rohingya refugees are therefore the first-generation who had to request permission to marry (Mawaha Nurul Kamal; March 6, 2018; 12/07). In practice, this procedure takes months and involves the payment of a hefty fee and several in-person meetings with local authorities (Mawaha Nurul Kamal; March 6, 2018; 11/09). During the meetings, state officials may impose further requirements, such as a written commitment to have no more than two children (Mawaha Nurul Kamal; March 6, 2018; 11/00).

Due to their denationalization, the Rohingya are no longer allowed entrance in public schools of secondary education (U.S. Department of State, 2012, p. 11). By the same token, students who graduated from high school in Rakhine do not have permission to travel outside the area for educational purposes, e.g., attending university (U.S. Department of State, 2012, p. 11). Similarly, Muslim students may not graduate from university without an NRC (U.S. Department of State, 2012, p. 11). While some students were still able to attend classes and sit for examinations, they could only request an official diploma by claiming a foreign ethnic minority affiliation (U.S. Department of State, 2012, p. 11).

In the 1990s and early 2000s, restrictions on freedom of movement were implemented (U.S. Department of State, 2020, p. 29). This meant that the Rohingya were required by law to carry special documents and travel permits for internal movement in five areas in northern Rakhine, i.e., Butheedaung, Mungdawe, Rathedaung, Kyauktaw and Sittwe (U.S. Department of State, 2020, p. 29). Prior approval is also required for Rohingya to travel outside their village of residence (U.S. Department of State, 2020, p. 29). In Burmese, this restriction is called “tokainja” (Mawaha Nurul Kamal; March 6,

2018; 13/25). A permit is also required to travel from one town to another against payment of a fee (Mawaha Nurul Kamal; March 6, 2018; 12/31). The Rohingya are barred from employment in the civil service and may not work as doctors, nurses, or teachers (U.S. Department of State, 2020, p. 29). They are often required to perform forced labor and are subject to mistreatment (U.S. Department of State, 2020, p. 29). For instance, authorities may arbitrarily detain them, seize their property or apply unfair tax rates (U.S. Department of State, 2020, p. 29). Yet, the Rohingya have no recourse against the state since they lack legal standing before the courts (Lindblom et al., 2015, p. 8; Irish Centre for Human Rights, 2010, p. 97).

In addition to these measures, the Rohingya also need to comply with religious restrictions. The Rohingya are only allowed to build religious places of worship with approval (Abdelkader, 2013, p. 402). Such approval is typically given informally and is often “rescinded” (Abdelkader, 2013, p. 402). In practice, formal requests are often unduly delayed or denied (Abdelkader, 2013, p. 402). In addition, Nasaka, often arrests people who are found building or repairing existing mosques (USCIRF, 2022, p. 4). Thus, Muslim Rohingya struggle to maintain places of worship (Abdelkader, 2013, p. 402). In addition, security forces often arrest Muslims for teaching religious doctrine and praying (Abdelkader, 2013, p. 402). The government has implemented further religious restrictions on the Muslims (USCIRF, 2022, p. 4). In 2011, the police started disallowing public gatherings by Muslims and inspected mosques in Rakhine (USCIRF, 2022, p. 4). For instance, the police only allowed religious worship in public places during major holidays (USCIRF, 2022, p. 4). Since these restrictions came into force, the Rohingya have practiced their religion in secrecy (Mawaha Nurul Kamal; March 6, 2018; 22/54).

Places of religious worship and religious learning, such as madrasa, are set up in secret to avoid detention or beatings (Mawaha Nurul Kamal; March 6, 2018; 22/54).

Food restrictions have also impacted the group. By losing citizenship, the Rohingya, who initially consisted in a farming population, has been disallowed from owning land and growing their own food (Abdelkader, 2013, p. 395). Since the early 1980s, these food restrictions have caused them to live in severe deprivation (Columbia Global Reports, 2017). The Burmese government deliberately refrained from creating economic opportunities or developing infrastructure in Rakhine (Leider, 2018, p. 16). The various regulatory measures taken by successive governments seemingly reinforced the strong bias held against them by the main population (Abdelkader 2013, p. 394). A report issued by Human Rights Watch (2013), an international non-governmental organization, states that there is a common belief in Burma that “the Muslim people are stealing our land, drinking our water, and killing our people. They are eating our rice and staying near our houses” (p. 25). It follows that the perception of the Rohingya as a threat to the wellbeing of the main Burmese population, i.e., competing for food against “intrastate” Burmese, is prevalent (Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 25). The Rohingya’s deprivation of nationality and lack of means of subsistence has allowed violence and abuses to occur against them with impunity (USCIRF, 2016, p. 2). The various restrictions on freedom of movement and the right to marry and register the births of children led many Rohingya to flee Burma (Leider, 2018, p. 16). As of 2020, most of these restrictions are still in place (U.S. Department of State, 2020, p. 29). The Burmese government also adopted a policy to encourage ethnic Buddhists to move to Rakhine and

repopulate Rohingya villages (Leider, 2018, p. 16). Under this policy, former prisoners are also eligible to do so (Leider, 2018, p. 16).

Despite these restrictions, in 2008, the government still saw the Rohingya as having a role to play as a voting base with the upcoming constitutional referendum on the political organization of the country to be held in May during that year (Leider, 2018, p. 16). Despite the Rohingya's political disenfranchisement, the government lobbied the Muslims both before the constitutional referendum planned in 2008 and the general elections of November 2010 (Leider, 2018, p. 16). The government pledged that white card holders would be granted full citizenship (Leider, 2018, p. 16). In fact, this promise, however, was never fulfilled (Leider, 2018, p. 16). As Leider (2018) explains, from 2010 to 2015, only three Rohingya were members of parliament (p. 16). All of them were members of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the government party (Leider, 2018, p. 16). During this period, due to the pressure exerted by pro-democracy movements, a new constitution was ratified in 2008 (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 18). It follows that the country organized parliamentary elections in 2010 (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 18). Due to these changes, in early 2011, the military junta transferred power to a semi-civilian government (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 18). Thein Sein, a Buddhist monk and retired general in the Tatmadaw, was the first civilian president elected in Burma (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 18). Despite these political developments and the country's transition to democracy, over the past 30 years, the Rohingya faced increasing restrictions in their daily lives. Their ability to travel, marry, have children, get an education and practice their religion were severely curtailed.

Burma's transition to democracy and liberalization (2011–2021) and the rise of anti-Rohingya propaganda in the social media

The democratization process did not improve the social treatment of the Rohingya. In fact, it allowed anti-Rohingya propaganda to develop even further. From 2011 to 2021, the Rohingya were both subjected to harsher restrictions and vilified online. In 2011, Burma transitioned to democracy (International Crisis Group, 2017, p. i). As a result, it embraced a wide political liberalization, which enabled the population to gain unfettered access to the media, including social networks (International Crisis Group, 2017, p. i). The following year, the government ended its heavy censorship and allowed citizens free access to internet resources, which had been previously banned (Fuller, 2012). The liberalization of the telecommunications sector allowed the population to access the 3G and 4G networks and buy affordable mobile phones with pre-loaded social media apps (Brooten, 2020, p. 215). Burmese increasingly used websites such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube (Fuller, 2012). As a result, the political dynamics of the country also changed (Myint Win, 2015, p. 3). Most politicians, in particular, government officials and extremist Buddhists monks, opened social media accounts (Brooten, 2020, p. 215). The country saw “an upsurge in extreme Buddhist nationalism, anti-Muslim hate speech and deadly communal violence” (International Crisis Group, 2017, p. i). By then, anti-Rohingya propaganda and derogatory portraying of the Rohingya became rife (International Crisis Group, 2017, p. i).

Ma Ba Tha, an acronym referring to the “Association for the Protection of Race and Religion,” formerly known as the 969 movement, became the main nationalist organization (International Crisis Group, 2017, p. i). Made up of monks, nuns and lay

people, it started to aggressively promote anti-Rohingya propaganda (International Crisis Group, 2017, p. i). The religious views of its leader, Ashin Wirathu Thero, commonly referred to as Wirashu, were perceived as more legitimate than the canons of members of the government and state religious authorities (International Crisis Group, 2017, p. ii). Ma Ba Tha increasingly promoted the boycott of Muslim businesses and violent attacks against the Rohingya ensued (McPherson, 2017, p. 4). While hate speech reached new heights, pamphlets and stickers promoted a government bill prohibiting Muslim men from marrying Buddhist women (Dean, 2013). At the time, most anti-Rohingya propaganda solely focused on the prohibition of inter-racial marriage (Dean, 2013).

In May 2012, a rumor spread on the social media that three Muslims had raped and killed a Buddhist woman (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 18). In early June 2012, a group of civilians stopped a bus in Rakhine (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 18). In retaliation against the alleged rape of this woman, they killed ten Rohingya Muslims who were on board (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 18). On June 8, 2012, more violence erupted in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung, and further attacks erupted in Sittway (Leider, 2018, p. 17). At this stage, violence against the Rohingya not only involved police forces, but also increasingly included civilian attackers (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 18). Civilians widely committed acts of violence against the Rohingya (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 18). Although a state of emergency was declared, security forces refrained from taking any step to stop the violence (Smith, 2013, p. 7). They either refused to intervene or helped Buddhists' to attack Rohingya villages (Smith, 2013, p. 7).

In the summer 2012, Burma had more than 100,000 internally displaced Rohingya living in camps (Leider, 2018, p. 17). The consequences of the violence were severe, i.e.,

eighty Rohingya were killed and 4,000 houses destroyed (Leider, 2018, p. 17). In the fall, a second wave of anti-Rohingya violence took place in central Rakhine (Leider, 2018, p. 17). It resulted in 80 dead, 22,000 people displaced and more homes destroyed (Leider, 2018, p. 17). The attacks were carefully planned and destroyed many Rohingya villages completely (USCIRF, 2022, p. 4). They were followed by both anti-Muslim and anti-Rohingya demonstrations all across the country (USCIRF, 2022, p. 4).

As argued by Knie & Pride (2018), at this point in time, intra-group violence subsequently evolved into “a coordinated effort to forcibly expel the Muslims through simultaneous attacks occurring” across the whole of Burma (p. 18). Interviews of victims, witnesses, and aid workers collected by Human Rights Watch (2013) show that both political and religious authorities heavily promoted ethnic cleansing by demonizing the Rohingya in hate speech (“All you can do is pray”). In particular, they employed tactics, such as denying that the Rohingya was an intrastate ethnicity or calling for their economic exclusion or complete “removal” from Burma (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 19). Approximately 100,000 Rohingya fled in a fourth wave of forced migration (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 19). At the instigation of the government, the Rohingya were barred from accessing markets and struggled to get food or work (Human Rights Watch, 2012, “Government Forces Targeting Rohingya Muslims”). Despite the level of violence in the country, the government refused to provide any assistance, claiming that the Rohingya are not an intrastate group of Burma (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 19). Ultimately, in late 2013, the number of internally displaced Rohingya refugees reached 138,000 (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 19).

In 2013, extremist nationalist groups organized another “Buy Buddhist” campaign targeted at Muslim businesses (USCIRF, 2022, p. 5). This led to the commission of further atrocities against the Rohingya (USCIRF, 2022, p. 5). In late 2014, the government implemented an indefinite internment program (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6). In addition, it set up the “Rakhine State Action Plan” (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6). This program aimed at determining the Rohingya’s eligibility for citizenship under the 1982 Citizenship Act (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6). To apply for citizenship, members of the Rohingya group were required to identify as “Bengali” (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6). Should they refuse to do so or be unable to produce the required documents, Rakhine State Action Plan stated that unsuccessful applicants would be confined indefinitely in camps (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6). Whilst there, they would only enjoy limited rights (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6). Despite the stringent legal conditions of this program, Buddhist extremists lobbied the government to terminate it for fear that some Rohingya may still be able to lawfully obtain Burma citizenship (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6). Mass protests took place in the Rakhine state and led the government to cancel the plan shortly after (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6).

