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dc.contributor.authorKaplow, Louis
dc.contributor.authorShavell, Steven
dc.date.accessioned2013-05-07T18:31:12Z
dc.date.issued1994
dc.identifier.citationLouis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 583 (1994).en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-3808en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10611797
dc.description.abstractSelf-reporting--the reporting by parties of their own behavior to an enforcement authority--is a commonly observed aspect of law enforcement, such as in the context of environmental and safety regulation. We add self-reporting to the model of the control of harmful externalities through probabilistic law enforcement, and we characterize the optimal scheme. Self-reporting offers two advantages over schemes without self-reporting: enforcement resources are saved because individuals who report their harmful acts need not be detected, and risk is reduced because individuals who report their behavior bear certain rather than uncertain sanctions.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2138624en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleOptimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavioren_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionProofen_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Political Economy -Chicago-en_US
dash.depositing.authorKaplow, Louis
dc.date.available2013-05-07T18:31:12Z
dc.identifier.doi10.3386/w3822
dash.contributor.affiliatedKaplow, Louis
dash.contributor.affiliatedShavell, Steven


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