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dc.contributor.authorSachs, Benjamin Ian
dc.date.accessioned2013-07-17T14:59:35Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationBenjamin Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After 'Citizens United', 112 Colum. L. Rev. 800 (2012).en_US
dc.identifier.issn0010-1958en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10875753
dc.description.abstractCitizens United upends much of campaign finance law, but it maintains at least one feature of that legal regime: the equal treatment of corporations and unions. Prior to Citizens United, that is, corporations and unions were equally constrained in their ability to spend general treasury funds on federal electoral politics. After the decision, campaign finance law leaves both equally unconstrained and free to use their general treasuries to finance political expenditures. But the symmetrical treatment that Citizens United leaves in place masks a less visible, but equally significant, way in which the law treats union and corporate political spending differently. Namely, federal law prohibits a union from spending its general treasury funds on politics if individual employees object to such use—employees, in short, enjoy a federally protected right to opt out of funding union political activity. In contrast, corporations are free to spend their general treasuries on politics even if individual shareholders object—shareholders enjoy no right to opt out of financing corporate political activity. This Article assesses whether the asymmetric rule of political opt-out rights is justified. The Article first offers an affirmative case for symmetry grounded in the principle that the power to control access to economic opportunities—whether employment or investment based— should not be used to secure compliance with or support for the economic actor’s political agenda. It then addresses three arguments in favor of asymmetry. Given the relative weakness of these arguments, the Article suggests that the current asymmetry in opt-out rules may be unjustified. The Article concludes by pointing to constitutional questions raised by this asymmetry, and by arguing that lawmakers would be justified in correcting it.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherColumbia Law Review Association, Inc.en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/112-4_Sachs.pdfen_US
dash.licenseMETA_ONLY
dc.titleUnions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After 'Citizens United'en_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalColumbia Law Reviewen_US
dash.depositing.authorSachs, Benjamin Ian
dash.embargo.until10000-01-01
dash.contributor.affiliatedSachs, Benjamin


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