From this chronology, it follows that it is difficult to assess at which point in time the Burmese government intent to eradicate the group, i.e., commit genocide, materialized. In September 2014, the government once again took an ambiguous stance toward the Rohingya. It took further restrictions to restrict the Rohingya’s political rights. A new law prevented white card holders from joining a political party (Leider, 2018, p. 16). In February 2015, the ruling USDP, led by Thein Sein, however, promised again to grant white card holders the right to vote, as previously done before the constitutional referendum of May 2008 (Leider, 2018, p. 16).

A few months later, violence in Burma spiraled into armed conflict (Amnesty International, 2017). Thousands of Rohingya left the country (Amnesty International, 2017). Before the elections, the government swiftly passed the “race and religion laws” (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6). This legislative package included the Religious Conversion Law, the Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Law (also known as the Interfaith Marriage Law), the Monogamy Law, and the Population Control Healthcare Law (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6). In essence, the race and religion laws sought to regulate religious conversions, marriages and births to ensure the population’s growth and wellbeing (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6). According to USCIRF (2022), the timing of this legislative reform, passed just before Election Day, shows that the government aimed at rallying Buddhists voters around issues of racial hegemony (p. 6).

At the time, further restrictions were implemented in relation to identification documents (Leider, 2018, p. 16). Although USDP’s electoral promise to grant voting rights to white card holders was granted and approved by parliament, this law was subsequently declared unconstitutional (Leider, 2018, p. 16). A few months later, white cards were cancelled (Leider, 2018, p. 14). During the previous elections, approximately 700,000–800,000 Rohingya Muslims, holding white cards, had been allowed to vote (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6). In February 2015, a presidential order provided that white cards were to expire at the end of March 2015 and requested them to be returned (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6). Rohingya people based in Rakhine were also prevented from running for office, except in limited circumstances (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6). In 2015, for the first time in the country’s history, Muslims were not represented in parliament (USCIRF, 2022, pp. 6–7). It follows that these measures deprived many Rohingya of any identification

evidence (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6). In June 2015, new green cards were provided but only to individuals willing to identify as “Rohingya” (Leider, 2018, p. 14).

During the electoral period, Ma Ba Tha supported the USDP, led by former head of state Thein Sein, against the NLD, led by Aung San Suu Kyi (Hodge, 2015). While Ma Ba Tha promoted anti-Rohingya hate speech, the organization also encouraged the boycott of political parties failing to “support Buddhism” (Hodge, 2015). The dehumanization of the Rohingya was rife on the social media (Zarni & Cowley, 2014, p. 683). For instance, Facebook posts referred to them as “kalar” (blacks) or animals, such as “Bengal tigers” (Hodge, 2015). Despite this campaign, the NLD ultimately won the general election (Hodge, 2015). As a result, Aung San Suu Kyi became State Counsellor, i.e., the head of government (Hodge, 2015). The change of government prompted many to believe that the rights of minorities would be protected (Hodge, 2015). Yet, Aung San Suu Kyi refrained from taking any action to stop abuses against the Rohingya (Hodge, 2015). Like the former government in place, she relied on the country’s need to enforce the 1982 Citizenship Law (Hodge, 2015).

The Rohingya genocide (October 2016–January 2017 and August 2017–present)

In early 2016, Wirathu, Ma Ba Tha’s leader, re-published on Facebook the story of the horrific rape and murder of a Buddhist woman in June 2012, which had led to sectarian violence then (USCIRF, 2022, p. 7). In the fall, paramilitary forces, made up of soldiers and extremist Buddhist monks, carried out raids in Rakhine, in retaliation of local riots (Human Rights Watch, 2020). During the raids, they burnt down Rohingya villages and committed serious human rights’ abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Among the main population, many individuals were insensitive to the Rohingya’s fate

(Human Rights Watch, 2020). There was little resistance against anti-Rohingya government policies (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Since then, sectarian violence has been lasting and has not yet come to an end (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

In October 2016, a fifth wave of forced migration occurred (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 19). A handful of Muslim Rohingya, part of a group called “Harakah al-Yaqin” or “HaY,” i.e., the “Faith Movement,” launched attacks at Rakhine’s border checkpoints (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 19). Paramilitary forces destroyed 1,500 buildings and engaged in indiscriminate killings of men, women and children (Knie & Pride, 2018, pp. 19–20).

In August 2017, HaY, changed its name to the Rakhine Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and attracted an increasing number of Rohingya rebels (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 20). As a result, the group successfully launched attacks on 30 border checkpoints and a Burmese army base (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 20). These attacks resulted in significant human and material casualties for Burma (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 20). The army retaliated by attacking villages (International Crisis Group, 2016, pp. 7–9). These events triggered the largest episode of forced migration of the Rohingya to date (International Crisis Group, 2016, pp. 7–9). The International Crisis Group (2016) reports that 671,000 Rohingya had fled to Bangladesh, in addition to the 200,000 refugees already present there since 2012 (International Crisis Group, 2016, pp. 7–9). In addition, 362 villages were burned down (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 20). Although the so-called “clearance operations” stopped in 2018, many Rohingya are still living in Bangladeshi refugee camps (Knie & Pride, 2018, pp. 20–21). There is little hope that they will return to Burma, despite the signing of a repatriation agreement between Bangladesh and Burma (Knie & Pride, 2018, p. 21).

In early 2019, Burma was tried before the International Court of Justice (Human Rights Watch, 2020). The Burmese government denied allegations of ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Rohingya (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Whilst testifying before the court, Aung San Suu Kyi refuted any wrongdoing by the military (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Nonetheless, the International Court of Justice ordered that the Burmese government take provisional measures to prevent a potential genocide of the Rohingya (Human Rights Watch, 2020). During that year, the International Criminal Court authorized the opening of an investigation in Myanmar/Bangladesh (International Criminal Court, 2020). In 2020, Aung San Suu Kyi's political party, the NLD was re-elected at the general elections (BBC, 2021). The military, however, declared the results to be fraudulent and deposed her (BBC, 2021). In 2022, she was tried by a military court and convicted to a 26-year sentence (Associated Press, 2022). To sum up, the Rohingya's genocide was preceded both by the increase of online hate speech and massive legal reforms affecting their livelihood conditions. In particular, the race and religion laws controlled every aspect of their lives, i.e., marriages, births and religious beliefs.

Step 3: Causal Graph and Theory-Building

The following paragraphs show the relevance of the suggested conceptual framework and how it is operationalized.

Relevance of the suggested conceptual framework

The Burmese laws, described in the above chronology, are reminiscent of the legal reforms taken by the Nazis in the early-mid 1930s to exclude the Jews from German society (Bankier, 1992, p. 42). Like antisemitic laws taken before the Holocaust, the

successive Burmese governments amended citizenship laws and laws on private matters before the outbreak of the Rohingya genocide. As a general rule, laws adopted before genocide are often analyzed through the lens of intentional discrimination or persecution (USCIRF, 2022, p. 2; Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 3). The deprivation of individual legal and civil rights falls within the global human rights regime, which conceptualizes them as human rights abuses or the oppression of minorities' rights (USCIRF, 2022, pp. 2–3; Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 3).

In this respect, Stanton (2016), the founder of Genocide Watch, an NGO whose mission statement includes predicting, preventing and punishing genocide, provides a ten-stage model of genocide, which is the main model of genocide prevention used in human rights and peace studies. According to this framework, these stages are neither linear nor mutually exclusive (Stanton, 2016). They identify milestones during the emergence of genocide that may be countered by preventive measures (Stanton, 2016).

For Stanton (2016), these ten stages include “classification, symbolization, discrimination, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, persecution, extermination, and denial.” The first five stages of the process involve cultural stages that increase genocide support and the remaining five steps include steps taken by the state to organize genocide (Stanton, 2016). Therefore, only the first five stages are relevant to the scope of this research.

During the “classification” stage, individuals make a distinction between “us and them” through various criteria, including race, ethnicity, religion, or nationality (Stanton, 2016). In the “symbolization” stage, members of the targeted group are given names or physical symbols conveying their inferior classification (Stanton, 2016). During the next

stage, the “discrimination” stage, the state undermines or denies the most fundamental rights of the targeted group through legal or political measures (Stanton, 2016).

According to Stanton (2016), the final “early” step of genocide occurs before the government takes organizational measures and involves “dehumanization” (Stanton, 2016). The process of dehumanization “denies the humanity” of the targeted group, and thus neutralizes moral barriers that prevent people from killing or committing abuses against other human beings (Stanton, 2016). Under this conceptual framework, at this stage, preventive measures act so as to prevent incitement to genocide and hate propaganda (Stanton, 2016).

Yet, this framework is overly abstract and does not explain how these early warning signs affect social attitudes and what conditions specifically lead to the normalization of violence against the targeted group. In addition, it overrepresents the importance of dehumanization as a variable of mass mobilization for genocide. The history of the Holocaust shows that dehumanizing propaganda was a constant during the Nazi regime (Landau, 1992/2016, p. 123). As such, dehumanization alone cannot explain why non-Jewish Germans supported the Nazi racist policies at certain points in time but rejected them on other occasions (Landau, 1992/2016, p. 123). This generic framework has little explanatory power, i.e., the impact of pre-genocide laws on societal attitudes vis-à-vis the targeted group, and their link with physical violence remain fuzzy.

The unsuitability of the human rights framework means that these violations may be better conceptualized as state-sanctioned institutionalized violence against the targeted group that frames a context in which physical genocidal violence is more likely to occur. Accordingly, I suggest using the biopolitical framework, as an alternative conceptual

framework to the traditional human rights frame. Within this theoretical explanation, dehumanization and propaganda against the targeted group are therefore only intermediate steps in the escalation of violence toward genocide, but not the sole determinants of mass mobilization. This alternative conceptual framework therefore presumes that dehumanization and hate propaganda are only made possible whenever compounded with pre-existing structural violence enshrined in laws and institutions. It follows that the biopolitical framework may help to decipher the ultimate, and not only the proximate, causes of mass mobilization in intrastate genocide.

From a methodological perspective, making a claim of causal inference is a difficult endeavor (McGrogan, 2016, p. 616). While the above chronology highlights the persuasiveness of the biopolitical frame, further evidence and argumentation is needed. To solve the “black box of causality,” my research design relies on a fine-grained qualitative analysis of historical events that involves a realistic, if not conservative, analysis of both the probing value of the evidence and counterfactuals (Gerring, 2007, p. 172). This approach differs from the main conventional approach in the social sciences, which entails measuring direct correlations between key variables to test my hypotheses or, alternatively, building a multiple regression analysis to infer causation, i.e., by measuring the effect of one variable while controlling others (McGrogan, 2016, p. 631).

In this respect, a more traditional approach to causality may have entailed measuring the correlation between biopolitics at given times in Burma and Nazi Germany, i.e., the independent variable, and the number of civilians participating in genocidal events, i.e., the dependent variable, to find whether biopolitics increase active mass mobilization for genocidal violence. Similarly, or alternatively, it may have

involved measuring the correlation between the same independent variable, on the one hand, and opinion polls, on the other, in order to measure both active and passive mass mobilization in intrastate genocide. Despite the adage that “correlation is not causation,” measuring these relationships may well have strengthened the rigor of my research and provided empirical evidence in support of my causal explanation of mass mobilization for intrastate genocide.

Nevertheless, there are three hurdles in pursuing a quantitative approach. First, a recent body of scholarship in human rights studies states that statistical approaches to human rights’ violations are unduly complicated and ultimately ineffective (McGrogan, 2016, p. 615). Since they solely rely on numerical indicators, quantitative approaches fail to consider the “lived experiences” of individuals (McGrogan, 2016, p. 616). As such, they run the risk of misinterpreting facts, and thus of poorly assessing causal links for given political outcomes (McGrogan, 2016, p. 615). In addition, the dominance of statistical approaches in the social sciences means that the underlying causality behind mass human rights abuses is under-theorized (McGrogan, 2016, p. 616). This school of thought therefore posits that causality should take place at the individual level and be guided by qualitative methods (McGrogan, 2016, p. 616). Secondly, quantitative methods may not be suited to analyze mass mobilization since the process is non-linear, reactive and contextual (Shaw, 2010, p. 8). Put differently, people change their minds over time (Luft, 2019, p. 3). They may perform different roles during genocide, e.g., from being indifferent to the ordeal of the targeted group to actively participating in atrocities (Luft, 2019, p. 3). Individuals may also adopt contradictory behaviors, e.g., killing and later saving (Luft, 2019, p. 3). Similarly, while individuals may find hate propaganda

appealing at certain times, they may lose interest in hate speech at others (Bankier, 1996, p. 142). It follows that many unmeasurable parameters may affect the outcome of interest (McGrogan, 2016, p. 631). Thirdly, potential causes may interfere (McGrogan, 2016, p. 633). In this respect, it is likely that biopolitics, the primary hypothesis, and dehumanization and hate propaganda, the rival hypotheses, interact during genocide. Accordingly, controlling one variable through statistical analyses may bias others (McGrogan, 2016, p. 633). The issue of endogeneity of the variables therefore means that a qualitative analysis may be more suitable (McGrogan, 2016, p. 633). For these reasons, although my analysis lacks quantitative data, it attempts to build a persuasive theoretical causal explanation of mass mobilization for intrastate genocide.

Bearing in mind these methodological considerations, the suggested explanatory framework relies on biopolitics, a concept that differs from human rights abuses in three respects. First, unlike any other types of human rights violations, biopolitical laws specifically focus on the targeted group's bios and are either taken for the main population's wellbeing or in the name of public health or are backed up by health professionals. Under a Foucauldian framework (1972), "truth" is entrusted in the hands of "men of science," i.e., those who are only deemed qualified to determine whether something is "true" or not (p. 216). Foucault (1976) explains that power and knowledge are part of the same thing, i.e., knowledge has become part of a process whereby "those qualified to speak" ritualize and systematize knowledge (p. 216). Although scientific knowledge produced through this process may be truncated, the law formalizes and even facilitates the operation of such scientific discourses (Foucault, 1972, p. 216). As such, biopolitics represent a form of invisible power asserted by the state over human bodies,

which alienates political freedom (Foucault, 1972, p. 255). While biopolitics do not require coercion, they produce structural violence and gets “into the very grain of individuals (Foucault, 1980, p. 39). Such violence is tolerated because it is both concealed and incremental (Foucault, 1998, p. 86).

Secondly, under this analytical framework, biopolitics operate so as to establish racialized, gendered and socio-economic classifications enshrined in laws. More specifically, the state regulates what the targeted group eats, caps how many children it may have, how much it may work, travel and practice religion. These restrictions go beyond human rights’ violations because they affect the targeted group’s bodily integrity and victimize the group through institutionalized violence. In contrast to human violations, biopolitical restrictions are embedded in legal codes. They allow both outright and more subtle discriminations to further seemingly legitimate aims. As such, they do not merely concern whether an individual’s most fundamental rights have been violated, but how these violations create categorizations of groups within society. Therefore, the primary focus on my research is not whether individual human rights have been violated. Rather, it investigates how a genocidaire government may shape a socio-political context in which these violations lead to the normalization of violence against the targeted group, and thus make ordinary citizens more likely to support a government’s genocidal agenda.

Thirdly, the mechanism at play implies that restrictions imposed by law on the targeted group for the main population’s wellbeing or in the name of science lead to the formation of an ingroup and an outgroup. Like slave laws or Apartheid laws, these biopolitical statutes lead to an unequal distribution of resources and life opportunities (Foucault, 2003, p. 255). Through biopolitics, a government establishes a hierarchy based

on the perceived worth of competing races, and thus a corresponding distribution of resources (Foucault, 2003, p. 255). As such, biopolitics frame a struggle between rights and redistribution that affects power relations within society (Foucault, 2003, p. 255). This process of “othering” creates artificial categories between individuals, i.e., those regarded as “us” and those regarded as “others,” which is eluded in conventional human rights thinking. By controlling the targeted group’s biology, biopolitics frame the targeted group as a threat to the main population’s life. Therefore, while I argue that biopolitics are an early warning sign of intrastate genocide, this conceptual framework does not suggest that the state intentionally take biopolitical restrictions against the targeted group in order to commit genocide. Rather, my research demonstrates that doing so, whether intentionally or unintentionally, is likely to increase mass mobilization for genocidal violence. The following section breaks down the steps involved in the process of mass mobilization for genocidal violence through biopolitics in both cases.

Operationalization of the conceptual framework

As shown in the causal graphs for each case study, which are reproduced in Appendix 2, intrastate genocide, as a socio-political process, typically begins with a census. In each case, the census is then followed by the denationalization of the targeted group, which triggers waves of mass migration. In a second step, the states passes even more stringent laws to limit the targeted group’s capacity to marry, especially into other ethnicities and religions, procreate, have any means of subsistence and access educational opportunities. A critical feature of biopolitics used in the context of intrastate genocide is the impoverishment of the targeted group, which triggers waves of forced migration.

In essence, violence stems from the legal, economic and institutionalized disenfranchisement of the targeted group deemed inferior. Disparities in food, work, property ownership and healthcare create a social hierarchy in which violence against the targeted group is normalized. Therefore, physical violence does not arise spontaneously but is structured by law. Although biopolitics may span over years or even generations, the state's permanent control over the biology and most intimate aspects of the targeted group question its existential rights. This slow, yet insidious, form of violence creates a context in which mass violence against the targeted group is more likely to occur, i.e., violence is institutionalized in law, and thus replicated in power dynamics.

Structural violence through biopolitics then leads to the last stage of intrastate genocide, i.e., civilian passive support for genocide and the active participation of citizens in the commission of atrocities. In this respect, mass mobilization for intrastate genocide is not necessarily a linear process (Shaw, 2010, p. 8). This means that, temporally, dehumanization does not necessarily arise only after biopolitical measures have been taken. At this final stage, biopolitics, however, allow dehumanization to become more effective and physical violence against the group to develop. The following paragraphs categorize biopolitical measures into four groups.

Denationalization: The first step of intrastate genocide, i.e., denationalization, operates so as to “de-root” the targeted group from society. In this respect, a comparative analysis of the denationalization process of the targeted group during the Holocaust and the Rohingya genocide is particularly telling. In the Holocaust case, although the denationalization of German Jews during the Holocaust took effect immediately upon

entry into force of the Nuremberg Race Laws of September 15, 1935, it is not necessarily linear. In the Holocaust case, earlier measures had led to their “social death,” i.e., their exclusion from social life (please see causal graph 2). Between 1933 and 1935, the state excluded Jews from employment in the civil service under the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service (LRPCS) of April 7, 1933. It also organized boycotts and public burning of books authored by Jewish writers (USHMM, “Boycott of Jewish Businesses”). By contrast, in the Rohingya case, the denationalization of the targeted group was a slow intergenerational process, which covered nearly forty years of history (Cheesman, 2017, p. 14). It intensified in 1989 when the state started to aggressively enforce the Citizenship Law of 1982 (Cheesman, 2017, p. 14). In addition, in the Rohingya case, this process involved “politics of identity documents,” whereby the Rohingya’s eligibility to Burmese citizenship was consistently challenged and the state administration refused to issue any identification documents. Irrespective of whether denationalization is immediate or gradual, the targeted group’s deprivation of citizenship by the state is only a starting point triggering further restrictions against the group that are biopolitical in character.

Food and means of subsistence: In both cases, food policies seemed to have been instrumental in demarcating intergroup hierarchies and singling out the targeted group. In the case of Burma, the various policies of impoverishment of the Rohingya aimed at preventing them from growing food and depriving them from educational and work opportunities progressively built structures of exclusion. In the Holocaust case, pursuant to the Hereditary Farm Law of September 29, 1933, Jews were banned from owning land. Research in archives also reveal that an agrarian law, the Hereditary Farm Law

(Reichserbhofgesetz), was adopted in September 1933. This law, which has somehow been forgotten by scholars, prevented a substantial part of the land in Germany from being a “transferable economic good” that could be sold to a third party on the open market (Galbraith, 1939, p. 465). Instead, farming land became a family heirloom to be passed on to descendants based on principles of “blood and soil” (Galbraith, 1939, p. 465). This measure was meant to give an honorable status to farmers and remedy their financial decline (Galbraith, 1939, p. 465). Pursuant to this law, Jews were banned from owning farming land (Galbraith, 1939, p. 465). Similarly, the Law against Overcrowding in Schools and Universities (LOSU) of April 25, 1933 restricted their access to education and a program of voluntary aryanization of their assets was implemented.

Marriage, reproduction and family matters: Pre-genocide biopolitical laws affect both genders differently. In both cases, such laws merely view women through their reproductive functions and involve regulations on marriage, in particular into other ethnicities and religions, reproduction, e.g., the number of children of the targeted group is capped, and family matters, e.g., the registration of births. In this respect, the treatment of females is rarely considered in the international relations literature when examining issues of state security and conflict (Hudson et al, 2009, p. 7). Theoretical frameworks of genocide which include gender dimensions remain seldom (Chinkin, 2018, p. 6). As argued by Hudson et al (2009), gender, however, is a critical indicator of societal differences between individuals (p. 9). According to gender studies, gender is the “primary formative fixed difference experienced in human society” and sexual reproduction constitutes the most significant “evolutionary driver” of human society (Hudson et al, 2009, p. 12).

In the former case study, in 2015, the Burmese government passed a package of “race and religion” laws, which mostly impacted women (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6). First, the Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Law (also known as the Interfaith Marriage Law) prohibited Buddhist women from marrying men of other religions. Secondly, the Monogamy Law prohibited polygamy, which is still practiced by the Rohingya. Thirdly, the Population Control Healthcare Law imposed a compulsory waiting period on women between each pregnancy (USCIRF, 2022, p. 6). Similarly, in the latter case study, Jewish women were viewed as breeders of undesirables and threats to the Aryan population by the Nazi regime (Ephgrave, 2016, p. 12). In December 1934, some members of the Nazi party demanded that non-Jewish Germans consorting with Jews should be deprived of citizenship and sent to concentration camps and sterilized (Bankier, 1992, p. 44). In the early days of Nazism, they also pressured local marriage offices to disallow interreligious marriages (Bankier, 1992, p. 44). The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 ultimately banned marriage between Jews and those of “German blood” (Raggam-Blesch, 2019, p. 379; Strnad, 2015, p. 173). Although the government encouraged mixed couples to divorce, if, however, often faced resistance and failed to do so (Raggam-Blesch, 2019, p. 379; Strnad, 2015, p. 173).

Religion, travel and political rights: Further measures enshrine the social exclusion of the targeted group by limiting electoral participation, the practice of religion and traveling, and excluding it from the body politic. In both cases, these measures are only ancillary and occur at a later stage of the process. In the case of Burma, throughout the 1990s, the Nasaka persecuted the Rohingya for practicing their religion, imposed drastic traveling restrictions within both Burma and Rakhine, and gradually curtailed

their political rights. Similarly, in Nazi Germany, from 1941, Jews were required to observe curfews (USHMM, “Public humiliation”). They were only allowed to shop and use public transport at certain times and in restricted places (USHMM, “Public humiliation”). Similarly, public space was divided between groups on racial grounds (USHMM, “Public humiliation”). For instance, benches in public spaces were labeled “Only for Aryans” or “Forbidden to Jews,” while others bore a “J” for Jews (USHMM, “Public humiliation”).

