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Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
(Elsevier, 1994)
We present a general algorithm for computing the limit, as δ → 1, of the set of payoffs of perfect public equilibria of repeated games with long-run and short-run players, allowing for the possibility that the players′ ...
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players
(Blackwell Publishing, 1990)
This paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long- and short-run players and little discounting. Because the short-run players are unconcerned about the future, each equilibrium outcome is ...
An Easier Way to Calibrate
(Elsevier, 1999)
Forecasts are said to be calibrated if the frequency predictions are approximately correct. This is a refinement of an idea first introduced by David Blackwell in 1955. We show that “<i>K</i>-initialized myopic strategies” ...
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
(Elsevier, 1999)
In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This paper ...
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents
(University of Chicago Press, 1995)
"Income smoothing" is the process of manipulating the time profile of earnings or earnings reports to make the reported income stream less variable. This paper builds a theory of income smoothing based on the managers' ...
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning
(University of Chicago Press, 1993)
This paper studies agents who consider the experiences of their neighbors in deciding which of two technologies to use. We analyze two learning environments, one in which the same technology is optimal for all players and ...
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction
(University of Chicago Press, 1991)
Presents a correction to an article on rational expectations in business cycles.
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games
(MIT Press, 1997)
In some experiments rational players who understand the structure of the game could improve their payoff. We bound the size of the observed losses in several such experiments. To do this, we suppose that observed play ...
Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning
(MIT Press, 1995)
This paper studies the way that word-of-mouth communication aggregates the information of individual agents. We find that the structure of the communication process determines whether all agents end up making identical ...
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?
(Elsevier, 1998)
We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who are small, but not anonymous. If the play of the small players is observed with noise, and if the number of actions the large player ...