Person: Kaplow, Louis
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Publication Antitrust, Law & Economics, and the Courts
(Duke University School of Law, 1987) Kaplow, LouisNo abstract provided.
Publication The Accuracy of Traditional Market Power Analysis and a Direct Adjustment Alternative
(Harvard Law School, 1982) Kaplow, LouisNo abstract provided.
Publication Extension of Monopoly Power through Leverage
(Columbia Law Review Association, Inc., 1985) Kaplow, LouisNo abstract provided.
Publication Private versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit
(University of Chicago Press, 1986) Kaplow, LouisNo abstract provided.
Publication The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal
(Harvard University, 1984) Kaplow, LouisThe conflict between antitrust law and patent policy has incessantly perplexed courts and commentators. In this Article, Professor Kaplow develops and analyzes a conceptual solution to the patent-antitrust puzzle. This analysis is applied in a number of familiar contexts, and the resulting conclusions call into question much of the earlier analysis of these issues. Both the development of the model and the attempt to apply the theoretical framework in practice indicate that the problem is far more complex than has previously been realized. This Article is an attempt to clarify the issues, but in the end it may reinforce existing pessimism concerning the possibility of untangling the patent-antitrust intersection. The discussion also illustrates the difficulty of applying economic analysis to concrete problems in a manner that yields confident conclusions.
Publication Legal Advice about Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability
(The Harvard Law Review Association, 1989) Kaplow, Louis; Shavell, StephenLegal advice provided in the course of litigation often concerns the selection of information to present to a tribunal. Professors Kaplow and Shavell examine the effects and social desirability of this kind of advice. They observe that such advice may result in either more or less information reaching the tribunal and that, in either case, it will tend to produce more favorable outcomes for clients. Because individuals will take this effect into account when deciding how to act, the prospect of advice may alter their behavior. The authors explore the factors determining whether the influence on behavior is desirable or detrimental. They emphasize that legal advice supplied during litigation differs significantly from advice given when acts are initially contemplated, because only the latter type of advice generally tends to channel behavior in a socially desirable manner. The authors' analysis raises basic questions about the wisdom of the attorney-client privilege and rules protecting confidentiality in the context of litigation, and it suggests that inquiry into the lawyer's role be recast.
Publication An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions
(Harvard Law Review, 1986) Kaplow, LouisNo abstract provided.