Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing

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Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing

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Title: Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing
Author: Sachs, Benjamin Ian
Citation: Benjamin Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 655 (2010).
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Abstract: The proposed Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) has led to fierce debate over how best to ensure employees a choice on the question of unionization. The debate goes to the core of our federal system of labor law. Each of the potential legislative designs under consideration - including both “card check” and “rapid elections” - aims to enhance employee choice by minimizing or eliminating managerial involvement in the unionization process. The central question raised by EFCA, therefore, is whether enabling employees to limit or avoid managerial intervention in union campaigns is an appropriate goal for federal law. This Article answers this foundational question in the affirmative. It reaches this conclusion by conceptualizing federal labor law in terms of legal default rules, drawing in particular on the preference-eliciting default theory of statutory interpretation and the reversible default theory from corporate law. Doing so leads to the argument that card check, rapid elections, and similar mechanisms are best understood as “asymmetry-correcting altering rules” - means of mitigating the impediments that block departure from the nonunion default. Understanding EFCA in this way also requires that we ask how such an altering rule should be constructed. This Article addresses this institutional design question by arguing that card check’s open decision-making process is flawed and that rapid elections, while an improvement over the status quo, are an insufficient method of mitigating the relevant impediments to employee choice. Accordingly, this Article offers two new designs - alternatives to both card check and rapid elections - that would accomplish the legitimate function of minimizing managerial intervention while at the same time preserving secrecy in decision-making.
Published Version: http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/people/staffPapers/sachs/Sachs%20Enabling%20Employee%20Choice%202010.pdf
Other Sources: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1539123
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/123/january10/Article_6757.php
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10876007
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