The Effects of Performance-Contingent Financial Incentives in Online Labor Markets
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CitationYin, Ming, Yiling Chen, and Yu-An Sun. In press. The effects of performance-contingent financial incentives in online labor markets. In The proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'13), 14-18 July 2013, Bellevue, Washington, USA. Palo Alto, Calif: AAAI Press.
AbstractOnline labor markets such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) have emerged as platforms that facilitate the allocation of productive effort across global economies. Many of these markets compensate workers with monetary payments. We study the effects of performance-contingent ﬁnancial rewards on work quality and worker effort in MTurk via two experiments. We ﬁnd that the magnitude of performance contingent ﬁnancial rewards alone affects neither quality nor effort. However, when workers working on two tasks of the same type in a sequence, the change in the magnitude of the reward over the two tasks affects both. In particular, both work quality and worker effort increase (alternatively decrease) as the reward increases (alternatively decreases) for the second task. This suggests the existence of the anchoring effect on workers’ perception of incentives in MTurk and that this effect can be leveraged in workﬂow design to increasethe effectiveness of ﬁnancial incentives.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11129153
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