Now showing items 1-20 of 214

    • Accounting for Cognitive Costs in On-Line Auction Design 

      Parkes, David C.; Ungar, Lyle H.; Foster, Dean P. (Springer Verlag, 1999)
      Many auction mechanisms, including first and second price ascending and sealed bid auctions, have been proposed and analyzed in the economics literature. We compare the usefulness of different mechanisms for on-line auctions, ...
    • Accounting Mechanisms for Distributed Work Systems 

      Seuken, Sven; Tang, Jie; Parkes, David C. (AAAI Press, 2010)
      In distributed work systems, individual users perform work for other users. A significant challenge in these systems is to provide proper incentives for users to contribute as much work as they consume, even when monitoring ...
    • Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges 

      Parkes, David C.; Kalagnanam, Jayant R.; Eso, Marta (2001)
      Generalized Vickrey mechanisms have received wide attention in the literature because they are efficient and strategy-proof, i.e. truthful bidding is optimal whatever the bids of other agents. However it is well-known that ...
    • Achieving Trust without Disclosure: Dark Pools and a Role for Secrecy-Preserving Verification 

      Parkes, David C.; Thorpe, Christopher; Li, Wei (2015)
      Can an exchange be “dark,” so that orders are not displayed, while simultaneously trustworthy, so that the execution of trades and flow of information occur as promised? SEC actions against dark pools suggest cause for ...
    • Adaptive Limited-Supply Online Auctions 

      Hajiaghayi, Mohammad T.; Kleinberg, Robert; Parkes, David C. (Association for Computing Machinery, 2004)
      We study a limited-supply online auction problem, in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and bidders arrive and depart dynamically. We suppose that agent valuations are drawn independently from some unknown distribution ...
    • Algorithms and Models for Genome Biology 

      Zou, James Yang (2014-02-25)
      New advances in genomic technology make it possible to address some of the most fundamental questions in biology for the first time. They also highlight a need for new approaches to analyze and model massive amounts of ...
    • Analysis of Bidding Networks in eBay: Aggregate Preference Identification through Community Detection 

      Jin, R. Kang-Xing; Parkes, David C.; Wolfe, Patrick J. (American Association for Artificial Intelligence, 2007)
      Statistical analysis of networks plays a critical role in the context of economics and the social sciences. Here we construct a bidding network to represent the behavior of users of the eBay marketplace. We study the eBay ...
    • Applying Learning Algorithms to Preference Elicitation 

      Lahaie, Sébastien M.; Parkes, David C. (Association for Computing Machinery, 2004)
      We consider the parallels between the preference elicitation problem in combinatorial auctions and the problem of learning an unknown function from learning theory. We show that learning algorithms can be used as a basis ...
    • Approval Voting Behavior in Doodle Polls 

      Zou, James; Meir, Reshef; Parkes, David C. (2014)
      Doodle is a simple and popular online system for scheduling events. It is an implementation of the approval voting mechanism, where candidates are the time slots and each responder approves a subset of the slots. We analyze ...
    • Approximate and Compensate: A Method for Risk-Sensitive Meta-Deliberation and Continual Computation 

      Parkes, David C.; Greenwald, Lloyd (Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, 2001)
      We present a flexible procedure for a resource-bounded agent to allocate limited computational resources to on-line problem solving. Our APPROXIMATE AND COMPENSATE methodology extends a well-known greedy time-slicing ...
    • Approximate Strategyproofness 

      Lubin, Benjamin; Parkes, David C. (Indian Academy of Sciences, 2012)
      The standard approach of mechanism design theory insists on equilibrium behavior by participants. This assumption is captured by imposing incentive constraints on the design space. But in bridging from theory to practice, ...
    • Approximately Efficient Online Mechanism Design 

      Parkes, David C.; Singh, Satinder; Dimah, Yanovsky (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2004)
      Online mechanism design (OMD) addresses the problem of sequential decision making in a stochastic environment with multiple self-interested agents. The goal in OMD is to make value-maximizing decisions despite this ...
    • Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions 

      Kothari, Anshul; Parkes, David C.; Suri, Subhash (Elsevier, 2005)
      We present an approximately-efficient and approximately-strategyproof auction mechanism for a single-good multiunit allocation problem. The bidding language allows marginal-decreasing piecewise-constant curves and ...
    • Approximating the Shapley Value via Multi-Issue Decomposition 

      Soufiani, Hossein Azari; Charles, Denis X.; Chickering, David M.; Parkes, David C. (ACM, 2014)
      The Shapley value provides a fair method for the division of value in coalitional games. Motivated by the application of crowdsourcing for the collection of suitable labels and features for regression and classification ...
    • Are you Going to Do That? Contingent-Payment Mechanisms to Improve Coordination 

      Ma, Hongyao; Meir, Reshef; Parkes, David C.; Zou, James (2015)
      In this extended abstract, we consider simple coordination problems, such as allocating the right to use a shared sports facility in a way that maximizes its usage, or picking the time of a meeting in a way that maximizes ...
    • Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions for General Valuations 

      Mishra, Debasis; Parkes, David C. (Elsevier, 2007)
      Ascending price auctions involving a single price path and buyers paying their final bid price cannot achieve the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) outcome in the combinatorial auctions setting. Using a notion called universal ...
    • An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction 

      Parkes, David C.; Ungar, Lyle H. (2002)
      A simple characterization of the equilibrium conditions required to compute Vickrey payments in the Combinatorial Allocation Problem leads to an ascending price Generalized Vickrey Auction. The ascending auc- tion, ...
    • An Auction-Based Method for Decentralized Train Scheduling 

      Parkes, David C.; Ungar, Lyle H. (Association for Computing Machinery, 2001)
      We present a computational study of an auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling. The method is well suited to the natural information and control structure of mod- ern railroads. We assume separate network ...
    • Auctions, Bidding and Exchange Design 

      Kalagnanam, Jayant; Parkes, David C. (Kluwer, 2004)
      The different auction types are outlined using a classification framework along six dimensions. The economic properties that are desired in the design of auction mechanisms and the complexities that arise in their ...
    • Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions 

      Walsh, William E.; Boutilier, Craig; Sandholm, Tuomas; Shields, Rob; Nemhauser, George; Parkes, David C. (Association for Computing Machinery, 2009)
      The use of auction mechanisms like the GSP in online advertising can lead to loss of both efficiency and revenue when advertisers have rich preferences: even simple forms of expressiveness like budget constraints can lead ...