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The New York City High School Match
(American Economic Association, 2005)
Kidney Exchange
(MIT Press, 2004)
Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also many transplants from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a ...
Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets
(American Economic Association, 2007)
This essay examines how repugnance sometimes constrains what transactions and markets we see. When my colleagues and I have helped design markets and allocation procedures, we have often found that distaste for certain ...
Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls
(Rand Journal of Economics, 2007)
Many markets have “unraveled” and experienced inefficient, early, dispersed transactions, and subsequently developed institutions to delay transaction timing. It has previously proved difficult, however, to measure and ...
Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance
(American Economic Association, 2009)
Many markets encounter difficulty maintaining a thick marketplace because they experience transactions made at dispersed times. To address such problems, many markets try to establish norms concerning when offers can be ...
Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
(Springer, 2008)
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new ...
What Have We Learned from Market Design?
(Blackwell Publishing, 2008)
This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process
of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to
provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large ...
Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences
(American Economic Association, 2007)
Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a ...
An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions
(Rand Journal of Economics, 2005)
A great deal of late bidding has been observed on internet auctions such as eBay, which employ a second price auction with a fixed deadline. Much less late bidding has been observed on internet auctions such as those run ...
The Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation
(American Economic Association, 2006)
In an experiment, players’ ability to learn to cooperate in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma was substantially diminished when the payoffs were noisy, even though players could monitor one another's past actions perfectly. ...