Now showing items 1-2 of 2

    • Evolutionary Game Dynamics with Non-Uniform Interaction Rates 

      Taylor, Christine Jiayou; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2006)
      The classical setting of evolutionary game theory, the replicator equation, assumes uniform interaction rates. The rate at which individuals meet and interact is independent of their strategies. Here we extend this framework ...
    • Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift? 

      Imhof, Lorens; Fudenberg, Drew; Nowak, Martin (Elsevier, 2007)
      The repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is usually known as a story of tit-for-tat (TFT). This remarkable strategy has won both of Robert Axelrod's tournaments. TFT does whatever the opponent has done in the previous round. It ...