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Gambling for Global Goods
(Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2008)
Comparative Lesion Sequencing Provides Insights into Tumor Evolution
(Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2008)
We show that the times separating the birth of benign, invasive, and metastatic tumor cells can be determined by analysis of the mutations they have in common. When combined with prior clinical observations, these analyses ...
Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations
(Nature Publishing Group, 2004)
To explain the evolution of cooperation by natural selection has been a major goal of biologists since Darwin. Cooperators help others at a cost to themselves, while defectors receive the benefits of altruism without ...
Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift?
(Elsevier, 2007)
The repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is usually known as a story of tit-for-tat (TFT). This remarkable strategy has won both of Robert Axelrod's tournaments. TFT does whatever the opponent has done in the previous round. It ...
Genetic Progression and the Waiting Time to Cancer
(Public Library of Science, 2007)
Cancer results from genetic alterations that disturb the normal cooperative behavior of cells. Recent high-throughput genomic studies of cancer cells have shown that the mutational landscape of cancer is complex and that ...
Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
(American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2007)
In human societies, cooperative behavior in joint enterprises is often enforced through institutions that impose sanctions on defectors. Many experiments on so-called public goods games have shown that in the absence of ...
Strategy Abundance in 2×2 Games for Arbitrary Mutation Rates
(Elsevier, 2009)
We study evolutionary game dynamics in a well-mixed populations of finite size, N. A well-mixed population means that any two individuals are equally likely to interact. In particular we consider the average abundances of ...
The Replicator Equation on Graphs
(Elsevier, 2006)
We study evolutionary games on graphs. Each player is represented
by a vertex of the graph. The edges denote who meets whom. A player can use any one of n strategies. Players obtain a payoff from interaction with all their ...
Synergy and Discounting of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
(Elsevier, 2006)
The emergence and maintenance of cooperation by natural selection is an enduring conundrum in evolutionary biology, which has been studied using a variety of game theoretical models inspired by different biological situations. ...
A Symmetry of Fixation Times in Evoultionary Dynamics
(Elsevier, 2006)
In this paper, we show that for evolutionary dynamics between two types that can be described by a Moran process, the conditional fixation time of either type is the same irrespective of the selective scenario. With frequency ...