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dc.contributor.authorBebchuk, Lucian Arye
dc.contributor.authorKaplow, Louis
dc.date.accessioned2013-05-07T18:47:37Z
dc.date.issued1992
dc.identifier.citationLucian Arye Bebchuk and Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension, 21 J. Legal Stud. 365 (1992).en_US
dc.identifier.issn0047-2530en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10611800
dc.description.abstractNo abstract provided.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/724486en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleOptimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehensionen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionProofen_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Legal Studies -Chicago-en_US
dash.depositing.authorKaplow, Louis
dc.date.available2013-05-07T18:47:37Z
dc.identifier.doi10.3386/w4079
dash.contributor.affiliatedBebchuk, Lucian
dash.contributor.affiliatedKaplow, Louis


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