Now showing items 1-14 of 14

    • Coherentism via Graphs 

      Berker, Selim (Wiley-Blackwell, 2015)
    • Counsel and Command: An Address-Dependent Account of Authority 

      Glaeser, Micha Bernhard (2016-09-14)
      In this dissertation I develop an account of the concept of authority and the distinction between theoretical and practical authority in terms of their proper forms of interpersonal address. I then exploit the difference ...
    • Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Normativity Is Mind-Dependent? 

      Berker, Selim (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2014)
      Suppose we grant that evolutionary forces have had a profound effect on the contours of our normative judgments and intuitions. Can we conclude anything from this about the correct metaethical theory? This chapter argues ...
    • Duties of Rescue: a Moderate Account 

      Nishimoto, Craig Takeshi (2013-10-18)
      This dissertation clarifies a challenge present in Peter Singer's famine-relief argument and offers a new account of our moral duties of rescue. The challenge, in essence, is to differentiate two classes of idealized ...
    • Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions 

      Berker, Selim (Duke University Press, 2013)
      When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in ...
    • The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles 

      Berker, Selim (Wiley, 2018-02-08)
      Moral properties are explained by other properties. And moral principles tell us about moral properties. How are these two ideas related? In particular, is the truth of a given moral principle part of what explains why a ...
    • Gupta’s Gambit 

      Berker, Selim (Springer Verlag, 2011)
      After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book Empiricism and Experience, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; ...
    • Luminosity Regained 

      Berker, Selim (Scholarly Publishing Office, University of Michigan, University Library, 2008)
      The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one ...
    • The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience 

      Berker, Selim (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009)
    • Particular Reasons 

      Berker, Selim (University of Chicago Press, 2007)
      Moral particularists argue that because reasons for action are irreducibly context-dependent, the traditional quest in ethics for true and exceptionless moral principles is hopelessly misguided. In making this claim, ...
    • Rational Reconstruction and the Construction of an Interlocutor 

      Prescott-Couch, Alexander (2015-09-18)
      There has been much recent work in philosophy of science on idealization – the way inaccurate representations can be used to understand a target system. My dissertation concerns a particular sort of idealization that is ...
    • The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism 

      Berker, Selim (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013)
    • Reply to Goldman: Cutting Up the One to Save the Five in Epistemology 

      Berker, Selim (Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2015)
      I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the ...
    • The Unity of Grounding 

      Berker, A Selim (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2017)
      I argue—contra moderate grounding pluralists such as Kit Fine and more extreme grounding pluralists such as Jessica Wilson—that there is fundamentally only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation. I also argue that this single ...