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dc.contributor.authorStephenson, Matthew Caleb
dc.date.accessioned2013-06-28T18:25:09Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.citationMatthew Stephenson, Evidentiary Standards and Information Acquisition in Public Law, 10 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 351 (2008).en_US
dc.identifier.issn1465-7260en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10849727
dc.description.abstractThis article considers the type of evidence that an overseer (e.g., a court) should require before allowing a government agent to take some proposed action. The court can increase agency research incentives by prohibiting actions unless the agent produces supporting evidence, and/or by permitting action even when the agent uncovers adverse evidence. The court thus faces a trade-off between an evidentiary standard's ex post effects on the agent's policy decision and its ex ante effects on the agent's incentive to do research. An extension allows the court to make research effort a precondition for action, regardless of the evidence produced.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Issue%2088.3/Golden/fn268.Stephenson%20(taken%20from%20journal%20webpage).pdfen_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/mstephenson/pdfs/StephensonEvidentiaryStandards(ALER).pdfen_US
dash.licenseMETA_ONLY
dc.titleEvidentiary Standards and Information Acquisition in Public Lawen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalAmerican Law and Economics Reviewen_US
dash.depositing.authorStephenson, Matthew Caleb
dash.embargo.until10000-01-01
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/aler/ahn011
dash.contributor.affiliatedStephenson, Matthew


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