Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

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Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

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Title: Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
Author: Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Pathak, Parag Abishek; Roth, Alvin E.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. 2009. Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the NYC high school match. American Economic Review 99(5): 1954-1978.
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Abstract: The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences -- ties -- in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school -- single tiebreaking -- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (JEL C78, D82, I21)
Published Version: doi:10.1257/aer.99.5.1954
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11077572
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