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dc.contributor.authorSanders, Michael
dc.contributor.authorSmith, Sarah
dc.contributor.authorNorton, Michael Irwin
dc.date.accessioned2013-05-21T13:01:44Z
dc.date.issued2013-05-21
dc.identifier.citationSanders, Michael, Sarah Smith, and Michael I. Norton. "Non-Standard Matches and Charitable Giving." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 13–094, May 2013.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10646421
dc.description.abstractMany organisations, including corporations and governments, wish to encourage charitable giving, and offer incentives for their employees, customers and citizens to do so. The most common of these incentives is a match rate, where the organisation agrees to pay, for example, $1 for every $1 donated. However, these incentives may not be efficient. In this short article we suggest alternative ways of matching that existing theory and data suggest might be more effective at encouraging donations. These include non-linear matching, social (and team) matching, and lottery matching – each of which novel schemes could be tested empirically against a standard match incentive.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dash.licenseOAP
dc.titleNon-Standard Matches and Charitable Givingen_US
dc.typeResearch Paper or Reporten_US
dc.description.versionAuthor's Originalen_US
dc.relation.journalHarvard Business School working paper series # 13-094en_US
dash.depositing.authorNorton, Michael Irwin
dc.date.available2013-05-21T13:01:44Z
dash.contributor.affiliatedNorton, Michael


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