Steps 4–5: Alternative Events/Choices and Counterfactual Outcomes

The following section provides a historical analysis of mass mobilization during the Rohingya genocide and the Holocaust and addresses counterfactuals in each case. It shows that, although it is difficult to assess which variable – biopolitics or dehumanization or propaganda – is determinative of mass mobilization, dehumanization or propaganda without biopolitics are unlikely to succeed. In the first study, I analyze the Rohingya genocide and, in the second case, the Holocaust.

Case study 1: The Rohingya genocide

This section evaluates the available evidence by using four specific tests established by Van Evera (1997), i.e., “straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking-gun, and double-decisive,” described below, to measure the level of causation (pp. 31–32). Figure 3 below draws from Collier’s classification (2011) and provides a detailed explanation of how the four tests operate (p. 825).

		SUFFICIENT FOR AFFIRMING CAUSAL INFERENCE	
		No	Yes
NECESSARY FOR AFFIRMING CAUSAL INFERENCE	No	1. Straw-in-the-Wind	3. Smoking-Gun
		a. Passing: Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but does not confirm it.	a. Passing: Confirms hypothesis.
		b. Failing: Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is slightly weakened.	b. Failing: Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is somewhat weakened.
		c. Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing <i>slightly</i> weakens them. Failing <i>slightly</i> strengthens them.	c. Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing <i>substantially</i> weakens them. Failing <i>somewhat</i> strengthens them.
	Yes	2. Hoop	4. Doubly Decisive
		a. Passing: Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but does not confirm it.	a. Passing: Confirms hypothesis and eliminates others.
		b. Failing: Eliminates hypothesis.	b. Failing: Eliminates hypothesis.
		c. Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing <i>somewhat</i> weakens them. Failing <i>somewhat</i> strengthens them.	c. Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing <i>eliminates</i> them. Failing <i>substantially</i> strengthens them.

Figure 3. Process Tracing for Causal Inference.

Source: Collier (2011) (adapted from Bennett (2010), p. 210 and Van Evera (1997), pp. 31–32)

As shown in Figure 3, the four tests assess the value of the evidence (Collier, 2011, p. 825). Each test has different implications in terms of asserting causal inference (Collier, 2011, p. 825). First, passing the straw-in-the-wind test “affirms the relevance of the explanatory hypothesis but does not confirm it” (Collier, 2011, p. 825). Secondly, passing the smoking-gun test also shows the relevance of the hypothesis but is not sufficient evidence to assert a relationship of causality (Collier, 2011, p. 825). Thirdly, passing the smoking-gun test or the double-decisive test means that a sufficient evidentiary threshold is met in order to confirm the hypothesis (Collier, 2011, p. 825).

Passing each test has implications not only for the explanatory hypothesis but also for rival hypotheses (Collier, 2011, p. 825). As per Collier (2011), if a given hypothesis passes the straw-in-the-wind tests, it only “slightly weakens” the rival hypothesis; with

hoop tests, it “somewhat weakens” the rival hypothesis; with smoking-gun tests, it “substantially weakens” them; and with double-decisive tests, it “eliminates” the rival hypotheses (p. 825). Collier (2011) notes that ruling out a competing hypothesis completely, however, remains rare in the social sciences (p. 825).

Similarly, if a given hypothesis fails a straw-in-the-wind test, the hypothesis is “not eliminated but is slightly weakened” (Collier, 2011, p. 825). Failing a smoking-gun test does not eliminate the explanatory hypothesis but “somewhat weakens it” (Collier, 2011, p. 825). Failing a hoop test or a double-decisive test, however, rules out the explanatory hypothesis (Collier, 2011, p. 825). Table 1 below measures the level of causation of biopolitics on mass mobilization for genocidal violence based on the four tests described above.

Table 1. Process Tracing for Causal Inference.

Causal inference	
Event	Test
<i>Food and means of subsistence:</i> During the colonial period, the Rohingya became perceived as more affluent, due to their proximity with farming and food growing, and thus gradually became subject to social stigmatization.	Straw-in-the-wind
<i>Denationalization:</i> During the Ne Win regime (1962–1988), the Rohingya’s overpopulation led the Tatmadaw to launch Operation “Naga Min” (Dragon King) in 1978, a national census, and stripped them from their nationality due to their inability to produce any identification documents, despite not having received them in 1962.	Hoop
<i>Denationalization:</i> The denationalization of the Rohingya accelerated in 1989–1992 through aggressive state administrative practices. From 1992, interviewees report being told by local authorities to “go back to [their] country.”	Hoop
<i>Religion, travel and political rights; means of subsistence:</i> Throughout the 1990s, the Rohingya practiced their religion in secret to avoid detention or beatings by the Nasaka. They were not allowed to access educational opportunities nor to travel.	Hoop

Causal inference	
Event	Test
<i>Marriage, reproduction and family planning:</i> From the late 1990s and the early 2000s, biopolitics against the Rohingya did not only relate to land ownership and food growing. Laws made their right to marry subject to permission and capped their number of children.	Hoop
<i>Food and means of subsistence:</i> Due to the loss of their citizenship, the Rohingya, who initially consisted in a farming population, were disallowed from owning land and gradually lost their ability to grow their own food. By the mid-late 2000s, the Rohingya became destitute. Civilian violence and abuses occurred against the Rohingya with impunity.	Hoop
<i>Marriage, reproduction and family planning:</i> During Burma's liberalization period, which started in 2011, the population gained unfettered access to the media, including social networks. Hate speech became widespread on social media and was also used by the government and extreme Buddhists. Yet, the government took further biopolitical measures in relation to marriage. Anti-Rohingya propaganda then mostly related to inter-racial marriage and demonized them. In 2012, violence erupted between different groups and no longer involved police forces only. Civilians widely committed violence against the Rohingya.	Smoking-gun
<i>Marriage, reproduction and family planning:</i> In 2015, the government adopted seemingly neutral laws aimed at protecting the population's health and regulating its growth and wellbeing. The government limited the Rohingya's reproduction and further singled them out.	Smoking-gun

As shown in Table 1, during the colonial period, the Rohingya were perceived as affluent due to their proximity with farming and food growing, and thus gradually became subject to social stigmatization. This historical event shows that the ethno-religious conflict between the Rohingya and the rest of the population was framed within land ownership and food concerns, i.e., unequal access to food generated hatred against the Rohingya and may have provided a motivation for hating them. This piece of evidence should, however, not be overstated. While it affirms the relevance of the explanatory hypothesis, it does not confirm it. Such evidence only passes the straw-in-

the-wind test, which is the lowest threshold of evidential value (Collier, 2011, p. 825). Therefore, as per Collier (2011), this is a “promising lead” but is sufficient to accept causation (p. 826).

Moreover, during the Ne Win regime (1962–1988), the Rohingya’s overpopulation led the Tatmadaw to launch Operation “Naga Min” (Dragon King) in 1978, a national census, and subsequently stripped them from their nationality due to their inability to produce any identification documents, despite not having received them in 1962. The denationalization of the Rohingya led to a formal rejection of the targeted group by the government enshrined by law. The “de-rooting” of the Rohingya, as an undesirable group, was further implemented by the Citizenship Act of 1982. Likewise, this is a “promising lead” but not determinative evidence (Collier, 2011, p. 825). These pieces of evidence therefore both pass the hoop test, i.e., they are consistent with the primary hypothesis that the law normalizes violence against the targeted group and operates as a tool of structural violence. The fact that, later in history, the denationalization of the Rohingya accelerated in 1989–1992 through forceful administrative practices equally provides hoop test evidence. While it “slightly weakens” the rival hypothesis, it is insufficient on its own to draw causal inference (Collier, 2011, p. 825).

Furthermore, additional biopolitical measures were adopted in the 1990s and 2000s. First, throughout the 1990s, the Rohingya practiced their religion in secret to avoid detention or beatings by the Nasaka. They were not allowed to access educational opportunities nor to travel. Secondly, from the late 1990s and the early 2000s, biopolitics against the Rohingya did not only relate to land ownership and food growing but

specifically made their right to marry subject to permission and capped their number of children. Thirdly, by the mid-late 2000s, the Rohingya became destitute. By losing citizenship, the Rohingya, who initially consisted in a farming population, were no longer allowed to own land and gradually lost their ability to grow their own food. By then, civilian violence and abuses occurred against them with impunity. These various pieces of evidence also pass the hoop test. They are consistent with the hypothesis that the law formalizes structures of violence against the Rohingya. The evidence at hand also slightly weakens the impact of dehumanization and propaganda alone on mass mobilization for genocidal violence.

Finally, during Burma's liberalization period, which started in 2011, the population gained unfettered access to the media, including social networks. Hate speech became prevalent on social media and was also used by the government and extreme Buddhists. Anti-Rohingya propaganda then mostly related to inter-racial marriage and the demonization of the Rohingya. In 2012, violence erupted between different groups and no longer involved police forces only. Civilians widely committed violence against the Rohingya. Although it is more prudent to make a conservative assessment of the evidence, this event may be classed as smoking-gun evidence. It shows that, despite the widespread use of social media, propaganda draws from biopolitics already in place, i.e., in this case, restrictions on marriage, reproduction and family planning. Similarly, in 2015, the government adopted further laws, with seemingly neutral objectives to protect the population's health and regulate its growth and wellbeing. These laws regulated religious conversions, prevented interfaith marriages from being registered officially, capped the Rohingya's number of children, and thus further singled out the Rohingya

from society. By the same token, this may also constitute smoking-gun evidence. The adoption of this legislative package in 2015 shows that biopolitical measures work hand in hand with both dehumanization and propaganda. To further substantiate this assertion, Appendix 3 provides a content analysis of anti-Rohingya propaganda showing that, from early 2015 to 2018, biopolitical narratives reflected on dehumanization and hate propaganda. From this, it may be inferred that, without biopolitics, dehumanization and hate propaganda are unlikely to succeed.

Case study 2: The Holocaust

This section provides a historical analysis of mass mobilization during the Holocaust. It relies on both secondary sources on mass mobilization by Holocaust scholars and historians and a qualitative assessment of counterfactuals. Since inception, antisemitic propaganda was rife in Nazi Germany (Landau, 1992/2016, p. 123). Throughout the whole regime, propaganda consistently encouraged dehumanization against the Jews. The Nazis used all types of media to spread hatred, i.e., the radio, publicly displayed posters, movies, newspapers articles and images, and even school children's textbooks (USHMM, "Nazi Propaganda"). Nonetheless, Germans initially did not widely support Hitler's racist views (Landau, 1992/2016, p. 123). On April 1, 1933, Goebbels delivered a speech in Berlin, encouraging people to boycott Jewish-owned businesses and encourage violence against Jews (USHMM, "Boycott of Jewish Businesses"). At the time, the national boycott operation lasted only one day and was poorly received (USHMM, "Boycott of Jewish Businesses"). Most Germans ignored it, which made the operation unsuccessful (USHMM, "Boycott of Jewish Businesses"). In the late 1930s and the early 1940s, non-Jewish Germans disapproved the violent

messages conveyed by Nazi-controlled newspapers (Landau, 1992/2016, p. 123). Put differently, dehumanizing propaganda was initially an unsuccessful method to foster hostility against the Jews.

Drawing the lessons from this unsuccessful call for violence, the Nazi government shifted approach. In the first six years of Hitler's dictatorship, the government passed more than 400 decrees and regulations against the Jews (USHMM, "Anti-Jewish Legislation in Prewar Germany"). To draw a parallel with the Rohingya genocide, these measures were equally biopolitical. They regulated matters such as (i) food, (ii) marriage, reproduction and family planning; (iii) religion, travel and political rights and (iv) health. Although the history of Nazism is complex, this change of approach casts doubt as to whether hate speech and widespread dehumanization are enough to trigger mass mobilization for genocide against an intrastate group. While a cautious approach is required when analyzing historical events, the repositioning of Nazi policy, at least, allows to question the rival hypothesis and shows the relevance of the primary hypothesis as an alternative explanation to mass mobilization.

After the denationalization of the Jews, the Nuremberg Race Laws of September 15, 1935 prohibited Jews from marrying or having sexual relations with persons of "German or German-related blood," which amounted as criminal conduct (USHMM, "Nuremberg Race Laws"). Persons suspected of having sexual relations with non-Aryans were charged with "racial defilement" (*Rassenschande*) (USHMM, "Nuremberg Race Laws"). Evans (2005), a historian specialized in Holocaust studies, explains that the impact of these laws was to exclude the Jews from communities, and thus to punish and humiliate them (pp. 548, 553). Non-Jewish Germans became reluctant to socialize with

the Jews or buy goods in Jewish-owned shops (Evans, 2005, p. 548). If they did, they would be scolded (Evans, 2005, p. 553). Similarly, wholesalers supplying Jewish traders would be required to march through the streets, whilst wearing placards around their necks referring to them as traitors (Gellately, 1991, p. 105.).

Nonetheless, at the time, opposition was still alive (Friedländer, 2009, p. 51). The Communist party and part of the Catholic Church strongly opposed laws against the Jews (Friedländer, 2009, p. 51). Yet, by being stripped of their citizenship and civil rights, German Jews became completely cut out from the rest of German society (USHMM, “Nuremberg Race Laws”). By 1937, the Nuremberg Laws had considerably reduced economic opportunities for the Jews, who experienced dire financial distress (USHMM, “What made it possible”). The state tightly regulated how much space, food, electricity, and medical care they were allowed to receive (USHMM, “What made it possible”). In 1938, the Nazi government required all Jewish property to be registered and all Jewish individuals to bear identity markers. The law was amended to compel Jewish men and women with “non-Jewish” first names to add on their identity cards the names of “Israel” and “Sara,” respectively, to their given names by 1 January 1939 (USHMM, “Antisemitic Legislation 1933–1939”). Later in the autumn, authorities stamped passports held by Jews with an identifying letter “J.” (USHMM, “Antisemitic Legislation 1933–1939”). The “Night of Broken Glass” (Kristallnacht) on November 1938 (Friedländer, 1998, p. 270) was the first event of mass violence involving both Nazis officials and civilians (Friedländer, 1998, p. 270). At the time, antisemitic propaganda had become highly effective and dehumanization had reached its apex (Friedländer, 1998, p. 270). In 1940, *The Eternal Jew*, a movie directed by Fritz Hippler, depicted Jews as cultural parasites,

obsessed with sex and money (USHMM, “Nazi Propaganda”). In newspapers, Nazi propaganda depicted the Jews as “dangerous enemies of the nation” (USHMM, “Nazi Propaganda”).

Crucially, in July 1941, the nature of antisemitic propaganda changed and concentrated on “purity” and “health” (Landry, Orr & Mere, 2022, p. 15). Landry, Orr & Mere (2022) explain that metaphors of diseases and purity became prevalent in dehumanizing propaganda (p. 15). In the fall of 1941, the Nazi leadership shifted policy and started planning the systematic killing of all European Jews (USHMM, “What made it possible”). In September 1941, Propaganda Minister Goebbels ordered Jews over the age of 6 to sew on their clothing a yellow Star of David with the word “Jew” (Jude) (USHMM, “What made it possible”). This measure was also applied in Belgium, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Vichy France, and other German-occupied territories during the following year (USHMM, “What made it possible”). In Germany, Jews were required to comply with curfews (USHMM, “Public humiliation”). The places they were allowed to visit to shop were limited to certain locations and times of the day (USHMM, “Public humiliation”). Similarly, they were only allowed to use the public transports during certain times (USHMM, “Public humiliation”). Public amenities such as benches were divided by race (USHMM, “Public humiliation”). On September 3, 1941, the Nazis conducted the first gassing experiments using Zyklon B at the Auschwitz concentration camp (USHMM, “What made it possible”). The regime started using so-called “industrial methods” of genocide for mass killings (USHMM, “What made it possible”).

The above analysis of the history of mass mobilization in Nazi Germany suggests that dehumanization and propaganda do not suffice on their own to generate mass support

for policies of extermination or to gather active civilian participation in intrastate genocide. In this respect, the alternative frame suggested here may better explain causality. It posits that biopolitics make dehumanization and propaganda more effective. Essentially, biopolitics entail a different form of violence. They often appear as outwardly neutral laws aimed at protecting health in the public interest but involve no violent use of force. Therefore, they only seem to trigger mild resistance. With a declining agriculture and economy after World War I, millions of Germans were starving (Lovin, 1969, p. 447). Against this background, the Nazi government took legal measures to undermine the living conditions of the Jews (Lovin, 1969, p. 447). These regulations affected the core of their existence, i.e., they restricted their ability to earn a living, marry and have a family, and participate in civic affairs (Bankier, 1992, p. 42; Proctor, 1988, p. 223). Despite being controversial, they resonated with the suffering of ordinary Germans, and thus did not trigger mass opposition (Bankier, 1992, p. 42; Proctor, 1988, p. 223). In contrast, measures taken at the outset of the Nazi regime, which had promoted brutality against the Jews, such as boycotts or pogroms, were massively rejected by Germans (Landau, 1992/2016, p. 123). Since the main population did not support them, calls for violent action against the Jews did not help the Nazis to secure the required political base needed to implement Hitler's racist policies (Landau, 1992/2016, p. 123).

Furthermore, the suggested biopolitical frame not only argues that such measures were efficient because they hindered the targeted group's livelihood, but also because their scientific backing provided them with greater legitimacy. Under a Foucauldian framework, biopolitics are legitimized by "men of science" and influence discourses (Foucault, 1972, p. 216). In this respect, many Nazi policies arose from within the

scientific community (Proctor, 1988, p. 6). Scientific experts had a significant role in the design of antisemitic legislation (Proctor, 1988, p. 6). Although Nazi eugenic laws proceeded from elaborate legislative drafting, they were typically drawn in secrecy and gave rise to limited parliamentary discussions (Bankier, 1992, pp. 42–43). To compensate this research limitation, Proctor (1988), a professor of history, provides a comprehensive account of German medical involvement in the elaboration of Nazi racial laws and policies throughout the Third Reich. His (1998) extensive research of German-language medical journals shows that physicians and medical scientists were consistently involved during the legislative process of the Hereditary Health Law of July 14, 1933, which allowed courts to order the sterilization of people with hereditary diseases, the Blood Protection Law of September 15, 1935 which banned marriage between Jews and non-Jews, and the Aktion T4 program to destroy “lives not worth living,” i.e., providing for the euthanasia of disabled people (p. 6). Proctor’s work (1988) provides solid evidence that German health professionals encouraged Nazi leaders to regard the “Jewish problem” as a medical issue (p. 177).

In his view (1988), the social Darwinism of the late nineteenth century in America and Europe had given rise to a racial hygiene movement whose aim was to achieve a better, healthier, stronger population (p. 223). At the time, medical authorities were eager to make the German population healthy and promote fertility (Proctor, 1988, p. 223). In particular, an “organic” health movement encouraged the population to reduce smoking and drinking and consume high-fiber foods, in particular, whole-grain bread (Proctor, 1988, p. 223). As shown by the evidence, Nazi antisemitic policies therefore pivoted around medicine and science. The discourse on racial hygiene was particularly influential

on the population, albeit in a subtle way (Proctor, 1988, p. 223). From this, it follows that, from 1933–1935, Nazi racial laws established a classification of members of the population, i.e., those deemed worthy of living and those deemed to be a threat to its wellbeing. Crucially, since they were endorsed by the medical profession, these laws were conferred enhanced legitimacy, and thus gave “no reason” for ordinary Germans to question them (Bankier, 1992, p. 42; Proctor, 1988, p. 223).

Conclusion of this chapter

The above analysis has sought to trace the process of mass mobilization in intrastate genocide by conducting a comparative case study. It follows that two main findings may be drawn from this comparative analysis. First, denationalization seems to be a starting point for mass mobilization in cases of intrastate genocide. In this respect, both the Rohingya genocide and the Holocaust occurred only after both their denationalization and a long series of reforms affecting their ability to marry, have a family, travel, practice religion and get education or employment opportunities. In the Holocaust case, a historical analysis of events shows that dehumanization and propaganda remained ineffective up until a second series of biopolitics came into force after the denationalization of the Jews.

Secondly, the relevance of biopolitics as a conceptual framework is further evidenced in anti-Rohingya publications. Content analysis of anti-Rohingya publications, described in detail in Appendix 1, demonstrates that narratives related to biopolitics, i.e., narratives of food scarcity and competition for food, sexual abuse and mistreating women, and health, were prevalent in hate-speech and dehumanizing propaganda. As

such, it shows that propaganda works effectively when it resonates with structural beliefs created through biopolitical laws.

Chapter V.

Conclusion

This thesis has made the case that, well before genocide is planned or even intended, biopolitical restrictions regulate – and call into question – the existential rights of the targeted group. As a result, this project has questioned the prevalent theory that hate propaganda or dehumanization, i.e., the process of denying individuals of their humanness and treating them as “less than” humans (Haslam, 2006, p. 252), are the primary causes of mass mobilization in intrastate genocide. In this respect, it has been argued that the importance of dehumanization, as a variable of mass mobilization for genocide, is overrepresented in the political science scholarship.

This project has, however, acknowledged its own methodological limitations, i.e., asserting causality of one explanatory variable over another requires a high evidentiary threshold. In practice, in multi-variable cases like the cases studied here, it is difficult to establish causality with a high level of confidence (Gerring, 2007, p. 172). With this caveat, a comparative analysis of the history of the Rohingya genocide and the Holocaust persuasively supports the argument that dehumanization or propaganda without biopolitics are unlikely to succeed.

In this respect, this thesis has departed from the conventional approach in the social sciences, which traditionally uses quantitative methods to measure causality, and followed a qualitative methodology. This deliberate choice is justified by *inter alia* the need to consider the lived experiences of individuals.

Ultimately, one of the main findings of this research is that a new theoretical framework may be needed to explain intrastate genocide, as an alternative to the conventional human rights framework. Despite its dominant place in prevention studies, the human rights framework, including such as Stanton's ten-stage model of genocide, tells little about how genocide is experienced at the level of the individual. By contrast, the biopolitical framework posits that dehumanization and hate propaganda are only made possible whenever compounded with pre-existing structural violence enshrined in laws and institutions. Put differently, biopolitical restrictions produce state-sanctioned institutionalized violence against the targeted group that frames a context in which physical violence against the targeted group is more likely to occur. Whilst biopolitical restrictions and human rights abuses may overlap in practice, it may be appropriate to reconceptualize human rights abuses as biopolitics to develop predictive and preventive frameworks for intrastate genocide. It follows that this alternative conceptual framework may complement, rather than challenge, existing genocide prevention tools, such as Stanton's ten-stage model of genocide.

Regarding the operationalization of this new framework, this thesis has argued that biopolitics operate so as to establish racialized, gendered and socio-economic classifications structured by law. More specifically, the state regulates what the targeted group eats, limits how many children it may have, how much it may work, travel and practice religion. These restrictions go beyond human rights' violations because they affect the targeted group's bodily integrity and victimize the group through institutionalized violence. Like slave laws or Apartheid laws, biopolitical laws distribute resources and life opportunities unequally within society. Through biopolitics, the

government establishes a hierarchy of lives based on the perceived worth of competing races and a corresponding distribution of resources. As such, biopolitical laws frame a struggle between rights and redistribution that affects the distribution of power relations within society. This process of “othering” creates artificial categories between individuals, i.e., those regarded as “us” and those regarded as “others,” which is eluded in conventional human rights thinking. In short, by controlling the targeted group’s biology, biopolitics frame the targeted group as a threat to the main population’s life.

