Incomplete Contracts and Signaling
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CitationKathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23(3) RAND J. Econ. 432 (1992).
AbstractThis article Presents a principal-agent model in which asymmetric information leads to contractual incompleteness. I show that in the presence of transactions costs, incompleteness may act as a signal of the principal's type. Two types of transactions costs are considered: those incurred ex ante (drafting costs) and those incurred ex post (enforcement or verification costs). I prove that in the presence of either of these costs, asymmetric information leads to more contractual incompleteness than full information does.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10611780
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