Now showing items 1-5 of 5

    • Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations 

      Nowak, Martin; Sasaki, Akira; Taylor, Christine; Fudenberg, Drew (Nature Publishing Group, 2004)
      To explain the evolution of cooperation by natural selection has been a major goal of biologists since Darwin. Cooperators help others at a cost to themselves, while defectors receive the benefits of altruism without ...
    • Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations 

      Taylor, Christine Jiayou; Fudenberg, Drew; Sasaki, Akira; Nowak, Martin A. (Springer Verlag, 2004)
      We introduce a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations which is similar to the familiar replicator dynamics for infinite populations. Our focus is on the conditions for selection favoring the ...
    • Evolutionary Game Dynamics with Non-Uniform Interaction Rates 

      Taylor, Christine Jiayou; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2006)
      The classical setting of evolutionary game theory, the replicator equation, assumes uniform interaction rates. The rate at which individuals meet and interact is independent of their strategies. Here we extend this framework ...
    • A Symmetry of Fixation Times in Evoultionary Dynamics 

      Taylor, Christine Jiayou; Iwasa, Yoh; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2006)
      In this paper, we show that for evolutionary dynamics between two types that can be described by a Moran process, the conditional fixation time of either type is the same irrespective of the selective scenario. With frequency ...
    • Transforming the Dilemma 

      Taylor, Christine Jiayou; Nowak, Martin A. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2007)
      How does natural selection lead to cooperation between competing individuals? The Prisoner's Dilemma captures the essence of this problem. Two players can either cooperate or defect. The payoff for mutual cooperation, R, ...