Person:

Reese, Hannah

Social Phobics exhibit an attentional bias for threat in probe detection and probe discrimination paradigms. Attention training programs, whereby probes always replace nonthreat cues, reduce attentional bias for threat and self-reported anxiety. However, it remains unclear whether the therapeutic benefits of attention training result from people learning to disengage attention from threat cues or acquiring greater control over their attention by learning to deploy it flexibly. Moreover, researchers have seldom taken behavioral measures, and have never taken physiological measures of fear reduction. Investigating these questions, we found that training to disengage attention from threat is more effective than training to deploy it flexibly in social phobia. Indeed, the former condition reduced self-report, behavioral and physiological measures of anxiety.

The belief that we can control our thoughts is not inevitably adaptive, particularly when it fuels mental control activities that have ironic unintended consequences. The conviction that the mind can and should be controlled can prompt people to suppress unwanted thoughts, and so can set the stage for the intrusive return of those very thoughts. An important question is whether or not these beliefs about the control of thoughts can be reduced experimentally. One possibility is that behavioral experiments aimed at revealing the ironic return of suppressed thoughts might create a lesson that could reduce unrealistic beliefs about the control of thoughts. Aims: The present research assessed the influence of the thought suppression demonstration on beliefs about the control of thoughts in a non-clinical sample, and among individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Method: In Study 1, we assessed the effect of the thought suppression demonstration on beliefs about the control of thoughts among low and high obsessive individuals in the non-clinical population (N = 62). In Study 2, we conducted a similar study with individuals with OCD (N = 29). Results: Results suggest that high obsessive individuals in the non-clinical population are able to learn the futility of suppression through the thought suppression demonstration and to alter their faulty beliefs about the control of thoughts; however, for individuals with OCD, the demonstration may be insufficient for altering underlying beliefs. Conclusions: For individuals with OCD, the connection between suppressing a neutral thought in the suppression demonstration and suppressing a personally relevant obsession may need to be stated explicitly in order to affect their obsessive beliefs.