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HarTAC– The Harvard TAC SCM'03 Agent
(2004)
The Trading Agent Competition (TAC) is an annual event in which teams from around the world compete in a given scenario concerning the trading agent problem. This paper describes some of the key features and strategies ...
Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
(Springer, 2004)
Auctions define games of incomplete information for which it is often too hard to compute the exact Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Instead, the infinite strategy space is often populated with heuristic strategies, such as ...
Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
(IEEE Computer Society, 2004)
Mechanism design (MD) provides a useful method to implement outcomes with desirable properties in systems with self-interested computational agents. One drawback, however, is that computation is implicitly centralized in ...
Auctions, Bidding and Exchange Design
(Kluwer, 2004)
The different auction types are outlined using a classification framework along six dimensions. The economic properties that are desired in the design of auction mechanisms and the complexities that arise in their ...
Hard-to-Manipulate Combinatorial Auctions
(Division of Applied Science, Harvard University, 2004)
Mechanism design provides a framework to solve distributed optimization problems in systems of self-interested agents. The combinatorial auction is one such problem, in which there is a set of discrete items to allocate ...
Applying Learning Algorithms to Preference Elicitation
(Association for Computing Machinery, 2004)
We consider the parallels between the preference elicitation problem in combinatorial auctions and the problem of learning an unknown function from learning theory. We show that learning algorithms can be used as a basis ...
An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2004)
Online mechanism design (MD) considers the problem of providing incentives to implement desired system-wide outcomes in systems with self-interested agents that arrive and depart dynamically. Agents can choose to misrepresent ...
On Learnable Mechanism Design
(Springer, 2004)
Adaptive Limited-Supply Online Auctions
(Association for Computing Machinery, 2004)
We study a limited-supply online auction problem, in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and bidders arrive and depart dynamically. We suppose that agent valuations are drawn independently from some unknown distribution ...
Using Virtual Markets to Program Global Behavior in Sensor Networks
(Association for Computing Machinery, 2004)
This paper presents market-based macroprogramming (MBM), a new paradigm for achieving globally efficient behavior in sensor networks. Rather than programming the individual, low-level behaviors of sensor nodes, MBM defines ...