Now showing items 1-20 of 87

    • Birthplace Diversity and Economic Prosperity 

      Alesina, Alberto Francesco; Harnoss, Johann; Rapoport, Hillel (2015)
      We propose an index of population diversity based on peopleís birthplaces and decompose it into a size (share of immigrants) and a variety (diversity of immigrants) component. We show that birthplace diversity is largely ...
    • Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America 

      Alesina, Alberto; Hausmann, Ricardo; Hommes, Rudolf; Stein, Ernesto (Elsevier Science B.V., 1999)
      In this paper, we collect detailed information on the budget institutions of Latin American countries. We classify these institutions on a "hierarchical"/"collegial" scale, as a function of the existence of constraints on ...
    • Choosing Electoral Rules: Theory and Evidence from US Cities 

      Aghion, Philippe; Alesina, Alberto Francesco; Trebbi, Francesco (2005)
      This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular, the question of minority representation. Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules. With the aim of ...
    • The Clash of Brothers: Wars to Avoid Diffusion in a Contagious World 

      Lada, Akos (2015-05-18)
      My dissertation explores macro-level questions in Political Economy. Using the toolbox of Economics, I find a new reason for international conflict: cultural similarity. Two culturally similar nations may have very different ...
    • Comments on "When Do Policy Reforms Work?' by Daron Acemoglu et al. 

      Alesina, Alberto Francesco (Brookings Institution Press, 2008)
      Questions of the effectiveness of economic policy reform are inseparable from the political economy factors responsible for distortionary policies in the first place. Distortionary policies are more likely to be adopted ...
    • Comments on 'Europe's Gamble' by M. Obstfeld 

      Alesina, Alberto Francesco (Brookings Institution Press, 1997)
    • Comments on ‘Alternative Models of Political Business Cycles’ by W.D. Nordhaus 

      Alesina, Alberto Francesco (Brookings Institution Press, 1989)
    • Conflict, Defense Spending, and the Number of Nations 

      Alesina, Alberto; Spolaore, Enrico (Elsevier, 2006)
      This paper provides a formal model of endogenous border formation and choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict. We examine both the case of democratic governments and of dictatorships. The model ...
    • Corruption, Inequality, and Fairness 

      Alesina, Alberto; Angeletos, George-Marios (Elsevier, 2005)
      Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption. We formalize ...
    • The Costs and Benefits of Fiscal Rules: Evidence from U.S. States 

      Alesina, Alberto Francesco; Bayoumi, Tamim (2018-06-22)
      This paper shows that in American states balanced budget rules are effective in enforcing fiscal discipline but they have no costs in terms of increased output variability. More specifically, we show that tighter fiscal ...
    • Culture and Institutions 

      Alesina, Alberto Francesco; Giuliano, Paola (American Economic Association, 2015)
      A growing body of empirical work measuring different types of cultural traits has shown that culture matters for a variety of economic outcomes. This paper focuses on one specific aspect of the relevance of culture: its ...
    • Currency Unions 

      Alesina, Alberto; Barro, Robert (MIT Press, 2002)
      Common currencies affect trading costs and, thereby, the amounts of trade, output, and consumption. From the perspective of monetary policy, the adoption of another country's currency trades off the benefits of commitment ...
    • Democracy, Technology, and Growth 

      Aghion, Philippe; Alesina, Alberto Francesco; Trebbi, Francesco (2007)
      We explore the question of how political institutions and particularly democracy affect economic growth. Although empirical evidence of a positive effect of democracy on economic performance in the aggregate is weak, we ...
    • The Design of Fiscal Adjustments 

      Alesina, Alberto Francesco; Ardagna, Silvia (University of Chicago Press, 2013)
      This paper offers three results. First, in line with the previous literature, we confirm that fiscal adjustments based mostly on the spending side are less likely to be reversed. Second, spending based fiscal adjustments ...
    • Distributive Politics and Economic Growth 

      Alesina, Alberto; Rodrik, Dani (MIT Press, 1994)
      We study the relationship between politics and economic growth in a simple model of endogenous growth with distributive conflict among agents endowed with varying capital/labor shares. We establish several results regarding ...
    • Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid? 

      Alesina, Alberto; Weder, Beatrice (American Economic Association, 2002)
      Critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies. Supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments. This paper documents that ...
    • Economic Integration and Political Disintegration 

      Alesina, Alberto; Spolaore, Enrico; Wacziarg, Romain (American Economic Association, 2000)
      In a world of trade restrictions, large countries enjoy economic benefits, because political boundaries determine the size of the market. Under free trade and global markets even relatively small cultural, linguistic or ...
    • Economic Risk and Political Risk in Fiscal Unions 

      Alesina, Alberto; Perotti, Roberto (Blackwell Publishing, 1994)
      A fiscal programme that redistributes income from rich to poor individuals indirectly redistributes tax revenues from regions hit by a favourable shock to regions hit by an unfavourable one. Centralised fiscal redistribution ...
    • Electoral Rules and Minority Representation in U.S. Cities 

      Trebbi, Francesco; Aghion, Philippe; Alesina, Alberto (MIT Press, 2008)
      This paper studies the choice of electoral rules and in particular the question of minority representation. Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules. With the aim of ...
    • Endogenous Political Institutions 

      Aghion, Philippe; Alesina, Alberto; Trebbi, Francesco (MIT Press, 2004)
      A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if ...