In this respect, this thesis has sought to trace the process of mass mobilization in intrastate genocide by conducting a comparative case study. In each case at hand, a national census is the premise of the denationalization of the targeted group, which, in turn, triggers waves of mass migration. The state subsequently passes even stricter laws to limit the targeted group’s capacity to marry, especially into other ethnicities and religions, procreate, have any means of subsistence and access educational opportunities. Therefore, the impoverishment of the targeted group, leading to waves of forced migration, is a crucial step in intrastate genocide. As stated above, violence stems from the legal, economic and institutionalized repression of the targeted group deemed inferior by the body politic. Disparities in food, work, property ownership and healthcare create a social and racialized hierarchy in which violence against the targeted group is normalized. Therefore, physical violence does not arise out of a vacuum but is structured by law. Although biopolitics may span over years, or even generations, the state’s permanent control over the biology and most intimate aspects of the targeted group questions its existential rights. This slow, yet insidious, form of violence creates a context in which mass violence against the targeted group is more likely to erupt, i.e., violence is

institutionalized in law, and thus metabolized into power dynamics. It follows that structural violence through biopolitics then leads to the last stage of intrastate genocide, i.e., civilian passive support for genocide and the active participation of citizens in the commission of atrocities.

While process tracing mass mobilization in intrastate genocide may advance knowledge in the field, this work is only a beginning. On the one hand, laws falling within the biopolitical framework may be used as an instrument of genocide prevention. On the other, further research would need to be built on the matter. For instance, the gender dimensions of genocide are largely absent from peace and security studies. As shown in this thesis, biopolitical laws taken before genocide often view women only through their reproductive functions. They involve numerous restrictions on marriage, in particular into other ethnicities and religions, reproduction and fertility. Therefore, further research may be needed to decipher the implications on biopolitical laws affecting women on the prevention of genocide.

Ultimately, the suggested biopolitical framework discussed here may help scholars to better map the stages of intrastate genocide and provide avenues for new research.

Appendix 1.

Map: The Rakhine state (formerly Arakan)




Figure 4. Map of the Rakhine State.

Source: Human Rights Watch (2013)

Appendix 2.

Causal Graphs




Figure 5. Causal Graph of variables and sub-variables leading to civilian mobilization for genocide during the Rohingya genocide.




Figure 6. Causal graph of variables and sub-variables leading to civilian mobilization for genocide during the Holocaust.

Appendix 3.

Content Analysis of Anti-Rohingya Publications (early 2015–2018)

This section analyzes evidence provided through pamphlets, poems and public statements issued by political parties and Buddhist monks' associations against the Rohingya, collectively referred to as "anti-Rohingya publications." These publications encompass "hate speech" typically defined as "public speech that expresses hate or encourages violence towards a person or group based on something such as race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation" (Cambridge dictionary, 2020), "propaganda" understood as "communication that is used primarily to influence an audience and further an agenda, which may not be objective and may be presenting facts selectively to encourage a particular synthesis or perception, or using loaded language to produce an emotional rather than a rational response to the information" (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020) and publicly-shared information.

The scope of study is limited to materials disseminated on social media. It should, however, be noted that some of the materials collected online have also been distributed in hardcopy to members of the population in Burma. These materials include promotional material and literature for the Buddhist nationalist movement, pamphlets on anti-Muslim and anti-Rohingya bills. Photographs of pamphlets distributed in person and subsequently posted online also form part of the analysis. Regarding the temporal scope of research, this case study focuses on the most recent aspects of the Rohingya crisis. The period of reference starts from early 2015, i.e., when campaigning for Burma's first democratic general election started, until 2018, i.e., when the international community took action against Burma for acts of

genocide. The primary data shall be subject to both quantitative and qualitative evaluations.

A- Methodologies and Results

Data collected comprise 52 anti-Muslim and anti-Rohingya pamphlets and public statements issued by political parties and Buddhist monks' associations (including but not limited to Ma Ba Tha) during the period of reference (n=52). The collection of primary data is used to build a corpus of texts to test the hypotheses described below.

Methodology

My hypothesis is that some elements of online anti-Rohingya publications were made more salient than others, e.g., the competition between Buddhists and Muslims for food, the Rohingya's continuous need of food and the illegitimacy of their claim for food, the reproduction and growth of the Rohingya population, while obscuring other information, a process known as "framing" in the IR literature (Entman, 1993, p. 52). In essence, framing is a process whereby "the communicator constructs frames through selecting 'some aspects of a perceived reality'" (Vu & Lynn, 2020, p. 1286). It follows that some pieces of information may appear more salient than others, to the detriment of objective facts (Vu & Lynn, 2020, p. 1286). This may be reflected by a choice of words and language, whether literal or figurative (Entman, 1993, p. 52).

In IR studies, several methods have been used to detect frames (Vu & Lynn, 2020, p. 1287). In their seminal work, Boumans and Trilling (2016) show the relevance of computerized automated content analysis, "as a sophisticated process to

study documents and communication artifacts and to examine communication patterns in a replicable and systematic manner.” They (2016) rely on three main categories of automated frame detection (i) “basic counting and dictionary-based method”; (ii) “supervised machine learning”, and (iii) “unsupervised machine learning,” which they recommend using in combination. Similarly, Vu & Lynn (2020) opine that triangulation, i.e., the simultaneous use of different methods, helps reveal “critical textual choices” in news, including figurative meaning (p. 1288).

In view of these considerations, this study relies on a dual testing-method, i.e., basic counting and dictionary, on the one hand, and unsupervised machine learning, on the other. With regard to the latter, this research has used KH coder, a computer program for quantitative content analysis and text mining (Vu & Lynn, 2020, p. 1288). As pointed out by Vu & Lynn (2020), this software allows to measure “coder frequency of words, semantic network, hierarchical cluster analysis and multi-dimensional scaling” (p. 1288).

Accordingly, this study has used the following methodology. First, a quantitative analysis was performed by measuring word frequency through KH coder. The purpose of the analysis was to establish how frequently words referring to concepts of food or water, and the actions of eating or drinking, having a family appear within a typical anti-Rohingya publications. Secondly, automated analysis through KH coder was used to reveal co-occurrence networks (Vu & Lynn, 2020, p. 1291). The objective behind this approach was to measure co-occurrence networks, i.e., what types of words are likely to co-occur within a typical post. Thirdly, a qualitative assessment helped to categorize idioms, defined as “a phrase or expression that typically presents a figurative, non-literal meaning attached to the phrase” (Keizer, 2016, p. 981).

Results

The following paragraphs assess word frequency and co-occurrences networks and include a manual mapping of frames.

1. Word frequency (KH Coder)

The word frequency analysis illustrates that words referring to food and drink and women and family ranked highly in terms of frequency within anti-Rohingya publications. The most frequent words among all texts contained in the sample included: “land” (9th), “eat” (26th), “food” (34th), “water” (41st), “drink” (47th) and “rice” (58th) (please see Figure 7 below). Although the most frequent words include references to “Muslims” (1st) or “Muslim” (3rd) and Bengalis (6th), a locally racist term deemed to pejoratively refer to the Rohingya, as well as to “money” (2nd), the word frequency analysis shows that food narratives prevailed in anti-Rohingya online publications.




Figure 7. Word Frequency.

2. Co-occurrence networks (KH Coder)

Moreover, a qualitative assessment measured co-occurrence networks through KH Coder. Co-occurrence networks are used to “measure the frequency of occurrence of several terms related to a same concept or idea,” i.e., viewed as network, within a text corpus (Lancia, 2007, p. 1). As pointed by Lancia (2007), this method may help to decipher “latent structures of mental and social representations” (p. 1). Therefore, it is particularly useful in the case at hand, i.e., to test the hypothesis that anti-Rohingya publications forged negative social representations against them through food scarcity and narratives around women’s suffering. The results of this assessment are displayed in Chart 1 below.

commit acts of violence against the Rohingya, Buddhist monks instilled the fear of the “wicked other”. They used a nationalist narrative referring to the need to preserve the state and the Buddhist religion by referring to key terms, e.g., “Buddhists”, “powerful”, “believe”, “join”, “invade” and by using simple language to gather support.

Secondly, although the networks of *food* (5) and *drink* (6) seem relatively small in the chart, they co-occur with the other networks displayed within the chart. Despite their small size, they seem to be a recurrent feature of anti-Rohingya publications. This shows that nationalist Buddhist monks honed on food to create leverage for their hate campaigns and eradicate the Rohingya’s political voice.

Thirdly, owing to the large size of the *women and the family* (7) network, the results of this analysis also show that this seemed to have played an important role in anti-Rohingya publications. In fact, other studies have shown how extremist movements in Burma have capitalized on women’s rights to foster hatred against the Rohingya, for instance, by using stories according to which the Rohingya beat their wives, Buddhist women married to the Rohingya live a hard life, the Rohingya promote child marriage (Marler & Macarenam, 2018).

3. Manual mapping of frames

The third method used, a manual mapping, analyzes in greater detail figurative aspects of the language used against the Rohingya through idioms (please see full results in Table 2 below). It shows that four frames were interconnected with food narratives, i.e., *animals* (1); *trade/business* (2); *inter-communal marriage* (3); and *nationalism and Buddhist religion* (4). For instance, references to animals are used to describe that the

Rohingya are insatiable and portray them as an existential threat to indigenous Burmese, e.g., “The African catfish have a great population.” In this text, “African” refers to the Rohingya’s dark skin and “catfish” depicts someone who appears to be honest but is in fact evil.

Similarly, there is a prevailing idea that the Rohingya are both food-grabbing and money-grabbing. This idea is developed through the interconnected frames of food and trade/business, e.g., “Muslims are only well behaved when they are weak,” “Muslims ... are like a wolf or a jackal [hunting in packs],” “Muslim shops ... have become richer and wealthier than us ... [they] can marry our girls.” Figuratively, these texts strongly imply that the population should socially and economically isolate the Rohingya to protect the Burmese. The same inference may be drawn from the interconnection between food and inter-communal marriage, e.g., “All the land in the country shall be owned by the Muslims,” “Buddhist women get married with Muslims ... using money.” According to the Burmese interpreter, the reference to “land” seems inapposite in the given context since the Rohingya are no longer allowed to own land. Therefore, it strongly implies that the word “land” used in this context refers to the ability to grow food.

Finally, the *nationalism and Buddhist religion (4)* framing cue underlines the food requirements of the Muslim population, which are deemed peculiar and imply that the population should remain wary of them.

Table 2. Manual frame mapping based on semantic networks.

Frame	Implied meaning	Example (use of idioms)
interconnected with food narratives		
Animal references: danger, existential threat, overpopulated group, dehumanization	Emphasizes the alleged foreign character of the Rohingya and portrays them as an existential threat to intrastate Burmese	“The whole village becomes Muslim ...” “The African catfish have a great population.”
Trade/business: danger, social injustice, stealing women, (animal references also prevalent)	Request to the population to socially and economically isolate the Rohingya to protect the Burmese	“Must not do business with Bengalis [Rohingya].” “Must not associate with Bengalis [Rohingya].” “Muslims are only well behaved when they are weak.” “Muslims ... are like a wolf or a jackal [hunting in packs].” “Muslim shops ... have become richer and wealthier than us ...” “[Muslims] can marry our girls.”

Frame interconnected with food narratives	Implied meaning	Example (use of idioms)
Inter-communal marriage: sexualization of the Rohingya, land ownership, loss of sexual power, loss of masculinity, emasculation as implying loss of honor	Request to the population to socially and economically isolate the Rohingya to prevent the Burmese	“Burmese Citizen - Beware! The Muslims living in Burma are attempting to expand their religion while destroying Buddhism in Burma by using the following ways: 1) Land: All the land in the country shall be owned by the Muslims. 2) ... 3) Women: To organize Buddhist women to get married with Muslims using money and other ways.” “In this way, they have destroyed and penetrated not only our nation but also our religion.”

