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Now showing items 21-30 of 114
Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: Issues in Online Mechanism Design
(Association for Computing Machinery, 2003)
We consider the problem of designing mechanisms for online problems in which agents arrive over time and truthfully announce their arrival. These problems are becoming extremely common in a wide variety of problems involving ...
Computational Mechanism Design
(Institute of Mathematical Sciences, University of Singapore, 2008)
Computational mechanism design brings together the concern in microeconomics with decision making in the context of distributed private information and self-interest and the concern in computer science with computational ...
Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions
(AUAI, CoRR, and ACM Digital Libraries, 2009)
Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium
with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against ...
Two Auction-Based Resource Allocation Environments: Design and Experience
(Wiley, 2009)
Many computer systems have reached the point where the goal of resource
allocation is no longer to maximize utilization; instead, when demand
exceeds supply and not all needs can be met, one needs a policy to guide
resource ...
When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-Correcting Procedures
(Springer Verlag, 2009)
Computational mechanism design (CMD) seeks to understand how to design game forms that induce desirable outcomes in multi-agent systems despite private information, self-interest and limited computational resources. CMD ...
ICE: An Expressive Iterative Combinatorial Exchange
(Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 2008)
We present the design and analysis of the first fully expressive, iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE).
The exchange incorporates a tree-based bidding language (TBBL) that is concise and expressive for
CEs. Bidders ...
Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism
(Berkeley Mathemarketics Group, 2008)
We describe an auction mechanism in the class of Groves mechanisms that has received attention in the computer science literature because of its theoretical property of being more “learnable” than the standard second price ...
Enabling Environment Design via Active Indirect Elicitation
(2008)
Many situations arise in which an interested party wishes to
affect the decisions of an agent; e.g., a teacher that seeks to
promote particular study habits, a Web 2.0 site that seeks to
encourage users to contribute ...
HarTAC– The Harvard TAC SCM'03 Agent
(2004)
The Trading Agent Competition (TAC) is an annual event in which teams from around the world compete in a given scenario concerning the trading agent problem. This paper describes some of the key features and strategies ...
Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
(Springer, 2004)
Auctions define games of incomplete information for which it is often too hard to compute the exact Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Instead, the infinite strategy space is often populated with heuristic strategies, such as ...