Judicial Review as a Response to Political Posturing

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Judicial Review as a Response to Political Posturing

Citable link to this page


Title: Judicial Review as a Response to Political Posturing
Author: Stephenson, Matthew Caleb; Fox, Justin

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Matthew Stephenson & Justin Fox, Judicial Review as a Response to Political Posturing, 105 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 397 (2011).
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: We use an agency model to analyze the impact of judicial review on the incentives of elected leaders to “posture” by enacting bold but ill-advised policies. We find that judicial review may exacerbate posturing by rescuing leaders from the consequences of unwise policies, but may also discourage posturing by alerting voters to unjustified government action. We further find that judges will defer to the decision of elected leaders unless posturing is sufficiently likely. We then show how judicial review affects voter welfare, both through its effect on policy choice and through its effect on the efficacy of the electoral process in selecting leaders. We also analyze how the desirability of judicial review is affected by characteristics of the leaders and the judges.
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/10.1017/S0003055411000116
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10814613
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)


Search DASH

Advanced Search