Now showing items 1-20 of 20

    • Chevron as a Voting Rule 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Yale Law School, 2007)
      In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court created a new framework for judicial deference to agency interpretations of law: courts should defer to an agency interpretation unless ...
    • Chevron as a Voting Rule 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Yale Law School, 2007)
      In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court created a new framework for judicial deference to agency interpretations of law: courts should defer to an agency interpretation unless ...
    • Deadlines in Administrative Law 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; O'Connell, Anne Joesph (University of Pennsylvania, 2008)
      A cottage industry in administrative law studies the various mechanisms by which Congress, the President, and the courts exert control of administrative agencies. Restrictions on the appointment and removal of personnel, ...
    • Delegating to Enemies 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Columbia Law Review Association, Inc., 2012)
      An axiom of institutional design is known as the ally principle: All else equal, voters, legislators, or other principals will rationally delegate more authority to agents who share their preferences (“allies”). The ally ...
    • Delegating to Enemies 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Columbia Law Review Association, Inc., 2012)
      An axiom of institutional design is known as the ally principle: all else equal, voters, legislators or other principals will rationally delegate more authority to agents who share their preferences (“allies”). The ally ...
    • Election Timing and Public Policy 

      Gersen, Jacob E. (Now Publishers, 2011)
      There are nearly half a million elected officials in American local governments, and the timing of local elections varies enormously even within the same state. Some local elections are held simultaneously with major federal ...
    • Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions 

      Berry, Christopher R.; Gersen, Jacob E. (University of Chicago Press, 2009)
      There are more than 500,000 elected officials in the United States, 96 percent of whom serve in local governments. Electoral density - the number of elected officials per capita or per governmental unit - varies greatly ...
    • Hiding in Plain Sight: Timing and Transparency in the Administrative State 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; O'Connell, Anne Joesph (University of Chicago Press, 2009)
      Anecdotal evidence of agencies burying bad news is rife in law and politics. The bureaucracy regularly is accused of announcing controversial policies on holidays and weekends when public attention is elsewhere. We show ...
    • Improving Deference: Chevron as a Voting Rule 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Yale Law School, 2007)
    • Improving Deference: Chevron as a Voting Rule 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Yale Law School, 2007)
    • Legislative Rules Revisited 

      Gersen, Jacob E. (University of Chicago Press, 2007)
      The distinction between legislative rules and nonlegislative rules is one of the most confusing in administrative law. Yet, it also critical for understanding not just when agencies must use procedural formality to issue ...
    • Markets and Discrimination 

      Gersen, Jacob E. (The New York University Law Review, 2007)
      Despite decades of scholarship in law and economics, disagreement persists over the extent of employment discrimination in the United States, the correct explanation for such discrimination, and the normative implications ...
    • Over-Accountability 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; Stephenson, Matthew Caleb (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2014)
      Although ensuring the “accountability” of agents to their principals is widely considered a core objective of institutional design, recent work in political economy has identified and elucidated an important class of ...
    • Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; Posner, Eric (Stanford Law School, 2008)
      Soft law consists of rules issued by lawmaking bodies that do not comply with procedural formalities necessary to give the rules legal status yet nonetheless influence the behavior of other lawmaking bodies and of the ...
    • Substitution Strategies 

      Gersen, Jacob E. (Harvard University, Harvard Law School, 2007)
      Positive political theory (PPT) is not new to administrative law, but it is increasingly becoming part of the mainstream, as evidenced by the Harvard Law Review’s publication of Professor Stephenson’s Strategic Substitution ...
    • Temporary Legislation 

      Gersen, Jacob E. (University of Chicago Press, 2007)
      This paper provides a descriptive, positive, and normative analysis of temporary legislation, statutes containing a clause terminating legal authority on a specified future date. Notwithstanding the fact that a significant ...
    • The Timing of Elections 

      Berry, Christopher R.; Gersen, Jacob E. (University of Chicago Press, 2010)
    • Timing Rules and Legal Institutions 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; Posner, Eric (Harvard University, Harvard Law School, 2007)
      Constitutional and legislative restrictions on the timing of legislation and regulation are ubiquitous, but these “timing rules” have received little attention in the legal literature. Yet the timing of a law can be just ...
    • The Unbundled Executive 

      Berry, Christopher R.; Gersen, Jacob E. (University of Chicago Press, 2008)
      This Article articulates and analyzes the possibility of an unbundled executive. The unbundled executive is a plural executive regime in which discrete authority is taken from the President and given exclusively to a ...
    • Unbundled Powers 

      Gersen, Jacob E. (Virginia Law Review Association, 2010)