Now showing items 1-9 of 9

    • Commentary: Nash equilibrium and mechanism design 

      Maskin, Eric (Elsevier BV, 2011)
      A Nash equilibrium (called an “equilibrium point” by John Nash himself; see Nash 1950) of a game occurs when each player chooses a strategy from which unilateral deviations do not pay. The concept of Nash equilibrium is ...
    • Essays in Mechanism and Market Design 

      Tomoeda, Kentaro (2016-04-28)
      This thesis consists of three essays on mechanism and market design. The first chapter studies the question of when we can eliminate investment inefficiency in a general mechanism design model with transferable utility. ...
    • Essays on Indices and Matching 

      Shorrer, Ran I. (2015-05-11)
      In many decision problems, agents base their actions on a simple objective index, a single number that summarizes the available information about objects of choice independently of their particular preferences. The first ...
    • Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games 

      Maskin, Eric (Springer Nature, 2009)
      I discuss recent work that characterizes what outcomes correspond to evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player symmetric repeated games when players have a positive probability of making a mistake.
    • Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals 

      Maskin, Eric (American Economic Association, 2008)
      The theory of mechanism design can be thought of as the “engineering” side of economic theory. Much theoretical work, of course, focuses on existing economic institutions. The theorist wants to explain or forecast the ...
    • Models of Matching Markets 

      Kadam, Sangram Vilasrao (2016-05-02)
      The structure, length, and characteristics of matching markets affect the outcomes for their participants. This dissertation attempts to fill the lacuna in our understanding about matching markets on three dimensions through ...
    • On The Robustness of Majority Rule 

      Dasgupta, Partha; Maskin, Eric (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2008)
      We show that simple majority rule satisfies the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, and (generic) transitivity on a bigger class of preference domains than any other voting rule. If we replace neutrality in the above ...
    • An Optimal Ownership Structure for Cooperatives 

      Van Wassenaer, Alexander Philips Willem (2017-10-31)
      This thesis identifies an optimal ownership structure for cooperatives. The objective of this structure is to maximize the joint income of the members of that cooperative. To achieve this objective, this structure must ...
    • The value of victory: social origins of the winner’s curse in common value auctions 

      van den Bos, Wouter; Li, Jian; Lau, Tatiana; Maskin, Eric; Cohen, Jonathan D.; Montague, P. Read; McClure, Samuel M. (2008)
      Auctions, normally considered as devices facilitating trade, also provide a way to probe mechanisms governing one’s valuation of some good or action. One of the most intriguing phenomena in auction behavior is the winner’s ...