Constitutional Design in the Ancient World

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Constitutional Design in the Ancient World

Citable link to this page

 

 
Title: Constitutional Design in the Ancient World
Author: Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian; Lanni, Adriaan M.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Adriaan M. Lanni & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Design in the Ancient World, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 907 (2012).
Access Status: Full text of the requested work is not available in DASH at this time (“dark deposit”). For more information on dark deposits, see our FAQ.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: This paper identifies two distinctive features of ancient constitutional design that have largely disappeared from the modern world: constitution-making by single individuals and constitution-making by foreigners. We consider the virtues and vices of these features, and argue that under plausible conditions single founders and outsider founders offer advantages over constitution-making by representative bodies of citizens, even in the modern world. We also discuss the implications of adding single founders and outsider founders to the constitutional toolkit by describing how constitutional legitimacy would work, and how constitutional interpretation would be conducted, under constitutions that display either or both of the distinctive features of ancient constitutional design.
Published Version: http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Lanni-Vermeule-64-Stan-L-Rev-907.pdf
Other Sources: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1747087
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10875736
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters