Browsing by Author "Tabellini, Guido"

Now showing items 1-5 of 5

    • Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task 

      Alesina, Alberto; Tabellini, Guido (American Economic Association, 2007-03-01)
      This paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elected politician versus an independent bureaucrat. The bureaucrat is preferable for technical tasks for which ability is ...

    • External Debt, Capital Flight and Political Risk 

      Alesina, Alberto; Tabellini, Guido (Elsevier, 1989)
      This paper explains the simultaneous occurrence of large external debts, private capital outflows and low domestic capital formation. We consider a general equilibrium model in which two government types with conflicting ...

    • A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt 

      Alesina, Alberto; Tabellini, Guido (Blackwell Publishing, 1990)
      This paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections. Government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his ...

    • Voting on the Budget Deficit 

      Tabellini, Guido; Alesina, Alberto (American Economic Association, 1990)
      This paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending. All voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal. However, if there is disagreement ...

    • Why Is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical? 

      Alesina, Alberto Francesco; Campante, Filipe Robin; Tabellini, Guido (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008)
      Fiscal policy is procyclical in many developing countries. We explain this policy failure with a political agency problem. Procyclicality is driven by voters who seek to “starve the Leviathan” to reduce political rents. ...