Browsing by Author "Pathak, Parag"
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Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets*
Kojima, Fuhito; Pathak, Parag; Roth, Alvin E. (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2013)Accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist ... -
Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Pathak, Parag Abishek; Roth, Alvin E. (American Economic Association, 2009)The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences -- ties -- in ...