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dc.contributor.authorFudenberg, Drew
dc.contributor.authorLavine, David K.
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-13T15:16:56Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifierQuick submit: 2013-07-08T16:05:33-04:00
dc.identifier.citationDrew Fudenberg and David K. Levine. Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theorems. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 81:606-612.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11022184
dc.description.abstractThe most widely used economic models of social preferences are specified only for certain outcomes. There are two obvious methods of extending them to lotteries. If we do so by expected utility theory, so that the independence axiom is satisfied, our results imply that the resulting preferences do not exhibit ex ante fairness. If we do so by replacing certain outcomes with their expected utilities for each individual, so that individual risk preferences are preserved, then ex ante fairness may be preserved, but neither the independence axiom nor ex post fairness is satisfied. Both ex ante and ex post fairness can be satisfied but then the individual does not have well defined preferences over own lotteries.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/archive/refs4786969000000000001.pdfen_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://scholar.harvard.edu/files/fudenberg/files/fairness_risk.pdfen_US
dash.licenseOAP
dc.subjectfairnessen_US
dc.subjectrisken_US
dc.subjectex-ante risken_US
dc.titleFairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theoremsen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.date.updated2013-07-08T20:06:01Z
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscripten_US
dc.rights.holderDrew Fudenberg and David K. Levine
dc.relation.journalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organizationen_US
dash.depositing.authorFudenberg, Drew
dc.date.available2013-09-13T15:16:56Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.004
dash.authorsorderedfalse
dash.contributor.affiliatedFudenberg, Drew


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