Now showing items 1-17 of 17

    • The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration 

      Grossman, Sanford J.; Hart, Oliver D. (University of Chicago Press, 1986)
      Our theory of costly contracts emphasizes that contractual rights can be of two types: specific rights and residual rights. When it is costly to list all specific rights over assets in the contract, it may be optimal to ...
    • Debt Enforcement Around the World 

      Djankov, Simeon; Hart, Oliver; McLiesh, Caralee; Shleifer, Andrei (University of Chicago Press, 2008)
      Insolvency practitioners from 88 countries describe how debt enforcement will proceed against an identical hotel about to default on its debt. We use the data on time, cost, and the likely disposition of the assets ...
    • Essays in Financial Economics 

      Kirti, Divya (2016-04-25)
      The chapters in this dissertation study the incidence of risk, risk taking, and the role of markets used to trade risk, with a focus on interest-rate risk. In Chapter 1, I ask why bank-dependent firms bear interest-rate ...
    • Essays on Applied Microeconomics 

      Lee, Hoan Soo (2014-06-24)
      Empirical and theoretical topics in applied microeconomics are discussed in this dissertation. The first essay identifies and measures managerial advantages from access to high-quality deals in venture capital investments. ...
    • Essays on Development Economics: Consumers, Firms, and Financial Institutions 

      Wang, Zhaoning (2016-05-18)
      This dissertation presents three chapters addressing issues pertaining to consumers, firms, and financial institutions in the developing world. The first chapter, co-authored with Juan Ma and Tarun Khanna, evaluates the ...
    • Essays on the Economics of Contracts and Organizations 

      Hirata, Daisuke (2015-05-16)
      This thesis consists of three essays on the economics of contracts and organizations. The first essay studies organizational design as the allocation of decision rights, primarily focusing on its interplay with agents' ...
    • Hold-Up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points 

      Hart, Oliver D. (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2009)
      We study two parties who desire a smooth trading relationship under conditions of value and cost uncertainty. A contract fixing price works well in normal times because there is nothing to argue about. However, when value ...
    • Models of Matching Markets 

      Kadam, Sangram Vilasrao (2016-05-02)
      The structure, length, and characteristics of matching markets affect the outcomes for their participants. This dissertation attempts to fill the lacuna in our understanding about matching markets on three dimensions through ...
    • Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points 

      Hart, Oliver D. (MDPI AG, 2013)
      We analyze noncontractible investments in a model with shading. A seller can make an investment that affects a buyer’s value. The parties have outside options that depend on asset ownership. When shading is not possible ...
    • On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization 

      Hart, Oliver D.; Moore, John (University of Chicago Press, 2005)
      We consider an economy that has to decide how assets are to be used. Agents have ideas, but these ideas conflict. We suppose that decision‐making authority is determined by hierarchy: each asset has a chain of command, and ...
    • Organizational Innovation in Health Care 

      Haque, Rezwan (2015-04-27)
      This dissertation investigates whether differences in organizational innovation amongst health care providers can explain the huge variation in costs and outcomes. I specifically consider two facets of organizational ...
    • Price Destabilizing Speculation 

      Hart, Oliver D.; Kreps, David M. (University of Chicago Press, 1986)
      It is sometimes asserted that rational speculative activity must result in more stable prices because speculators buy when prices are low and sell when they are high. This is incorrect. Speculators buy when the chances of ...
    • The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons 

      Hart, Oliver D.; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, R. W. (Oxford University Press (OUP), 1997)
      When should a government provide a service inhouse and when should it contract out provision? We develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost, If contracts are ...
    • Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm 

      Hart, Oliver D.; Moore, John (University of Chicago Press, 1990)
      This paper provides a framework for addressing the question of when transactions should be carried out within a firm and when through the market. Following Grossman and Hart, we identify a firm with the assets that its ...
    • Skill, Job Design, and the Labor Market under Uncertainty 

      Barrera, Catherine Grace (2014-06-06)
      The labor market matches agents with work, but uncertainty over the type and location of available work reduces the efficiency with which skill can be allocated to its best use. The essays in this dissertation examine the ...
    • Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of the Firm Perspective on the Economic Substance Doctrine 

      Borek, T. Christopher; Frattarelli, Angelo; Hart, Oliver D. (University of Chicago Press, 2014)
      Courts have articulated a number of legal tests to distinguish corporate transactions that have a legitimate business or economic purpose from those carried out largely, if not solely, for favorable tax treatment. We outline ...
    • Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks 

      Grossman, Sanford J.; Hart, Oliver D.; Maskin, Eric S. (University of Chicago Press, 1983)
      A general equilibrium model of' optimal employment contracts is developed where firms have better information about labor's marginal product than workers. It is optimal for the wage to be tied to the level of employment, ...