Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension

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Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension

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Title: Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension
Author: Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Kaplow, Louis

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Citation: Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension, 21 J. Legal Stud. 365 (1992).
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Abstract: No abstract provided.
Published Version: http://www.jstor.org/stable/724486
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10611800
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