Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance

Citable link to this page

 

 
Title: Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance
Author: Niederle, Muriel; Roth, Alvin E.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth. 2009. Market culture: How rules governing exploding offers affect market performance. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 1(2): 199-219.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: Many markets encounter difficulty maintaining a thick marketplace because they experience transactions made at dispersed times. To address such problems, many markets try to establish norms concerning when offers can be made, accepted, and rejected. Examining such markets suggests it is difficult to establish a thick market at an efficient time if firms can make exploding offers, and workers cannot renege on early commitments. Laboratory experiments allow us to isolate the effects of exploding offers and binding acceptances. In a simple experiment, we find inefficient early contracting when firms can make exploding offers and applicants' acceptances are binding. (JEL C91, D40, D81)
Published Version: doi:10.1257/mic.1.2.199
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11077571
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters