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Exley, Christine

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Exley

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Christine

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Exley, Christine

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Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
  • Publication

    Nonprofits in Good Times and Bad Times

    (University of Chicago Press, 2023-02-01) Exley, Christine; Lehr, Nils H.; Terry, Stephen J.

    Need fluctuates over the business cycle. We conduct a survey revealing a desire for nonprofit activities to countercyclically expand during downturns. We then demonstrate, using comprehensive U.S. nonprofit data drawn from millions of tax returns, that the public's hopes are disappointed. Nonprofit expenditure, revenue, and balance sheets fluctuate procyclically: contracting during national and local downturns. This finding is evident even for a narrow group of nonprofits the public most wishes would expand during downturns, e.g., those providing critical needs like food or housing. Our new facts contribute to the charitable giving, nonprofit, and business cycle literatures.

  • Publication

    Observability Increases the Demand for Commitment Devices

    (Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2017) Exley, Christine; Naecker, Jeffrey K.

    Previous research often interprets the choice to restrict one’s future opportunity set as evidence for sophisticated time inconsistency. We propose an additional mechanism that may contribute to the demand for commitment technology: the desire to signal to others. We present a field experiment where participants can choose to give up money if they do not follow through with an action. When commitment choices are made public rather than kept private, we find significantly higher uptake rates.

  • Publication

    Excusing Selfishness in Charitable Giving: The Role of Risk

    (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2016) Exley, Christine

    Decisions involving charitable giving often occur under the shadow of risk. A common finding is that potential donors give less when there is greater risk that their donation will have less impact. While this behavior could be fully rationalized by standard economic models, this paper shows that an additional mechanism is relevant: the use of risk as an excuse not to give. In a laboratory study, participants evaluate risky payoffs for themselves and risky payoffs for a charity. When their decisions do not involve tradeoffs between money for themselves and the charity, they respond very similarly to self risk and charity risk. By contrast, when their decisions force tradeoffs between money for themselves and the charity, participants act more averse to charity risk and less averse to self risk. These altered responses to risk bias participants towards choosing payoffs for themselves more often, consistent with excuse-driven responses to risk. Additional results support the existence of excuse-driven types.