Now showing items 1-20 of 48

    • An Axiomatic Characterization of Continuous-Outcome Market Makers 

      Gao, Xi; Chen, Yiling (Springer Verlag, 2010)
      Most existing market maker mechanisms for prediction markets are designed for events with a finite number of outcomes. All known attempts on designing market makers for forecasting continuous-outcome events resulted in ...
    • An axiomatic characterization of wagering mechanisms 

      Lambert, Nicolas S.; Langford, John; Wortman Vaughan, Jennifer; Chen, Yiling; Reeves, Daniel M.; Shoham, Yoav; Pennock, David M. (Elsevier BV, 2015)
      We construct a budget-balanced wagering mechanism that flexibly extracts information about event probabilities, as well as the mean, median, and other statistics from a group of individuals whose beliefs are immutable to ...
    • Betting on the Real Line 

      Gao, Xi; Chen, Yiling; Pennock, David M. (Springer-Verlag, 2009)
      We study the problem of designing prediction markets for random variables with continuous or countably infinite outcomes on the real line. Our interval betting languages allow traders to bet on any interval of their choice. ...
    • Connections between markets and learning 

      Chen, Yiling; Vaughan, Jennifer Wortman (Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2010)
      We provide an overview of recent research exploring the striking mathematical connections that exist between market maker mechanisms for prediction markets and no-regret learning. We describe how these connections can be ...
    • Decision Markets with Good Incentives 

      Chen, Yiling; Kash, Ian; Ruberry, Michael Edward; Shnayder, Victor (Springer Verlag, 2011)
      Decision markets both predict and decide the future. They allow experts to predict the effects of each of a set of possible actions, and after reviewing these predictions a decision maker selects an action to perform. ...
    • Designing Incentives for Online Question and Answer Forums 

      Jain, Shaili; Chen, Yiling; Parkes, David C. (Association for Computing Machinery, 2009)
      In this paper, we provide a simple game-theoretic model of an online question and answer forum. We focus on factual questions in which user responses aggregate while a question remains open. Each user has a unique piece ...
    • Designing incentives for online question-and-answer forums 

      Jain, Shaili; Chen, Yiling; Parkes, David C. (Elsevier BV, 2014)
      We provide a game-theoretic model of sequential information aggregation motivated by online question-and-answer forums. An asker posts a question and each user decides when to aggregate a unique piece of information with ...
    • Designing informative securities 

      Chen, Yiling; Ruberry, Mike; Vaughan, Jennifer Wortman (AUAI Press, 2012)
      We create a formal framework for the design of informative securities in prediction markets. These securities allow a market organizer to infer the likelihood of events of interest as well as if he knew all of the traders’ ...
    • Designing Markets For Prediction 

      Chen, Yiling; Pennock, David M. (Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, 2010)
      We survey the literature on prediction mechanisms, including prediction markets and peer prediction systems. We pay particular attention to the design process, highlighting the objectives and properties that are important ...
    • The Effects of Performance-Contingent Financial Incentives in Online Labor Markets 

      Yin, Ming; Chen, Yiling; Sun, Yu-An (Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, 2013)
      Online labor markets such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) have emerged as platforms that facilitate the allocation of productive effort across global economies. Many of these markets compensate workers with monetary ...
    • Elicitability and Knowledge-Free Elicitation with Peer Prediction 

      Zhang, Peter; Chen, Yiling (International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014)
      The elicitation of private information from individuals is crucially important to many real-world tasks. But elicitation is most challenging when it is most useful: when objective (verifiable) truth is inaccessible or ...
    • Elicitation for Aggregation 

      Frongillo, Rafael M; Chen, Yiling; Kash, Ian A (Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, 2015)
      We study the problem of eliciting and aggregating probabilistic information from multiple agents. In order to successfully aggregate the predictions of agents, the principal needs to elicit some notion of confidence from ...
    • Eliciting and Aggregating Truthful and Noisy Information 

      Gao, Xi (2014-10-21)
      In the modern world, making informed decisions requires obtaining and aggregating relevant information about events of interest. For many political, business, and entertainment events, the information of interest only ...
    • Eliciting Predictions and Recommendations for Decision Making 

      Chen, Yiling; Kash, Ian A.; Ruberry, Michael; Shnayder, Victor (Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2014)
      When making a decision, a decision maker selects one of several possible actions and hopes to achieve a desirable outcome. To make a better decision, the decision maker often asks experts for advice. In this article, we ...
    • Experimental Studies of Human Behavior in Social Computing Systems 

      Mao, Qiushi (2015-05-18)
      Social computing systems, fueled by the ability of the Internet to engage millions of individuals, have redefined computation to include not only the application of algorithms but also the participation of people. Yet, the ...
    • Fair Information Sharing for Treasure Hunting 

      Chen, Yiling; Nissim, Kobbi; Waggoner, Bo (Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, 2015)
      In a search task, a group of agents compete to be the first to find the solution. Each agent has different private information to incorporate into its search. This problem is inspired by settings such as scientific research, ...
    • The Fisher Market Game: Equilibrium and Welfare 

      Branzei, Simina; Chen, Yiling; Deng, Xiaotie; Filos-Ratsikas, Aris; Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Søren; Zhang, Jie (AAAI, 2014)
      The Fisher market model is one of the most fundamental resource allocation models in economics. In a Fisher market, the prices and allocations of goods are determined according to the preferences and budgets of buyers to ...
    • Gaming Dynamic Parimutuel Markets 

      Lin, Qianya; Chen, Yiling (Springer-Verlag, 2009)
      We study the strategic behavior of risk-neutral non-myopic agents in Dynamic Parimutuel Markets (DPM). In a DPM, agents buy or sell shares of contracts, whose future payff in a particular state depends on aggregated trades ...
    • Gaming Prediction Markets: Equilibrium Strategies with a Market Maker 

      Chen, Yiling; Dimitrov, Stanko; Sami, Rahul; Reeves, Daniel; Pennock, David; Hanson, Robin; Fortnow, Lance; Gonen, Rica (Springer-Verlag, 2009)
      We study the equilibrium behavior of informed traders interacting with market scoring rule (MSR) market makers. One attractive feature of MSR is that it is myopically incentive compatible: it is optimal for traders to ...
    • A General Approach to Environment Design with One Agent 

      Zhang, Haoqi; Chen, Yiling; Parkes, David C. (Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 2009)
      The problem of environment design considers a setting in which an interested party aims to influence an agent's decisions by making limited changes to the agent's environment. Zhang and Parkes [2008] first introduced the ...