Now showing items 1-20 of 145

    • An Activity-Generating Theory of Regulation 

      Schwartzstein, Joshua; Shleifer, Andrei (University of Chicago Press, 2013)
      We propose an activity-generating theory of regulation. When courts make errors, tort litigation becomes unpredictable and as such imposes risk on firms, thereby discouraging entry, innovation, and other socially desirable ...
    • Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World 

      La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2000)
      This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the “outcome” model, dividends are the result of effective pressure by minority shareholders to force corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According ...
    • The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth 

      Murphy, Kevin M.; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W. (Oxford University Press (OUP), 1991)
      A country's most talented people typically organize production by others, so they can spread their ability advantage over a larger scale. When they start firms, they innovate and foster growth, but when they become rent ...
    • Anomalies: Closed-End Mutual Funds 

      Lee, Charles; Shleifer, Andrei; Thaler, Richard H (American Economic Association, 1990)
    • Asset Fire Sales and Credit Easing 

      Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W. (American Economic Association, 2010)
    • Banks as Patient Fixed-Income Investors 

      Hanson, Samuel Gregory; Shleifer, Andrei; Stein, Jeremy C.; Vishny, Robert W. (Elsevier, 2015)
      We examine the business model of traditional commercial banks when they compete with shadow banks. While both types of intermediaries create safe "money-like" claims, they go about this in different ways. Traditional banks ...
    • Chasing Noise 

      Mendel, Brock; Shleifer, Andrei (Elsevier, 2012)
      We present a simple model in which rational but uninformed traders occasionally chase noise as if it were information, thereby amplifying sentiment shocks and moving prices away from fundamental values. In the model, noise ...
    • The Clash of Brothers: Wars to Avoid Diffusion in a Contagious World 

      Lada, Akos (2015-05-18)
      My dissertation explores macro-level questions in Political Economy. Using the toolbox of Economics, I find a new reason for international conflict: cultural similarity. Two culturally similar nations may have very different ...
    • Coarse Thinking and Persuasion 

      Mullainathan, Sendhil; Schwartzstein, Joshua; Shleifer, Andrei (MIT Press, 2008)
      We present a model of uninformative persuasion in which individuals “think coarsely”: they group situations into categories and apply the same model of inference to all situations within a category. Coarse thinking exhibits ...
    • Comments on Gorton and Metrick: Regulating the Shadow Banking System 

      Shleifer, Andrei (Brookings Institute, 2010)
    • Comovement 

      Barberis, Nicholas; Shleifer, Andrei; Wurgler, Jeffrey (Elsevier BV, 2005)
      A number of studies have identifed patterns of positive correlation of returns, or comovement, among different traded securities. We distinguish three views of such comovement. The traditional "fundamentals" view explains ...
    • Competition for Attention 

      Bordalo, Pedro; Gennaioli, Nicola; Shleifer, Andrei (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013)
      We present a model of market competition and product differentiation in which consumers' attention is drawn to the products' most salient attributes. Firms compete for consumer attention via their choices of quality and ...
    • Conscription as Regulation 

      Mulligan, C. B.; Shleifer, Andrei (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2005)
      We examine the practice of military conscription around the world from the perspective of two standard theories, and a new one, which emphasizes the fixed cost of introducing and administering the draft as a deterrent to ...
    • Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk 

      Lakonishok, Josef; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W (Wiley-Blackwell, 1994)
    • Corporate Ownership Around the World 

      La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-De-Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei (Wiley-Blackwell, 1999)
      We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an effort to identify ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder ...
    • Costs of Financial Distress, Delayed Calls of Convertible Bonds, and the Role of Investment Banks 

      Jaffee, Dwight; Shleifer, Andrei (University of Chicago Press, 1990)
    • Courts: the Lex Mundi Project 

      Djankov, S.; La Porta, R.; Lopez-de-Silanes, F.; Shleifer, Andrei (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2003)
      In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use ...
    • The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping the Electorate 

      Glaeser, Edward Ludwig; Shleifer, Andrei (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2005)
      James Michael Curley, a four-time mayor of Boston, used wasteful redistribution to his poor Irish constituents and incendiary rhetoric to encourage richer citizens to emigrate from Boston, thereby shaping the electorate ...
    • Debt Enforcement Around the World 

      Djankov, Simeon; Hart, Oliver; McLiesh, Caralee; Shleifer, Andrei (University of Chicago Press, 2008)
      Insolvency practitioners from 88 countries describe how debt enforcement will proceed against an identical hotel about to default on its debt. We use the data on time, cost, and the likely disposition of the assets ...
    • Disclosure by Politicians 

      Djankov, Simeon; La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei (American Economic Association, 2010)
      We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available ...