In Strange Company: The Puzzle of Private Investment in State-Controlled Firms

DSpace/Manakin Repository

In Strange Company: The Puzzle of Private Investment in State-Controlled Firms

Citable link to this page

 

 
Title: In Strange Company: The Puzzle of Private Investment in State-Controlled Firms
Author: Pargendler, Mariana; Musacchio, Aldo; Lazzarini, Sergio G.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Pargendler, Mariana, Aldo Musacchio, and Sergio G. Lazzarini. "In Strange Company: The Puzzle of Private Investment in State-Controlled Firms." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 13–071, February 2013.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: A large legal and economic literature describes how state-owned enterprises (SOEs) suffer from a variety of agency and political problems. Less theory and evidence, however, have been generated about the reasons why state-owned enterprises listed in stock markets manage to attract investors to buy their shares (and bonds). In this Article, we examine this apparent puzzle and develop a theory of how legal and extralegal constraints allow mixed enterprises to solve some of these problems. We then use three detailed case studies of state-owned oil companies – Brazil’s Petrobras, Norway’s Statoil, and Mexico’s Pemex – to examine how our theory fares in practice. Overall, we show how mixed enterprises have made progress to solve some of their agency problems, even as government intervention persists as the biggest threat to private minority shareholders in these firms.
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10304547
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters