Browsing by FAS Department "Philosophy"
Now showing items 1-20 of 253
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2015 Mark Sacks Lecture Williams, History, and ‘the Impurity of Philosophy’
(Wiley-Blackwell, 2016) -
Acting for a Reason
(Oxford University Press, 2008)Starting from the debate over whether practical reasons are mental states or the facts to which those mental states are a response, this chapter argues that being motivated by a practical reason must be a reflexive form ... -
Acting From Thought About Action
(2016-08-25)Human action is unique. It is metaphysically unique because we can act self-consciously. It is normatively unique because we are subject to prudential, moral, and rational standards in action, whereas other agents are not. ... -
Active Belief
(University of Calgary Press, 2011)I argue that cognitively mature human beings have an important sort of control or discretion over their own beliefs, but that to make good sense of this control, we must reject the common idea that it consists in a capacity ... -
The Activity of Reason
(American Philosophical Association, 2009) -
Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique
(Wiley, 2012-04-28)“Additive theories” of rationality, as I use the term, are views that hold that an account of our minds can begin with an account of what it is to perceive and desire, in terms which do not presuppose any connection to the ... -
Affordances and the Contents of Perception
(Oxford University Press, 2014) -
Against Intentionalism
(Springer Verlag, 2007)Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenological properties of a perceptual experience supervene on its intentional properties. The paper presents a counterexample to this claim, one that concerns visual grouping ... -
Agency and morality
(Routledge, 2021-12-07)The traditional categorization of ethical theories into consequentialist, deontological, and virtue-ethical theories ignores the significance of the fact that philosophers supposedly representing these categories are working ... -
Ambiguity of “intention”
(Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2010)Knobe reports that subjects’ judgments of whether an agent did something intentionally vary depending on whether the outcome in question was seen by them as good or as bad. He concludes that subjects’ moral views affect ... -
Amicus Brief (in the Case of Happy the Elephant)
(Project Muse, 2023-01)II. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT This brief does not address the issue of Happy's personhood. The key question for the Court is not whether Happy can be called a "person." Instead, the key questions are, first, whether there ... -
Animal Selves and the Good
(Oxford University Press, 2018-12-18)If we would save a human in preference to some other kind of animal, does that show that we must think humans are more important or valuable than the other animals? If everything that is important must be important to ... -
Anscombe on Expression of Intention
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) -
Are There Edenic Grounds of Perceptual Intentionality?
(Oxford University Press, 2012-11-26)This is a critical piece on "The Character of Consciousness" by David Chalmers. It focuses on Chalmers's two-stage view of perceptual content and the epistemology of perceptual belief that flows from this theory, and ... -
Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value
(University of Chicago Press, 1986) -
Aristotle on Function and Virtue
(Oxford University Press, 2008)According to Plato and Aristotle, a virtue is a quality that makes you good at performing your function. Aristotle thinks that the human function is rational activity. This chapter asks how the moral virtues could contribute ... -
Aristotle's Function Argument
(Oxford University Press, 2008)In Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, Aristotle claims that to discover the human good we must identify the function of a human being. He argues that the human function is rational activity. Our good is therefore rational activity ... -
Arthur Collins's The Nature of Mental Things
(Blackwell Publishing, 1994) -
Artifice and Persuasion: The Work of Metaphor in the Rhetoric
(University of California Press, 1996) -
Autonomy and the Second Person Within: A commentary on Stephen Darwall's The Second-Person Standpoint.
(University of Chicago Press, 2007)