Now showing items 1-7 of 7

    • Community Size and Network Closure 

      Mobius, Markus; Szeidl, Adam; Karlan, Dean; Allcott, Hunt; Rosenblat, Tanya (American Economic Association, 2007)
    • Competing Auctions 

      Ellison, Glenn; Fudenberg, Drew; Mobius, Markus (MIT Press, 2004)
      This paper shows that larger auctions are more efficient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. ...
    • Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks 

      Leider, Stephen; Mobius, Markus; Rosenblat, Tanya; Do, Quoc-Anh (MIT Press, 2009)
      We conduct online field experiments in large real-world social networks in order to decompose prosocial giving into three components: (1) baseline altruism toward randomly selected strangers, (2) directed altruism that ...
    • Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions 

      Fudenberg, Drew; Mobius, Markus; Szeidl, Adam (Elsevier, 2007)
      We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in dou- ble auction markets with correlated, conditionally independent private values and many participants. The equilibrium we find is arbitrarily ...
    • Getting Closer or Drifting Apart 

      Rosenblat, Tanya; Mobius, Markus (MIT Press, 2004)
      Advances in communication and transportation technologies have the potential to bring people closer together and create a "global village." However, they also allow heterogeneous agents to segregate along special interests, ...
    • Trust and Social Collateral 

      Karlan, Dean; Mobius, Markus; Rosenblat, Tanya; Szeidl, Adam (MIT Press, 2009)
      This paper builds a theory of trust based on informal contract enforcement in social networks. In our model, network connections between individuals can be used as social collateral to secure informal borrowing. We define ...
    • Why Beauty Matters 

      Mobius, Markus; Rosenblat, Tanya (American Economic Association, 2006)
      We decompose the beauty premium in an experimental labor market where “employers” determine wages of “workers” who perform a maze-solving task. This task requires a true skill which we show to be unaffected by physical ...