Frame	Implied meaning	Example (use of idioms)
interconnected with food narratives		
Nationalism and religion: Peculiar food requirements, immoral accumulation of wealth, (animal references and references to stealing women) coupled with nationalist and Buddhist narratives	Request that the population remain prudent toward Rohingya's peculiar habits and immoral character	“1. According to the above subject mentioned, Muslims in Meikthila, those “Tiger Kalar” are wearing their Kalar Mosque’s Dresses and going around in the town more than ever before. 2. In those Muslim people (Kalar), there are some Stranger Kalars who we have never seen before. 3. Although the time is not for Kalar’s Eid al-Fitr or Eid al-Adha period, they have been attending meetings at mosque (day and night). 4. Using money from Saudi which has been distributed to mosques, Muslims have been buying lands, farms and houses both in and out of the city with incredible amount of money under the Burmese broker’s names.

Frame	Implied meaning	Example (use of idioms)
interconnected with food narratives		5. Two Burmese women from North Pyi Tharyar were married off to two Kalar under the responsibility of a mosque. 6. Furthermore, Kalar are urging each other that only “Halal” labelling branded kids products such snacks, fizzy drinks and tea are edible for Kalars.” “Muslims are eager to monopolize lands, property, and mineral resources ... Islam is justified to eliminate all Buddhists according to the Quran.” “They (Muslims) do everything in nationalist’s way and that’s why they (Muslims) keep buying lands and properties. They (Muslims) carried bags of money to propose girls for marriage, and they (Muslims) use those to

Frame	Implied meaning	Example (use of idioms)
interconnected with food narratives		manipulate girls ... If they (Muslims) have power, even the “Ka Htein” which is Buddhist charity will be gone from our country.”

B- Discussion

The results of this research show the salience of food and reproduction narratives in online publications in fueling hatred and violence against the Rohingya. Through the semantics of starvation and pejorative metaphors referring to the Rohingya as animals or bad character individuals, extreme Buddhist nationalists constructed negative social representations against the Rohingya to effectively channel their views to the remaining population.

Moreover, as this case has shown, the communication strategy used by Buddhist extremists was highly sophisticated in contrast with the level of education of the population with Internet resources. As such, extremist movements directed their ideology by referring to simplistic terms and narratives which generally appeal to the average reader in Myanmar, i.e., linked to his or her basic biological needs to eat and drink and the treatment of females. For instance, the sample of evidence has shown that many posts instilled the idea of the Rohingya as being the “others” and perpetuated longstanding

stereotypes associated to this group, e.g., as being money-hungry. Those messages reached a population which had not been educated in relation the use of social media and was often unable to differentiate between proper channels of information and the social media.

References

- Abbinnett, R. (2020). Living after Auschwitz: memory, culture and biopolitics in the work of Bernard Stiegler and Giorgio Agamben. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 37(7–8), 255–277.
- Abdelkader, E. (2013). The Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar: Past, present, and future. *Oregon Review of International Law*, 15, 393–412.
- Agamben, G. (1998). *Homo Sacer: Sovereign power and bare life*. Stanford University Press.
- Amnesty International (2017). *Myanmar 2016/2017*.
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/myanmar/report-myanmar/>.
- Anderson, K. (2018) *Perpetrating genocide: A criminological account*. Routledge.
- Arendt, H. (2006). *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil*. Penguin Press.
- Arendt, H. (1951). *The origins of totalitarianism*. Meridian Book, Inc.
- Bachman, Jeffrey (2020). Cases studied in genocide studies and prevention, and journal of genocide research and implications for the field of genocide studies. *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal*, 14(1), 2–20.
- Bankier, D. (1992). *Germans and the final solution: Public opinion under Nazism*. (1st ed.) B. Blackwell.
- Bauman, Z. (1989). *Modernity and the Holocaust*. Polity.
- Bauman, Z. (2004). Categorical murder, or: how to remember the Holocaust. In R. Lentin (Ed.), *Representing the Shoah for the twenty-first century* (pp. 24–40). Berghahn Books.
- BBC News. (2021, February 1). *Myanmar coup: Aung San Suu Kyi detained as military seizes control*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55882489>.
- Bennett, A. & Checkel, J. T. (2015). Process-tracing: From philosophical roots to best practices. In A. Bennett & J. T. Checkel (Eds.), *Process-tracing* (pp. 3–37). Cambridge University Press.

- Bennett, A. & Checkel, J.T. (2014). *Process tracing from metaphor to analytic tool*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bennett, A. (2008). Process tracing: A Bayesian perspective. In J. M. Box-Steffensmeier, H. E. Brady & D. Collier (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of political methodology* (pp. 702–721). Oxford University Press.
- Bissell, K. & Parrott, S. (2013). Prejudice: The role of the media in the development of social bias. *Journalism & Communication Monographs*, 15(4), 219–270.
- Boumans, J. W. & Trilling, D. (2016). Taking stock of the toolkit. *Digital Journalism*, 4(1), 8–23.
- Brooten, L. (2020). When media fuel the crisis: Fighting hate speech and communal violence in Myanmar. In J. Matthews (Ed.), *Media, journalism and disaster communities* (pp. 215–230). Palgrave.
- Cambridge Dictionary (2020). *Hate speech*.
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/hate-speech>.
- Chakravarti, N. R. (1971). *The Indian minority in Burma: The rise and decline of an immigrant community*. Oxford University Press.
- Charny, I. W. (1994). Toward a generic definition of genocide. In G. A. Andreopoulos (Ed.), *Genocide: Conceptual and historical dimensions* (pp. 64–94). University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Chinkin, C. (2018). *International human rights, criminal law and the women, peace and security agenda*. Center for Women, Peace and Security Studies.
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/104032/1/Chinkin_international_human_rights_criminal_law_published.pdf.
- Chiot D. & McCauley C. (2010). *Why not kill them all? The logic and prevention of mass political murder*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Collier, D. (2011). Understanding process tracing. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 44(4), 823–830.
- Columbia Global Reports (2017). *How we missed the Rohingya ethnic cleansing*. <https://globalreports.columbia.edu/blog/2017/09/missed-rohingya-ethnic-cleansing-decades/>.
- Dadrian, V. (2003). *The history of the Armenian genocide: Ethnic conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus*. Berghahn Books.
- Danning, G. (2018). Did radio RTLW really contribute meaningfully to the Rwandan genocide? Using qualitative information to improve causal inference from measures

- of media availability. *Civil Wars*, 20(4), 529–554, DOI: 10.1080/13698249.2018.1525677.
- Dean, A. (2013). *Burma's menacing monks*. Panos.
<https://library.panos.co.uk/siteowner/pdf-cache/doc-1594-2088.pdf>.
- Doctors without Borders (2021). *Timeline: A visual history of the Rohingya refugee crisis*. <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/timeline-visual-history-rohingya-refugee-crisis>.
- Egreteau, R. & Jagan, L. (2013). *Soldiers and diplomacy in Burma: Understanding the foreign relations of the Burmese praetorian state*. NUS Press.
- Encyclopedia Britannica (2020). *Propaganda*.
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/propaganda>.
- Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51–58.
- Ephgrave N. (2016). On women's bodies: Experiences of dehumanization during the Holocaust. *Journal of Women's History*, 28(2), 12–32.
- Early Warning Project. (2022). *Countries at risk for mass killing 2022–23: Statistical risk assessment results*.
<https://earlywarningproject.ushmm.org/storage/resources/2634/Early-Warning-Project-Statistical-Risk-Assessment-2022-23.pdf>.
- Fein, H. (1993). Revolutionary and antirevolutionary genocides: A comparison of state murders in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975 to 1979, and in Indonesia, 1965 to 1966. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 35(4), 796–823.
- Fein, H. (1990). *Genocide: A sociological perspective*. Sage Publications.
- Finkel E. & Straus S. (2012). Macro, meso, and micro research on genocide: Gains, shortcomings, and future areas of inquiry. *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal*, 7(1), 56–67.
- Foucault, M. (1998) *The will to knowledge: The history of sexuality* (R. Hurley, Trans). Penguin. (Original work published 1976).
- Foucault, M. (1977). *Security, territory, population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978*. Editions Seuil.
- Foucault, M. (2003). *Society must be defended*, In M. Bertani & A. Fontana (Eds.), Penguin.
- Foucault, M. (1995). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*. Vintage Books.

- Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-77*. Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1972). *The Archaeology of knowledge and the discourse on language*. (A. M. Sheridan Smith, Trans) Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1994). Confronting governments: Human rights. In J. D. Faubion (Ed.), *Power: essential works of Foucault, 1954–1984* (pp. 474–478). Penguin.
- Fuller, T. (2012). Internet unshackled, Burmese aim venom at ethnic minority. Retrieved from <https://goldsteinreport.com/internet-unshackled-burmese-aim-venom-at-ethnic-minority/>.
- Furlong, B. (2015, September 16). *The road to genocide: Violence against the rohingya muslims in burma*. Academia.edu. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/es/15784079/The_Road_to_Genocide_Violence_Against_the_Rohingya_Muslims_in_Burma
- Galtung, J. (1969) Violence, peace, and peace research. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), 167–191.
- Galtung, J (1990). Cultural violence. *Journal of Peace Research*, 27(3), 291–305.
- Gerhard, G. (2015). *Nazi hunger politics: A history of hunger in the Third Reich*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Gerring, J. (2011). The case study: what it is and what it does. In R. E. Goodin (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of political science*. Oxford University Press.
- Gerring, J. & Thomas, C. (2007). Internal validity: process tracing. In J. Gerring (Ed.), *Case study research: Principles and practice* (pp. 172–186). Cambridge University Press.
- Haque, M. M. (2017). Rohingya ethnic Muslim minority and the 1982 Citizenship Law in Burma. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 37(4), 463–64. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2017.1399600>.
- Harff, B. (2003). No lessons learned from the Holocaust? Assessing risks of genocide and political mass murder since 1955. *American Political Science Review*, 97(1), 57–73.
- Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 10(3), 252–264. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_4. PMID 16859440.
- Hilberg, R. (1961). *The destruction of the European Jews*. Allen.

- Hinton, A. L. (2012). Critical genocide studies. *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal*, 7(1), 4–15.
- Hodge, A. (2015). *Buddhist monks in Myanmar and Sri Lanka preach anti-Islam message*. The Australian. <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/weekend-australian-magazine/buddhist-monks-in-myanmar-and-sri-lanka-preach-antiislam-message/news-story/881e0fd23a54aad01d6633927dc7e6a5>.
- Horowitz, I. (2002). *Taking lives: Genocide and state power*. (5th ed.) Transaction Publishers.
- Hudson, V. M., et al. (2009). The heart of the matter: The security of women and the security of states. *International Security*, 33(3), 7–45.
- Human Rights Watch. (2020). *International Court of Justice orders Burmese authorities to protect Rohingya Muslims from genocide*. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/27/international-court-justice-orders-burmese-authorities-protect-rohingya-muslims>.
- Human Rights Watch. (2017). *Burma events of 2016*. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/burma>.
- Human Rights Watch. (2013). “*All you can do is pray*”: *Crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan state*. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/04/22/all-you-can-do-pray/crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-rohingya-muslims>.
- Human Rights Watch. (2012). *Burma: Government forces targeting Rohingya Muslims*. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/31/burma-government-forces-targeting-rohingya-muslims>.
- Human Rights Watch. (1996). *Burma: The Rohingya Muslims: Ending a cycle of exodus?* <http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/b/burma/burma969.pdf>.
- International Criminal Court. (2020). *Bangladesh/Myanmar*. <https://www.icc-cpi.int/bangladesh-myanmar>.
- International Crisis Group. (2017). *Buddhism and state power in Myanmar*. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/290-buddhism-and-state-power-myanmar>.
- International Crisis Group. (2021). *Myanmar’s Rohingya crisis enters a dangerous new phase*. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/292-myanmars-rohingya-crisis-enters-dangerous-new-phase#:~:text=The%20mass%20flight%20of%20Rohingya,potential%20cross%2Dborder%20militant%20attacks>.

