Search
Now showing items 1-3 of 3
The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games
(Elsevier, 2007)
We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public” information. The results generalize to the <i>n</i>-person case. However, the ...
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
(Elsevier, 2007)
In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the way that the distribution of public signals varies with the players' actions. Recent research has focused on the case of “frequent ...
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient
(Elsevier, 2007)
We provide a characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring as the discount factor goes to one. Our result covers general stage games including ...