Now showing items 1-15 of 15

    • Direct Reciprocity on Graphs 

      Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2007)
      Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on the idea of repeated encounters between the same two individuals. Here we examine direct reciprocity in structured populations, where individuals ...
    • Evolution of Cooperation by Phenotypic Similarity 

      Antal, Tibor; Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Wakeley, John R.; Taylor, Peter D.; Nowak, Martin A. (National Academy of Sciences, 2009)
      The emergence of cooperation in populations of selfish individuals is a fascinating topic that has inspired much work in theoretical biology. Here, we study the evolution of cooperation in a model where individuals are ...
    • Evolutionary Dynamics in Structured Populations 

      Nowak, Martin A.; Tarnita, Corina E.; Antal, Tibor (The Royal Society, 2010)
      Evolutionary dynamics shape the living world around us. At the centre of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The structure of that population affects evolutionary dynamics. The individuals ...
    • Evolutionary dynamics with fluctuating population sizes and strong mutualism 

      Chotibut, Thiparat; Nelson, David R. (American Physical Society (APS), 2015)
      Game theory ideas provide a useful framework for studying evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed environment. This approach, however, typically enforces a strictly fixed overall population size, deemphasizing natural growth ...
    • Evolutionary Stability on Graphs 

      Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2008)
      Evolutionary stability is a fundamental concept in evolutionary game theory. A strategy is called an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), if its monomorphic population rejects the invasion of any other mutant strategy. ...
    • Mutation-Selection Equilibrium in Games with Multiple Strategies 

      Antal, Tibor; Traulsen, Arne; Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Tarnita, Corina Elena; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2009)
      In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but ...
    • The One-Third Law of Evolutionary Dynamics 

      Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Bordalo, Pedro; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2007)
      Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations provide a new framework for studying selection of traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Recently, a “one-third law” of evolutionary dynamics has been described, which ...
    • Pairwise Comparison and Selection Temperature in Evolutionary Game Dynamics 

      Traulsen, Arne; Pacheco, Jorge M.; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2007)
      Recently, the frequency-dependent Moran process has been introduced in order to describe evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. Here, an alternative to this process is investigated that is based on pairwise ...
    • Prosperity is Associated with Instability in Dynamical Networks 

      Cavaliere, Matteo; Sedwards, Sean; Tarnita, Corina Elena; Nowak, Martin A.; Csikász-Nagy, Attila (Elsevier, 2012)
      Social, biological and economic networks grow and decline with occasional fragmentation and re-formation, often explained in terms of external perturbations. We show that these phenomena can be a direct consequence of ...
    • Public Goods with Punishment and Abstaining in Finite and Infinite Populations 

      Hauert, Christoph; Traulsen, Arne; Brandt, Hannelore; Nowak, Martin A.; Sigmund, Karl (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2008)
      The evolution and maintenance of cooperation in human and animal societies challenges various disciplines ranging from evolutionary biology, to anthropology, social sciences and economics. In social interactions, cooperators ...
    • Repeated Games and Direct Reciprocity Under Active Linking 

      Pacheco, Jorge M.; Traulsen, Arne; Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2008)
      Direct reciprocity relies on repeated encounters between the same two individuals. Here we examine the evolution of cooperation under direct reciprocity in dynamically structured populations. Individuals occupy the vertices ...
    • Spatial Invasion of Cooperation 

      Langer, Philipp; Nowak, Martin A.; Christoph, Hauert (Elsevier, 2008)
      The evolutionary puzzle of cooperation describes situations where cooperators provide a fitness benefit to other individuals at some cost to themselves. Under Darwinian selection, the evolution of cooperation is a conundrum, ...
    • Stochastic Payoff Evaluation Increases the Temperature of Selection 

      Traulsen, Arne; Nowak, Martin A.; Pacheco, Jorge M. (Elsevier, 2007)
      We study stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in populations of finite size. Moreover, each individual has a randomly distributed number of interactions with other individuals. Therefore, the payoff of two individuals ...
    • Strategy Abundance in 2×2 Games for Arbitrary Mutation Rates 

      Antal, Tibor; Nowak, Martin A.; Traulsen, Arne (Elsevier, 2009)
      We study evolutionary game dynamics in a well-mixed populations of finite size, N. A well-mixed population means that any two individuals are equally likely to interact. In particular we consider the average abundances of ...
    • Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment 

      Hauert, Christoph; Traulsen, Arne; Brandt, Hannelore; Nowak, Martin A.; Sigmund, Karl (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2007)
      In human societies, cooperative behavior in joint enterprises is often enforced through institutions that impose sanctions on defectors. Many experiments on so-called public goods games have shown that in the absence of ...