Now showing items 1-17 of 17

    • The Administrative Law of Borrowed Regulations: Legal Questions Regarding the Bankruptcy Law's Incorporation of IRS Standards 

      Stephenson, Matthew Caleb; Hickman, Kristin E. (Norton Bankruptcy Law Adviser, 2008)
      In the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Congress included a provision requiring bankruptcy courts evaluating individual debtors' financial circumstances to utilize certain monthly ...
    • Chevron Has Only One Step 

      Stephenson, Matthew Caleb; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Virginia Law Review Association, 2009)
      Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council lays out a two-step process that courts must follow when they review a federal agency's construction of a federal statute. We argue that Chevron, rightly understood, has ...
    • Complementary Constraints: Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design 

      Stephenson, Matthew Caleb; Nzelibe, Jide O. (Harvard University, Harvard Law School, 2010)
      This Article explores how the separation of powers affects voters’ electoral strategies, and how this interaction influences the performance of different institutional arrangements. We show that when one political agent, ...
    • Does Separation of Powers Promote Stability and Moderation? 

      Stephenson, Matthew Caleb (University of Chicago Press, 2013)
      It is often asserted that separation of legislative powers tends to make legislation both more moderate (because concessions to all veto players are needed to secure enactment) and less frequent (because sufficient concessions ...
    • Evidentiary Standards and Information Acquisition in Public Law 

      Stephenson, Matthew Caleb (Oxford University Press, 2008)
      This article considers the type of evidence that an overseer (e.g., a court) should require before allowing a government agent to take some proposed action. The court can increase agency research incentives by prohibiting ...
    • Information Acquisition and Institutional Design 

      Stephenson, Matthew Caleb (Harvard University, Harvard Law School, 2011)
    • Judicial Deference to Inconsistent Agency Statutory Interpretations 

      Givati, Yehonatan; Stephenson, Matthew Caleb (University of Chicago Press, 2011)
      Although administrative law doctrine requires courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable statutory interpretation, the doctrine is unclear as to whether an agency gets less deference when it changes its own prior interpretation. ...
    • Judicial Review as a Response to Political Posturing 

      Stephenson, Matthew Caleb; Fox, Justin (Cambridge University Press, 2011)
      We use an agency model to analyze the impact of judicial review on the incentives of elected leaders to “posture” by enacting bold but ill-advised policies. We find that judicial review may exacerbate posturing by rescuing ...
    • Legal Institutions and Informal Networks 

      Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan; Stephenson, Matthew Caleb (SAGE Publications, 2006)
      The relationship between third-party contract enforcement and informal networks raises important sociological, political, and economic questions. When economic activity is embedded in social structures, what are the ...
    • Legal Realism for Economists 

      Stephenson, Matthew Caleb (American Economic Association, 2009)
      Economists have made great progress in understanding the incentives and behavior of actors who operate outside of traditional economic markets, including voters, legislators, and bureaucrats. The incentives and behavior ...
    • Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents: Implications for Public Policy in a Pluralist System 

      Stephenson, Matthew Caleb; Jackson, Howell Edmunds (Harvard University, Harvard Law School, 2010)
      Interest group pluralism presumes that public policy outcomes are determined principally through a contest for influence among organized pressure groups. Most interest groups, however, do not represent themselves in this ...
    • Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy 

      Stephenson, Matthew Caleb (Michigan Law Review, 2008)
      It is widely believed that insulating an administrative agency from the influence of elected officials, whatever its other benefits or justifications, reduces the agency's responsiveness to the preferences of political ...
    • Over-Accountability 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; Stephenson, Matthew Caleb (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2014)
      Although ensuring the “accountability” of agents to their principals is widely considered a core objective of institutional design, recent work in political economy has identified and elucidated an important class of ...
    • Political Accountability Under Alternative Institutional Regimes 

      Stephenson, Matthew Caleb; NJzelibe, Jide O. (SAGE Publications, 2010)
      We analyze the interaction between electoral accountability and separation-of-powers by comparing three regimes: ‘Unilateral Authority’ (the President has exclusive decision-making power); ‘Mandatory Checks’ (the President ...
    • The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs 

      Stephenson, Matthew Caleb (Yale Law School, 2008)
      This Article argues that courts can, and often should, implement constitutional guarantees by crafting doctrines that raise the costs to government decisionmakers of enacting constitutionally problematic policies. This ...
    • Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect Oversight 

      Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan; Stephenson, Matthew Caleb (Cambridge University Press, 2007)
      We analyze the positive and normative implications of regulatory oversight when the policymaking agency can improve the quality of regulation through effort, but only some kinds of effort are observable by the overseer, ...
    • Seminole Rock's Domain 

      Stephenson, Matthew Caleb; Pogoriler, Miri (George Washington Law Review, 2011)
      In carrying out their duties, federal administrative agencies must often interpret statutes and regulations that are not entirely clear. Sometimes an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous legal text may not seem like the ...