Now showing items 1-20 of 64

    • Absolute Majority Rules 

      Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Cambridge University Press, 2007)
      This article considers absolute majority rules, which require the affirmative vote of a majority of all those eligible to vote in the institution. I compare absolute majority rules to simple majority rules under which only ...
    • Allocating Power within Agencies 

      Magill, Elizabeth; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Yale Law School, 2013-07-17)
      Standard questions in the theory of administrative law involve the allocation of power among legislatures, courts, the President, and various types of agencies. These questions are often heavily informed by normative ...
    • Beard and Holmes on Constitutional Adjudication 

      Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (University of Minnesota Law School, 2014)
      What is the connection, if any, between the external perspective of the historian or political scientist and the internal perspective of lawyers and judges? That is the puzzle for constitutional law posed by Charles Beard’s ...
    • Book Review 

      Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (The Academy of Political Science, 2007)
    • Chevron as a Voting Rule 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Yale Law School, 2007)
      In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court created a new framework for judicial deference to agency interpretations of law: courts should defer to an agency interpretation unless ...
    • Chevron as a Voting Rule 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Yale Law School, 2007)
      In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court created a new framework for judicial deference to agency interpretations of law: courts should defer to an agency interpretation unless ...
    • Chevron Has Only One Step 

      Stephenson, Matthew Caleb; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Virginia Law Review Association, 2009)
      Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council lays out a two-step process that courts must follow when they review a federal agency's construction of a federal statute. We argue that Chevron, rightly understood, has ...
    • Common-Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason 

      Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Columbia Law Review Association, Inc., 2007)
      In recent years, the central claim of common-law constitutionalism has been that precedent and tradition embody some form of latent wisdom. Judges will generally do best by deferring to the wisdom embodied in precedent and ...
    • Connecting Positive and Normative Legal Theory 

      Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (2014)
    • Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures 

      Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian; Sunstein, Cass Robert (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009)
      Many millions of people hold conspiracy theories; they believe that powerful people have worked together in order to withhold the truth about some important practice or some terrible event. A recent example is the belief, ...
    • Constitutional Design in the Ancient World 

      Lanni, Adriaan M.; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Stanford Law School, 2012)
      This paper identifies two distinctive features of ancient constitutional design that have largely disappeared from the modern world: constitution-making by single individuals and constitution-making by foreigners. We ...
    • Constitutional Showdowns 

      Posner, Eric A.; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (University of Pennsylvania, 2008)
    • Conventions in Court 

      Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (2013)
      In the Commonwealth nations, a constitutional “convention” denotes an unwritten but obligatory constitutional custom or norm. The question I will address is whether public law in the United States should be understood to ...
    • Conventions of Agency Independence 

      Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Columbia Law Review Association, Inc., 2013)
      It is often said that the legal touchstone of agency independence is whether agency heads are removable at will or only for cause. Yet this condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for operational independence. Many ...
    • The Credible Executive 

      Posner, Eric A.; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (University of Chicago Press, 2007)
      Legal and constitutional theory has focused chiefly on the risk that voters and legislators will trust an ill-motivated executive. This paper addresses the risk that voters and legislators will fail to trust a well-motivated ...
    • Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008 

      Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian; Posner, Eric A. (University of Chicago Press, 2010)
      This essay compares crisis governance and emergency lawmaking after 9/11 and the financial meltdown of 2008. We argue that the two episodes were broadly similar in outline, but importantly different in detail, and we attempt ...
    • Deference and Due Process 

      Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (2015)
      In the textbooks, procedural due process is a strictly judicial enterprise; although substantive entitlements are created by legislative and executive action, it is for courts to decide independently what process the ...
    • Delegating to Enemies 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Columbia Law Review Association, Inc., 2012)
      An axiom of institutional design is known as the ally principle: all else equal, voters, legislators or other principals will rationally delegate more authority to agents who share their preferences (“allies”). The ally ...
    • Delegating to Enemies 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Columbia Law Review Association, Inc., 2012)
      An axiom of institutional design is known as the ally principle: All else equal, voters, legislators, or other principals will rationally delegate more authority to agents who share their preferences (“allies”). The ally ...
    • The Delegation Lottery 

      Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Harvard University, Harvard Law School, 2006)
      Replying to Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1035 (2006). Matthew Stephenson models "the decision calculus ...