Political Accountability Under Alternative Institutional Regimes

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Political Accountability Under Alternative Institutional Regimes

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Title: Political Accountability Under Alternative Institutional Regimes
Author: Stephenson, Matthew Caleb; NJzelibe, Jide O.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Matthew Stephenson & Jide O. Nzelibe, Political Accountability Under Alternative Institutional Regimes, 22 J. Theoretical Pol. 139 (2010).
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Abstract: We analyze the interaction between electoral accountability and separation-of-powers by comparing three regimes: ‘Unilateral Authority’ (the President has exclusive decision-making power); ‘Mandatory Checks’ (the President cannot change policy without congressional assent); and ‘Opt-in Checks’ (the President may seek congressional authorization or act unilaterally). We find: (1) voters use asymmetric electoral rewards and punishments to offset the risk of politician bias, but voters rely less on this blunt instrument if there are internal checks; (2) adding a veto player need not alter the ex ante likelihood of policy change; and (3) voter welfare is highest under Opt-In Checks and lowest under Unilateral Authority.
Published Version: 10.1177/0951629809359037
Other Sources: http://jtp.sagepub.com/content/22/2/139.full.pdf+html
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10814614
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