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Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions
(Springer-Verlag, 2002)
The equilibrium of the direct-revelation Vickrey-Clarke- Groves (VCG) mechanism for combinatorial auctions requires every agent to provide complete information about its preferences. Not only is this unreasonable in settings ...
Challenge Problem: Agent-Mediated Decentralized Information Mechanisms
(2002)
Pervasive computing, driven by faster, cheaper and smaller devices, and wireless networking technology, promises to make people perpetual users of a massive and decentralized computational system. Pervasive computing blurs ...
On Indirect and Direct Implementations of Core Outcomes in Combinatorial Auctions
(Division of Applied Science, Harvard University, 2002)
This note presents a partial characterization of the core outcome implemented in the ascendingproxy combinatorial auction, which is demonstrated to terminate at a core point intermediate between buyer-optimal core and ...
An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction
(2002)
A simple characterization of the equilibrium conditions required to
compute Vickrey payments in the Combinatorial Allocation Problem leads
to an ascending price Generalized Vickrey Auction. The ascending auc-
tion, ...