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A Modular Framework for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
(Association for Computing Machinery, 2008)
We describe a modular elicitation framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. The framework includes proxy agents, each of which can adopt an individualized bidding language to represent partial value information of a ...
On the Communication Requirements of Verifying the VCG Outcome
(Association for Computing Machinery, 2008)
We consider the amount of communication required to verify the outcome of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism: an efficient allocation together with incentivizing VCG payments. We compare this to the communication ...
An Expressive Auction Design for Online Display Advertising
(AAAI Press, 2008)
We propose an expressive auction design that allows advertisers to specify the kinds of demographics and websites they wish to target within an advertising network. The design allows the network to differentiate impressions ...
TBBL: A Tree-Based Bidding Language for Iterative Combinatorial Exchanges
(2005)
We present a novel tree-based logical bidding language, TBBL, for preference elicitation in combinatorial exchanges (CEs). TBBL provides new expressiveness for two-sided markets with agents that are both buying and selling ...
More on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions: Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives
(International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2005)
Query learning models from computational learning theory (CLT) can be adopted to perform elicitation in combinatorial auctions. Indeed, a recent elicitation framework demonstrated that the equivalence queries of CLT can ...
Using Virtual Markets to Program Global Behavior in Sensor Networks
(Association for Computing Machinery, 2004)
This paper presents market-based macroprogramming (MBM), a new paradigm for achieving globally efficient behavior in sensor networks. Rather than programming the individual, low-level behaviors of sensor nodes, MBM defines ...
Fair Package Assignment
(Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009)
We consider the problem of fair allocation in the package assignment model, where a set of indivisible items, held by single seller, must be efficiently allocated to agents with quasi-linear utilities. A fair assignment ...
ICE: An Iterative Combinatorial Exchange
(Association for Computing Machinery, 2005)
We present the first design for a fully expressive iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE). The exchange incorporates a tree-based bidding language that is concise and expressive for CEs. Bidders specify lower and upper ...