- International Federation of Human Rights Leagues. (2000). *Burma: Repression, discrimination and ethnic cleansing in Arakan*.
<https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/arakbirm.pdf>.
- Irish Centre for Human Rights (2010). *Crimes against humanity in western Burma: The Situation of the Rohingyas*. http://burmaactionireland.org/images/uploads/ICHR_Rohingya_Report_2010.pdf.
- Katz, S. T. (2019). The issue of the uniqueness of the Holocaust: After forty years of study. *Modern Judaism*, 40(1), 48–70.
- Katz, S. T. (1996). The uniqueness of the Holocaust: The historical dimension. In A. S. Rosenbaum (Ed.), *Is the Holocaust unique? Perspectives on comparative genocide* (pp. 49–68). Westview Press.
- Kiernan, B. (2007). *Blood and soil: A world history of genocide and extermination from Sparta to Darfur*. Yale University Press.
- Knie, C.T., & Pride, T.E. (2018). *Ending the cycle: A history of Rohingya persecution, analysis of their potential for radicalization, and a method for attaining a peaceful resolution*. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey United States.
<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1065393>.
- Kuper, L. (1983). *Genocide: Its political uses in the Twentieth century*. Yale University Press.
- Lancia, F. (2007, May 16). *Word co-occurrence and similarity in meaning: Some methodological issues*. TLAB. <https://mytlab.com/wcsmeaning.pdf>.
- Lemkin, R. (1944). *Axis rule in occupied Europe: Laws of occupation, analysis of government, proposals for redress*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Leider, J. (2018). The history of a Muslim identity in Myanmar. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History*, 1–38.
- Lindblom, A. et al. (2015). *Persecution of the Rohingya Muslims: Is genocide occurring in Myanmar's Rakhine State? A legal analysis – Myanmar*. Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School.
<https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/persecution-rohingya-muslims-genocide-occurring-myanmar-s-rakhine-state-legal>.
- Luft, A. (2019). *Dehumanization and the normalization of violence: It's not what you think*. <https://items.ssrc.org/insights/dehumanization-and-the-normalization-of-violence-its-not-what-you-think/>.
- Mann, M. (2012). *The dark side of democracy: Explaining ethnic cleansing*. Cambridge University Press.

- Marler, I. & Macarena, A. (2018). *What's attracting women to Myanmar's Buddhist nationalist Movement?* Open Democracy.
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/women-myanmar-buddhist-nationalist-movement/>.
- May, L. (2010). *Genocide: A normative account*. Cambridge University Press.
- McPherson, P. (2017). "We must protect our country:" Extremist Buddhists target Mandalay's Muslims. The Guardian.
<https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/may/08/buddhist-extremists-anti-muslim-mandalay-ma-ba-tha>.
- McGill, D. (2017). Different violence, different justice? Taking structural violence seriously in post conflict and transitional justice processes. *State Crime Journal*, 6(1), 79–101.
- McGrogan, D. (2016). The problem of causality in international human rights law. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 65(3), 615–644.
- Melson, R. (1992). *Revolution and genocide: On the origins of the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust*. Chicago University Press.
- Midlarsky, M. (2005). *The killing trap: Genocide in the Twentieth century*. Cambridge University Press.
- Milchman A., Rosenberg, A. (1997). Michel Foucault and the genealogy of the Holocaust. *The European Legacy*, 2(4), 697–699.
- Moses, D. A. (2008). Genocide and modernity. In D. Stone (Ed.), *The Historiography of Genocide* (pp. 156–193). Springer.
- Moses, D. A. (2008). *Toward a theory of critical genocide studies*. Science Po.
<https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/toward-theory-critical-genocide-studies.html>.
- Myint Win, Y. (2015). *The rise of anti-Muslim hate speech shortly before the outbreaks of mass violence against Muslims in Myanmar*. Burma Library.
<https://www.burmalibrary.org/en/the-rise-of-anti-muslim-hate-speech-shortly-before-the-outbreaks-of-mass-violence-against-muslims>.
- Nichols, M. (2017). *Rohingya crisis: Burmese military guilty of widespread rape of fleeing women and girls, Human Rights Watch says*. The Independent.
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/rohingya-crisis-latest-today-burmese-military-rape-accusation-human-rights-watch-muslim-refugees-rakhine-a8057846.html>.
- Ontario International Development Agency. (2018). *Forced migration of Rohingya: The untold experience*. <http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-748001110>.

- Oxford Bibliographies. (2020). Biopolitics and state regulation of human life. <https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0170.xml>.
- Power, S. (2002). *“A problem from hell”: American and the age of genocide*. Basic Books.
- Power, S. (2001). *Bystanders to genocide*. The Atlantic. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/>.
- Proctor, R. N. (1988). *Racial hygiene: Medicine under the Nazis*. Harvard University Press.
- Raggam-Blesch, M. (2019). “Privileged” under Nazi-Rule: The fate of three intermarried families in Vienna. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 21(3), 378–397. doi:10.1080/14623528.2019.1634908.
- Reports, S. (2018, February 8). *Massacre in Myanmar: One grave for 10 Rohingya men*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-rakhine-events/>.
- Reinermann J., Williams, T. (2020). Motivational change in the perpetration of genocidal violence. *Violence: An International Journal*, 1(1), 144–165.
- Ricks, J. I. & Liu, A. (2018). Process-tracing research designs: A practical guide. *Political Science & Politics*, 51(4), 842–846.
- Rohlfing, I. (2014). Comparative hypothesis testing via process tracing. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 43(4), 606–642.
- Rummel, R. (1994). *Death by government*. Transaction Publishers.
- Salih, M. A. (2017). *Obsessive regulation and “biological minimum” in ISIS biopolitics*. ISIS Media. <https://www.21global.ucsb.edu/global-e/november-2017/obsessive-regulation-and-biological-minimum-isis-biopolitics>.
- Scheper-Hughes, N. (2002). Coming to our senses: Anthropology and genocide. In A. L. Hinton (Ed.), *Annihilating difference* (pp. 348–381) University of California Press.
- Shaw, M. (2015). *What is genocide?* (2nd ed.). Polity.
- Shaw, M. (2010). Sociology and genocide. In D. Bloxham & D. A. Moses (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of genocide studies* (143–162) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, M. (1999). *Burma: Insurgency and the politics of ethnicity*. University Press.

- Stanton, G. (2016). *The ten stages of genocide*. Genocide Watch.
<http://genocidewatch.net/genocide-2/8-stages-of-genocide/>.
- Stokke, K., Vakulchuk, R. & Øverland, I. (2018). *Myanmar: A political economy analysis*. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
<https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-political-economy-analysis>.
- Stone, D. (2004). The historiography of genocide: beyond “uniqueness” and ethnic competition. *Rethinking History*, 8(1), 127–142.
- Straus, S. (2016). *Fundamentals of genocide and mass atrocity prevention*. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
- Straus, S. (2012). Political science and genocide. In D. Bloxham & A. D. Moses (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of genocide studies* (pp. 164–180). Oxford University Press.
- Straus, S. (2007). What is the relationship between hate radio and violence? Rethinking Rwanda’s “Radio Machete.” *Politics & Society*, 35(4), 609–637.
- Turnell, S. (2011). Myanmar’s fifty-year authoritarian trap. *Journal of International Affairs*, 65(1), 79–92.
- UNICEF (2018). *Hunger: A lethal weapon of war*. <https://www.savethechildren.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Hunger-Lethal-weapon-of-war-.pdf>.
- United Nations Economic and Social Council. (2000). *Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in any part of the world, Situation of human rights in Myanmar, E/CN.4/2000/38*. <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G00/103/51/PDF/G0010351.pdf?OpenElement>.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] (2020). *Rohingya emergency*. <https://www.unhcr.org/rohingya-emergency.html>.
- United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner [OHCHR] (2017). *Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016*.
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/MM/FlashReport3Feb2017.pdf>.
- United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect (2020). *Definitions*. <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml>.
- United Nations Secretary-General (2018) *Transcript of Secretary-General’s remarks at press encounter with President of the World Bank, Jim Yong Kim*.
<https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2018-07-02/transcript-secretary-general’s-remarks-press-encounter>.

- U.S. Department of State (2020). *Country reports of human rights practices for 2020: Burma*. <https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/>.
- U.S. Department of State (2019). *Country reports of human rights practices for 2019: Burma*. <https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/>.
- U.S. Department of State (2012). *Country reports on International Religious Freedom for 2011: Burma*. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2011/eap/192615.htm>.
- U.S. Department of State (2005). *Background Note: Burma*. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61603.htm>.
- U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. (2022, April 17). *Suspended in time: The ongoing persecution of Rohingya Muslims in Burma*. USCIRF. <https://www.uscifr.gov/publications/suspended-time-ongoing-persecution-rohingya-muslims-burma>.
- Strnad, M. (2015). The fortune of survival: Intermarried German Jews in the dying breath of the “thousand-year Reich.” *Dapim: Studies on the Holocaust*, 29(3), 173–196. doi:10.1080/23256249.2015.1082806. S2CID 163076737.
- Valentino, B. (2004). *Final solutions: Mass killing and genocide in the Twentieth century*. Cornell University Press.
- Van Evera, S. (1997). *Guide to methods for students of political science*. Cornell University Press.
- Verdeja, E. (2010). Genocide: Clarifying concepts and causes of cruelty. *Review of Politics*, 72(3), 513–526.
- Verdeja, E. (2012). The political science of genocide: Outlines of an emerging research agenda. *Perspectives on Politics*, 10(3), 307–321.
- Voltolini, B. (2017). Framing processes and lobbying in EU foreign policy: Case study and process-tracing methods. *European Consortium for Political Research*, 16, 354–368.
- Vu, H. T. & Lynn, N. (2020). When the news takes sides: Automated framing analysis of news coverage of the Rohingya crisis by the elite press from three countries. *Journalism Studies*, 1–21.
- de Waal, A. (2015). Ending mass atrocity and ending famine. *The Lancet* (386)10003, 1528–1529.
- de Waal, A. (2017). The Nazis used it, we use it. *London Review of Books*, (39)12, 1–4.

- de Waal, A. (2018). *Mass starvation: The history and future of famine*. Wiley.
- Wallensteen, P. (1976). Scarce goods as political weapons: The case of food. *Journal of Peace Research*, 13(4), 277–298.
- Wong, J. C. (2019). *Overreacting to failure: Facebook's new Myanmar strategy baffles local activists*. The Guardian.
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/feb/07/facebook-myanmar-genocide-violence-hate-speech>.
- World Food Program [WFP] (2020). *WFP Myanmar country brief*. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000113447/download/?_ga=2.260059469.1936586635.1585350840-525068653.1584303256.
- Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2012). *Propaganda and conflict theory and evidence from the Rwandan genocide*. Harvard Kennedy School.
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/cid/files/publications/faculty-working-papers/257_Drott_Rwanda.pdf.
- Yegar, M. (2002). *Between integration and secession: The Muslim communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar*. Lexington Books.
- Yegar, M. (1972). *The Muslims of Burma: A study of a minority group*. Otto Harrassowitz.
- Zarni, M., et al. (2017). *An evolution of Rohingya persecution in Myanmar: From strategic embrace to genocide*. Middle East Institute.
<https://www.mei.edu/publications/evolution-rohingya-persecution-myanmar-strategic-embrace-genocide>.
- Zarni, M. & Cowley A. (2014). The slow-burning genocide of Myanmar's Rohingya. *Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association*, 23(3), 681–752.