Getting Told and Being Believed
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CitationMoran, Richard. 2005. Getting told and being believed. Philosopher's Imprint 5(5): 1-29.
AbstractThe paper argues for the centrality of believing the speaker (as distinct from believing the statement) in the epistemology of testimony, and develops a line of thought from Angus Ross which claims that in telling someone something, the kind of reason for belief that a speaker presents is of an essentially different kind from ordinary evidence. Investigating the nature of the audience's dependence on the speaker's free assurance leads to a discussion of Grice's formulation of non-natural meaning in an epistemological light, concentrating on just how the recognition of the speaker's self-reflexive intention is supposed to count for his audience as a reason to believe P. This is understood as the speaker's explicitly assuming responsibility for the truth of his statement, and thereby constituting his utterance as a reason to believe.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10121963
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