As plug-in electric vehicles become more widespread, their charging needs to be coordinated, in order to ensure that capacity constraints are not exceeded. This is becoming particularly critical as new fast-charging ...

We consider the problem of fair allocation in the package assignment model, where a set of indivisible items, held by single seller, must be efficiently allocated to agents with quasi-linear utilities. A fair assignment ...

Software correctness has bedeviled the field of computer science since its inception. Software complexity has increased far more quickly than our ability to control it, reaching sizes that are many orders of magnitude ...

We provide a simple protocol for secret reconstruction in any threshold secret sharing scheme, and prove that it is fair when executed with many rational parties together with a small minority of honest parties. That is, ...

We present a useful new mechanism that facilitates the atomic exchange of many large baskets of securities in a combinatorial exchange. Cryptography prevents information about the securities in the baskets from being ...

Economic and social sciences will drive Internet protocols and services into the future.

We present the design of a banner advertising auction which is considerably more expressive than current designs. We describe a general model of expressive ad contract/bidding and an allocation model that can be executed ...

In this paper, we combine for the first time the methods of dynamic mechanism design with techniques from decentralized decision making under uncertainty. Consider a multi-agent system with self-interested agents acting ...

We present a cryptographic protocol for conducting efficient, provably correct and secrecy-preserving combinatorial clock-proxy auctions. The "clock phase" functions as a trusted auction despite price discovery: bidders ...