Browsing by Author "Fudenberg, Drew"

Now showing items 1-20 of 74

    • Advancing Beyond "Advances in Behavioral Economics" 

      Fudenberg, Drew (American Economic Association, 2006)
      This essay discusses the field of behavioral economics, with a focus on the papers in <i>Advances in Behavioral Economics</i>. These papers show that there is a body of “behavioral facts” that is both economically significant ...

    • An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 

      Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.; Maniadis, Zacharias (Elsevier BV, 2014)
      We derive a simplified version of the model of Fudenberg and Levine, 2006 and Fudenberg and Levine, 2011 and show how this approximate model is useful in explaining choice under risk. We show that in the simple case of ...

    • Competing Auctions 

      Ellison, Glenn; Fudenberg, Drew; Mobius, Markus (MIT Press, 2004)
      This paper shows that larger auctions are more efficient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. ...

    • Conditional Universal Consistency 

      Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David (Elsevier, 1999)
      Players choose an action before learning an outcome chosen according to an unknown and history-dependent stochastic rule. Procedures that categorize outcomes, and use a randomized variation on fictitious play within each ...

    • Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play 

      Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David (Elsevier, 1995)
      We study a variation of fictitious play, in which the probability of each action is an exponential function of that action's utility against the historical frequency of opponents' play. Regardless of the opponents' strategies, ...

    • Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 

      Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David (Elsevier, 2007)
      In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the way that the distribution of public signals varies with the players' actions. Recent research has focused on the case of “frequent ...

    • Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags 

      Fudenberg, Drew; Ishii, Yuhta; Kominers, Scott Duke (Elsevier BV, 2014)
      We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that ...

    • A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control 

      Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David (American Economic Association, 2006)
      We propose that a simple “dual-self” model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time inconsistency that has motivated models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and Rabin's ...

    • Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion 

      Fudenberg, Drew; Strzalecki, Tomasz (The Econometric Society, 2015)
      We characterize a generalization of discounted logistic choice that incorporates a parameter to capture different views the agent might have about the costs and benefits of larger choice sets. The discounted logit model ...

    • An Easier Way to Calibrate 

      Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David (Elsevier, 1999)
      Forecasts are said to be calibrated if the frequency predictions are approximately correct. This is a refinement of an idea first introduced by David Blackwell in 1955. We show that “<i>K</i>-initialized myopic strategies” ...

    • An Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning 

      Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David (Elsevier, 2007)
      We comment on the Shoham, Powers, and Grenager survey of multi-agent learning and game theory, emphasizing that some of their categories are important for economics and others are not. We also try to correct some minor ...

    • Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 

      Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David (Elsevier, 1994)
      We present a general algorithm for computing the limit, as δ → 1, of the set of payoffs of perfect public equilibria of repeated games with long-run and short-run players, allowing for the possibility that the players′ ...

    • Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations 

      Nowak, Martin; Sasaki, Akira; Taylor, Christine; Fudenberg, Drew (Nature Publishing Group, 2004)
      To explain the evolution of cooperation by natural selection has been a major goal of biologists since Darwin. Cooperators help others at a cost to themselves, while defectors receive the benefits of altruism without ...

    • Essays in Behavioral Economics 

      Peysakhovich, Alexander (2013-03-14)
      Essays in this dissertation cover three topics in behavioral economics: social preferences, ambiguity aversion and self-control. The first essay, based on work with Aurelie Ouss, studies the behavior of individuals making ...

    • Essays in Dynamic Games 

      Ishii, Yuhta (2014-06-06)
      This dissertation presents three independent essays. Chapter 1, which is joint work with Mira Frick, studies a model of innovation adoption by a large population of long-lived consumers who face stochastic opportunities ...

    • Essays in Revision Games 

      Kamada, Yuichiro (2012-09-18)
      This dissertation consists of three essays related to revision games. The first essay proposes and analyzes a new model that we call “revision games,” which captures a situation where players in advance prepare their actions ...

    • Essays on Learning, Uncertainty, and Choice 

      Frick, Mira Anna Phyllis (2015-04-20)
      This dissertation presents three independent essays in microeconomic theory. Motivated by the rise of social media, Chapter 1 (co-authored with Yuhta Ishii) builds a model studying the effect of an economy's potential for ...

    • Evolutionary Cycles of Cooperation and Defection 

      Imhof, Lorens A.; Fudenberg, Drew; Nowak, Martin A. (National Academy of Sciences, 2005)
      The main obstacle for the evolution of cooperation is that natural selection favors defection in most settings. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, two individuals interact several times, and, in each round, they have a ...

    • Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations 

      Taylor, Christine Jiayou; Fudenberg, Drew; Sasaki, Akira; Nowak, Martin A. (Springer Verlag, 2004)
      We introduce a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations which is similar to the familiar replicator dynamics for infinite populations. Our focus is on the conditions for selection favoring the ...

    • Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions 

      Fudenberg, Drew; Mobius, Markus; Szeidl, Adam (Elsevier, 2007)
      We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in dou- ble auction markets with correlated, conditionally independent private values and many participants. The equilibrium we find is arbitrarily ...