Now showing items 1-6 of 6

    • Audits as Signals 

      Kotowski, Maciej Henryk; Weisbach, David A.; Zeckhauser, Richard Jay (University of Chicago Law Review, 2014)
      A broad array of law enforcement strategies, from income tax to bank regulation, involve self-reporting by regulated agents and auditing of some fraction of the reports by the regulating bureau. Standard models of ...
    • Bribing in First-Price Auctions: Corrigendum 

      Kotowski, Maciej Henryk; Rachmilevitch, Shiran (Elsevier, 2013)
      We clarify the sufficient condition for a trivial equilibrium to exist in the model of Rachmilevitch (2013). Rachmilevitch (2013), henceforth R13, studies the following game. Two ex ante identical players are about to ...
    • Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks 

      Kariv, Shachar; Kotowski, Maciej Henryk; Leister, C. Matthew (Elsevier BV, 2018)
      This paper studies a model of intermediated exchange with liquidity-constrained traders. Intermediaries are embedded in a trading network and their financial capacities are private information. We characterize our model’s ...
    • Models of Matching Markets 

      Kadam, Sangram Vilasrao (2016-05-02)
      The structure, length, and characteristics of matching markets affect the outcomes for their participants. This dissertation attempts to fill the lacuna in our understanding about matching markets on three dimensions through ...
    • On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints 

      Kotowski, Maciej Henryk; Li, Fei (Elsevier BV, 2014)
      We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for ...
    • The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information 

      Kotowski, Maciej Henryk; Li, Fei (Elsevier BV, 2014)
      We provide a simple example demonstrating that the unconditional revelation information in a war of attrition with private budget constraints can decrease expected revenue. Our example suggests that information non-revelation ...